2017년 10월 19일 목요일

환원론에 대한 로저 펜로즈Roger Penrose의 생각




Reductionism and Quantum Mechanics

David: Some people we're talking to say there's only one kind of knowledge which counts as knowledge ‒ which gets you to the truth ‒ and that's scientific or mathematical knowledge, and everything else ‒ art, poetry ‒ it's just story-telling, it's fantasy, it's entertainment. This is what one person said. Do you hold with that?

RP: Well it's difficult to say what I think because it's an unresolved issue. I think there are things which have to do with our feelings and so on which are very real and which certainly have no room in the physics that we know today. But I'm regarding the physics that we know today as a shadow. That’s maybe not quite the right term. I'm not sure of what's really going on, and we certainly don't almost know what's going on.

Scientific knowledge has the advantage that you can test things, and you can see when things are wrong and when they're right. To an extent you have to be jolly careful with that, too. But they, to a good extent, can tell you when things are right and when they're wrong. Now, that's not true of many things where we have to form our judgements. We have to form aesthetic judgements, often, about things, and are these things reducible to scientific things?

This is a question of reductionism, I suppose, and the view is that you… I suppose reductionism means more than one thing. It means, partly, if you have a thing and you want to know how it works, you say, well, if you know all the parts work, then that will tell you how it works. So you work out how all the parts work. And then, as science has gone, you say, well, you've got molecules, and then we've got atoms, and then we've got particles, and you've got protons and neutrons, and then we've got quarks, and then we've got things which might constitute them, and then you're going smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller.

However, the view of reductionism there is if you know how the little things work, you know how the big things work. But I don't think that's reliable, because particularly it has to do with where quantum mechanics goes wrong. That's big things: things which on the scale of normal understanding of quantum mechanics would be huge.

David: So you think that complete reductionism just can't be right?

RP: It's misleading, I suppose, partly because quantum mechanics itself is not a reductionist theory in a sense. There are these quantum entanglements. You can have experiments which tell you things that vast distances apart are not independent of each other: those things are entangled. This is a basic part of quantum mechanics pointed out by Schrödinger, and these things are now experiments showing this has happened. You can have many, many hundreds of kilometres apart...

David: And does that tell you that reductionism can't be the whole story?

RP: One view is that it is all determined by the little things. So, you know, that's a good old fashioned Laplacian universe thing. It's all determined by the little things, and therefore deterministically determined by the little things. But, yet, there are questions you ask about the big things which somehow are new kinds of questions which you don't see if you just study the little things. Now, I'm saying something more than that: there are things which start to come in on a big scale which are different from what the laws of the little things are. I'm not saying we won't have a theory of that, maybe, I don't know when ‒ it might be soon; it might not be very soon.

David: Does the realm of ideas…? Is that a realm that's not completely governed by the rules of the little things? Do ideas cause things to happen? Are they real? Do they have power in addition to the bumping of molecules?

RP: Well, of course, they certainly…ideas certainly have power, but whether those ideas… You see some people say, well, they're just the little things bumping each other, and they bump each other in a particular way which happens to take off. That would be a kind of view.

David: Do you believe that?

RP: I think that's not the way I would look at things completely. You see it's all to do with this consciousness issue, and I think something else comes in which is outside the science that we presently know. It doesn't mean it's outside science. So you see, when you're asking me is it all science, well, science is limited at the moment, because it only deals with certain areas which don't include that.

David: Yes, but you could say it's going to be natural rather than supernatural. You don't have to say that there's something supernatural. You could say it's going to be explicable by a kind of science which maybe we don't have yet?

RP: I guess I would say that, yes. But then it's hard to know because if we don't have it yet, you don't know what it's like.

David: Alright, thank you.

2017년 10월 18일 수요일

대한민국은 재생할 수 있을까?



나의 생각은 비관적이다.
 
수년 내로 대한민국은 그리스와 베네수엘라를 합친 듯한 경제적 망국 사태에 직면할 가능성이 가장 크다. 경제의 기본 원칙을 무시한 소위 사회적 경제를 실시하고, 대대적인 공무원 증원을 계속한다면, 국가 채무가 천문학적으로 증가하고, 어느날 갑자기 시장이 주저앉을 수 밖에 없다.
 
거기에서 끝난다면 다행인데, 지금의 베네수엘라나 그리스처럼 좌파 선전선동이 계속되면, 나라는 더욱 혼란에 빠질 것이다. 문제는 해결되지 않고, 나라는 좌우로 갈려서 해방 정국과 유사한 혼란이 올 것이다.
 
거기에다 우리에게는 북한과 핵이라는 너무나 큰 변수가 도사리고 있다. 한국 좌파의 조국인 북한은 계속해서, 한국 사회를 혼란에 빠뜨리기 위한 모든 수단을 다 이용할 것이다. 그렇게 보면 우리는 베네수엘라보다도 더 심한 경제, 정치적 파탄을 예상해야 할지도 모른다.
 
물론 한국의 우파들이 정신을 차려서 내년 총선에서 자유한국당이 압도적으로 승리하고 전열을 가다듬는다면, 상황을 역전시킬 수도 있지만, 그런 가능성은 현재로선 희박하다.
 

웬만한 문자 해독 능력만 있어도 현재의 대통령 탄핵 사태가 정치적 음모와 조작으로 가능했다는 것을 알 수 있지만, 한국의 그 수많은 지식인 중에 이를 지적하고, 항의하는 인간들은 극소수에 불과하다. 경제도 문제지만, 한국 사회에 만연한 이런 지적, 도덕적 파탄을 회복하기란 지극히 어렵다.

그리고 좌파 이념에 대항할 수 있는 자유주의 사상이 사회에 두루 퍼져 있어야 하는데, 이를 아는 사람들 역시 극히 적다. 좌파들과 대항하려면 자유주의 이념으로 무장한 우파 청장년들이 있어야 하는데, 이런 조직이 거의 없다고 보아도 무방하다.
 
이에 반해 좌파들은 이념으로 무장한 조직이 전국이 깔려 있고, 그들은 더구나 자금과 공권력의 지지를 받고 있다. 박 대통령을 지지하는 노년층은 대부분 뚜렷한 이념 무장이 안 되어 있고, 왜 좌파들과 싸워야 하는지 제대로 알지도 못하고, 비가 오면 신경통에 시달리는 환자들이 대부분이다. 이들로서는 좌파들과 싸워서 이길 수가 없다.
 
지금 우파는 이념, 조직, , 육체적 힘과 정열 등 모든 것에서 좌파들에게 열세이다. 과연 이런 열세를 이겨내고 우파들은 부활할 수 있을까? 나는 간절히 그러기를 바라지만, 객관적으로 보아서는 아무래도 비관적이다.


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네오 리버럴리즘의 탄생과 그에 대한 오해


Neo-Liberalism: From Laissez-Faire to the Interventionist State







One of the most accusatory and negative words currently in use in various politically “progressive” circles is that of “Neo-Liberalism.” To be called a “Neo-Liberal” is to stand condemned of being against “the poor,” an apologist for the “the rich” and a proponent of economic policies leading to greater income inequality.


The term is also used to condemn all those who consider the market economy to be the central institution of human society, at the expense of senses of “community” and shared caring and concern beyond supply and demand. A Neo-Liberal is one who reduces everything to market-based dollars and sense, and disregards the “humane” side of mankind, say the critics of Neo-Liberalism.
The opponents of Neo-Liberalism, so defined, claim that its proponents are rabid, “extremist” advocates of laissez-faire, that is, a market economy unrestrained and unrestricted by government regulations, controls or redistributive fiscal policies. It represents and calls for the worst features of the “bad old days” before socialism and the interventionist-welfare state, each in their respective “radical” or “moderate” ways, attempted to abolish or rein in unbridled, “anti-social” capitalism.

The Birth of Neo-Liberalism: Walter Lippmann and a Paris Conference

The historical fact is that these descriptions have little or nothing to do with the origin of Neo-Liberalism, or what it meant to those who formulated it and its policy agenda.  It all dates from about eighty years ago, with the publication in 1937 of a book by the American journalist and author, Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), entitled, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society, and an international conference held in Paris, France in August of 1938 organized by the French philosopher and classical liberal economist, Louis Rougier, centered around the themes in Lippmann’s book. A transcript of the conference proceedings was published later in 1938 (in French) under the title, Colloquium Walter Lippmann.
(See my article about some of Louis Rougier’s own writings during this time, “All Government Power is Based on Mystical Justifications”.)


During his lifetime, Walter Lippmann was one of the most famous American newspaper columnists and authors on the social order, democracy, the free society, and the role of government at home and in international affairs. Over his lifetime, his views on government and public policy were all over the political map, from pro-socialist, to “individualist” critic of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, to then back again after World War II to a strong advocate of “activist” government, both domestically and globally.


But in 1937, his book on The Good Society was a forceful and lucid declaration of the dangers to a free society from the totalitarian collectivist systems – Soviet communism, Italian fascism and German Nazism – that were enveloping Europe in the 1930s.  In addition, he warned of the complementary danger from “creeping collectivism” in the form of the regulatory and interventionist policies then growing in the Western democracies, including in the United States under the New Deal.

Walter Lippmann’s Damning Criticism of the Collectivist State

Lippmann’s critique of political and economic collectivism, which makes up the first half of the nearly 400-page book, is still worth reading today by any friend of freedom. He eloquently explains how totalitarian collectivism is a counter-revolutionary revolt against centuries of efforts by humanity to throw off tyranny and poverty, and the ideological superstitions that rationalized rule by the few over the many. Whether in its fascist or communist variations, collectivism is a return to justifications for denying the uniqueness and dignity and liberty of the individual, as well as the abolition of the institutions of a free society that are meant to protect the ordinary human being from domination and control by the State.


As part of his critique of the centrally planned society that inescapably accompanies the Total State, Lippmann heavily drew upon the writings of the Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek, on the unworkability of a fully planned economy. Also, in ways that anticipated Hayek’s later writings on the decentralized use of knowledge in a competitive market economy, Walter Lippmann explained how dispersed knowledge is conveyed and used by multitudes of people around the world, so the wants of all of us as consumers may be more fully satisfied. And how all of this is made possible through the price system of the market.


He is no less scathing against the danger from the piecemeal forms of planning that pervade modern democratic societies through regulatory restrictions, trade protections and production subsidies that artificially create monopolies, privileged industries and favored individuals. Government intervention corrupts and strangles the functioning of the market mechanism of a free society. To the extent that it does, power and decision-making is transferred from consumers and market-based entrepreneurs guided by the wants of the demanding public to politicians, bureaucrats and the special interest groups that all work together against the “good society” of free and prosperous people.

Walter Lippmann’s Rejection of Laissez-faire

But when Lippmann turns in the second half of the book to “The Reconstruction of Liberalism,” he clearly and loudly makes clear that he does not believe that any return to a laissez-faire market economy or that a highly limited government involvement in society is either possible or desirable. He says the reforms that he wishes to propose are meant to secure a free society from abuse and misuse by those in political power and special interests wishing to use government for their own personal purposes at other’s expense. And much of what he says here about restraints, transparency, and the consist preservation of the rule of law in democratic society to assure personal and civil liberties are often reasonable in a debate over the nature and role of government in human society.
But he argues that the classical economists and the classical liberals of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries operated with a false and stylized conception of a mechanical “economic man” in a “perfectly” competitive market that does not match how the real world works. If “liberalism” is to be renewed and restored as a viable system acceptable to most in society, government must be more controlling and supervisory over corporations and their workings, since these forms of “big business” are dangerous to freedom. In other words, he questions the acceptance of limited liability companies and thinks that anti-trust laws need to be far better enforced.


“Power” is unjustly and unfairly distributed in an unregulated market economy, leading to abuses against consumers and employed workers by unbridled private enterprise. Government must regulate the size of businesses and how they use their decision-making power must be overseen by agencies of government. Taxes must be established and imposed to assure a more equitable distribution of wealth among the members of society. And the taxes collected more heavily on “the rich” must be spent on “public health, education, conservation, public works, [social] insurance” and other welfarist projects and programs.
In other words, the reformed and “new” liberalism that Walter Lippmann proposes as the alternative to the totalitarian collectivisms threatening to extinguish freedom and democracy around the world is: the interventionist-welfare state that simply recognizes and places much greater importance on the effectiveness of market competition to “deliver the goods” and supply important forms of personal liberty and choice than the more collectivist critics of capitalism.

The Colloquium Walter Lippmann in Paris in 1938

This agenda became, as I said, the basis for that 1938 conference in Paris devoted to Walter Lippmann’s book.  Among the participants at the conference were Raymond Aron, Louis Baudin, F. A. Hayek, Michael Heilperin, Etienne Mantoux, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi, Wilhelm Röpke, Jacque Rueff, Alexander Rüstow, and Alfred Schutz. In all, there were more than twenty-five attendees.
In his opening introductory remarks to the conference, Louis Rougier was clearly and deeply impressed and influenced by Lippmann’s arguments on a reformed new liberalism. He stated that the issue now facing “liberals” was not whether there should be government intervention in the market economy but what type of such interventions.


He referred to those interventions that were “conformable” with the market economy, and those that were not. A laissez-faire world was a thing of the past, It was necessary to “accept the world as it is,” especially because economic policy had to be consistent with “the social demands of the masses.” Thus, a “new” liberalism must recognize State involvement with “the regulation of property, of contracts, of patents, of the family, the status of professional organizations and commercial corporations,” and a variety of other active intrusions into the market system.


Following Walter Lippmann’s own opening remarks, in which he restated the major theses of his book, the discussion turned to what should be the name of this alternative to totalitarian collectivism? Back and forth several of the participants went about whether what they were talking about was still consistent with the “old liberalism,” or was it something different. Was it still consistent with the traditional understanding of “individualism”? Had not “liberalism” always stood for the widest liberty for the individual and a government strictly limited to protect that liberty?  Was what was offered in Lippmann’s book and what was to be the subject matter of the conference a “new” Liberalism”?


Later, near the end of the conference, French economist, Jacque Rueff, suggested, “Left Liberalism.” This did not sit well with many of the other participants. So, instead, other possibilities were offered: “positive liberalism,” or “social liberalism,” or “Neo-Liberalism.”

Ludwig von Mises on Monopoly and Cartels

The clash between the proponents of traditional, or laissez-fare, or “classical” liberalism and this emerging Neo-Liberalism soon showed itself in the conference sessions that followed. Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, argued that regulation of business to limit “bigness” was neither necessary nor desirable. He reminded the other attendees that monopolies and cartels among private enterprises invariably were historically due to the interventions of the State to protect privileged companies from market competition. And, indeed, governments had often had to use their compulsory powers to force private enterprises into politically created cartels that were not wanted or desired by many of the market competitors. Said Mises:
In many cases even this State intervention has not been enough by itself to being about the creation of cartels. The State has had to force the producers to group themselves into cartels by means of special laws . . . So it is impossible to maintain the thesis according to which the coming of cartels was the natural result of the action of economic forces. It is not the free play of these forces that has given rise to cartels but rather the intervention of the State. So it is a logical error to try to justify State intervention in the economy by the necessity of preventing the formation of cartels because it is precisely the State which has led to the creation of cartels by its intervention.
Similarly, Mises insisted any problems with anti-competitive monopolies in the market were not the result of normal market forces, but the interventions of the State, as well. “It is not the free play of economic forces but the anti-liberal policy of governments that has created conditions favorable to the establishment of monopolies,” Mises said. “It is legislation, it is politics that have created the tendency toward monopoly.”


Along related lines Mises also argued that it would be economically harmful for government to restrain the formation of limited liability corporations. They serve as a market means of combining large sums of investable funds that enable projects to be undertaken that serve market demands, that otherwise might very well be impossible.


Mises was met by other conference participants who, counter-wise, insisted that the market tended toward forms of unhealthy and undesirable concentrations of industry and economic power and influence, which only the State could contain, control and limit. Regulation of business had to be part of the new Neo-Liberal agenda. The famous German economist and sociologist, Alexander Rüstow, who was one of the intellectual influences on post-World War II German economic policy, went so far as to say that the problem was due to the State being too “weak” to prevent these corporate tendencies toward industrial concentration.

Social Safety Nets and the Role of the State

In another session, the issue was social welfare and the interventionist state. And here, again, the debate concerned the extent to which a free market economy could “satisfy” the demands of “the masses” for “social security.” In general, there was no principled resistance to certain minimal social “safety nets” on the part of the participants who addressed the issue in this part of the conference. Instead, the discussion surrounded the “limits” of the welfare state. How was it to be financed? What dangers could arise due to deficit spending to cover government redistributive spending? What incentives should not exist for people to find it attractive to be permanent wards of the State?


For instance, Austrian economist, Friedrich A. Hayek, argued that the social insurance benefits should not be equal to or greater than what an unemployed or displaced worker would receive if he were employed. Otherwise, he’d have not the incentive to relocate and find market-based gainful employment. And Jacque Rueff highlighted a theme he had already emphasized in the 1920s, a clear relationship between the generosity of unemployment insurance payments and the amount and length of general unemployment as experienced in a number of countries in the 1920s and during the Great Depression.


But the older classical liberal presumption that it should not be the duty of the State to subsidize or financially support those who found themselves temporarily unemployed was never discussed. The case that this is one of the tasks of the voluntary associations of civil society was never brought up.


However, Mises reminded the others that, “Unemployment, as a mass and lasting phenomenon, is the consequence of a policy [by governments and labor unions] that aims at maintaining salaries at a higher level that would result from the state of the [free] market.” In this Mises was seconded by a number of the other participants.

Spontaneous Social Order vs. State Direction of Society

A clear difference between the traditional classical liberals and these Neo-Liberals was whether society, in general, should be the product of the spontaneous interactions of the social and market participants, themselves, or might the unregulated patterns of social evolution take on forms requiring government intervention and “correction”?


In a session devoted to the “Sociological and Psychological, Political and Ideological Causes of the Decline of Liberalism,” Alexander Rüstow set the tone with an insistence that the evolution of markets had created outcomes that needed governmental correction and guidance. He argued that the task of government policy was not to assure the greatest material income, but “a living situation that was as satisfying as possible.”


Men need liberty, most certainly, Rüstow emphasized, but they also need “unity,” a sense of social “belonging,” similar to the family. Society needed to provide this in some way, and as far as he was concerned, this could not be left only to the free associations of the marketplace. The State had to devise ways of giving and providing people with this shared sense of collective belonging while also maintaining the freedom that people also clearly desired. This required social planning of various types along side the market economy, including urban and rural zoning and planning for a more balanced and harmonious life. Either a new, reformed and interventionist liberalism could offer the missed sense of collective belonging, Rüstow claimed, or fascism and Nazism would fill the void in men’s psychological being.


Ludwig von Mises countered Rüstow’s argument. Rüstow’s implicit presumption that the peasants of yester-years before the dawn of capitalism were happier than modern industrial workers in urban areas with all their available material and cultural amenities was highly dubious. Mises suggested that Rüstow had fallen into the misplaced “romantic” fantasies of those anti-market conservatives who conjured up images of an idyllic countryside of contented “commoners” and kind and gentle noblemen before commercialism undermined human bliss. “It is an undeniable fact,” Mises said, “that in the last hundred years millions of men have abandoned agricultural occupations for industrial work, which certainly cannot be considered a proof of the greater satisfaction that agricultural activity would have given them.”


For all the talk about group identity and unity in the totalitarian states, Mises went on, the fact is that the collectivist regimes in the Soviet Union, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had all promised materially better circumstances and economic opportunities through planning and control to those over whom they ruled. Individuals do often suffer from psychological dissatisfactions with liberal society, but the task was to make it plain to people that liberty and market-based prosperity offer the greatest opportunities for each to find their own best answers to these wider needs and desires for human association.

Neo-Liberalism Concessions to the Collectivist Spirit of the Times

What, then, was the upshot of the conference? And what does it tell us about the meaning of Neo-Liberalism? Many of the classical liberals during the period between the two World Wars were despondent and despairing about the seeming twilight of the free society. Totalitarian variations on the collectivist theme were on the ascendency in Europe.


When the Walter Lippmann conference occurred in August 1938, Hitler had already annexed Austria in March of that year, and the crisis had begun that led to the Munich Conference in September that resulted in the dismembering of Czechoslovakia under the threat of Hitler invading that country. The fear of war was everywhere; this came with the accompanying concern that war would bring a final end to the last residues of the liberal epoch that had existed before the First World War. And, indeed, an entire session at the conference was devoted to this concern and how to respond to it.


Virtually all the conference participants were strongly market-oriented liberals who considered competitive capitalism essential to freedom and prosperity, and that all forms of socialist planning to be economically unworkable and threats to personal and civil liberty.


But except for a few of the participants such as Ludwig von Mises, all the attendees concluded that to “save” political and economic liberalism from total destruction, a “Neo-liberalism” had to be formulated, developed and offered to a world apparently mesmerized by the promises of Soviet communism and Italian and German fascism.


Either out of actual reflective conviction on the nature of the market or political expediency in the face of a general rejection of laissez-faire liberalism in Western society, many of those who commented, debated and argued during the three days of the conference concluded that to counteract the collectivist trends and preserve the essential institutions and working of a relatively free market system, it had to be combined with aspects of the interventionist-welfare state that would make it palatable to “the masses.”


Neo-Liberalism was not born as an attempt to rationalize and restore a laissez-faire unbridled capitalism, but as an idea to introduce a wide network of regulatory and redistributive programs that would enable the political salvaging of some of the essential elements of a competitive market order. The tricky task, in the eyes of most of the attendees, was to figure out how to do this without the interventionist system itself threatening to get out of control and degenerate into that type of piecemeal system of collectivist privilege, plunder and corruption that Walter Lippmann had, himself, said easily can be an incremental backdoor to a planned society.

Neo-Liberalism and the Rise of the Interventionist-Welfare State

In retrospect, the Neo-Liberalism agenda that was emerging out of the Colloquium Walter Lippmann was an attempt to square the hole: the combining of individual freedom and free market competitive association with political paternalism and governmental commands and controls over how people may interact and the outcomes to be allowed from their interactions.
By doing so, those sincere friends of freedom and the market order ended up conceding all the basic premises of their collectivist rivals: the market, when left alone, tends toward unhealthy corporate concentration with worker and consumer exploitation, thus requiring regulation of business size and practice; the market could not be trusted to assure stability, security or welfare, and hence “activist” government had to provide these things, within, hopefully, fiscally sound boundaries, of course; the free market is not enough for man and the human condition, so government has to regulate, guide and restrain social development to create “unity” and community beyond supply and demand.


Neo-Liberalism was born not as an “extremist” attempt to rationalize and implement unrestrained capitalism and an inhumane social system. It was conceived as creating a more humane and just society precisely by rejecting laissez-faire liberalism and its accompanying reliance upon the free associations of civil society to mitigate the uncertainties and problems of everyday life. And it was meant to be a system that would be acceptable and accepted by “the masses” in democratic society.


It is certainly true that the much of the Neo-Liberal agenda that was successfully implemented in a variety of post-World War II countries, such as West Germany, brought about an “economic miracle” of recovery from the war’s destruction by unleashing market forces and the entrepreneurial spirit. (See my article on, “The German Economic Miracle and the ‘Social Market Economy’”.)


However, the triumph of the interventionist-welfare state, beginning in the immediate post-World War II era and up to the present, therefore, is also partly due to the Neo-Liberal friends of freedom who offered their own justifications for many of the same policies that their opponents on “the left” also espoused. Only they hoped to keep them within more “manageable limits” so a vibrant market economy might still effectively function.


The modern day “progressives,” therefore, are rejecting and condemning just another variation of themselves that has wanted far more reliance on competitive markets and less regulation and redistribution than for which they have any desire; and all within the context of those “progressives” doing their best to deny any family resemblance.


Neo-Liberalism’s origins, agenda, and consequences all point toward the need for a new agenda for liberty: one that recognizes and restates the idea and ideal of that original and true liberalism of laissez-faire and voluntary civil society.


Originally published by the Future of Freedom Foundation. 


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2017년 10월 17일 화요일

 
Those who seek to dismiss practically all existing culture by the mere process of labeling it "bourgeois" are not necessarily Marxists. They are simply new barbarians, celebrants of crudity and ignorance.
 


 
Literature and the "Class War"
Henry Hazlitt
 
 
 
[Editor's Note: This essay, a prescient blast at the then-growing problem of Marxism in literary criticism, was published as an appendix in Henry Hazlitt's 1933 book The Anatomy of Criticism: A Trialogue. The same arguments, of course, apply to claims used in criticism that certain literature is worthless because it supports "the patriarchy" or other modern stand-ins for "the bourgeoisie." ]
 
The astonishingly rapid spread, in the last two or three years, of the application of so-called social standards in literary criticism, and particularly of so-called Marxian standards, makes it desirable that these standards should be submitted to a critical examination. In undertaking such an examination, one is confronted at the very beginning by a formidable difficulty.
 
One feels that few of the writers whose theories are being examined will trouble to weigh on their merits any of the specific objections offered. For most of the nouveau-Marxists know all the answers in advance. They know that any critic who questions any item in the Marxian ideology is a "bourgeois" critic, and that his objections are "bourgeois" criticisms, and from that terrible and crushing adjective there is no appeal. For the bourgeois critic, if I understand the nouveau-Marxists rightly, has less free will than a parrot. He is a mere phonograph, who can only repeat the phrases and opinions with which he has been stuffed from his reading of bourgeois literature and his contacts with bourgeois science and bourgeois art. All these make up bourgeois culture, which is a mere class culture, i.e., an elaborate and colossal system of apologetics; worse, an instrument for class dominance and class oppression.
 
The bourgeois critic, in brief, is a mere automaton, incapable of surmounting or of escaping from the bourgeois ideology in which he is imprisoned; and the poor fool's delusion that he is capable of seeing any problem with relative objectivity and disinterestedness is simply one more evidence that he cannot pierce beyond the walls of his ideological cell. (Of course it does seem possible for a few of the chosen, by an act of grace, to receive the revelation and jump suddenly into a complete acceptance of the Marxian ideology; otherwise it would be impossible to account for the bourgeois-Marxists themselves. But we may return to such miracles later.)
 
In such an atmosphere, I hope I may be forgiven if I begin with an ad hominem argument, for in such an atmosphere ad hominem arguments are the only kind likely to make any impression. Now the first article in the Marxian credo is that there is but one Karl Marx and that Lenin is his prophet. One would suppose, therefore, that the critics who call themselves Marxists would trouble to learn what their master and his greatest disciple thought on cultural questions. Did Marx himself reject the culture of his age on the ground that it was bourgeois culture? Did he flee from its contamination as from a plague? Did he repudiate it as mere apologetics?
 
The evidence against any such assumption is overwhelming. Wilhelm Liebknecht, in his delightful biographical memoir, tells us that Marx read Goethe, Lessing, Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes "almost daily," and that he was fond of reciting scenes from Shakespeare, and long passages from the "Divina Commedia" that he knew almost entirely by heart. Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, in his personal recollections (which appear in Karl Marx: Man, Thinker, and Revolutionist, a symposium edited by D. Ryazanoff), confirms this and supplements it in more detail. Marx, he tells us,
 
 
knew much of Heine and Goethe by heart, and would even quote these poets in conversation. He read a great deal of poetry, in most of the languages of Europe. Year after year he would read Aeschylus again in the original text, regarding this author and Shakespeare as the two greatest dramatic geniuses the world had ever known. For Shakespeare he had an unbounded admiration.
 
Sometimes he would lie down on the sofa and read a novel, and had often two or three novels going at the same time, reading them by turns. He had a preference for eighteenth-century novels, and was especially fond of Fielding's Tom Jones. Among modern novelists, his favorites were Paul de Kock, Charles Lever, the elder Dumas, and Sir Walter Scott, whose Old Mortality he considered a masterpiece.
 
He had a predilection for tales of adventure and humorous stories. The greatest masters of romance were for him Cervantes and Balzac. His admiration for Balzac was so profound that he had planned to write a critique of La comédie humaine as soon as he finished his economic studies.
 
Even more direct evidence of Marx's literary tastes is furnished by a "confession" which he signed at the insistence of two of his daughters. It was a game, popular in the early sixties, and still often revived, of answering a set of leading questions; and from what we know of Marx there can be no doubt that his answers, while in one or two instances playful, were fundamentally serious.
 
Asked who his "favorite poet" was, he answered: "Shakespeare, Aeschylus, Goethe." He gave his favorite prose writer as Diderot, his favorite occupation as "book worming," and what ought to interest those critics who seem to have decided that nothing outside of the class struggle is now worth discussing he set down his favorite maxim as "Nihil humanum a me alienum tuto" "I regard nothing human as alien to me."
 
Lenin was as little disposed to reject bourgeois culture as Marx himself. In her biographical memoir, Lenin's widow, N.K. Krupskaya, tells us that "Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] not only read, but many times reread, Turgenev, L. Tolstoy, Chernyshevsky's What Is to Be Done? and in general had a fine knowledge of, and admiration for, the classics."
 
We learn also that at one time he was very much taken up with Latin and the Latin authors; that he eagerly scanned Goethe's "Faust" in German, Heine's poems, and Victor Hugo's poems; that he liked Chekhov's Uncle Vanya; and that he "placed the works of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Nekrasov by the side of his bed, along with Hegel".
 
Madame Lenin tells an amusing story of his encounter with some young communists. "Do you read Pushkin?" he asked them. "Oh, no, he was a bourgeois. Mayakovsky for us." Lenin smiled: "I like Pushkin better." But he admired Mayakovsky, and even praised him once for some verses deriding Soviet bureaucracy.
 
If supplementary evidence is needed on this point, we have it in the list published by Joshua Kunitz in the New Masses of January, 1932, of the volumes which Lenin ordered for his library in 1919 "a year," Mr. Kunitz reminds us, "of economic disorganization, political counter-revolution, and impending civil war." Among the poets whose collected works were ordered were Pushkin, Lermontov, Tuitshev, and Fet, and among the prose writers Gogol, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Alsakov, and Chekhov.
 
Even when we pass from this record of the personal tastes of Marx and Lenin to questions of theory, we find that the author of the doctrine of Economic Determinism was far from applying it with the crude, rigid and dogmatic directness of many of those who now profess to be his followers. Unfortunately, Marx's views on the relation of literature to class are less fully set forth than we should like, but in a paper published as an appendix to The Critique of Political Economy he makes this significant statement:
 
 
It is well known that certain periods of highest development of art stand in no direct connection with the general development of society, nor with the material basis and the skeleton structure of its organization. Witness the example of the Greeks as compared with the modern nations or even Shakespeare.
 
Here is a clear acknowledgment that a work of literature is not necessarily to be dismissed as inferior because it grows out of a society in which social injustice prevails, even if it is the product of an oppressing class or of a slave-holding class. To call a work of literature "bourgeois," in other words, would not have meant for Marx that it was necessarily not a great work. And as a corollary, to call a work of art "proletarian" would not have meant for him that it was necessarily admirable.
 
Now that Leon Trotsky is a political exile, his ideas on any subject are presumably not as widely popular among communists, and certainly not among the party hacks, as they once were; but his remarkable volume Literature and Revolution, published in America in 1925, was written when he still held office, and seems to me at bottom a development of the attitude already implicit in Marx.
 
Like Marx himself, Trotsky is not free from inconsistencies. Certainly he often mistakes political for aesthetic criticism. He has a curiously ambivalent attitude toward the "fellow-travelers," at times praising, at times deriding them, and at times engaging in an unattractive heresy hunt. He insists, especially in the early part of his volume, on the essential class character of art. Social landslides, he says, reveal this as clearly as geologic landslides reveal the deposits of earth layers. But he has a genuine feeling for literature and brilliant analytical powers, and the common sense and courage to contradict the dogmas of the extremists in his own party. The italics in the following quotations are mine:
 
 
It is not true that we regard only that art as new and revolutionary which speaks of the worker, and it is nonsense to say that we demand that the poets should describe inevitably a factory chimney, or the uprising against capital! Personal lyrics of the very smallest scope have an absolute right to exist within the new art.
 
It is very true that one cannot always go by the principles of Marxism in deciding whether to reject or to accept a work of art. A work of art should, in the first place, be judged by its own law, that is, by the law of art.
 
Every ruling class creates its own culture, and consequently its own art. Bourgeois culture has existed five centuries, but it did not reach its greatest flowering until the nineteenth century, or, more correctly, the second half of it. History shows that the formation of a new culture which centers around a ruling class demands considerable time and reaches completion only at the period preceding the political decadence of that class.
 
The period of the social revolution, on a world scale, will last decades, but not centuries. Can the proletariat in this time create a new culture? It is legitimate to doubt this, because the years of social revolution will be years of fierce class struggles in which destruction will occupy more room than new construction. At any rate, the energy of the proletariat itself will be spent mainly in conquering power. The cultural reconstruction which will begin when the need of the iron clutch of a dictatorship unparalleled in history will have disappeared, will not have a class character. This seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no proletarian culture and that there never will be any, and in fact there is no reason to regret this. The proletariat acquires power for the purpose of doing away forever with class culture and to make way for human culture. We frequently seem to forget this.
 
The main task of the proletarian intelligentsia in the immediate future is not the abstract formation of a new culture regardless of the absence of a basis for it, but definite culture-bearing, that is, a systematic, planful, and, of course, critical imparting to the backward masses of the essential elements of the culture which already exists.
 
It would be monstrous to conclude that the technique of bourgeois art is not necessary to the workers.
 
It is childish to think that bourgeois belles-lettres can make a breach in class solidarity. What the worker will take from Shakespeare, Goethe, Pushkin, or Dostoevsky, will be a more complex idea of human personality, of its passions and feelings, a deeper and profounder understanding of its psychic forces and of the role of the subconscious,
 
The proletariat also needs a continuity of creative tradition. At the present time the proletariat realizes this continuity not directly, but indirectly, through the creative bourgeois intelligentsia.
 
I apologize for these long quotations, but as I remarked at the beginning, the majority of our own so-called Marxists are so impervious to arguments from liberal and bourgeois sources that it is necessary to direct their attention at least to the tastes and opinions of the leaders they profess to follow. These leaders, obviously, dispose of a good deal of the nonsense about "proletarian literature." Those who seek to dismiss practically all existing culture by the mere process of labeling it "bourgeois" are not necessarily Marxists. They are simply new barbarians, celebrants of crudity and ignorance.
 
There is in most of the new American "Marxist" critics a deplorable mental confusion, and this mental confusion, as I have hinted, is not necessarily connected with Marxism. Marx himself would probably be distressed by the manner in which they abuse Marxian terms. A proletarian, for example, in Marx's use of the term, is an exploited manual worker, a factory "hand," and he remains a proletarian regardless of his political or economic views.
 
A communist, on the other hand, is a person who, regardless of his economic position, holds a certain definite set of opinions. Most of the new "Marxian" critics use these terms interchangeably, as if they were synonyms, and as a result some very strange things happen. A Harvard graduate like Dos Passos, for example, is hailed as a great "proletarian" novelist. Still more abusive, in a double sense, is the use of "bourgeois" to mean either a person of a certain economic status or a non-communist.
 
Now it should not seem particularly disgraceful not to be a sweated factory worker. In this simple, descriptive, and Marxian sense of the word, Marx himself was a bourgeois economist. (As Trotsky remarks in Literature and Revolution, "Marx and Engels came out of the ranks of the petty bourgeois democracy and, of course, were brought up on its culture and not on the culture of the proletariat.") If this economic-status meaning were adhered to, the adjective "bourgeois" would not seem particularly damning. But it is, as I have said, used also as an emotive word, a blackjack to describe non-communists. Full advantage is taken of its historic, non-Marxian connotations an uncultured shopkeeper, a provincial, a timidly conventional person, a non-Bohemian, a philistine.
 
This emotive use of words is bound to lead to mental confusion. It is impossible to make out, for example, exactly what the new Marxists mean by a "proletarian literature." Most of them, most of the time, appear to mean a literature about proletarians. Some of them, some of the time, seem to mean a literature by proletarians. Some of them, part of the time, mean a communist or revolutionary literature; and a few of them demand nothing less than a combination of all three of these. This hardly seems to leave much room for most of what used to be called literature.
 
It may be well at this point to ask just how much a culture is invalidated or suspect because it is a "class" culture. We are led to suppose, under extreme interpretations of the doctrine of economic determinism, that our economic status inevitably determines our opinions, that those opinions are mere rationalizations of our class status. Let us admit the element of truth in this; let us admit that our economic status influences the opinions of each of us, in various unconscious and subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways.
 
Is it impossible for the individual to surmount these limitations? Is it impossible for him, once he has recognized this prejudice, to guard against it as he guards against other prejudices? Is the limitation of class necessarily any more compelling than the limitation of country, of race, of age, of sex? Because Proust was a Frenchman, his writing is naturally colored by his French environment; it is different from what it would have been had he lived all his life in England. But does Proust's Frenchness diminish, to any extent worth talking of, his value to American readers?
 
Shakespeare, as a seventeenth-century writer, was naturally limited by the lack of knowledge and many of the prejudices of his age; his age colors his work. Does that mean that he is of little value to the twentieth-century reader? Because Dreiser is a man, does he lose his value for women readers? Does Willa Cather lose hers for men readers? The answers to these questions are so obvious that it seems almost childish to ask them. The great writer with great imaginative gifts may universalize himself. If not in a literal sense, then certainly in a functional sense, he can transcend the barriers of nationality, age, and sex. And certainly he can, in the same functional sense and to the same degree, transcend the barrier of class.
 
Indeed, the barrier of class is perhaps in some respects less difficult to surmount than the barriers of nationality, historic era, personal age, and sex. This is no place to examine the entire basis of communism, but it can be said that it is simply not true that the modern world, particularly the American world, consists of just two sharply defined classes. Our class boundaries are notoriously vague, loose, and shifting. No doubt the contrast between those at the top and those at the bottom is just as great as the communists say it is, but the division into just two contrasted classes is a child of the Hegelian dialectic rather than of objective fact.1
 
There is the further question, never satisfactorily dealt with and perhaps not even clearly recognized by most communist critics, of the distinction between genesis and value. Every opinion, stated or implied, has a right to be dealt with purely on its own merits, and must be so dealt with if there is to be any intellectual clarity. The truth or value of an idea or an attitude must ultimately be judged wholly apart from the prejudices, the interests, or the income of the man who expresses it.
 
All this is not to say that the question of class bias is not important in literature, science, or art; it is simply to subordinate it to its proper place. It is silly and practically meaningless, for example, to say that we have a bourgeois astronomy, a bourgeois physics, a bourgeois mathematics. Here the class bias enters to so infinitesimal an extent that it is not worth talking about. But the elements of class bias may be larger in biology as, for example, in its answers to problems of environment and heredity.
 
When we come to the social sciences, particularly economics, the elements of class bias may be very large. In the arts they will be present less directly: they will be smaller in poetry than in fiction, smaller in painting than in poetry, smaller in music than in painting. This distinction is clearly admitted by Trotsky. What must be decided in each case is the question of the degree of class bias and the real relevance of it. It may be sometimes relevant for the critic to point out the class bias or the class sympathy in any writer and just how it affects his work.
 
It may be sometimes even more relevant, for that matter, to point to his religious bias, his nationalistic bias, his sexual bias, or the influence upon him of the particular historic era in which he writes. There is no reason why any one of these should receive exclusive or constant emphasis. The greatest danger, in short, of so-called Marxian criticism in literature is that the critics who make a fetish or a cult of it will in time become infinitely boring. When we are told that Emerson was bourgeois, Poe bourgeois, Mark Twain bourgeois, Proust bourgeois, Thomas Mann bourgeois, we can only reply that this may all be very true, but that we knew it in advance and that it tells us nothing. It is like telling us that Rousseau was an eighteenth-century writer, that Goethe was a German, and that atheists are not Catholics. What we are interested in is what distinguishes the great writer from other persons of his class, what gives him his individuality in brief, what makes him still worth talking about at all.

1. Certainly that division would be completely arbitrary if made on the basis of income, for one may just as well divide the American population into seventy-four "income classes" as the National Bureau of Economic Research actually has as into two. Nor can the division be made purely on the basis of employer and employed. A bootblack with one assistant is an "employer"; a railroad president on salary an "employee."