2018년 9월 14일 금요일

조경태 자유한국당 의원이 제주도 무사증(무비자) 제도 폐지를 요구하며 “중국 당국이 나쁜 마음만 먹으면 제주도가 점령 당할 수도 있다”고 주장했다.

조 의원은 29일 국회 예산결산특별위원회 전체회의에서 “제주 무사증 불법체류자가 1만4000여명에 달하는 데 (그 중) 중국인기 가장 많다”며 “관련 자료를 보면 중국인이 (제주도) 토지도 최근 많이 매입하고 있다”고 밝혔다.

그는 “현재 제주도에 중국인이 소유한 땅이 여의도 면적의 3.2배를 넘어섰다. 앞으로 더 살 것으로 생각되는데, 중국인들이 제주도 땅을 많이 사는 건 미래적 관점에서 보면 위험하다”고 지적했다. 이어 “기우겠지만 중국 당국이 나쁜 마음만 먹으면 제주도가 점령 당할 수 있다고 본다”고 말했다. 지난해 중국인이 보유한 제주도 땅 면적은 944만5000㎡로 2016년 대비 12.1% 증가했다....
[출처] 조경태, “중국인 제주도 땅 매입 급증…나쁜 마음 먹으면 제주도 점령될 수도”
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

윤서인이 징역 1년을 구형받게 된 문제의 만화. 하지만 그 내용은 사실과 부합했다.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
김명수 사법부' 어디쯤 가고 있나?
류근일

사법 진보주의는 1977년 미국 위스콘신대학에서 있었던 법학도들의 한 모임에서 비롯했다. 1960년대 반전(反戰) 운동, 인종 갈등, 페미니즘, 빈곤 문제, 성(性) 소수자 문제를 접했던 진보 법학도들이 CLS(critical legal studies·비판 법학) 운동을 시작했다. 법은 객관적·보편적 진리를 대표하지 않고 그때그때 지배 권력, 당시로선 백인 권력, 남성 우월주의, 가진 자, 가부장(家父長)제의 도구에 불과하다는 것이다. 
  
  CLS 운동은 '사법 행위는 정치 행위'라고 선언했다. 보수가 법을 '보수 입맛대로' 써먹었다면 진보도 법을 '진보 입맛대로' 써먹어야 한다는 것이다. 그것도 진보 판사 개개인 입맛대로. 법 해석엔 받들어 모셔야 할 꼭 하나의 정답이란 없다(불확정성)는 식이다. 
  
  이래서 그들은 법조문 자체보다 진보 사회과학·사회철학·문화이론의 잣대로 법을 해석한다. 프랑크푸르트학파의 네오(新)마르크스주의, 현대 프랑스 철학 포스트 모더니즘(근대 합리주의와 기술 발달, 자본주의 관리 사회는 대량 살상과 지구 파괴·억압 구조였다는 주장) 같은 게 그것이다. 
  
  이들은 기성 사회의 편견에 저항한다는 그 나름의 의미를 부여받을 수 있었다. 반면 반론도 만만치 않았다. '법을 정치적 당파성에 매이게 한다'와 '자유주의 법치에 대한 실패한 공격이다' '법리(法理)적이지 않고 과장되고 모호하다'는 식의 비판이었다. (발췌)
---------------------------------------------------------
내각 위의 권력? 임종석 비서실장의 월권(越權) 사례



조샛별(조갑제닷컴)




현 정권의 핵심실세는 임하룡이다.”라는 말이 여의도 정치판에서 회자된다는 기사를 읽은 적이 있다. 물론 80년대 인기 개그맨 임하룡 씨가 아니라, 청와대 핵심요직 3인방인 임종석 비서실장, 장하성 정책실장, 정의용 안보실장을 가리키는 말이다.(발췌)
-----------------------------------
--->헛소리!   한국정부에서 뒷돈을 받았거나 엄청나게 잘못된 정보를 받고 있거나... 
-----------------------------------------------
  인간의 뇌는 출생 이후에 백지장이었지만, 학습에 의해 남자나 여자로 성장한다는 좌파들의 말은 거짓이다.

Sex, Gender and Bullshit Part 6: Are science and gender studies in conflict? | We The Internet TV



---------------------------------------------------------------
3개의 뉴딜: 나치와 파시스트는 왜 루스벨트를 좋아했나
 
루스벨트의 뉴딜을 비판하는 사람들은 그것을 파시즘과 비견한다. 루스벨트의 변호인들은 이런 비난을 무시하지만, Schivelbusch이 분명히 밝혔듯이 그것은 완전한 사실이다.
나치의 당 기관지는 루스벨트가 경제, 사회 정책에서 국가사회주의적 사고를 채용했다고 강조했다.
루스벨트가 모든 시민에게 부과한 도덕적 요구는, ‘공공의 복지는 개인의 이익을 넘어선다는 독일 국가 철학의 핵심이기도 했다.
히틀러와 무솔리니는 2차대전 전에는 일반의 생각과 달리 상당한 찬사를 받았다.
뉴딜이 비록 연성 파시즘이었지만, 강압의 요소는 모두 갖추고 있었다.
뉴딜은 사회적 개입을 정당화하기 위해 영구적인 위기 또는 영구적인 전쟁을 필요로 하는 상황을 만들어갔다.
 
Three New Deals: Why the Nazis and Fascists Loved FDR
 
David Gordon
[Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt's America, Mussolini's Italy, and Hitler's Germany, 1933-1939. By Wolfgang Schivelbusch. Metropolitan Books, 2006. 242 pgs.]

Critics of Roosevelt's New Deal often liken it to fascism. Roosevelt's numerous defenders dismiss this charge as reactionary propaganda; but as Wolfgang Schivelbusch makes clear, it is perfectly true. Moreover, it was recognized to be true during the 1930s, by the New Deal's supporters as well as its opponents.
 
When Roosevelt took office in March 1933, he received from Congress an extraordinary delegation of powers to cope with the Depression.
 
The broad-ranging powers granted to Roosevelt by Congress, before that body went into recess, were unprecedented in times of peace. Through this "delegation of powers," Congress had, in effect, temporarily done away with itself as the legislative branch of government. The only remaining check on the executive was the Supreme Court. In Germany, a similar process allowed Hitler to assume legislative power after the Reichstag burned down in a suspected case of arson on February 28, 1933. (p. 18).
 
The Nazi press enthusiastically hailed the early New Deal measures: America, like the Reich, had decisively broken with the "uninhibited frenzy of market speculation." The Nazi Party newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, "stressed 'Roosevelt's adoption of National Socialist strains of thought in his economic and social policies,' praising the president's style of leadership as being compatible with Hitler's own dictatorial Führerprinzip" (p. 190).
 
Nor was Hitler himself lacking in praise for his American counterpart. He "told American ambassador William Dodd that he was 'in accord with the President in the view that the virtue of duty, readiness for sacrifice, and discipline should dominate the entire people. These moral demands which the President places before every individual citizen of the United States are also the quintessence of the German state philosophy, which finds its expression in the slogan "The Public Weal Transcends the Interest of the Individual"'" (pp. 19-20). A New Order in both countries had replaced an antiquated emphasis on rights.
 
Mussolini, who did not allow his work as dictator to interrupt his prolific journalism, wrote a glowing review of Roosevelt's Looking Forward. He found "reminiscent of fascism the principle that the state no longer leaves the economy to its own devices"; and, in another review, this time of Henry Wallace's New Frontiers, Il Duce found the Secretary of Agriculture's program similar to his own corporativism (pp. 23-24).
 
Roosevelt never had much use for Hitler, but Mussolini was another matter. "'I don't mind telling you in confidence,' FDR remarked to a White House correspondent, 'that I am keeping in fairly close touch with that admirable Italian gentleman'" (p. 31). Rexford Tugwell, a leading adviser to the president, had difficulty containing his enthusiasm for Mussolini's program to modernize Italy: "It's the cleanest most efficiently operating piece of social machinery I've ever seen. It makes me envious" (p. 32, quoting Tugwell).
 
Why did these contemporaries sees an affinity between Roosevelt and the two leading European dictators, while most people today view them as polar opposites? People read history backwards: they project the fierce antagonisms of World War II, when America battled the Axis, to an earlier period. At the time, what impressed many observers, including as we have seen the principal actors themselves, was a new style of leadership common to America, Germany, and Italy.
 
Once more we must avoid a common misconception. Because of the ruthless crimes of Hitler and his Italian ally, it is mistakenly assumed that the dictators were for the most part hated and feared by the people they ruled. Quite the contrary, they were in those pre-war years the objects of considerable adulation. A leader who embodied the spirit of the people had superseded the old bureaucratic apparatus of government.
 
While Hitler's and Roosevelt's nearly simultaneous ascension to power highlighted fundamental differences contemporary observers noted that they shared an extraordinary ability to touch the soul of the people. Their speeches were personal, almost intimate. Both in their own way gave their audiences the impression that they were addressing not the crowd, but each listener as an individual. (p. 54)
 
But does not Schivelbusch's thesis fall before an obvious objection? No doubt Roosevelt, Hitler, and Mussolini were charismatic leaders; and all of them rejected laissez-faire in favor of the new gospel of a state-managed economy. But Roosevelt preserved civil liberties, while the dictators did not.
 
Schivelbusch does not deny the manifest differences between Roosevelt and the other leaders; but even if the New Deal was a "soft fascism", the elements of compulsion were not lacking. The "Blue Eagle" campaign of the National Recovery Administration serves as his principal example. Businessmen who complied with the standards of the NRA received a poster that they could display prominently in their businesses. Though compliance was supposed to be voluntary, the head of the program, General Hugh Johnson, did not shrink from appealing to illegal mass boycotts to ensure the desired results.
 
"The public," he [Johnson] added, "simply cannot tolerate non-compliance with their plan." In a fine example of doublespeak, the argument maintained that cooperation with the president was completely voluntary but that exceptions would not be tolerated because the will of the people was behind FDR. As one historian [Andrew Wolvin] put it, the Blue Eagle campaign was "based on voluntary cooperation, but those who did not comply were to be forced into participation." (p. 92)
 
Schivelbusch compares this use of mass psychology to the heavy psychological pressure used in Germany to force contributions to the Winter Relief Fund.
 
Both the New Deal and European fascism were marked by what Wilhelm Röpke aptly termed the "cult of the colossal." The Tennessee Valley Authority was far more than a measure to bring electrical power to rural areas. It symbolized the power of government planning and the war on private business:
 
The TVA was the concrete-and-steel realization of the regulatory authority at the heart of the New Deal. In this sense, the massive dams in the Tennessee Valley were monuments to the New Deal, just as the New Cities in the Pontine Marshes were monuments to Fascism But beyond that, TVA propaganda was also directed against an internal enemy: the capitalist excesses that had led to the Depression(pp. 160, 162)
 
This outstanding study is all the more remarkable in that Schivelbusch displays little acquaintance with economics. Mises and Hayek are absent from his pages, and he grasps the significance of architecture much more than the errors of Keynes. Nevertheless, he has an instinct for the essential. He concludes the book by recalling John T. Flynn's great book of 1944, As We Go Marching.
 
Flynn, comparing the New Deal with fascism, foresaw a problem that still faces us today.
 
But willingly or unwillingly, Flynn argued, the New Deal had put itself into the position of needing a state of permanent crisis or, indeed, permanent war to justify its social interventions. "It is born in crisis, lives on crises, and cannot survive the era of crisis. Hitler's story is the same." Flynn's prognosis for the regime of his enemy Roosevelt sounds more apt today than when he made it in 1944 "We must have enemies," he wrote in As We Go Marching. "They will become an economic necessity for us." (pp. 186, 191)
 
Originally published September 2006.
---------------------------------------

댓글 없음:

댓글 쓰기