------> 요즘 기업은 법원에서 경영을 하고 있다. 한국 자본주의를 법원이 죽이고 있다.
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북한 엘리트의 분노, "우리가 쳐내려가면 종북부터 죽인다."
국가정보기관에서 對北공작을 오래 맡았던 한 前職 고위공무원은 몇년 전 '양심 있는 북한노동당 간부들이 때려죽이고 싶어하는 게 남한의 종북세력이다'고 했다. 對南부서 사람들과 비밀리에 만나 회의를 하다가 친해지면 서로 속내를 털어놓을 때가 있다고 한다. 그들이 從北을 미워하는 이유는 그 자들이 김정일 김정은의 눈을 가려 북한의 개혁 개방을 방해한다고 생각하기 때문이다.
'지도자 동지는 남한에서 자신을 추종하는 세력이 건재하므로 이들을 믿고 체제를 개혁할 필요가 없다고 생각한다'는 것이다. 김대중, 노무현 정권 때 김정일 정권에 갖다 준 현금, 식량, 비료는 정권의 통제력을 강화시켜 북한의 개혁 개방을 막는 데 결정적 효과가 있었다고 한다. 그들은 우리 정보기관 간부들에게 이렇게 하소연한다는 것이다.
'그 민족 반역자들을 왜 가만 두는가. 잡아넣어야 할 것 아닌가. 그 놈들의 입을 막아야 진정한 민족화해가 이뤄지는 거야. 만약 우리가 쳐내려가면 그 새끼들을 맨 먼저 때려죽일 거야.'
(조갑제닷컴, 발췌)
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지구 온난화는 사기다.
Delingpole:
Now 400 Scientific Papers in 2017 Say ‘Global Warming’ Is a Myth
Modern temperatures, sea levels, and extreme weather events are neither unusual nor unprecedented. Many regions of the Earth are cooler now than they have been for most of the last 10,000 years.
Natural factors such as the Sun (106 papers), multi-decadal oceanic-atmospheric oscillations such as the NAO, AMO/PDO, ENSO (37 papers), decadal-scale cloud cover variations, and internal variability in general have exerted a significant influence on weather and climate changes during both the past and present. Detecting a clear anthropogenic forcing signal amidst the noise of unforced natural variability may therefore be difficult.
And current emissions-mitigation policies, especially related to the advocacy for renewables, are often costly, ineffective, and perhaps even harmful to the environment. On the other hand, elevated CO2 and a warmer climate provide unheralded benefits to the biosphere (i.e., a greener planet and enhanced crop yields).
http://notrickszone.com/2017/10/23/400-scientific-papers-published-in-2017-support-a-skeptical-position-on-climate-alarm/#sthash.XjjFDfS2.mp7OAN5L.dpbs
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탈북 군인의 몸에서 탄저균 항체 발견!!
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이런저런 복지정책이 개발되고 남발되면 복지비용, 복지인력 그리고 복지병까지 늘어날 뿐이다.
그리고 이와 병행된 복지관련비리가 양산된다. 지금 한국에서는 복지관련비리가 좌파에 의해 주도되고, 좌파의 주된 수익사업일 정도다.
좌파에 의해 남발된 각종 복지사업들 그 내용과 관련자들을 세세히 들여다 볼 필요가 있다. 에산도둑놈들 복마전이었음이 드러날 것이다.
요즘 좌파들은 아주 부자다. 그리고 이들이 막대한 부를 급속이 축적한 것은 바로 좌파가 주도한 복지정책에 편승한 기법이었다.
우파가 주로 무역정책을 중점으로 수행하며 부를 축적한 것과 좌파가 복지정책에 편승해서 부를 축적한 것을 비교해 보라.
우파는 국가경제를 발전시켜왔고, 좌파는 국가경제시스템을 망가뜨리고 국가재정도 파탄내왔다. 즉 내용과 결과가 극과극이다.
이러니 좌파가 복지정책을 남발할수록 새금인상,물가폭등, 경기침체, 일자리감소, 재정고갈 등등 악순환이 펼쳐지는데
이 와중에 복지예산관련 비리부패는 또한 폭증한다. 결과는 오히려 민생이 파탄나고 경제적 요인에 의한 자살율이 급등한다.
좌파의 복지는 서민위한 것이 결코 아니다. 서민 죽이는 복지다. 좌파의 복지는 그저 좌파의 수익사업, 정치사업일 뿐이다.
[출처] 좌파의 복지예산은 서민 위한게 아니라 좌파들 수익사업, 정치자금 조달용이다./ 발췌, 일베
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Review: ‘Utopia for Realists’ by Rutger Bregman
16 March 2017
기본 소득제라는 엉터리 주장을 담은 브레그먼의 책 <리얼리스트를 위한 유토피아>
First published in the Netherlands in 2014 and now republished in English with a retina-burning, bright orange jacket, Rutger Bregman’s Utopia for Realists has become an international bestseller thanks to three big ideas: open borders, a basic income and a shorter working week. At least two of these proposals have been of longstanding interest to libertarians. It is good to see them making waves on the centre-left. Bregman’s passion for the basic income, in particular, is beyond doubt although it sometimes comes at the expense of objectivity. If you have studied any of these ideas before and are sceptical, Bregman’s analysis is unlikely to convince you, but there is enough original material to give most readers something to think about.
The book begins with an invigorating summary of the benefits of free trade and globalisation which starts where Johan Norberg’s excellent Progress left off. The extraordinary, unprecedented rise of economic prosperity and all its attendant benefits in recent generations cannot be lauded too often and Bregman pays fitting tribute before turning on a sixpence to discuss the problems that have turned our ‘Land of Plenty’ into a ‘dystopia’: anxiety, narcissism, boredom, apathy and – above all – the inability of his generation to come up with a vision of where society should go next (he is 28).
Bregman’s answer to this sense of purposelessness is to propose three grand schemes, starting with a guaranteed income for all. Citing some illuminating real world experiments, Bregman makes a compelling case for giving poor people money rather than setting up elaborate poverty-reduction schemes. It is the stress of being poor that leads people to make bad decisions as much as it is bad decision-making that makes them poor. Give homeless people a lump sum with no questions asked, he says, and you’ll be surprised how quickly they get back on their feet. Give people the security of a basic income and you’ll be surprised by how few of them fritter it away.
There is much to be said for this and Bregman claims to have a good deal of evidence to back it up. But as he makes his case, there is a creeping suspicion that the evidence is not as strong as he implies. When unfavourable evidence suggests that giving away ‘free money’ can create unintended consequences or simply not work, he is quick to explain it away but his critical faculties go to sleep when evidence supports his priors. For example, an absurd report from the New Economics Foundation is cited as evidence that advertising executives destroy £7 for every £1 they earn. Research by Robert Putnam and others which suggests that diversity undermines social cohesion is described by Bregman as having being ‘debunked’ so thoroughly that it ‘crumbles to dust’ but the studies he cites do not deliver any such killer blow, including a meta-analysis that largely confirms Putnam’s findings from the USA. The risible scatterplots of The Spirit Level don’t belong in a book aimed at ‘realists’ and it would have taken Bregman only a few minutes to fact-check the old myth about Henry Ford giving his workers a pay rise so that they could buy his cars (that wasn’t his reason and his workers wouldn’t have been able to afford one anyway).
I only looked up a few of the book’s references, but I saw enough to make me question whether the author was always being entirely candid. His account of the Speenhamland welfare system is particularly misleading. Introduced in 1795 and abolished in 1834, the Speenhamland System taxed landowners to prop up the wages of workers to compensate for rising bread prices. Historians have generally regarded it as a dismal failure that created mass pauperism. Bregman’s claim that it was actually a ‘success’ is tendentious but that scarcely matters since it was not a ‘basic income’ in any sense, despite his repeated insistence to the contrary. It was effectively a working tax credit for people who had jobs. The unemployed did not benefit from it at all and it tells us nothing about how a basic income may or may not work in practice.
The idea of a basic income may not be as old as Bregman makes out but, like his other big ideas, it has been around long enough for serious people to have given it serious consideration. Bregman does not mention Milton Friedman’s early endorsement of the basic income (perhaps because he fears alienating readers who only know of Friedman from the bizarre distortions of Naomi Klein) but he rightly cites John Maynard Keynes as a great proponent of more leisure. Open borders also have many advocates in the economics profession.
Why, then, have they not been acted upon? From Bregman’s telling you might assume that it is because people have an exaggerated sense of the risks while being unaware of the benefits. There may be some truth to this, but those of us who are sympathetic to the idea of having more leisure time, freer movement and a simpler welfare system must accept that there are obvious objections to part-time work, open borders and a basic income with which Bregman does not fully engage.
The most common objection to the basic income is not that it failed in Georgian England but that it is simply unaffordable. To sell the idea to waverers like myself, Bregman needs to explain how much the basic income should be, how much it will cost in total and what areas of government expenditure can be cut as a result. We need to be told whether it will generate a net saving or a net loss. Bregman says that poverty could be eradicated in the USA for what he suggests is a modest $175 billion a year, but this $175 billion is on top of the many billions already being spent to relieve poverty.
Bregman says that the basic income must be paid to everybody if it is to be popular, but that implies a gross cost of £650 billion per annum if every man, woman and child in Britain is given £10,000 each. Admittedly, a large portion of this will be clawed back through taxes but it is still a colossal sum; total government expenditure is currently less than £800 billion. If the provision of a basic income means that there is no need for services to be ‘free at the point of need’ then the government can stop trying to run whole sectors of economy, such as health and education, and make massive savings to offset some of the cost. But there is no suggestion that this is what Bregman has in mind. More likely, he intends the basic income to be offered in addition to existing benefits-in-kind and, perhaps, in addition to existing cash benefits. There is no way of knowing whether this would be remotely affordable as Bregman doesn’t hint at the size of the basic income or at the tax rates that would be needed to pay for it.
The perennially unpopular idea of open borders also has flaws with which Bregman does not get to grips. Doubtless there are xenophobic objections to mass immigration but there are also practical objections which cannot easily be dismissed. Bregman is right to take on the myth that immigration is bad for the economy and he provides good evidence to show that immigrants are not particularly prone to crime, idleness or terrorism. But, like many proponents of open borders, he overlooks the fact that studies of immigration in the modern era are invariably studies of controlled immigration. He takes comfort from the fact that, since 1975, only 41 US residents have been killed by foreign-born terrorists (‘apart from the 2,983 people who died in the September 11 terrorist attack’), but he does not entertain the idea that this figure would have been a good deal higher if the US had allowed jihadists to come and go as they pleased. It is possible that open borders would give us exactly the same type of hard-working, diligent and peaceful immigrant that we get with the current system of passport checks and work visas, but the possibility that a free-for-all could lead to more undesirables entering the country must at least be considered.
Nor does he ask whether developed countries have the infrastructure and resources to accommodate, let alone assimilate, hundreds of millions of people at short notice. Many libertarians support open borders in principle but argue that free movement is incompatible with the welfare state. Bregman’s basic income would compound that problem. Can we really expect a nation’s taxpayers to give a guaranteed income to anyone who chooses to move there? These questions are not necessarily unanswerable, but Bregman does not help his case by failing to ask them.
Finally, the obvious objection to the fifteen hour week is not so much to the concept of working less as it is to the coercion needed to achieve it. There is no mystery about why Keynes’ prophecy of the three hour day failed. Bregman touches on it himself when he says ‘Economic growth can yield either to more leisure or more consumption.’ People have opted for more consumption. A part-time job could easily afford us a standard of living that was the norm when Keynes made his prediction in the 1930s, but we aspire to more than that. Bregman notes that many people say that they would like to work less, but talk is cheap. There are not many people in full-time work who are desperately trying to find part-time work, but there are always a large number of reluctant part-timers who would prefer to be working full-time.
Bregman argues that a basic income would lead to people working less – indeed, he says that this is ‘precisely the point’ of the basic income – but this contradicts his claim a few pages earlier when, defending the basic income against the accusation that it will lead to idleness, he cites evidence showing no decline in the number of hours worked when a basic income was trialled in a Canadian town. If he is right about the Canadian experiment, it would suggest that there is no great appetite for more leisure time. If he is wrong, his case for the basic income is weaker.
Although questions remain over Bregman’s big ideas, he should be applauded for seeking progressive, forward-looking policies at a time when the Left is split between those who are trying to relive the 1970s and those who are stuck in the cul-de-sac of identity politics. When discussing his policy proposals, Bergman is lively and thought-provoking, and so it is disappointing when gloomy clichés start appearing at the halfway stage. He tries hard to maintain a sunny disposition but cannot resist the familiar template of left-wing doom-mongering.
It is patently untrue that we have ‘all gotten poorer’ and are ‘all working harder than ever’. His explicitly refutes this earlier in the book, so why say it? Income inequality in the Netherlands, as in Britain, has not risen for a quarter of a century so why claim it is ‘spiralling’?
Utopia for Realists is a cut above your average socialist tract by the likes of Oliver James or Danny Dorling and yet its author falls back on some of the same lazy rhetoric at times. He spends several pages berating people for having ‘bullshit jobs’, overlooking the fact that somebody must value this work otherwise they would not get paid. His chapter about mechanisation does not give a convincing reason why we should view the current hysteria about ‘robots taking our jobs’ any differently to previous Luddite movements. And do we really need another bog standard critique of GDP, a measure of economic output that no one has ever claimed was the sole measure of progress?
When, in the closing chapters, the solution to mechanisation turns out to be ‘massive redistribution’ and the only way to get people to do jobs that Bregman considers ‘useful’ is to introduce ‘higher taxes’, it becomes clear that the shiny new vision for the Left is not so different from the old. The apple, alas, does not fall far from the tree.
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박근혜 대통령에게 공개사과와 검찰수사 수용을 누가 조언했나?
-----> 그 놈들이 바로 청와대 내에서 반역 세력과 공모한 놈들이다.
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사회과학에서 확률에 관한 거의 모든 것이 엉터리라는
나심 탈레브의 설명
The Logic of Risk Taking
A central chapter that crystallizes all my work. In forth. Skin in the Game
The difference between 100 people going to a casino and one person going to a casino 100 times, i.e. between (path dependent) and conventionally understood probability. The mistake has persisted in economics and psychology since age immemorial.
Consider the following thought experiment.
First case, one hundred persons go to a Casino, to gamble a certain set amount each and have complimentary gin and tonic –as shown in the cartoon in Figure x. Some may lose, some may win, and we can infer at the end of the day what the “edge” is, that is, calculate the returns simply by counting the money left with the people who return. We can thus figure out if the casino is properly pricing the odds. Now assume that gambler number 28 goes bust. Will gambler number 29 be affected? No.
You can safely calculate, from your sample, that about 1% of the gamblers will go bust. And if you keep playing and playing, you will be expected have about the same ratio, 1% of gamblers over that time window.
Now compare to the second case in the thought experiment. One person, your cousin Theodorus Ibn Warqa, goes to the Casino a hundred days in a row, starting with a set amount. On day 28 cousin Theodorus Ibn Warqa is bust. Will there be day 29? No. He has hit an uncle point; there is no game no more.
No matter how good he is or how alert your cousin Theodorus Ibn Warqa can be, you can safely calculate that he has a 100% probability of eventually going bust.
The probabilities of success from the collection of people does not apply to cousin Theodorus Ibn Warqa. Let us call the first set ensemble probability, and the second one time probability (since one is concerned with a collection of people and the other with a single person through time). Now, when you read material by finance professors, finance gurus or your local bank making investment recommendations based on the long term returns of the market, beware. Even if their forecast were true (it isn’t), no person can get the returns of the market unless he has infinite pockets and no uncle points. The are conflating ensemble probability and time probability. If the investor has to eventually reduce his exposure because of losses, or because of retirement, or because he remarried his neighbor’s wife, or because he changed his mind about life, his returns will be divorced from those of the market, period.
We saw with the earlier comment by Warren Buffett that, literally, anyone who survived in the risk taking business has a version of “in order to succeed, you must first survive.” My own version has been: “never cross a river if it is on average four feet deep.”
I effectively organized all my life around the point that sequence matters and the presence of ruin does not allow cost-benefit analyses; but it never hit me that the flaw in decision theory was so deep. Until came out of nowhere a paper by the physicist Ole Peters, working with the great Murray Gell-Mann. They presented a version of the difference between the ensemble and the time probabilities with a similar thought experiment as mine above, and showed that about everything in social science about probability is flawed. Deeply flawed. Very deeply flawed. For, in the quarter millennia since the formulation by the mathematician Jacob Bernoulli, and one that became standard, almost all people involved in decision theory made a severe mistake. Everyone? Not quite: every economist, but not everyone: the applied mathematicians Claude Shannon, Ed Thorp, and the physicist J.-L. Kelly of the Kelly Criterion got it right. They also got it in a very simple way. The father of insurance mathematics, the Swedish applied mathematician Harald Cramér also got the point. And, more than two decades ago, practitioners such as Mark Spitznagel and myself build our entire business careers around it.
(I personally get it right in words and when I trade and decisions, and detect when ergodicity is violated, but I never explicitly got the overall mathematical structure –ergodicity is actually discussed in Fooled by Randomness).
Spitznagel and I even started an entire business to help investors eliminate uncle points so they can get the returns of the market. While I retired to do some flaneuring, Mark continued at his Universa relentlessly (and successfully, while all others have failed). Mark and I have been frustrated by economists who, not getting ergodicity, keep saying that worrying about the tails is “irrational”. 발췌
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배진영
한국 외교는 오늘로 끝장났다.일본은 물론 세계 그 어떤 나라도 이제 한국을 신뢰할 수 있는 나라라고 생각하지 않을 것이다.탈레반 또는 북한이나 할 짓을 했다.
[출처] 배진영 -----한국 외교는 오늘로 끝장났다.
[출처] 배진영 -----한국 외교는 오늘로 끝장났다.
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