문무대왕
북한이 싫다는데도 이렇게 구질구질하게 저자세 간청을 하는 이유가 무엇인지 알 수가 없다. 빈정대고 수모를 주어도 북한의 그 소리가 자장가처럼 달콤하게만 들린다는 말인가?그렇지 않고서야 어떻게 이렇게 비굴하고 추하고 지저분할 수가 있단 말인가? 무슨 약점이 그렇게 많기에 1억 달러어치의 식량을 무상지원하고 금강산관광 개방을 꺼내며 추파를 던지고 있는가. 삼척항에 입항한 북한 목선에 대한 허위조작 보고와 조사도 제대로 하지 않고 동승자 4명 가운데 2명을 그대로 돌려보낸 대국민 사기극이 문재인 정부의 대북한 노이로제란 말인가?
이쯤 되면 관계자가 할복자살할 정도의 참상이 아닌가?
문재인 정부의 이러한 꼴불견을 보면서 조선일보 박정훈 논설실장은 "문 대통령은 고종의 길을 가려 하는가?" 하고 물었다. "오늘의 시국은 구한말같은 난세이고 나라 밖은 정글판인데 내부에 적을 만들어 우리끼리 지지고 볶고 편협한 리더십이 성공할 수 없다"고 꾸짖었다.
구한말 국가 통치자였던 고종은 어떤 짓을 했던가? 고종은 첫째 강대국의 역학관계를 잘못 읽고 치명적 판단미스를 했다. 둘째 힘이 있어야 나라를 지킬 수 있다는 실력주의 원리를 이해하지 못했다. 셋째 차지한 권력을 지키려 인적 역량을 제거하는 자해극을 벌였다. 고종은 이렇게 해서 국권을 빼앗기고 망국의 길로 들어갔다. 가장 큰 매국노가 바로 고종 자신이었다. 나라를 빼앗기고 팔아먹고 나서 왕족들만 일본으로부터 작위나 받고 호의호식한 아주 나쁜 군주의 모델이 되고 말았다. 문재인 대통령은 정녕 고종의 길을 가려고 하는가? 박정훈 논설실장은 묻고 있다. 문재인은 대답하라! (발췌)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
문재인 퇴진을 바라는 국민모임'의 트럼프 대통령 訪韓 환영 기자회견
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
hm27****
올해 4월까지 재정적자 38조, 년말까지 110조 적자다. 그래도 탈원전하고 민노총 밀어주고 기업을 쫓아내고 북한에 퍼주고있다. 나라가 무너지고 있다.
qtw3****
작년에 국내쌀값30%오르더니 다 이유가 있었네..이제 서민들 끼니도 걱정해야 할듯
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
시진핑은 2020년 대선 결과를 기다리고 있지만, 그러면 불확
실성 때문에 기업들이 중국을 떠나게 된다.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
시진핑은 무역 협상을 원하지 않거나 아니면 트럼프를 굴복시킬 수 있다고 믿고 있다. 하지
만 그 결과는 중국 경제의 추락일 수 있다.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
화웨이는 중국 군부와의 관계를 말하지 않고 있다. 시진핑의 민관 융합발전融合发展은 헌법에 기재되어 있다.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afterlives of Chinese Communism includes essays from over 50 world-renowned scholars in the China field from different disciplines and continents. It provides an indispensable guide for understanding how the intellectual legacies of the Mao era shape Chinese politics today. Each chapter discusses a concept or practice from the Mao era, what it meant in its historical context, and what has become of it since. The authors respond to the legacy of Maoism each in their own way, to consider what lessons Chinese communism offers today and whether there is a future for the egalitarian politics that communism once promised.
Available for free download at ANU Press and for purchase at Verso Books.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
자기들의 세금을 올려서 빈부의 불평등을 시정해 달라는 갑부들은, 그런 세금을
아무리 퍼부어도 불평등은 해소할 수가 없다는 사실을 모르고, 또 부가 어떻게 만
들어지는지 모르고 있다. 기업을 일으키고 투자를 하는 것이 불평등을 해소하는
가장 좋은 방법이다.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
중국이 새로 정한 외국의 지명, 뉴욕이 신향(新鄕)으로 바뀌었다.
New York 新乡 Greenland 青岛 중국 청도와 같다. Pearl Harbor 蚌埠 New Foundland 新发地 Rocktown 石家庄 Table Mountain 平顶山 Phoenix 宝鸡 Broadway 宽街 5th Avenue 五道口 Mont Blanc 长白山 Westfield 西单 Evergreen 长春 이것도 중국 지명하고 같다. Hollywood 吉林 중국 길림하고 겹친다.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
미국은 약탈적인 보조금과 도둑질한 기술에도 불구하고, 중국의 기업들이 미국
의 시장을 잠식하도록 방치했다.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
고든 창을 비롯한 강경파들은 이런 결과를 두려워했다. 트럼프는 내년 대선을 앞
두고 강경책으로만 중국을 몰아붙일 수가 없었다. 하지만 지금 중국을 어느 정도
제압하지 못하면, 가까운 미래에 중국은 미국을 누르고 세계 최대의 경제 대국으
로 올라설 것이다. 또 트럼프가 북한에 어떤 양보를 하느냐에 따라, 한국의 운명
이 달라질 수 있다.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
영국이 2050년까지 탄소 제로를 완성하겠다는 헛된 도덕 현시(顯示, virtue signalling)에 빠졌다. 하지만 그것은 보조금을 타먹으려는 정실 자본주의자들만을 늘릴 뿐이다.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
정부 관리로 사멸할 뻔한 동식물들이 지역 부족에게 관리를 맡기면서 살아났다.
---> 관료주의는 모든 것을 죽이는 특이한 능력이 있다.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
유럽연합은 왜 쇠퇴를 피할 수 없나?
This is the transcript of a speech delivered by Rebecca Lowe. It took place at the UK edition of the Free Market Road Show 2019 hosted by 1828 and the Austrian Economics Center.
When I was asked to discuss “where the EU should go next” and “how the EU can adapt and survive”, it threw me slightly.
To be honest, I’m not really convinced the EU will go anywhere next. Or, at least, I’m not convinced that there’s any kind of reform that would work sufficiently well unless it brought about pretty substantial change, in which case it wouldn’t be “the EU” as we know it that persists, but something quite different thing.
Anyway, I’m not even really convinced that that kind of whole-scale substantial reform is ever going to happen.
So, yes, to answer the question I’ve been set, I’m not convinced that the EU can adapt and survive. And I’m certainly not convinced it will or can change in a way that will become more conducive to respect for freedom, which this event is also focused on.
Basically, my money is on the EU’s break-up, sooner or later. Simply, there probably just needs to be one big catastrophe, economic or otherwise, and it could easily collapse.
An important member state or two just cannot cope, EU institutions then fail and break down, uprisings take place, and it’s all over. That said, this is a bit like predicting the fall of Berlin Wall or Brexit: you know it’s coming, but it’s hard to predict just when, or what will be the trigger. It could be tomorrow, it could be ten years’ time. It will probably be somewhere in between.
And while, of course, such an eventuality will undeniably bring a lot of serious pain to a lot of people, I must admit I don’t see it happening as being entirely a bad thing.
Yes, it will have many awful consequences, but fear of awful consequences is not always a good reason in itself to want something you see as bad to persist.
I won’t go through the reasons I think the EU is bad in detail, but suffice to say I’m a big believer in democracy and sovereignty. I also worry greatly about the way in which EU policies have severely harmed people within European countries, not least those countries with long-term structural economic problems, which have been exacerbated by an ideological commitment to the Euro, whose introduction was, to my mind, not only economically insane but also damaging in many other ways.
I voted to leave partly because I don’t want my country to be complicit in that. I’d rather we were on the outside ready to choose to help when necessary.
So, yes, I think the EU, as a formal structure in its current state, will probably collapse. Because I’m not a determinist, however, next I’d like to think briefly about whether there’s some form of change that might delay or even prevent this break-up.
When considering what might be the necessary change, two key points arise: technical or analytical predictions, and the need to respond to demand from people within member states.
The first of these points relates to assessments about issues within member states, like financial crises and unemployment, and also issues across the whole EU, like security threats from outside.
The second of these points about change relates to growing frustrations within member states, shown through political discontent, polling figures, and so on. And this second point shouldn’t be underestimated as fans of the EU still seem astonishingly prone to do.
In fact, polling from 2017 commissioned by the Tony Blair Institute (hardly the home of Brexit) showed that when asked: “which of the following is closest to your own personal position on France’s membership of the EU”, less than ten per cent of French voters answered: “I want to see us remain in the EU as it is today“.
When the respective question was asked to Germans, just over ten per cent of them wanted to remain “as it is today”. That sounds like pretty serious dissatisfaction.
Related to that, generally, there have been two standard schools of thought on the kinds of change the EU might need if it were to persist in some form: kinds of change that people within member states have called for.
The first school, and I’m addressing this generally, outside of any particular specific current context, relates to “more EU”. This would mean increased centralised top-down political control.
For instance, the classic Piketty (et al) suggestion of mutualising EU debt and issuing “Eurobonds”, so the ECB could support countries in extremis, is an example of a reforming approach that would necessitate greater political union.
Now, that kind of reform might be welcomed by some economically weaker countries like Greece, for instance. But probably not by so many in Germany.
Insight into a standard take on an alternative approach to reform, therefore, comes from Paul Lever’s recent book Berlin Rules. Lever, a former UK ambassador to Germany, contends that “whatever form a ‘political union’ might take, it does not mean, for Germans, raising money in Germany for the benefit of others”.
His conclusion is that the extended union Germany wants is most likely one in which a closer eye can be kept on other countries, with the aim of persuading them to approach fiscal policy along the German lines of low debt, borrowing, and deficits.
So, what can we take from these two approaches, and crucially, what might they mean for freedom within the EU?
First, we should recognise that there is a genuine need and demand for change. Second, however, that something pretty big would need to happen for people to reach consensus about the kind of change that should take place. And, third, crucially, that it’s wrong to think that all of this is focused on economics.
It’s a false dichotomy to attempt to separate economics from politics. And most of the points I’ve been making depend on the interlocking nature of these things.
Indeed to me, the craziness of the Euro is that, as well as tying together such incredibly different economies in monetary union, it prevents countries putting in place the economic policies on which their citizens have elected politicians.
This brings me to my final and most important point. For me, democracy is a necessary condition of a good and legitimate political society. Democracy (when enacted properly) entails that our right to political participation, and other key political rights, are upheld.
And this is essential for us as autonomous creatures who are born free and equal. It is also essential to the recognition of our freedom within organised society, and, crucially to this discussion, something that, not least for practical reasons, seems best enacted within a nation state.
While the EU remains technocratic and actively anti-democratic, it will continue to impede our freedom and the freedom of our European friends.
And it’s unlikely that the EU will become more democratic anytime soon, or start to respect democratic processes within its member states. Those are not changes that appear to be on the horizon. Its aims now are completely otherwise, and a lack of responsiveness is inbuilt to its structures and institutions.
So I have little hope for the EU as it stands, and particularly on any assessment related to freedom.
---------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
아래의 글들이 비로 앤티프래질의 정의이다.
Ase Deliri
This is the very definition of #AntiFragile and the poem I think of when I imagine the #RWRI crew.
RWRI: Real World Risk Institute
------------------------------------------------------------------------
그냥 여자라고 하면 될 것을, 질을 갖고 있는 모든 사람이라고? 그러면 정치적으로 올바른 언어가 되는가 보네.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
미투 폭도가 시인으로서의 내 삶을 파괴하려 했다.
--->우리나라에서도 일어났던 일 아니었나?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
좌파들에게 좋은 예술작품은 올바른 정치 성향을 지닌 것이고, 올바른 정치 성향이란 정체성의 문제이다.
따라서 작품의 평가는 개인의 정체성과 정치적 입장을 고려해 판단된다. 이런 자기 검열은 자기 기만이 되고, 이런 방식으로 노선에서 벗어나는 사람들을 제거한다.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
앤드류 양은 자동화를 걱정하지만, 그보다는 인플레를 두려워해야 한다.
중앙은행이 목표로 삼고 있는 2% 인플레는 빠르게 새로운 돈을 찍어내서, 생산성 상승 효과를 초과하고 있다. 그로 인해 물가는 계속 오르고 있다.
자동화로 인해 기계들이 인간 대신 일하고, 또 생산성을 높인다면, 가격은 떨어질 것이고, 사람들의 임금이나 저축은 더 오래 쓸 수 있게 된다.
결국 자동화는 노동 시간이 줄고 생활 수준은 높아진다는 것이다.
Andrew Yang Fears Automation. He Should Fear Inflation.
Per Bylund
It is not automation that scares people, it is inflation. Might sound odd, but what I mean is that the promise of a fully (or at least a more extensively) automated future seems like a threat because modern currencies are fundamentally inflationary.
When we work and save, the purchasing power of our saved funds diminishes with time. This is not a natural state of things, as many nowadays would assume. It is created. The reason prices tend to go up over time is that money loses its purchasing power.
If you think about it, shouldn't innovations and competition mean we become more productive and thus can get the same benefits (goods, services) at a lower cost? That is exactly what is happening, and it is evident in some industries like hi-tech (smartphones, tablets, PCs). Wherever there are private businesses producing and competing with others, prices fall.
The reason the number of dollars required to buy an item increases is that the number of dollars in circulation is increasing at a faster rate than productivity. Prices go up because banks, especially through central banks "run" by governments create new money. Prices of goods adjust to the additional money in circulation.
In other words, the 2% inflation target many central banks have is really, though simplified, a matter of creating new money at a rate that exceeds productivity gains by two percentage points.
So what does this mean for automation?
Inflation means it is immensely difficult to save for retirement, to accumulate funds to last a lifetime--or to use savings to cut down on work time. Because those savings, if in cash, lose purchasing power over time, or must be invested, which means you risk losing them.
In other words, losing one's job is a huge problem whether or not you have savings. Which means the lack of work in a future where machines can do the work (or, perhaps, all work) appears to be a threat.
Economically speaking, it is not a threat, but an opportunity: machines relieve us from hard, time-consuming, and dangerous work so that we can do other things – and since machines save us from working because they increase productivity (produce at lower cost), prices should fall even faster. So our wages and savings should last much longer!
But in a world with inflationary currencies, this seems impossible because the perception is that we must work longer hours to keep our standard of living (imagine if you never had a raise--your standard of living would fall due to inflation's rising prices).
This loss of purchasing power, compared to the increased purchasing power we should benefit from, is basically taken from us through taxation. And this is what makes an automated future seem like a threat.
Without inflationary money, that is in a world where we benefit in full from our (individual and collective) increasing productivity, automation means we can work less while at the same time have an even higher standard of living – because all prices would consistently fall, likely at an increasing rate.
How is that not a promise?
Adapted from Twitter @PerBylund
---------------------------------------------------------
댓글 없음:
댓글 쓰기