[단독] 모더나 86% 폐기…'접종일 주 1일로 제한' 검토 출처 : SBS 뉴스 원본 링크 : https://news.sbs.co.kr//news/endPage.do?newsId=N1006714260&plink=COPYPASTE&cooper=SBSNEWSEND ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 연합뉴스 [1보] 대검 "검수완박, 명백한 헌법 위반" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 중앙일보 고교생도 턴 공수처, 이래서였나…"국민의힘 갤러리서 활동" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 매일신문 한동훈 "검수완박=야반도주극…통과되면 범죄자 죄짓고도 처벌 안 받아" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 동아일보 전교조만 살찌운 좌파 교육감들[오늘과 내일/이진영] 기초학력 손놓고 전교조 민원해결·보은인사 교육 망치는 교육감 직선제 이젠 폐지하자 ---->교육감뿐만 아니라 시장, 구청장, 각 도의 지사들 역시 모두 없애야 한다. 시민의 혈세를 빨아먹고 사는 흡혈귀들일이다. 개인적으로 저들 모두를 대신해, "호민관" 또는 "호법관"을 두어, 공무원을 감시하는 권한만을 주어야 한다고 생각한다. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 중앙선관위 상임위원에 대구 출신 김필곤! 내사랑 야무 앙선관위원장에 대구출신이 내정되었다니 환영을 할일입니다 말로는 다 표현할수없을정도의 부정부패로 가득찬 선관위 앞으로 잘될것같습니다 정말 다시 일어납시다 앞으로 50년간 정권이양 못합니다 뭉칩시다^^ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 충격보고) 좌빨 서식지 소탕작전, 윤석열의 박정희 소환 이유. 좌파 멘붕 https://youtu.be/jIKF-FnQFGE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 정치적 변혁이 민주제를 위협하는 게 아니라, 민주제가 그러하다 미국에서의 최근의 정치적 양극화는 민주제를 위협하지 않는다. 그 보다는 우리가 알고 있는 민주제가 양극화의 주범이다. Political Upheaval Is Not Threatening “Our Democracy.” Our Democracy Is. Joseph Solis-Mullen Attempting to understand the political polarization and dysfunction that has increasingly come to define American politics in the twenty-first century requires grappling with a host of interconnected phenomena. The gradual transformations undergone by the Republican and Democratic parties, which saw the steady elimination of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, have deep historical roots. For all its apparent complexity, however, our political dysfunction largely stems from a small set of easy-to-understand problems. We must, therefore, resist the popular urge to attribute polarization to specific figures, such as Trump or Obama, and instead look at the structural reasons these figures emerged when they did and into what environment. History, as Scott Horton says, didn’t start this morning. Single-Winner, First-Past-the-Post Districts The problem is, in part, an inherited one. For all their ingenuity and creativity in crafting an experimental new kind of government, the Founders directly adopted the British system of elections at the district level. This was understandable, there being few if any applicable historical or contemporary examples they could look to for guidance, and this feature of the British electoral model apparently worked fine. And in a parliamentary system, where the effective head of government is the de facto leader of a majority coalition in parliament, the model can and does work fine. In presidential systems not so much. This has always been a bug more than a feature. And as the American political scientist Lee Drutman has documented, it is telling that while many governments around the world have amended their electoral rules, switching from single-winner, first-past-the-post districts to split-member proportional districts, none have made the switch from the latter to the former. Uncompetitive Districts Due to a combination of geographical sorting and gerrymandering, 94 percent of Congressional districts in the United States are now what political scientists designate as uncompetitive. This means one party enjoys so much local popular support it de facto controls that congressional seat. In these districts, the greatest threat therefore comes from a candidate’s own party—typically from farther right or left depending on whether the district is Republican or Democrat controlled. This effectively means the winner of that party’s primary becomes the de facto congressional representative for the district. As political participation fell across the board from the 1970s through the 2000s, primary voter turnout fell with it. Today, just 28 percent of registered voters nationwide turn out on primary day—up from 14 percent a decade ago. Those who turn up are generally the most ideologically committed partisans of their parties and they effectively choose upwards of 90 percent of Congress’s members. Unsurprisingly, under these conditions it was increasingly the most partisan of their parties each sent to Congress. The Nationalization of Elections This was essentially the ideological purification of brands. As the geographical sorting and ideological party realignments of the 1960s–90s documented by Alan Abramowitz unfolded, party leaders increasingly sought to distinguish their party by emphasizing its ideological commitments. The strategy, pioneered by Newt Gingrich, sought to replace discussions of local issues with the major issues separating the two national parties as the dividing lines in local races. Because the two parties were increasingly distinct both ideologically and demographically, along urban/rural, college educated / blue collar, secular/Christian, nonwhite/white, political fights at the national level came increasingly to be about the character of the country itself. Under such circumstances, the stakes involved are perceived to dramatically increase. For, unlike distributional questions, questions of national identity cut to who we are and what are values are. Combined with a uniquely competitive electoral environment, politics has increasingly come to resemble warfare rather than reasoned debate. Insecure Majorities About that newly competitive electoral environment, as Frances Lee outlined in her important book insecure majorities were a relatively rare occurrence in American politics in the twentieth century. From the Civil War onward Republicans essentially dominated the White House and Congress until FDR’s landslide, which ushered in a period of Democratic dominance. From the end of the Second World War until 1994, Democrats controlled the House for forty-five of forty-nine years—with the Senate much of the time as well. When one party enjoys such broad support, the dynamics of negotiations between parties are fundamentally different than when either party could find itself in power come next November. Where much of the twentieth century saw minority parties positively collaborating in the legislative process, using what power they had to pragmatically shape legislation more to their liking, American politics in the twenty-first century has been defined by strategic opposition—betting, in effect, that fiercely opposing your opponent’s legislative initiatives will prove more popular with your own voters than will making compromises to govern more effectively. The Growth of Government Democracy in America, in the Tocquevillian sense, evolved naturally out of deeply rooted social, economic, and political interrelations at the local level. But for much of its history “democracy,” in the modern parlance of one person one vote, was not practiced in the United States. Real universal suffrage arrived late, in the 1960s. It brought with it subsequent enlargements of a federal government already too big, and it was this expansion, perhaps more than anything else, that destroyed the foundations of democracy in America. First, politics gradually ceased being local. The growing power and wealth concentrated in Washington led naturally to an alienation of the people from the power that they collectively supposed to be theirs. And the people’s collective faith in their government, by any number of metrics, steadily declined from the 1960s onward. Second, the expansion of the government obviated the purpose of most of the prior institutions of civil society, the very foundations of democracy. Schools were placed under the purview of Washington, while the many mutual aid societies and church groups central to community life were outright replaced or marginalized. Citizens were torn from their collective institutions, placed at home, and told to write a letter to their representative or donate to one or the other party. The truth is that over the course of the twentieth century, America gradually traded democracy for statism. Conclusion While there are other factors that bear consideration—and some, like the centralization of party leadership and the increasing influence of corporate lobbying over the legislative and electoral processes, bear significant shares of the blame—these five interconnected issues are most to blame for the dysfunction that has made America’s once enviable government a laughingstock the world over. While the process was a gradual one, and therefore passed largely unobserved, today historians of American politics can clearly delineate the development of this trend towards less pragmatic politics: for in a political incentive structure where candidates feel most answerable to their own party’s most radical partisans, what incentive is there to compromise in order to govern more effectively? Answer, unless you believe politicians are solely guided by pursuit of the public good, rather than with an eye toward their own chances at reelection, none. In case you are in any doubt, as a GOP strategist succinctly explained: “If the purpose of the majority is to govern, then the purpose of the minority is to become the majority.” Though it is obvious something must be done, because any change to the status quo would threaten the collective monopoly on power they have long enjoyed, Republicans and Democrats predictably oppose even mild attempts at reform, such as rank choice voting—let alone the more radical but desperately needed switch to multimember proportional districts. We are therefore likely to see only more increasingly desperate efforts by both Democrats and Republicans to capture the state, producing more dysfunction—until, finally, the system fails completely. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------