[부정선거] 한국대선은 부정/조작 선거 준비 완료 - FACT 대장동들탁뇌피 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11393306633 [부정선거] 한국대선은 부정/조작 선거 준비 완료 - FACT ................................................................................. 1.부정선거로 가려는 좌빨들의 전략으로 여론 조사부터 조작중. 초반:윤석렬 우세로 시작 중반:윤석렬 역전으로 보여줌 (* 이렇게 하여 오르 내리한다는 여론조사의 신빙성을 올림) 막판:이재명 역전으로 보여주며 여론조사 마무리 2. 선거는 중국바이러스 코로나 핑계로 사전/우편투표 (미국의 경우는 우편투표) 독려 3.선관위원 전원은 여당( 더불어 만진당)추천자 인것 알지? 4. 이미 지난번 총선에서 부정선거 경험이 있기에 쉽게 부정선거/조작선거 가능 그래서 경험이 있는 선관위원장 교체하지 않는 이유. 5. 지난번 서울시장 선거에서 부정/조작 하지 않은 이유는 큰것을 위해 작은 것을 버리는 전략. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [분석] 송영길 고의로 코로나 걸렸을지 모른다. analysis 니시키노상 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11393326871 팩트에 기반한 추측이니 재미로 읽어주길 기억하겠지만 송영길은 갑자기 휠체어를 타고 등장하기 시작한다. 저 시점이 언제냐면 찢 지지율이 빠지기 시작한 연말연시 기점이었음. 조짐이 안좋아 갈아타고 싶은데 대놓고 지지안할 수는 없으니 거동 불편을 핑계로 행동을 줄이는 전략이었음 그 이후에는 쩔뚝이 흉내를 내고 다님. 왼발인지 오른발인지 영상을 잘 보면 구란지 아닌지 알텐데 그건 오늘은 생략. 암튼 저 시점은 지지율 역전된 시점임. 지지는 존나게 하기 싫으니 쩔뚝쩔뚝 거리면서 시간을 끔. 그러다가... 폐경궁 건이 터져버림 ㅋㅋㅋ 사실상 이제는 돌이킬 수가 없음 그래서 손절하기로 한 영길은 코로나에 걸려버림 (또는 걸린척 함) 그린야갤 성님도 같은 분석을... 송영길의 코로나는 전라도식 손절 방법의 하나였음. 굿바이 찢~ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 문화일보 코로나 2년 만에… 계절독감 전환 검토 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 매일신문 [속보] 김혜경 과잉의전 제보자 "삶 포기하고 싶을 만큼 스트레스…제발 보호 부탁" --->저승사자가 아니라 재명이 사자(使者)가 무섭다고 하오! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 오스트리아 경제학이 서수적 효용Ordinal Utility을 강조하는 이유 서수는 첫째, 둘째, 셋째와 같이 순서를 나타낸다. 그리고 기수는 1, 2, 4, 8, 9처럼 셈을 하는 숫자를 말한다. 효용이란 단순히 ‘선택’을 설명하기 위해 경제학자들이 사용하는 개념일 뿐이다. 즉 내가 배보다 사과를 좋아한다면, 나에게는 사과가 배보다 효용이 많은 것이고, 사과와 배 둘 중에 하나를 고르라면 사과를 고른다는 말이다. 메리가 나의 가장 친한 친구이고, 다음이 샐리, 톰이 세 번째라고 할 때, 나와 메리의 우정이 샐리와의 우정보다 38% 크다고 말하는 것은 엉터리일 뿐이다. 오스트리아 경제학이 기수를 쓰지 않고 서수를 이용해 효용을 말하는 것은 이 때문이다. Why Austrians Stress Ordinal Utility Robert P. Murphy David Friedman recently posted a critique of Austrian economics as laid out in the Rothbardian tradition. In his essay, Friedman repeats a claim he has made before—namely that economists used to agree with the Austrians that utility was ordinal, but after the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s work on game theory in 1947, it was recognized that utility was cardinal after all. (To avoid confusion, Friedman has other reasons for believing that utility is cardinal too, including intuitive appeals to everyday experience.) In the present article I’ll first explain what Austrians mean by saying utility is ordinal, and then I’ll examine the contribution of von Neumann and Morgenstern. As we’ll see, their framework doesn’t upset the long-standing Austrian view that in economic theory, utility is indeed ordinal. Why Austrians Claim That Utility Is Ordinal The ordinal numbers involve a ranking, such as 1st, 3rd, 8th, and so on. In contrast, the cardinal numbers are things like 2, 19, 34.7, and so on. You can perform arithmetic operations on the cardinal numbers, but it makes no sense to deploy them on the ordinal numbers. For example, the cardinal number 3 is three times bigger than the cardinal number 1. With the ordinal numbers, we can also say that “first” is better than “third,” but we can’t say it’s three times better; that type of claim isn’t just wrong, but it doesn’t even make sense. In the history of economics, a major innovation occurred in the early 1870s, when three thinkers—namely, Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Léon Walras—independently developed what we now call subjective marginal utility theory. This replaced the old classical approach to price and value, which relied on an objective cost (or labor) theory. Sometimes people are surprised to hear this, so it’s worth emphasizing: the labor theory of value was not an invention of Karl Marx but in fact was embraced (in various forms) by some of the leading lights in promarket economics, including the celebrated Adam Smith. Another surprising twist is that if you read the original works that ushered in the Marginal Revolution, even including those of the Austrians Menger and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, you will see that they use illustrative examples involving cardinal amounts of utility. However, by the early twentieth century, economists had developed standard price theory and their explanation of consumer behavior without an appeal to utility as a cardinal, psychic magnitude. (Interested readers can consult the first chapter of John Hicks’s 1939 work Value and Capital to learn the details of this evolution in thought.) As laid out, for example, by Murray Rothbard in his classic work Man, Economy, and State, utility is simply the concept economists use to explain choice. That is to say, if a certain good X gives John more utility than a different good Y, all we mean is that if faced with a choice between the two, John would pick X over Y. When they speak in this fashion, Austrian economists aren’t suggesting that there is a psychic magnitude of “utils” that John is seeking to maximize; all we mean is that John prefers X to Y. That’s all Austrians mean—and nothing more—when they equivalently say, “John gets more utility from X than from Y.” Since utility is ultimately tied to choice, it can only be expressed as a ranking. All we can ever conclude from someone’s actions is that particular units of different goods are ranked in a certain order. If we hypothetically knew that John would pick vanilla over chocolate, and chocolate over pistachio, then we know the first, second, and third items in his ranking of ice cream flavors.1 But we couldn’t say that John’s preference for vanilla over chocolate is bigger than his preference for chocolate over pistachio.2 To repeat, that would be as nonsensical as arguing that the difference between first and second is bigger (or smaller, or the same) as the difference between second and third. For an analogy, I often invoke friendship. It makes sense to rank your friends: Mary is your best friend, Sally is your second-best friend, Tom is your third-best friend, and so on. But it would be nonsense to claim that your friendship with Mary is 38 percent larger than your friendship with Sally. It is similar when Austrians treat utility. Finally, the Austrian approach to utility definitely rules out interpersonal comparisons. It makes absolutely no sense to ask whether a dollar gives more utility to a poor man than a rich man, because utility has to do with explaining (or interpreting) an individual’s actions or choices. It is not the economist’s invocation of a psychic magnitude that could, at least in principle, be measured and compared across different individuals. What about Common Sense?! Sometimes people—even other economists—are incredulous that the Austrians deny the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. “Do you really mean to tell me,” they exclaim, “that you don’t know if a starving man gets more utility from a sandwich than a sleeping man gets from rat poison?” The problem here is that this approach uses the word “utility” in an everyday sense, rather than the formal sense Austrians use in economic theory. To repeat, “more utility” in Austrian usage is simply an equivalent way of saying, “would choose over the alternative.” So it’s not that the Austrians don’t know if the starving man gets more utility from the sandwich than the sleeping man gets from rat poison; rather the Austrians say that such a claim makes no sense. It would be like asking if a rainbow has more anxiety than the number 7. We can see this (perhaps confusing) distinction between a formal, technical definition and an intuitive, everyday usage from the field of physics. (Walter Block originally came up with this analogy.) In physics, we would say that a person who picks a feather up from the floor and lifts it up to chest level performs more work than someone who holds a fifty-pound weight at chest level for ten minutes. But in everyday language, we would all agree that it takes “more work” to hold the weight rather than to lift the feather. This is because for physicists, “doing work” means applying a force through a distance, whereas in lay terms “doing work” means “exerting effort” or “performing a task that is intrinsically unpleasant.” In the same way, when people invoke common sense to say that “the young child gets more utility from the toy car than the older child does,” they are invoking a different concept from the formal one that Austrians have in mind when discussing utility theory. If some economists want to try to link up this commonsense, intuitive notion of psychic happiness with their formal theories of price determination and market value, they can go ahead and try. But the apparatus of price theory and subjective marginal utility theory, as laid out by Rothbard, for example, doesn’t need to rely on such intuitive notions. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Expected Utility Theory The polymath John von Neumann and the Austrian (by geography) economist Oskar Morgenstern famously wrote a pioneering work in game theory, specializing in so-called zero-sum games. In the second edition of their work (published in 1947), they produced a very elegant result: if an individual’s ordinal ranking of lotteries over possible outcomes (or prizes) obeyed certain plausible axioms, then the individual would always choose among lotteries such that he appeared to be maximizing the mathematical expectation of a cardinal utility function where each prize was assigned a particular number. Because of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s result, many economists (including David Friedman, as we saw above) have concluded that the earlier insistence on ordinal utility is clearly outdated. Yet the von Neumann and Morgenstern result does nothing to alter the preexisting case for ordinal utility, as I will now argue. In the first place, the axioms necessary to satisfy their theorem are falsified in everyday experience. For example, the so-called Allais paradox is a popular example where most people, when faced with some hypothetical lotteries over different sums of money, would rank the lotteries in a way that violates the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms, making it impossible to assign cardinal numbers to the utility of the underlying dollar amounts. But more generally, the von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility theory simply says that if someone’s ordinal rankings obey certain rules, then we can model the person’s choices “as if” the person had cardinal magnitudes assigned to the constituent elements of choice. Yet that’s not the same thing as saying there really exists a cardinal magnitude of something which the chooser is seeking to maximize. An analogy here may help. Suppose we are considering a person’s choices between various bundles of US currency consisting of coins and bills. That is to say, we want to present a person with things like “two $20 bills and three dimes” versus “five $10 bills and four pennies,” and always know which of these alternatives the person would prefer. Starting out with the person’s complete set of ordinal preference rankings between any two possible combinations of US currency (perhaps with a limit of $1,000 in the total amount, to keep our rankings finite), we could then prove a theorem: if the person’s ordinal rankings exhibited certain plausible features, then we could model their choices “as if” they were maximizing the total financial value of the bundle. Specifically, we could assign a value of, say, “1 util” to a penny, then define the value of a nickel as 5 utils, the value of a dime as 10 utils, the value of a $20 bill as 2,000 utils, and so on. Then our person would appear to be maximizing a cardinal utility function whenever faced with a choice between two different bundles of currency. In this hypothetical demonstration, would we really have “proved” the existence of cardinal utility? Of course not! In the first place, in the real world people would violate our “axioms” all the time. For example, someone who wants to use a vending machine might actually prefer three quarters rather than a dollar bill, even though the latter would have 100 utils while the former only had 75 utils. Such a person would appear to behave “irrationally” according to our “penny-maximizing theory,” but in reality we understand why the person might choose the three quarters over the dollar bill. Yet beyond this type of consideration, even on its own terms, we really haven’t proven that it makes sense to assign 1 util to a penny, 5 utils to a nickel, and so on. For one thing, we could just as easily assign 2 utils to a penny, 10 utils to a nickel, and so on, and get the same result. In the von Neumann and Morgenstern framework, they admit that the cardinal utility functions are unique only “up to a positive affine transformation,” so that should have nipped in the bud the notion that we were really grappling with underlying psychic quantities that governed human choices. The last point I will make concerns the attempted response to my argument. Specifically, supporters of the claim that von Neumann and Morgenstern proved the existence of cardinal utility will say that when it comes to temperature, here too the reported magnitudes are not unique. For example, water freezes at either 32 degrees Fahrenheit, 0 degrees Celsius, or 273.15 degrees Kelvin. But we all agree that temperature is a cardinal magnitude. So what’s the Austrian beef? Yet here, the reason we agree temperature is cardinal is that it relates to an underlying physical phenomenon of the jostling of molecules. In particular, there is an absolute zero temperature (which is calibrated to zero on the Kelvin scale), which corresponds to zero physical motion (except for quantum effects). In contrast, do we say that a dead man has zero utility? What about someone being tortured, does he have even fewer utils? These considerations should demonstrate that the Austrians are still on solid ground when claiming that in formal theory, utility is an ordinal concept. Even the elegant results of von Neumann and Morgenstern do not overturn this fact. 1.Note that we are here talking about a hypothetical, instantaneous ranking of the three flavors. In practice, all we could ever do is observe John choosing one particular flavor from a given set of options. For example, if we observed John pick vanilla over chocolate, then observed him pick chocolate over pistachio, and then a bit later observed him pick pistachio over vanilla, that wouldn’t be evidence of “irrationality” because of an alleged intransitivity of preferences. Rather, the Austrian would say that John’s preferences changed between the choices, which were necessarily occurring at different points in time. (Or one could also argue that the previous choices influenced the later ones, as perhaps John got tired of vanilla, etc.) 2.In his arguments with some of us over email, David Friedman raised an excellent objection: Couldn’t we at least conclude that John’s preference of vanilla over pistachio is greater than his preference of vanilla over chocolate? I confess I had never considered this clever question before. However, even on its own terms, it begs the question: Greater in what sense? What is the underlying magnitude whose greatness we are discussing? Furthermore, in actual practice, we could never observe John making these distinct choices among three or more items. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------