[개분노]- [중국 사관학교]에서 [SARS]를 무기화시키는 교육을 해온 [교육교재]가 발견됨. [우한폐렴]이 [생물학적무기]인 결정적 증거가 나옴. Truth21 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11341359500 경악할만한 뉴스가 나왔다. Chinese document discussing weaponising coronaviruses provides 'chilling' information Sky News Australia https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuKPBur_TiI 2015년에 중공에 있는 사관학교 교수가 향후 몇 년간 SARS를 무기화 하는 방법을 교육시키고 연구시킨 교재가 나왔다. 이건 [석정리]라는 [우한연구소]의 생물학 무기 연구를 촉발시킨 원인으로 지목되고 있다. 중공에서 유명한 사관학교의 명예교수이며, 이 교육을 지속적으로 시킨 것으로 밝혀졌다. [인간을 상대로 한 신생물학적 무기]라는 이 교재에서는 다음과 같은 [희대의 악랄한 계획]을 세우고 있다. 1. SARS 는 미국이 만들어서 중국에 심은 생물학적 무기이므로, 중국도 비슷하게 대비를 해야 한다. 2. SARS를 잘 퍼뜨릴 수 있는 방법은 다양해서 폭발물보다 훨씬 위력이 있다. 3. 적당한 온도와 습도, 바람을 통해 [공기로 전염]시키는 것이 가장 효과적이다. 4. 바이러스가 퍼질 경우, 상대국가의 멘탈이 나가고, 의료체계를 효과적으로 마비시킬 수 있다. 이 연구교재를 가지고 몇 백명의 사관학도들을 가르쳐 왔고, 그들이 전부 연구에 매진해 오다 일이 터진 것이다. 작년 우한폐렴 초기에, 일부러 침을 묻히고 다니던 [중국인]들이 의도적으로 병원균을 퍼뜨린 것으로 확신할 수 있는 이유다. 특히나, 미국이 다른 국가에 비해 크게 피해를 본 점이 이를 뒷받침한다. 앵커 말로는 이 내용을 중국 공산당 간부들에게도 수십번 강연을 했다고 한다. --->사스가 인공적으로 만들어진 서방의 공격 무기라는 주장을 펼친 사람은 중국인 徐德忠(쉬더종) , 李峰(리펑)이다. 비디오의 호주 여자는 쉬더종의 발음을 잘 모르고 있다. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 중앙일보 [단독]"4.4조 들여 北공항 건설" 인천시 보고서, 與는 법 발의 '인천공항 대북 교류 거점 연구' 용역 보고서 "국비 등 투입해 9개 북한 공항 정비·건설" 방안 여당 의원들 '남북 항공협력' 명시한 법 개정안 고란 댓글달기 이건 아무것도 어니야 고성은 북한 고성 남한 고성을 연결해 경제특구로 만들려고 한다 홍콩처럼 저 법안이 3개 더있는데 자치법안이라 강원도 맘대로 하는 거임 강원도는 최문순이 3번 해줬는데 평창 그렇게 지원 받고 다 말아먹었지 이젠 짱개 북한한테 땅주고 지옥으로가라 꼴좋다 감자새끼들 지금 민주당 놈들 자치법으로 다음 대선 털려도 진행하려고 꼼수 쓰는중 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 공산당문재인정부 구글통제압박 5만5천개기사지움/일본의 50배,미국의 5.7배 ㅎㄷㄷ 매경 ---> 삭제 당하는 자유 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 충격! 물 없는 세종보 공주보 강바닥 드러나 정부 수문 활짝 얼어 보를 무용지물로 만들었다 https://youtu.be/YrksOcCP_Uk --->여름에 비가 오지 않으면, 재앙이 될 것이다. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [칼럼] 문재인 ‘한 번도 경험 못한 나라’가 북한‧중국 식민지였다 이계성 한강의기적 신화 창조했던 한국이 중국과 북한에 조공을 바치는 3류 국가로 추락 중국과 북한에 조공을 바치게 만든 문재인을 대깨문들은 문재인 보유국이라 자랑 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 미군내 공산혁명 적신호!!! 현역 공군 중령 육필 경고. 저항할 수 없는가? #407​. 210509 백두산캠프 https://youtu.be/ukiUBMSAeRw ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- “One death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic.” Where did that come from? The answer is in DOOM. "한 사람의 죽음은 비극이지만, 백만 명의 죽음은 통계일 뿐이다." 위의 말은 스탈린의 말이라고 하지만, 1947년 워싱턴포스트에 칼럼을 쓴 레너드 라이온스는 딱히 근거를 밝히지 않았다. 그런데 그 말은 그전에 베를린의 풍자가 쿠르트 투촐스키, 또 그 전에는 프랑스의 외교관이 했다고 한다. --닐 퍼거슨 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 재커리 카터가 쓴 케인즈의 전기 서평 케인즈는 대공황 시기에 자신의 <일반이론>을 썼지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 그는 결핍이 더 이상 문제가 되지 않는다고 생각했다. 그는 풍요의 가능성이 바로 가까이에, 아니 가까운 미래에 있다고 믿었다. 따라서 진정한 경제학의 문제는 그 풍요를 분배해서, 이기적인 투기꾼들이 대중을 가난하게 하는 대신, 풍요를 독차지 하지 않게 하는 거라고 생각했다. 믿기지 않는 얘기지만, 케인즈는 정말 그렇게 믿었다. 케인즈는 화폐가 정부의 창조물이고, 계속적인 화폐 공급의 팽창으로 역사적 진보가 발생했다고 주장한다. 아담 스미스는 정부가 생기기 전에 시장이 발생했다고 말했는데, 케인즈는 그건 잘못된 역사이고, 자본주의 자체가 기원전 3천년 경의 바빌론 제국에서 비롯되었다고 주장한다. 또 인플레가 역사 기록이 남아 있는 모든 시기의 상시적인 현상이었다는 것이다. 그는 번영에 이르는 방법으로 정부의 통화 공급 확장, 그리고 투자의 통제 2가지를 들었다. 나아가 그는 자신의 생각이 실현되려면 정부가 모든 투자의 2/3를 통제해야 한다고 생각했다. Keynes Thought Scarcity Would Disappear in the Near Future. Boy, Was He Wrong. David Gordon The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy, and the Life of John Maynard Keynes by Zachary D. Carter Random House, 2021 [2020] xxii + 628 pages For many people, though not, to be sure, readers of The Austrian, John Maynard Keynes ranks as the greatest economist of the twentieth century; but for Zachary D. Carter, this is a restrained understatement. Carter, a writer on economics at the HuffPost, says this about Keynes: No European mind since Newton had impressed himself so profoundly on both the political and intellectual development of the world. When the [London] Times wrote Keynes’ obituary, it declared him ”the greatest economist since Adam Smith.” But even praise so high as this sold Keynes short, for Keynes was to Smith as Copernicus was to Ptolemy—a thinker who replaced one paradigm with another. In his economic work he fused psychology, history, political theory, and observed financial experience like no economist before or since. (p. 368) Those who make their way through this long book will likely come away puzzled with Carter’s enthusiasm. Keynes held bizarre beliefs, far stranger than the familiar underconsumptionist fallacy that the government needs to bolster insufficient aggregate demand. Though he wrote his most famous book about economic theory in the midst of the Great Depression, he thought that scarcity was no longer a problem. The potential for abundance was at hand, or soon would be; the real economic problem was to distribute this abundance so that selfish speculators would not take it all for themselves, leaving the masses in poverty. This sounds unbelievable, but Keynes really did claim this. Summarizing Keynes’s position, Carter says, Prior to The General Theory, economics was almost exclusively concerned with scarcity and efficiency. The very word for the productive output of society—economy—was a metaphor for making do with less. The root cause of human suffering was understood to be a shortage of resources to meet human needs…. This was the worldview of what Keynes called the “classical economists.”… But the sheer productive power of modern capitalism and the “miracle of compound interest” had rendered the portrait obsolete. Technological advances now allowed people to produce so much more with so much less effort than they had in the past that scarcity was no longer the overriding problem of humanity. (pp. 258–59) What stands in the way of abundance for all? In essence, the problem is money. People hoard money because they fear an uncertain future, and if they hoard money, businessmen will be reluctant to invest. Attempts to cut costs by reducing wages exacerbate the problem, since this lessens consumers’ spending. The classical economists wrongly assumed that adjustments in relative prices suffice to take care of shortages and surpluses. “Say’s law” ensured that there could not be a “general glut” or depression. Keynes rejects Say’s law, arguing that it ignores the cumulative power of pessimistic expectations. It does not help matters that Keynes misstates the law: “For Keynes, the soft underbelly of the classical theory was Say’s Law, which he summarized as the maxim that ‘supply creates its own demand.’” (p. 261) The law in fact says that the supply of a commodity is demand for other commodities. The technical difficulties of Keynesian theory have been covered amply and in depth by, among others, Henry Hazlitt, W.H. Hutt, and Murray Rothbard, and I do not propose to deal with them at further length here. What is important for our purposes is the mindset with which Keynes addresses the problems he alleges exist for the free market. For him the underlying problem is that an elite of official experts is not in control of money and investment. If only our betters, quintessentially Keynes himself, were in charge, then money creation and governmentally controlled investment would generate prosperity for all. Money does not arise, as the classical economists, here followed by the Austrian school, thought, as a way to overcome the difficulties of barter. It is a creation of the state, and Keynes developed a peculiar theory of history according to which the continued expansion of the money supply drives historical progress. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith had presented markets for trade as a primordial force that came into being long before the development of the political state…. The market was natural, while the state was a relatively recent artifice that intervened in or distorted the independent rhythms of trade … Keynes concluded that this history was all wrong. Capitalism itself was an ancient creation of government, dating back at least as far as the Babylonian Empire of the third millennium B.C.…. Inflation—viewed by orthodox economists of the 1920s as an underhanded sovereign’s subversion of the natural order—had instead been a near-constant condition ”throughout all periods of recorded history.” (pp. 167–69) In his Treatise on Money, Keynes argued that government expansion of the money supply would by itself lead to abundance, but he changed his mind. Government control of investment is needed as well. In The General Theory, he calls for a “somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment,” and in an article for the Quarterly Journal of Economics in February 1937, Keynes speculated on what would happen after a European war. He hoped that a program of government control of investment would enable most fluctuations in employment to be eliminated. “Keynes thought that the government would need to control about two-thirds of all investment in the economy for his idea to work” (p. 402). Readers of Ludwig von Mises will recognize a familiar pattern. Government control of the economy, while preserving the outward forms of private ownership of the means of production, exactly describes the economic system of Nazi Germany. Carter calls to our attention many critical remarks by Keynes about Hitler, but he nowhere mentions Keynes's notorious foreword to the German translation of The General Theory. In it he says, The theory of aggregate production, which is the point of the following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state [eines totalen Staates] than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire. This is one of the reasons that justifies the fact that I call my theory a general theory. Since it is based on fewer hypotheses than the orthodox theory, it can accommodate itself all the easier to a wider field of varying conditions. Keynes in his recommendations suffers from an odd blindness. He starts from a genuine insight, the uncertainty of the future. He here is on the same side as Mises, and against the neoclassicals, who fail to recognize the distinction between risk and uncertainty, though the consequences he draws from this for the economy are diametrically opposed to Mises’s policy conclusions. But he takes for granted that the experts who run the state somehow can with precision foretell the future. Would not the problems of free market entrepreneurs be magnified, not solved, by this desperate remedy? Keynes fails to see this because of his invincible conviction of his own superiority to the common lot. Plebian businessmen may be baffled by the future; not so him and his ilk. If they control money and guide investment, all will be well. And it is this same failing that resolves another quandary. How can Keynes have thought that scarcity no longer posed a problem? Don’t people continue to want more and more material goods, no matter how much technology develops? Yes, in this sense “scarcity” remains, but Keynes thought that people ought to abandon such crudities. They should instead cultivate the refined pleasures afforded by certain states of mind. Like his fellow members of the Bloomsbury Set, he thought that the “profound truths were pure ‘states of mind’ achieved in moments of mutual understanding between lovers or afternoons spent contemplating great works of art” (p. 26). In the happy world of abundance on the horizon, people would come to share these tastes, and the expertly controlled government would guide us to this attenuated vision of abundance. In fact, the Bloomsbury Set, far from being an elite, looking down from above at the rest of us, were a sorry lot, (though the set included people of genuine artistic achievement) preoccupied with their epicene practices and the description and disclosure to the world of their own thoughts and feelings. It is not surprising that Keynes looks at the economy from the perspective of a government bureaucrat; this is exactly what, for a significant part of his life, he was. Carter brings out very well that during World War II, Keynes was the main planner of the British war economy, and it was for this reason, not his theoretical achievements, that he was elevated to the peerage. Though we cannot share Carter’s opinion of Keynes, the author has done a useful job in presenting his views, though Keynes's strong interest in eugenics is veiled in silence. Perhaps Carter surmises we would think less of his master if the topic were frankly discussed. Unfortunately, the author does not confine himself to Keynes and comments on others as well, and in doing so he turns a useful, if flawed, book into a near disaster. He absurdly underrates Hayek, treating him as an economist of little consequence whom Keynes barely deigned to notice. In fact, Hayek’s review of the Treatise on Money destroyed the theoretical framework of the book, greatly to Keynes’s embarrassment, though he tried to shrug it off. The Road to Serfdom is not an “attack on the political implications of Keynesian economics” (p. 341); that book does not discuss Keynesian economics at all. He bears for Herbert Luhnow of the William Volker Fund an inexplicable animus, describing him as addled and insinuating that he sympathized with Hitler ([p. 386] that page contains another item of interest, though I shall leave this for readers to discover). I could go on at much further length, but I have had all of Zachary Carter that I can take. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------