[단독] 국가보안법 철폐 여론전 사업 계획서 입수 '충격'···이미 지난해 기획돼 [충격] 국가보안법 철폐론 수면위로···더불어민주당 범여권 73명 주최자 명단 공개 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 탄소중립 사기를 알아보자 모험자본가 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11350907260 1차 산업혁명(1760~1820)과 2차 산업혁명(1865~1900) 그리고 2차 세계대전(1939~1945)을 거치면서 인류의 이산화탄소(CO2) 배출량은 기하급수적으로 늘어났으며, 그 주요 원인은 석탄(43%), 석유(34%), 천연가스(18%) 등이다. 과거 10만년간의 이산화탄소량의 변화를 보면 최저 182ppm 수준까지 낮았던 수치가 산업혁명직전에는 280ppm까지 올라섰고, 산업혁명 이후에는 드라마틱하게 치솟아 2017년 현재 406ppm까지 올라갔고 계속 상승중이다. 빌게이츠는 이러한 기후재앙으로 인해 농사를 짓지 못하고, 산불로 인해 미국 농업생산이 급감할 것으로 예상하고 있다. 그래서 탄소중립정책 등을 통해 향후 30년 이내에 인류의 탄소배출량 510톤을 '0'으로 만들어야 한다고 책도 썼다. 세계 각국도 탄소중립 아젠다에 대한 대응책을 발표하고 있다. "그런데 말입니다" 이런 주장들이 사실일까?? 하나하나 따져보자. 1. 이산화탄소가 지구온도를 급상승시키고 있나?? - 아니다. 사실은 지난 300년간 지구는 서서히 1.5°C 정도 상승하여 왔으며 인류의 이산화탄소 배출량과 큰 상관관계는 없었다. 2. 인류의 이산화탄소 배출이 빙하축소와 해수면 상승의 원인이 아닌가? - 아니다. 오히려 지구온도의 상승이 빙하를 녹이고, 빙하가 녹으면서 해수면이 상승한 것일 뿐이다. 1825년경부터 190년간 지구온도 상승으로 빙하가 일정추세로 줄어들기 시작하였고, 이러한 경향은 이산화탄소 배출 급증시기인 2차세계대전 이후에도 별다른 영향 없이 그 추세가 그대로 유지되고 있다. 3. 아무튼 이산화탄소가 많아지고 기온이 올라가면 캘리포니아 처럼 산불이 많이 늘어나고 재앙이 오는 것이 아닌가? - 아니다. 이산화탄소가 많아지면 토양이 습해져 산불이 줄어든다. 기온이 올라가면 수증기가 더 많이 생기고 공기에 습기가 더 많아진다. 이산화탄소가 많아지면 식물이 물을 더 적게 소비하게 되어 토양에 습기가 많아진다. 따라서 미국의 산불발생 건수는 과거보다 매우 낮은 수준을 유지하고 있으며 전세계적으로 산불피해 지역은 지구온난화와 함께 지속적으로 감소하고 있다. 4. 하지만 빌게이츠는 이산화탄소 배출 급증에 따른 온난화에 따른 농업생산의 감소를 경고하고 있는데? - 멍청한 소리다. 이산화탄소의 증가는 인류의 축복이다. 동일한 조건에서 공기중 이산화탄소 수치가 높을 수록 식물의 성장을 촉진한다. 만약 이산화탄소가 지금보다 300ppm 더 많아진다면 평균적으로 46%의 농작물 수확증대가 예상된다. 지구의 이산화탄소 수치가 급증한 최근 30년 동안 지구 온난화로 인해 줄어든 녹지보다 늘어난 녹지가 훨씬 많아진 것을 알 수 있다. 특히 2000 ~2017년 사이에 아시아, 인도, 유럽은 이산화탄소 급증의 최대 수혜를 받았다고 할 수 있다. 5. 그렇지만 지금의 이산화탄소 수치는 인류를 위협할 정도로 너무 많은 수치 아닌가? - 아니다. 인류는 화석연료를 활용하게 되면서 너무 많이 줄어든 지구의 이산화탄소 수치를 정상화 시키는 중이다. 지구의 이산화탄소는 1억4천만년전 2500ppm에서 182ppm까지 떨어졌다가 인류의 화석연료 사용으로 비로소 반등하게 되었다. 이산화탄소는 조개류나 화석, 각종 암석들에 지속적으로 축적되면서 농도가 계속 낮아져만 왔었는데 화석연료를 태우면서 이를 지구에 되돌려준 것이다. 만일 150ppm 이하로 떨어지게 되었다면 식물이 멸종하는 대재앙을 맞을뻔 하였다. 참고로, 잠수함 내부의 이산화탄소 수치가 8,000ppm까지 올라가지만 인간의 생존에는 큰 영향이 없다고 한다. 6. 하지만 지구온난화로 해수면이 상승하면 진짜 큰일 아닌가? - 지구의 온도변화에 따라 해수면은 항상 변해왔다. 그것을 사람이 막을 수는 없지만, 공포심을 유발시킬수는 있다. 과거에는 지금보다 해수면이 100미터 이상 낮았었다. 지금은 지구의 온도가 올라가고 있는 시기 때문에 당연히 해수면이 올라가는 것이지 이산화탄소가 해수면을 올리는 것이 아니다. 과거 1만년간의 기후변화를 보면 지구는 이제야 비정상적으로 추운 시대를 지나 조금 따스해 지고 있으며 6천만년전과 비교해 본다면 따뜻해서 남극에서조차 빙하가 없었던 지구가 지독히 추워져 북극에도 빙하가 생겼다가, 최근에야 기온이 조금 반등한 상황이다. 지구의 온도 정상화에 따라 해수면 상승은 당연하지만 환경론자들이 이것을 부풀려서 공포심과 신앙심을 불러 일으켰다는 것이 문제다. (시간이 지날수록 해수면상승 예상수치가 계속 실패하고 예측수치도 계속 낮아지고 있음) 미국에 상륙한 허리케인의 수도 줄고 있어 이산화탄소 증가에 의한 기후변화로 천재지변이 늘어난다는 것도 미신이란 것을 알수있다. 7. 하지만 북극곰은 빙하가 없어지면 멸종하는데 이러한 현상이 전 지구적으로 나타나는 것은 비극 아닌가? - 북극곰은 포유류이기 때문에 따뜻한 지역에서 더 잘 산다. 북극곰은 인류의 사냥으로 줄어든 것이지 온난화로 줄어들지 않으며 실제로 개체수가 늘었다. 빙하가 많이 줄어든 지역(따뜻한 지역)의 북극곰이 빙하가 적게 줄어든 지역(추운지역)의 북극곰들 보다 몸무게가 더 무겁다는 통계 북극곰의 숫자도 50년 전보다 두배 이상 증가하였고 잘 지내고 있다. 심지어 코카콜라도 마시고 있다. 8. 이런 주장들을 믿을 수 있나? - "97%의 과학자들이 지구온난화를 믿고 있다."라는 사기에 놀아나는 것은 후진국에서의 병폐라고 봐야한다. 미국은 민주당 지지자들의 80%가 기후변화 아젠다에 동의하지만, 공화당 지지자들은 20% 만이 동의하고 있다. 학교에서 관련 서적들을 읽고 토론하며 실체적 진실에 다가가 있는 것이다. 트럼프가 탈퇴한 파리기후협정에 바이든이 재가입 의향서를 제출했지만 미국 의회에서 승인될 가능성은 거의 없다. 9. 그럼 탄소중립 아젠다와 그 모든 탄소중립을 위한 정책들은 도대체 무엇인가? - 글로벌 엘리트들은 그들의 이익을 위해 사람들을 위협하고 맹목적으로 따르도록 할 수 있다고 생각한다. 10. 그럼 내가 여러분께 한가지 질문을 하겠다. 인류의 이산화탄소 배출의 증가로 농업생산이 위협을 받을 것이라고 책까지 쓴 빌게이츠는 왜 지속적으로 농지를 사고 있나? 자료 출처 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OsIuPwIIqo&ab_channel=InconvenientFacts(Gregory Wrightstone) 관련 서적 : Inconvenient Facts: The science that Al Gore doesn't want you to know(아마존 베스트 셀러) (국내번역서 : 불편한 사실 앨 고어가 몰랐던 지구의 기후과학) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 박대출 의원 발의 공직선거법 개정안 입법에 관한 청원 청원의 취지 우리나라는 투표가 끝나면 투표함들을 개표소로 이송하여 투표지분류기를 이용해 개표를 하고 있습니다. 그러나 선거 때마다 투표지분류기의 오류가 발생한 상황입니다. 또한, 현행법상 사전투표 종료 후 그 투표함을 보관할 때 이를 영상정보처리기기로 확인할 수 있는 법적 근거가 없는 등 사전투표 관리의 안전성과 신뢰성을 담보하기 위한 규정이 부족한바, 이에 대한 보완이 필요한 상황입니다. 이에 개표를 할 때에는 수개표를 원칙으로 하는 내용을 도입이 필요합니다. 사전투표 실시 방법ㆍ절차에 관한 사항을 개선하는 등 공직선거에서의 투표ㆍ개표관리의 공정성을 강화가 필요하기 때문입니다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 조선일보 대법 “5·18 유공자 된 이해찬·설훈… 국가보훈처는 공적조서 공개하라” ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 미제스와 사회진화론 사회적 진화론자들은 진화에서 잘못된 결론을 도출해냈다. 지난 수천년간의 인간을 포함해, 진화에서는 강자가 약자를 정복하는 투쟁이 있었다. 하지만 분업이 나타나면서 상황이 바뀌었다. 약육강식의 논리 대신에, 분업 이후에 진화의 성공에서 중요한 것은 강자와 약자간의 평화적인 상호 협력이 되었다. 인간들 사이의 친선을 가능하게 한 것은 바로 분업의 결과로 나타난 높은 생산력 덕분이었다. 모든 사람은 빵과 옷과 신발, 자동차 등을 원하는데, 대량 생산에 의해 가격이 낮춰지고 거의 모든 사람들이 이것들을 살 수 있게 되었다. 먹이를 찾아 서로 경쟁하는 자연계의 생물학적인 경쟁과, 사회적 협력 체제에서 가장 좋은 위치를 차지하려는 개인들의 사회적 경쟁을 혼동해선 안된다. 사회적 경쟁은 투쟁이 아니며, 여기에서 패배한 사람은 제거되는 게 아니라 그에게 적절한 위치로 옮겨가게 될 뿐이다. Mises and Social Darwinism David Gordon It’s often claimed that support for the free market rests on the ideology of social Darwinism. According to this nefarious doctrine, Charles Darwin showed that evolution is a process of struggle. In it, the strong, meaning those best able to reproduce, supplant the weak. Social Darwinists like Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, it is alleged, applied evolutionary theory to support the free market. If the poor did not fare well, their situation should not be deplored or remedied. The victory of the strong over the weak is a law of nature, and to endeavor to combat it is futile. One way to respond is to claim that social Darwinism is a myth, largely concocted by the historian Richard Hofstadter in his book Social Darwinism in American Thought. The journalist Jonathan Goldberg adopts this line, but for reasons I’ve stated elsewhere, it’s a mistake. There really were social Darwinists, who defended capitalism in just the way indicated above. A better way to counter the claim that capitalism rests on the ideology of social Darwinism is to show that Spencer and Sumner, the supposed chief figures of this line of thought, do not advocate it. In a recent column, I attempt this task for Sumner. Mises adopts a characteristically insightful standpoint on this issue. He is strongly committed to Darwinism, but, he says, the social Darwinists draw the wrong lessons from evolution. They are right that, aside from human beings in the past several thousand years, evolution is a struggle in which the strong overcome the weak. But the onset of the division of labor changes things. With its onset, the key to evolutionary success is peaceful cooperation between the weak and the strong. As Mises puts this point in Human Action, Yet nature does not generate peace and good will. The characteristic mark of the “state of nature” is irreconcilable conflict. Each specimen is the rival of all other specimens. The means of subsistence are scarce and do not grant survival to all. The conflicts can never disappear. If a band of men, united with the object of defeating rival bands, succeeds in annihilating its foes, new antagonisms arise among the victors over the distribution of the booty. The source of the conflicts is always the fact that each man’s portion curtails the portions of all other men. What makes friendly relations between human beings possible is the higher productivity of the division of labor. It removes the natural conflict of interests. For where there is division of labor, there is no longer question of the distribution of a supply not capable of enlargement. Thanks to the higher productivity of labor performed under the division of tasks, the supply of goods multiplies. A preeminent common interest, the preservation and further intensification of social cooperation, becomes paramount and obliterates all essential collisions. Catallactic competition is substituted for biological competition. It makes for harmony of the interests of all members of society. The very condition from which the irreconcilable conflicts of biological competition arise—viz., the fact that all people by and large strive after the same things—is transformed into a factor making for harmony of interests. Because many people or even all people want bread, clothes, shoes, and cars, large-scale production of these goods becomes feasible and reduces the costs of production to such an extent that they are accessible at low prices. The fact that my fellow man wants to acquire shoes as I do, does not make it harder for me to get shoes, but easier. What enhances the price of shoes is the fact that nature does not provide a more ample supply of leather and other raw material required, and that one must submit to the disutility of labor in order to transform these raw materials into shoes. The catallactic competition of those who, like me, are eager to have shoes makes shoes cheaper, not more expensive. (pp. 669–70) To reiterate, there is for Mises an antithesis between biological competition and social competition. In biological competition, people struggle against each other; in social or catallactic competition, more people does not mean greater struggle. The division of labor means that people benefit each other. As Mises says, In nature there prevail irreconcilable conflicts of interests. The means of subsistence are scarce. Proliferation tends to outrun subsistence. Only the fittest plants and animals survive. The antagonism between an animal starving to death and another that snatches the food away from it is implacable. Social cooperation under the division of labor removes such antagonisms. It substitutes partnership and mutuality for hostility. The members of society are united in a common venture. The term competition as applied to the conditions of animal life signifies the rivalry between animals which manifests itself in their search for food. We may call this phenomenon biological competition. Biological competition must not be confused with social competition, i.e., the striving of individuals to attain the most favorable position in the system of social cooperation. As there will always be positions which men value more highly than others, people will strive for them and try to outdo rivals. Social competition is consequently present in every conceivable mode of social organization…. Catallactic competition is emulation between people who want to surpass one another. It is not a fight, although it is usual to apply to it in a metaphorical sense the terminology of war and internecine conflict, of attack and defense, of strategy and tactics. Those who fail are not annihilated; they are removed to a place in the social system that is more modest, but more adequate to their achievements than that which they had planned to attain. (pp. 273–74) Mises doesn’t think that it is always true that, once people have discovered the benefits of the division of labor, the more people the better. He is a Malthusian who thinks that there is an optimum level of population. But it is safe to say that such a point will not be reached for a very long time to come. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 경찰을 민영화하라! Privatize the Police N. Rothbard Abolition of the public sector means, of course, that all pieces of land, all land areas, including streets and roads, would be owned privately, by individuals, corporations, cooperatives, or any other voluntary groupings of individuals and capital. The fact that all streets and land areas would be private would by itself solve many of the seemingly insoluble problems of private operation. What we need to do is to reorient our thinking to consider a world in which all land areas are privately owned. Let us take, for example, police protection. How would police protection be furnished in a totally private economy? Part of the answer becomes evident if we consider a world of totally private land and street ownership. Consider the Times Square area of New York City, a notoriously crime-ridden area where there is little police protection furnished by the city authorities. Every New Yorker knows, in fact, that he lives and walks the streets, and not only Times Square, virtually in a state of "anarchy," dependent solely on the normal peacefulness and good will of his fellow citizens. Police protection in New York is minimal, a fact dramatically revealed in a recent week-long police strike when, lo and behold!, crime in no way increased from its normal state when the police are supposedly alert and on the job. At any rate, suppose that the Times Square area, including the streets, was privately owned, say by the "Times Square Merchants Association." The merchants would know full well, of course, that if crime was rampant in their area, if muggings and holdups abounded, then their customers would fade away and would patronize competing areas and neighborhoods. Hence, it would be to the economic interest of the merchants' association to supply efficient and plentiful police protection, so that customers would be attracted to, rather than repelled from, their neighborhood. Private business, after all, is always trying to attract and keep its customers. But what good would be served by attractive store displays and packaging, pleasant lighting and courteous service, if the customers may be robbed or assaulted if they walk through the area? The merchants' association, furthermore, would be induced, by their drive for profits and for avoiding losses, to supply not only sufficient police protection but also courteous and pleasant protection. Governmental police have not only no incentive to be efficient or worry about their "customers'" needs; they also live with the ever-present temptation to wield their power of force in a brutal and coercive manner. "Police brutality" is a well-known feature of the police system, and it is held in check only by remote complaints of the harassed citizenry. But if the private merchants' police should yield to the temptation of brutalizing the merchants' customers, those customers will quickly disappear and go elsewhere. Hence, the merchants' association will see to it that its police are courteous as well as plentiful. Such efficient and high-quality police protection would prevail throughout the land, throughout all the private streets and land areas. Factories would guard their street areas, merchants their streets, and road companies would provide safe and efficient police protection for their toll roads and other privately owned roads. The same would be true for residential neighborhoods. We can envision two possible types of private street ownership in such neighborhoods. In one type, all the landowners in a certain block might become the joint owners of that block, let us say as the "85th St. Block Company." This company would then provide police protection, the costs being paid either by the home-owners directly or out of tenants' rent if the street includes rental apartments. Again, homeowners will of course have a direct interest in seeing that their block is safe, while landlords will try to attract tenants by supplying safe streets in addition to the more usual services such as heat, water, and janitorial service. ' To ask why landlords should provide safe streets in the libertarian, fully private society is just as silly as asking now why they should provide their tenants with heat or hot water. The force of competition and of consumer demand would make them supply such services. Furthermore, whether we are considering homeowners or rental housing, in either case the capital value of the land and the house will be a function of the safety of the street as well as of the other well-known characteristics of the house and the neighborhood. Safe and well-patrolled streets will raise the value of the landowners' land and houses in the same way as well-tended houses do; crime-ridden streets will lower the value of the land and houses as surely as dilapidated housing itself does. Since landowners always prefer higher to lower market values for their property, there is a built-in incentive to provide efficient, well -paved, and safe streets. Private enterprise does exist, and so most people can readily envision a free market in most goods and services. Probably the most difficult single area to grasp, however, is the abolition of government operations in the service of protection: police, the courts, etc.—the area encompassing defense of person and property against attack or invasion. How could private enterprise and the free market possibly provide such service? How could police, legal systems, judicial services, law enforcement, prisons—how could these be provided in a free market? We have already seen how a great deal of police protection, at the least, could be supplied by the various owners of streets and land areas. But we now need to examine this entire area systematically. In the first place, there is a common fallacy, held even by most advocates of laissez-faire, that the government must supply "police protection," as if police protection were a single, absolute entity, a fixed quantity of something which the government supplies to all. But in actual fact there is no absolute commodity called "police protection" any more than there is an absolute single commodity called "food" or "shelter." It is true that everyone pays taxes for a seemingly fixed quantity of protection, but this is a myth. In actual fact, there are almost infinite degrees of all sorts of protection. For any given person or business, the police can provide everything from a policeman on the beat who patrols once a night, to two policemen patrolling constantly on each block, to cruising patrol cars, to one or even several round-the-clock personal bodyguards. Furthermore, there are many other decisions the police must make, the complexity of which becomes evident as soon as we look beneath the veil of the myth of absolute "protection." How shall the police allocate their funds which are, of course, always limited as are the funds of all other individuals, organizations, and agencies? How much shall the police invest in electronic equipment? fingerprinting equipment? detectives as against uniformed police? patrol cars as against foot police, etc.? The point is that the government has no rational way to make these allocations. The government only knows that it has a limited budget. Its allocations of funds are then subject to the full play of politics, boondoggling, and bureaucratic inefficiency, with no indication at all as to whether the police department is serving the consumers in a way responsive to their desires or whether it is doing so efficiently. The situation would be different if police services were supplied on a free, competitive market. In that case, consumers would pay for whatever degree of protection they wish to purchase. The consumers who just want to see a policeman once in a while would pay less than those who want continuous patrolling, and far less than those who demand twenty-four-hour bodyguard service. On the free market, protection would be supplied in proportion and in whatever way that the consumers wish to pay for it. A drive for efficiency would be insured, as it always is on the market, by the compulsion to make profits and avoid losses, and thereby to keep costs low and to serve the highest demands of the consumers. Any police firm that suffers from gross inefficiency would soon go bankrupt and disappear. One big problem a government police force must always face is: what laws really to enforce? Police departments are theoretically faced with the absolute injunction, "enforce all laws," but in practice a limited budget forces them to allocate their personnel and equipment to the most urgent crimes. But the absolute dictum pursues them and works against a rational allocation of resources. On the free market, what would be enforced is whatever the customers are willing to pay for. Suppose, for example, that Mr. Jones has a precious gem he believes might soon be stolen. He can ask, and pay for, round-the-clock police protection at whatever strength he may wish to work out with the police company. He might, on the other hand, also have a private road on his estate he doesn't want many people to travel on—but he might not care very much about trespassers on that road. In that case, he won't devote any police resources to protecting the road. As on the market in general, it is up to the consumer—and since all of us are consumers this means each person individually decides how much and what kind of protection he wants and is willing to buy. All that we have said about landowners' police applies to private police in general. Free-market police would not only be efficient, they would have a strong incentive to be courteous and to refrain from brutality against either their clients or their clients' friends or customers. A private Central Park would be guarded efficiently in order to maximize park revenue, rather than have a prohibitive curfew imposed on innocent—and paying—customers. A free market in police would reward efficient and courteous police protection to customers and penalize any falling off from this standard. No longer would there be the current disjunction between service and payment inherent in all government operations, a disjunction which means that police, like all other government agencies, acquire their revenue, not voluntarily and competitively from consumers, but from the taxpayers coercively. In fact, as government police have become increasingly inefficient, consumers have been turning more and more to private forms of protection. We have already mentioned block or neighborhood protection. There are also private guards, insurance companies, private detectives, and such increasingly sophisticated equipment as safes, locks, and closed-circuit TV and burglar alarms. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice estimated in 1969 that government police cost the American public $2.8 billion a year, while it spends $1.35 billion on private protection service and another $200 million on equipment, so that private protection expenses amounted to over half the outlay on government police. These figures should give pause to those credulous folk who believe that police protection is somehow, by some mystic right or power, necessarily and forevermore an attribute of State sovereignty. [Excerpted from chapters 11 and 12 of For A New Liberty.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------