--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 문재인, 몰랐을까? / 다 알고 있지 않았을까? / 문재인 정권 하에서 치루어진 모든 공직선거들 / 그게 정상적인 선거였는가? / 결국 모든 것이 밝혀지게 될 것 [공병호TV] https://youtu.be/q2eIOdjbxjU ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 조민 사건이 존나 심각한 이유 제이슨샹 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11406982994 https://n.news.naver.com/article/020/0003421134 제2, 제3의 조민이 몇명인지 알수가 없다는거다 이미 5년 지나면 입학 자료 다 폐기 해버림 의사라고 개업한 것들 수천명 돌파리 천지 삐까리 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (재업)한중일의 제주분지 쟁탈전을 Araboja 메르 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11406982540 크게 관심가는 주제는 아니지만, 그래도 알아보자. 1. 제주도 남쪽 동지나해에 제주 분지라고 불리는 거대한 퇴적지역이 있음. 2. 거리상으로는 일본에 가깝고, 바닷속으로는 한국과 중국의 대륙붕에 이어져 있는 묘한 위치임. 3. 1969년 유엔 극동경제 위원회는 제주 분지 인근에 엄청난 석유가 묻혀있을 것 같다는 발표를 함. 4. 1970년 1월 1일 한국이 선빵을 날림. 5. 해저광물 자원 개발 법을 공포하며, 7광구는 한국 소유라고 선언한 것임. 6. 해저광물자원 개발 법은 일본의 약점을 잘 파고든 것이었음. 7. 제주 분지가 거리로는 일본 앞바다에 가깝지만, 바닷속으로 보면 한국은 대륙붕으로 연결되는데, 일본은 오키나와 해구라는 8천 미터 깊이의 엄청난 깊이의 고랑이 대륙붕을 끊어 버리고 있는 것을 파고든 것임. 8. 대륙붕의 영유권은 350해리까지는 대륙붕이 이어진 나라가 권리를 가진다는 자연 연장설과 두 나라의 중간선에서 권리가 나누어진다는 이론이 있었고, 당시에는 자연 연장설이 우세하던 시기라 지를 수 있었음 9. 일본이 발칵 뒤집힘. 10. 경제협력을 끊자느니 국제재판소에 제소하다느니 했지만 당시 한국 정부는 미국 코암 사를 불러서 해저자원 조사를 시키는 등 씹어버림. 11. 결국 일본이 숙이고 들어옴. 12. 공동 개발해서 반띵하자 였음. 13. 한국은 2억 불을 별도로 받으며 반띵을 수용함. 14. 1978년부터 50년간 한일이 공동 개발하고 석유가 나오면 5 대 5로 나누기로 함. 15. 한국은 일본에 삥 뜯은 2억 불 중 1억 3천만 불로 포항제철을 세웠고, 남은 돈으로 경부고속도로를 만듦. 16. 일본과는 자연 연장설로 다투었지만, 중국과는 중간선으로 금을 그음. 17. 바닷속 대륙붕으로 보면 중국이 우리보다 더 면적이 넓어 중국과는 자연 연장설이 아니라 중간선이 우리나라에 더 유리하다고 봄 18. 제주 분지의 지질학적 특성상 석유가 많이 있을 것 같지만 70년대에는 석유를 못 찾았음. 19. 1983년이었음. 20. 중국이 7광구를 살짝 벗어난 곳에 원유와 가스정을 찾게 됨. 21. 평호 유전이었음(위 사진 참고) 22. 해저유전에서 나는 원유나 가스의 양이 적은 소형 유전은 유조선으로 캐낸 가스나 원유를 보냄. 하지만, 대형 유전은 육지까지 파이프라인을 건설함. 23. 중국은 평호 유전에서 상하이를 잇는 파이프라인을 동해 함대를 동원해서 비밀리에 건설해 버림. 24. 당시 중국과 대만 사이에 긴장이 높던 시기라 중국 해군이 얼쩡거리는 것을 대만을 위협하고 훈련하는 것으로 생각을 해버리고, 일본이 알아차리지 못함. 25. 7광구 인근에서 거대 유전이 발견된 것을 알자 일본은 먼저 센카쿠제도를 재평가함. 26. 센카쿠제도는 대만 앞에 있는 몇 개 무인도와 암초임. 27. 국제법상 무인도는 영해권의 기준이 될 수가 없지만 앞으로 국제법이 어떻게 바뀔지 모르니 실효지배하는 선빵을 날리자는 생각을 일본이 하게 됨 28. 일본은 중국과 센카쿠제도로 지금까지 싸우고 있음. 29. 단순한 무인도에 대한 다툼이 아니라 그 밑에 있는 엄청난 자원 싸움이라 일본과 중국 사이에 전쟁이 난다면 센카쿠 때문일 거라는 게 정설임. 30. 이 와중에 국제법의 주류가 바뀜. 31. 70년대까지는 자연 연장설이 주류였는데 1980년 유엔이 해양법 협약을 만들면서 중간선 이론을 받아들였고, 1985년 리비아와 몰타 간 대륙붕 영유권 분쟁에서 중간선으로 판결을 해버림. 32. 재판 결과를 보고 일본이 잔머리를 굴림. 33. 7광구를 가지고 재판으로 가면 이길 거라고 판단을 함. 34. 이후 한국과 공동 개발을 일방적으로 중단해버림. 35. 1978년부터 50년간 7광구에서 기름을 캐내면 공동 개발 협정에 따라 한국과 반띵을 해야 하는데, 협약이 종료되는 2029년부터는 7광구 대부분을 일본이 먹을 수 있다는 판단을 하게 됨. 36. 현재까지 일본은 일체의 7광구 공동 개발을 씹으며 29년이 오기만을 바라고 있음. 37. 이 와중에 중국이 슬금슬금 들어옴. 38. 83년 평호 유전에 이어 7광구 인근에 꼽는 대로 기름을 발견함. 39. 저류층이 문제임. 40. 지하는 연결된 경우가 많아서 7광구 인근에 빨대를 꼽으면 7광구의 기름을 뽑아갈 수가 있음. 41. 91년 이라크가 쿠웨이트를 침공해서 걸프전이 일어난 게 저류층때문이었음. 42. 이라크는 쿠웨이트가 빨대를 꼽아 지하로 자기 기름을 훔쳐 간다는 게 침공의 이유였음. 43. 카타르가 친 이란 행보를 보이는 것도 저류층 때문임. 44. 카타르의 최대 가스전이 이란 영해와 붙어있어서, 카타르 영해에서 가스를 캐 올려도 지하로 보면 이란의 가스를 가져가는 것일 수도 있기 때문임. 46. 일본은 29년까지 버티면 7광구는 자기 거라고 생각하고 있는데, 중국이 7광구 근처에 빨대를 꼽아 석유를 빼내가니 속이 타기 시작함. 47. 7광구 바로 옆에 릉칭이라는 유전을 중국이 추가로 개발하자 갈수록 예민해지고 있는 중임 48. 2004년, 7광구에 유전이 초 초거대 규모로 추정되어 더 안달이 남. 49. 미국 우드로윌슨 연구소가 추정한 바로는 7광구에 천연가스 210조 입방미터와 원유 1천억 베럴 이 있다고 함. 배럴당 50달러로 추정하면 5,600조 가치라고 함. 50. 패가 한 번 더 꼬임. 51. 2009년에 중국이 대륙 연장설을 내세우면서 갑자기 7광구가 자기 거라고 주장함. 52. 이제는 대륙 연장설이 이기면 중국, 중간선이 이기면 일본 게 되는 상황이 되어버림. 53. 1998년 김대중이 신한일어업협정으로 7광구 대부분을 일본 수역으로 인정을 해줌. 54. 법적 다툼에서 불리해지는 협정이 됨. 55. IMF로 일본의 지원이 필요한 시기였지만, 장기적으로 보면 아쉬운 협정이었음. 한 줄 요약. 제주 분지를 놓고 한국, 중국, 일본이 물밑에서 치열하게 싸우는 중임. 한국이 초반에는 잘 치고 나갔지만, 최근 버벅거리고 있는 중임. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 혁명가 미제스 좌파들은 자본주의의 결점만을 들먹이며 사회주의 대 자본주의를 토론했는데, 미제스가 나타나 시장이 없는 사회주의에서는 경제적 계산이 불가능하다는 것을 입증해서, 그들의 근본적인 허점을 제기했다. 미제스는 자신의 이론에 충실했고, 60여년 동안 좌파적 경향의 세계와 싸웠다. 그는 각종 사회주의, 보호무역주의, 인플레 정책, 개입주의 각종 정책 등과 대항했고, 끝내 자신의 입장을 견지했다. 미제스는 혁신적인 자유주의자였고, 그의 사상은 타협 없는 합리주의에 뿌리 내리고 있었다. 그의 공리주의는 정치의 목적이 인간의 복지였는데, 그것은 시민 각자가 스스로 생각하는 개별적인 복지를 가리켰다. 모든 돈은 아무리 비천한 사람의 것이라도, 시장에서 고관대작의 돈과 동일한 대접을 받는다. 시장 경제는 만리장성을 파괴하고 전통적인 신분과 특권 사회를 붕괴시켰다. 미제스를 읽는다면 진실에 이르는 길을 매우 많이 단축할 수 있다. 그의 <사회주의> <자유주의Liberalism> <관료주의Bureaucracy > <만능의 정부Omnipotent Government> 등은 초보자들에게 적당한 책이다. Mises the Revolutionary Ralph Raico It is said that a number of years ago, when Bill Buckley was at the beginning of his career of college-speaking, and somewhat more tolerant of libertarians than he is today, he once wrote two names on the blackboard thereby nicely dramatized the point that students in his audience were being presented with only one side of the great world-forming debate between capitalism and socialism. The name of the defender of democratic socialism—I think it was Harold Laski, possibly John Dewey—was recognized by most of those present. The name of Ludwig von Mises was entirely unknown to them. Needless to say, the situation has not basically improved since then (unless perhaps in the sense that most college students would now recognize the name of William F. Buckley, Jr.). How has it been possible that the great majority of economics and social science students, even at elite American universities, are completely unfamiliar with Mises? Even the New York Times, in its notice at the time of his death in October 1973, termed Mises "one of the foremost economists of this century," and Milton Friedman, though from a completely different tradition of economic thought, has called him "one of the great economists of all time." But Mises was even more than a great economist. Throughout the world, among knowledgeable people—in German-speaking Europe, in France, in Britain, in Latin America, in our own country—Mises was famous as the great twentieth century champion of a school of thought which could be said to have a certain historical importance and a certain intellectual respectability: the one that began with Adam Smith, David Hume, and Turgot, and included Humboldt, Bentham, Benjamin Constant, Tocqueville, Acton, Böhm-Bawerk, William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, Pareto, and many others. Offhand, one would have thought that this acknowledged position alone would have entitled Mises to being presented within the "pluralistic" setting of left-liberal Academe. And then there were Mises's scientific achievements, which were extraordinary. For example, it is conceded on all sides that in the whole discussion revolving around the viability of a system of central economic planning, Mises played the key role. Quite possibly the great intellectual scandal (still unadmitted) of the past century has been that the vast international Marxian movement, including thousands upon thousands of professional thinkers in all fields, was for generations content to discuss the whole issue of capitalism vs. socialism solely in terms of the alleged defects of capitalism. The question of how, and how well, a socialist economy would function, was avoided as taboo. It was Mises's accomplishment—and a sign of his superb independence of mind—to have brushed aside this pious "one-just-doesn't-speak-of-such-things," and to have presented comprehensively and arrestingly the problems inherent in attempting rational economic calculation in a situation where no market exists for production goods. Anyone familiar with the structural problems with which the more advanced Communist countries are continually faced and with the debate over "market socialism," will perceive the significance and continuing relevance of Mises's work in this field alone. How then can we account for the fact that those who managed to take a Laski and a Thorstein Veblen—or even a Walter Lippmann and a Kenneth Galbraith—seriously as important social philosophers somehow could never bring themselves to familiarize their students with Mises or to show him the marks of public recognition and respect that were his due (he was, for example, never president of the American Economic Association)? At least part of the answer, I think, lies in what Jacques Reuff, in a warm tribute, called Mises's "intransigence." Mises was a complete doctrinaire and a relentless and implacable fighter for his doctrine. For over sixty years he was at war with the spirit of his age, and with every one of the advancing, victorious, or merely modish political schools, left and right. Decade after decade he fought militarism, protectionism, inflationism, every variety of socialism, and every policy of the interventionist state, and through most of that time he stood alone, or close to it. The totality and enduring intensity of Mises's battle could only be fueled from a profound inner sense of the truth and supreme value of the ideas for which he was struggling. This—as well as his temperament, one supposes—helped produce a definite "arrogance" in his tone (or "apodictic" quality, as some of us in the Mises seminar fondly called it, using one of his own favorite words), which was the last thing academic left-liberals and social democrats could accept in a defender of a view they considered only marginally worthy of toleration to begin with. (This would largely account, I think, for the somewhat greater recognition that has been accorded Friedrich Hayek, even before his greatly deserved Nobel Prize. Hayek is temperamentally much more moderate in expression than Mises ever was, preferring, for instance, to avoid the old slogan of "laissez faire." And it is hard to imagine Mises making such a gesture as Hayek did in dedicating The Road to Serfdom "to socialists of all parties.") But the lack of recognition seems to have influenced or deflected Mises not in the least. Instead, he continued his work, decade after decade: accumulating contributions to economic theory; developing the theoretical structure of the Austrian School; and, from his understanding of the laws of economic activity, elaborating, correcting, and bringing up to date the great social philosophy of classical liberalism. Now, within the classical liberal tradition, distinctions may be drawn. One very important one is between what may be termed "conservative" and "radical" liberals. Mises belonged to the second category, and on this basis may be contrasted to writers, for instance, such as Macaulay, Tocqueville, and Ortega y Gasset. There was very little of the Whig about Mises. The vaunted virtues of aristocracies; the alleged need for a religious basis for "social cohesion;" the reverence for tradition (it was somehow always authoritarian traditions that were to be reverenced, and never the traditions of free thought and rebellion); the fear of the emerging "mass-man," who was spoiling things for his intellectual and social betters; the whole cultural critique that later provided a substantial foothold for the attack on the consumer society—these found no place in Mises's thinking. To take an example, Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, at one point cries out: "Nothing conceivable is so petty, so insipid, so crowded with paltry interests—in a word, so anti-poetic—as the life of a man in the United States." Whether or not this judgment is true, Mises would never have bothered to make it. As a utilitarian liberal, he had more respect for the standards by which ordinary people judge the quality of their own lives. It is highly doubtful that Mises felt any of the qualms of liberals like Tocqueville at the Americanization of the world. (In fact, their attitude towards America would be a good rough criterion for categorizing classical liberals as "radical" or "conservative.") Mises, then, was a radical liberal, in the line of the Philosophical Radicals and the men of Manchester. All the elements of radical liberalism are there: first of all, and most basic, his uncompromising rationalism, reiterated again and again. (Symptomatic of Mises's avoidance of everything he would consider mystical and obscurantist in social thought is the fact that, to my knowledge, he never in all his published writings once mentions Edmund Burke except in the context of someone who, in alliance with writers like de Maistre, was ultimately a philosophical opponent of the developing liberal world.) There is his utilitarianism, taking the end of politics to be not "the good," but human welfare, as men and women individually define it for themselves. There is his championing of peace, which in the tradition of those nineteenth-century liberals most closely identified with the doctrine of complete laissez faire—Richard Cobden, John Bright, Frédéric Bastiat, and Herbert Spencer—he bases on the economic substructure of free trade. And, more surprising, there is in Mises a basically democratic concern and, in an important sense, an egalitarianism, such that this requires special comment. Mises's fundamentally democratic and egalitarian out-look is not, of course, to be understood in terms of belief in some innate equality of talents or in equality of income. When Mises discusses the great question of equality he does not have in mind a future fantasy utopia, where each will absolutely count for one and none for more than one, but rather the empirical conditions under which human beings have hitherto found themselves in various societies. What have actually been the conditions of class, status, degree, and privilege in the history of mankind, and what difference does capitalism make? The history of pre-capitalist societies is one of slavery, serfdom, and caste- and class-privileges in the most degrading forms. It is history made by slave-owners, warrior-nobles, and eunuch-makers, by kings, their mistresses, and courtiers, by priests and other Mandarin-intellectuals—by parasites and oppressors of all descriptions. Capitalism shifts the whole center of gravity of society ("The World Turned Upside Down," as Lord Cornwallis's troops played at Yorktown). In the hackneyed but true and sociologically enormously important statement: every dollar, whether in the possession of someone totally lacking in the social graces, of someone of "mean birth," of a Jew, of a black, of someone no one ever even heard of, is the equal of every other dollar and commands products and services on the market which talented people must structure their lives to provide. As Marx and Engels observed, the market breaks down every Chinese Wall and levels the world of status and traditional privilege that the West inherited from the Middle Ages. It is the battering ram of the great democratic revolution of modern times. Mises maintained that the pseudorevolution which socialism would bring about is much more likely to lead to the reemergence of the society of status and the re-degradation of the masses to the position of pawns, controlled by an elite which would assign itself the title role in the heroic melodrama, Man Consciously Makes His Own History. As far as the caliber and quality of Mises's thinking goes, my own view is that he is able to penetrate to the heart of important questions, where other writers typically exhaust their capacities on peripheral points. Some of my favorite examples are his discussions of "worker control" (which promises to become the preferred social system of the Left in many Western countries), and of Marxist social philosophy (which Mises deals with in a number of his books, most extensively and trenchantly in Theory and History.) In the conjunction in this brief discussion of great intellectual scope, rigorous reasoning, and the proud defense of classical liberal values, the reader can glimpse something of the distinctive character of Mises as social philosopher. No appreciation of Mises would be complete without saying something, however inadequate, about the man and the individual. Mises's immense scholarship, bringing to mind other German-speaking scholars, like Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, who seemed to work on the principle that someday all encyclopedias might very well just vanish from the shelves; the Cartesian clarity of his presentations in class (it takes a master to present a complex subject simply); his respect for the life of reason, evident in every gesture and glance; his courtesy and kindliness and understanding, even to beginners; his real wit, of the sort proverbially bred in the great cities, akin to that of Berliners, of Parisians and New Yorkers, only Viennese and softer—let me just say that to have, at an early point, come to know the great Mises tends to create in one's mind life-long standards of what an ideal intellectual should be. These are standards to which other scholars whom one encounters will almost never be equal, and judged by which the ordinary run of university professor—at Chicago, Princeton, or Harvard—is simply a joke (but it would be unfair to judge them by such a measure; here we are talking about two entirely different sorts of human beings). It was altogether fitting for Murray Rothbard, in the obituary he wrote for Mises in Libertarian Forum, to append these lines from Shelley's Adonais, and it is fitting for us to recall them in the year of Mises's centenary: For such as he can lend—they borrow not Glory from those who made the world their prey; And he is gathered to the kings of thought Who waged contention with their time's decay, And of the past are all that cannot pass away. Finally, for the serious reader of politics and social philosophy who has never studied Mises my advice would be to make the omission good as soon as possible: it will save a lot of otherwise wasted effort on the road to truth in these matters. Liberalism or Bureaucracy would be a good start; or, for those with a special interest in twentieth century history, Omnipotent Government; or his Socialism, which remains for me the finest book I have ever read in the social sciences. Considering the absolutely critical place America has in Western civilization today, it would truly be a tragedy if a few establishment professors succeeded in keeping intelligent young Americans from acquainting themselves with the rich heritage of ideas left us by Ludwig von Mises. A version of this article appeared in the October 1981 issue of the Libertarian Review. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------