정세균: 미국 백신 금수 조치, 깡패들이나 하는 짓 --->자기들이 일부러 백신 예약을 늦추었으면서, 이제 와서 미국을 탓하고 있다. 이노스케 댓글달기 @조선인사기력 사람들이 중국 경제 제재 무섭다고 호들갑 떨면서 미국 무서운줄은 모르는데 미국은 단순히 무역 제재만 하는게 아니라 금융 제재까지 가능함 중국은 한국으로부터 중국입장에서 반드시 필요한 중간재를 사가고 있어서 중국이 한국을 경제 제재하면 할수록 오히려 중국이 더 큰 타격을 받기 때문에 중국은 한국을 전면적으로 경제 제재할수도 없고 장기적으로 경제 제재할수도 없음 반면에 미국의 경제 제재는 한국을 세계 최빈국으로 만들어버릴 수 있음 미국의 적이 되면 경제 제재뿐만 아니라 국제 항로에서 한국 상선의 통행이 차단되고 미국 달러 중심인 국제 결제 시스템에서 한국이 퇴출당하게 될수 있음 21세기 신냉전시대에 어느 한쪽을 선택하지 않으면 양쪽에서 귀싸대기 날라올 가능성이 높음 차라리 미국을 선택해서 중국에서 날라오는 귀싸대기만 맞는게 그나마 나은 선택임 --- @이노스케 한국에서 중국으로 가는 수출품 중 95%는 중간재임 중국은 한국으로부터 중국입장에서 반드시 필요한 중간재를 사가고 있어서 중국이 한국을 경제 제재하면 할수록 오히려 중국이 더 큰 타격을 받기 때문에 중국은 한국을 전면적으로 경제 제재할수도 없고 장기적으로 경제 제재할수도 없음 한국에서 중간재를 만들어서 중국으로 중간재를 수출하면 중국에서 완제품으로 만들어서 미국으로 수출하기 때문에 어차피 한국발 수출품의 최종 목적지는 미국 소비 시장임 경제적으로 보나 군사적으로 보나 미국을 등졌을 때 훨씬 더 위험한 상황에 처하게 됨 --- @이노스케 일본이 확실하게 반중 친미해서 얻어낸 결과 (미일정상회담 4.16 공동성명 요약) 1. 미일양국 간의 5G, 인공 지능, 나노 기술, 양자 컴퓨팅, 바이오테크, 백신 기술 공유할 것 2. 4차산업 기술 공유 실천을 위해 Competitiveness and Resilience partnership (약칭: CORE) 체결함 3. 4차산업 기술 공유 실천을 위해 미국은 25억 달러, 일본은 20억 달러 각 각 투자할 것 4. 동중국해, 남중국해에서의 합동 항행 작전 실시할 것 5. 대만의 평화와 안정을 지켜낼 것 (1969년 이후 대만이 미일 정상회의에서 언급된 건 처음) 6. 중국이 경제보복할 경우 미일이 공동으로 대응할 것 7. 홍콩, 티베트, 위구르 인권을 위해 지원할 것 8. 미국은 핵무기를 포함 모든 수단을 동원해 미일동맹의 방위공약 이행할 것 (핵무기를 명시적으로 언급함) 9. 일본의 군사력 강화를 위해 미국이 기술 지원할 것 10. 북한의 완전한 비핵화 및 일본인 납북자 문제 해결할 것 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 지금 대한민국의 상황이 너무 비참하다 개똥벌래 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11337882732 출산율은 세계 꼴찌 남녀 갈등, 세대 갈등은 세계 최고 젊은 애들은 꿈도 없고 그저 유튜브나 코인에 미쳐 있고 버는 족족 외제차 사고 명품 사는데 혈안 되어 있고 물질만증주의는 극에 달해서 곧 죽어도 명품,외제차는 사야되고 다들 하이에나 마냥 유명인들중 뭐 하나 잘못하면 몰려와서 공격하기 바쁘고 정치인들은 나라 팔아먹고 있고.. 지금 대한민국은 희망도 없고, 꿈도 없고, 낭만도 없고, 사랑도 없고, 철학도 없고, 사색도 없다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 불타는 국회의원 모형... 문 대통령은 이 말 꼭 들으십시오 [최병성 리포트] 농토를 대기업에 넘기는 태양광 설치 사업, 이건 그린뉴딜이 아니다/ 오마이뉴스 cred**** 세계 최고 수준의 원자력은 폐쇄시키고 효율 적고 자연을 훼손시키는 태양광이라.ㅡㅡ역사가 훗날 심판할거다. naha**** 원전기술은 중국에 바치고, 중국 태양광으로 나라를 도배하는 이정권이 정상이냐? 대께들아 정신채려라.. yeop**** 와 진짜 태양광에 대해 좀 아시는 기자분이시네요.. 진짜 현실은 심각합니다.. 염해농지 기준이 심토 60cm인데다가 농어촌공사에도 태양광발전이 할당되는게 말인지요. bby2**** 문재인 감방가자 선진국은 탈원전에서 원전으로 돌아섰는데 자연훼손하며서까지 태양광 후손들에게 황폐화된 국토를 물려줄것인가 사리사욕 당리당략만 생각하는 대통령으로써 자격없다 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IMF, 한국만 콕집어…"코로나 끝나도 재정지출 안 줄 것" IMF, 35개국 재정모니터 / 매경 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 위기를 이용해 정부 권력을 휘두르고 확장하는 12가지의 그럴 듯한 구실들 위기를 이용한 정책 결정은 장기적으로 정부의 몸집을 부풀렸는데, 톱니바퀴 효과를 통해 임시적인 비상 조치들이 정부의 권력을 확장시켰다. 1. 이런 상황은 사상 초유의 일이다. 2. 정부가 개입하지 않으면 상황은 점점 악화될 뿐이다. 3. 지금이 중요하다. 우리는 당장 행동에 나서야 한다. A Dozen Dangerous Presumptions of Crisis Policymaking Robert Higgs Congress and the president have adopted many critically important policies in great haste during brief periods of perceived national emergency. During the first “hundred days” of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration in the spring of 1933, for example, the government abandoned the gold standard, enacted a system of wide-ranging controls, taxes, and subsidies in agriculture, and set in motion a plan to cartelize the nation’s manufacturing industries. In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted in a rush even though no member of Congress had read it in its entirety. Since September 2008, the government and the Federal Reserve System have implemented a rapid-fire series of bailouts, loans, “stimulus” spending programs and partial or complete takeover of big banks and other large firms, acting at each step in great haste. Any government policymaking on an important matter entails serious risks, but crisis policymaking stands apart from the more deliberate process in which new legislation is usually enacted or new regulatory measures are usually put into effect. Because formal institutional changes—however hastily they might have been made—have a strong tendency to become entrenched, remaining in effect for many years and sometimes for many decades, crisis policymaking has played an important part in generating long-term growth of government through a ratchet effect in which “temporary” emergency measures have expanded the government’s size, scope, or power. It therefore behooves us to recognize the typical presumptions that give crisis policymaking its potency. The twelve propositions given here express some of the ideas that are advanced or assumed again and again in connection with episodes of quick, fear-driven policymaking—events whose long-term consequences are often counterproductive. 1. Nothing like the present situation has ever happened before. If the existing crisis were seen as simply the latest incident in a series of similar crises, policy makers and the public would be more inclined to relax, appreciating that such rough seas have been navigated successfully in the past and will be navigated successfully on this occasion, too. Fears would be relieved. Exaggerated doomsday scenarios would be dismissed as overwrought and implausible. Such relaxation, however, would ill serve the sponsors of extraordinary government measures, regardless of their motives for seeking adoption of these measures. Fear is a great motivator, so the proponents of expanded government action have an incentive to represent the current situation as unprecedented and therefore as uniquely menacing unless the government intervenes forcefully to save the day. 2. Unless the government intervenes, the situation will get worse and worse. Crisis always presents some sort of worsening of something: the economy’s output has fallen; prices have risen greatly; the country has been attacked by foreigners. If such untoward developments were seen as having occurred in a one-off manner, then people might be content to stick with the institutional status quo. If, however, people project the recent changes forward, imagining that adverse events will continue to occur and possibly to gather strength as they continue, then they will object to a “do nothing” response, reasoning that “something must be done” lest the course of events eventuate in an utterly ruinous situation. To speed a huge, complex, “anti-terrorism” bill through Congress in 2001, George W. Bush invoked the specter of another terrorist attack. Barack Obama, Invoking the specter of economic collapse, rushed through Congress early in 2009 the huge Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Act before any legislator had digested it. In a February 5, 2009, op-ed in the Washington Post, he wrote, “If nothing is done … our nation will sink deeper into a crisis that, at some point, we may not be able to reverse.”1 At a February 9 press conference, he said “[A] failure to act will only deepen this crisis,” and “could turn a crisis into a catastrophe.”2 3. Today is all-important; we must act immediately. In his first inaugural address, Franklin D. Roosevelt declared, “This nation asks for action, and action now.” He then proceeded directly to speak of the most terrifying problem of the day, mass unemployment. "Our greatest primary task is the put people to work … It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war, but at the same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and reorganize the use of our national resources." In any event, "The people want direct, vigorous action."3 Similarly, not long after taking office, Barack Obama similarly declared, not long after taking office, “The situation is getting worse. We have to act and act now to break the momentum of this recession.”4 “Doing nothing is not an option,” he said in Elkhart, Indiana on February 9. “The situation we face could not be more serious,” and “we can’t afford to wait.” 5 In the February 5 op-ed, listing a series of objectives he claimed the pending legislation would achieve, he began four successive paragraphs with the words “now is the time to…”6 4. Government officials know or can quickly discover how to remedy the problem. All government policies adopted to meet a crisis presume that the government knows how to effect the rescue it seeks. The government officials may sometimes admit, as in the early new deal, that is does not know exactly how to proceed, yet it maintains that “doing something” is better than doing nothing. Roosevelt maintained that the government ought to try something and, if that measure failed, then try something else. Thus, ignorant flailing about— on the assumption that “doing something” has no costs, adverse effects, or untoward long-term consequences—has been touted as a virtue, and indeed many members of the public, no more expert than the government itself have agreed that the government must “try something.” 5. We may safely rely on the establishment and on its insiders for expertise in this crisis. As a common first step in reacting to a crisis, the government often assembles a council of experts or some such group of wise men and women. These experts are invariable drawn from the government itself and from groups with whom the government maintains cozy relations. The experts frequently include those who had responsibility for carrying out the government policies that contributed to the occurrence of the crisis in the first place. Thus, no matter how ill fated monetary policy may have been, the government will call on the secretary of the Treasury and the head of the Federal Reserve System to decide, perhaps along with others, what should be done next. In this constructed circle, the range of possible future actions the government might take is almost always no wider than the range of actions taken in the past. Hence, the “experts” are subject to repeating the same errors time and again. 6. We may trust the government to act responsibly and effectively on the basis of the expertise they command. The public looks to government officials and their assembled “wise men” to act in the public interest and to organize their actions in an effective manner. If the policy makers lack the requisite knowledge, then such trust is bound to be misplaced, because no matter how responsibly the policy makers may try to be, they simply don’t know what they are doing. If they do have the requisite expertise, however, they may still fail to act on it because of their political, ideological, or personal interests and connections. The public tends to think of crises as akin to mechanical problems—the car’s engine is not running; policy makers need to give it a “jump start.” Crises, however, are rarely so simple. More often, they involve far-reaching relationships among many individuals, groups, and nations, and the lack of productive coordination that the crisis represents can seldom be restored by simple policy actions such as “the government ought to double its spending and rely on borrowed funds to cover its budget deficit. Complex political, social, and economic breakdowns rarely take a form subject to easy treatment activist policymakers (though many of them can take care of themselves if only policymakers stand aside from them.) 7. The clear benefits of quick government action may be assumed to outweigh its costs and its actual or potential negative consequences. Crisis decision making is not characterized by careful attempts to justify actions on a benefit-cost basis. If the situation is dire, policy makers and many members of the public simply assume that a policy with positive net benefits may be adopted. Little basis exists for this assumption. Even in a crisis, the government may take many actions whose costs and risks greatly outweigh any benefit they may bring. The potential is great for focuses on benefits that are immediate and visible while disregarding costs that are delayed and less easily perceived. Thus, policymakers are likely to plunge almost blindly ahead where more calculating angels fear to tread. 8. Fact finding, deliberation, study, and debate are too time-consuming and must be forgone in favor of immediate action. In April 1932, a year before the momentous explosion of New Deal measures after Roosevelt took office, Felix Frankfurter complained in a letter to Walter Lippmann that “one measure after another has been … hurriedly concocted…. They have been denominated emergency efforts, and any plea for deliberation, for detailed discussion, for exploration of alternatives has been regarded as obstructive or doctrinaire or both.” 7 The events of the spring 1933 congressional session raised all of these attributes by an order of magnitude. President Obama likewise recently declared that enough debate had occurred on the massive “stimulus” package even though it had been rushed through both houses of Congress, neither of which had paused to hold hearings on it. “We can’t posture and bicker. Endless delay and paralysis in Washington in the face of this crisis will only bring deepening disaster.”8 9. Existing structures and incumbent firms must be preserved; new structures and firms are unthinkable. Existing office holders, bureaucrats, firm managers, and owners have a decisive political advantage over possible alternative occupants of their positions (“new entrants”). Hence, the overriding theme in any crisis is that current politicians and capitalists must be preserved—propped up, bailed out, subsidized, whatever it takes to save them and their present organizations. In truth, however, the best way to deal with some crises is by getting rid of the persons and organizations that helped to bring them on. Bankruptcy, for examples, is not the end of the world, but simply the end of existing stockholders. If a company still possesses valuable assets, they will be transferred to new and presumably more competent managers. 10. If a policy is not getting the results its proponents promised, more money should be poured into it until it finally “works.” This presumption receives application to government policies in general, not simply to crisis policies in particular, but it gains force during a national emergency, when getting results as regarded as especially imperative. By the time Barack Obama became president, the U.S. Treasury and the Fed had made commitments for trillions of dollars in loans, capital infusions, loan guarantees, and other purposes. Yet, the economy continued to sink. The president and his senior advisers did not conclude that these measures had failed, but only that they had been too timid.11 Thus, President Obama told reporters that after Japan’s bust in the early 1990s, the Japanese government “did not act boldly or swiftly enough,” even though it spent trillions of dollars on construction projects. Likewise, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner concluded from his study of the Japanese stagnations that “spending must come in quick, massive doses, and be continued until recovery takes firm root.”9 11. We must not be deterred by the accumulation of public debt; there is no practical limit to the amount the government may safely borrow. Political office holders prefer to finance their spending by borrowing rather than taxing, if possible. That way, the public does not feel so dispossessed and therefore is less inclined to oppose the spending programs. In a national emergency, the office holders’ preference for deficit finance comes ever more boldly to the fore, and throughout history governments have tended to borrow heavily to pay for major wars. With the dawning of the Age of Keynes, deficit financing during recessions acquired an ostensible intellectual rationale, magnifying whatever inclinations the politicians already possessed. At present, the public debt is rising at an unprecedented rate, yet few people raise serious objections to the government’s spending program on this ground. Virtually everyone who matters politically is content to rely on what I call “vulgar Keynesianism”—or at least pretend to do so. 12. The occasion demands that policymakers put aside partisan or strictly political maneuvering and act entirely in the general public interest, and we can expect them to do act accordingly. After Woodrow Wilson had sought and gained a congressional declaration of war in 1917, he declared that “politics is adjourned.” By this expression, he sought to convey the idea that he would henceforth abstain from the usual partisan maneuvering and devote himself to prosecution of the war in the most effective way and that, he hoped, others would do the same. Whether his announcement of the adjournment was sincere or merely attempt to point those who disagreed with his war policies as partisan obstructionists, we do not know. We do know, however, that partisan political actions did not cease on either side.10 In a similar way, President Obama recently declared, “We are in one of those periods in American history where we don’t have Republicans or Democratic problems, we have American problems. My commitment as the incoming president is going to be to reach out across the aisle to both chambers to listen and not just talk, to not just try to dictate but try to create a partnership … [W]e’re … not going to get bogged down by old-style politics on either side.” 11A month later he reiterated this idea, denouncing “the same old partisan gridlock that stands in the way of action while our economy continues to slide.” And promising “We can place good ideas ahead of old ideological battles, and a sense of purpose above the same narrow partisanship.”12 Even as he made this declaration, however, partisan maneuvering continued as usual on both sides in Congress. Politics cannot be put aside. Politics is what politicians and political interest groups do. Partisanship is inevitable as political actors who seek conflicting ends struggle for maximum control of the government. [Chapter 6 of Delusions of Power, published by the Independent Institute.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------