사법 사망!! 코메디 판결 !! 국정농단 20년 판결 죄목 ~ 다른 죄는 다 무죄고 오로지 재단 돈 모금하고 승마지원이 20년 이란다. 그것도 증거는 없고 사법부가 추정하건데...ㅋㅋㅋ .. 어떻게 공공목적의 재단후원금 모집과 삼성이 정유라 승마하라고 지원한 것이 국정농단 20년 형이 될 수 있냐! http://www.ilbe.com/view/11316986799/ 가련다go ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 중공 박멸 ] 트럼프가 중국 마저 조짐 ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 가성비옴므 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11316981678 워싱턴 (로이터) 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 퇴임 며칠 전에 미국 자본시장에 대한 중국인의 접근을 금지하며 중국군사기업 투자금지 강화 명령에 서명했다고 백악관이 수요일 밝혔다. 개정된 지침에 따르면, 2021년 11월 11일까지 미국 투자자들은 중국군이 소유하거나 통제하는 것으로 국방부가 지정한 회사의 지분을 완전히 처분해야 할 것이다. 국방부가 지금까지 블랙리스트에 올린 35개 기업 중에는 중국 최고의 반도체 제조업체인 SMIC와 거대 석유회사인 CNOOC가 있다. "오늘의 행정명령은 미국이 중국 군사 현대화에 자금을 대는 것으로부터 미국 투자자들을 보호하기 위한 핵심 도구를 보유하도록 보장해 줍니다"라고 한 행정부 고위 관리가 로이터 통신에 말했다. --->바이든이 취임 한 뒤에도 저런 정책이 계속 유지될까? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 무궁현꼬치피었습니다 팩트 : 블룸버그통신은 11일(현지시간) “트럼프 대통령이 주류 경제학자들의 경고를 무시한 채 ‘중국을 압박해 무역적자를 줄일 수 있다’고 공언했다. 하지만 미국의 대중 무역적자는 더 크게 늘었다”고 설명했다. 그가 취임하던 2017년만 해도 대중 적자는 연간 2400억 달러(약 264조원) 수준이었지만 지난해에는 3000억 달러를 훨씬 넘긴 것으로 추정된다. / 일베 댓글 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 트럼프가 만약 재선 못한다면, 그 이유는 계엄령 안내려서다 삼성동주민센터 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11316938630 11월초 개표후 지금까지 트럼프에겐 시간이 많았음 정식 당선자 인증일은 1월6일, 선거인단 투표일은 12월이였음. 그럼 못해도 1월6일 전에 자기가 모은 불법 부정선거 증거를 차곡 차곡 모아서 계엄령을 내렸어야 했는데.. 제일 좋은 시기는 12월이였고... 내리지 않고 펜스 또는 의회에 의해서 불법으로 바이든 당선 인증시켰으면 그후에는 트럼프는 법으로 할수 있는건 없다는 거 지금 미국시간 1월13일 5시, 1월19일까지 6일 남았는데 트럼프는 계속 승복은 안하면서 뭔가를 할꺼같은 암시를 주지만 정작 그게 안되고 바이든 취임되면 트럼프는 물론 지지자들까지 패닉에 빠지는거다. 자기편 그나마 많았을때인 12월에 계엄령 내렸으면 힘이 실리는 계엄일텐데 며칠 안남은 상황에서 그것도 확실치 않고 행복회로 돌리는것도 요즘 너무 지친다. 트럼프가 만약 재선 못하거나 후에 자기가 보복을 당한다면 그 이유는 자기편 많을때 계엄령 안내린거 하나뿐임. 그후에 싸우는건 의미없다. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1/20, 언론자유 회복하나? … 기도문, “악(evil), 이길 수 없다!” ... 이슈진단#.233 ... 2021.01.14. ... [박훈탁TV] https://youtu.be/hhJuvst7fYk -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 탈레브: 음모론은 언제나 부분적 사실들을 증거로 제시한다. Nassim Nicholas Taleb The pattern in conspiracy theories is always *partial* facts presented as evidence. <60 Minutes> President Trump’s claims of vote fraud in Georgia are “fantastical, unreasonable [and] lacking in any factual reality,” says Gabriel Sterling, a top state election official, who is also a longtime Republican and Trump voter. https://cbsn.ws/3oBCObm --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 우한 폐렴과 사회주의 계산 문제 가격 체계는 사적인 생산 수단의 소유를 필요로 한다. 왜 그럴까? 가격 체계는 개인들이 지닌 위계적 가치 평가에 의해 만들어지기 때문이다. 그리고 위계적 가치 평가는 생산 수단의 사적인 소유를 필요로 한다. 우한 폐렴에 대한 정부의 대처를 보면, 그들은 모든 사람의 사적인 위험의 위계를 알고 있고, 그에 따라 적절한 공적인 대응을 할 수 있다고 믿고 있다. 하지만 그것은 사회주의 국가에서 자원이나 상품의 가치를 아는 것만큼 불가능한 일이다. 사람들이 원하는 상품(또는 서비스)의 우선 순위가 다 다르듯이, 사람들이 위험하다고 여기는 것들의 우선 순위도 각기 다르다. 예를 들면 청년들은 우한 폐렴을 별로 겁내지 않고 있고, 노인들은 무척 두려워하고 있다. Covid-19 and the Socialist Calculation Problem Patrick Barron One hundred years ago Ludwig von Mises wrote the definitive exposure of the impossibility of socialism: "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth." In a recent Mises Wire essay—"Socialist Robert Heilbroner's Confession in 1990: 'Mises Was Right.'"—Gary North sums up the socialist problem succinctly (his emphasis). But Heilbroner failed to present the central argument that Mises had offered. Mises was not talking about the technical difficulty of setting prices. He was making a far more fundamental point. He argued that no central planning bureau could know the economic value of any scarce resource. Why not? Because there is no price system under socialism that is based on the private ownership of the means of production. There is therefore no way for central planners to know which goods and services are most important for the state to produce. There is no hierarchical scale of value that is based on supply and demand—a world in which property-owning individuals place their monetary bids to buy and sell. The problem of socialism is not the technical problem of allocation facing a planning board. It is also not that planners lack sufficient technical data. Rather, the central problem is this: assessing economic value through prices. The planners do not know what anything is worth. Notice North's point. Socialism is impossible, not just technically difficult. Knowing what to produce requires a price system. A price system requires private ownership of the means of production. Why? Because the price system rests on individually held hierarchical scales of values. And the hierarchical scale of values require private ownership of the means of production. In other words, if you don't own something, you cannot know its worth. This doesn't mean that everyone has the same hierarchical scale of values. But all these individual scales of value do meet in the marketplace to determine marginal prices at given points of time. Your Beanie Baby collection may be worth a thousand dollars in today's market and possibly zilch tomorrow. Now, your beanie baby collection may be priceless to you and you don't really care about its value to others. But if you decided to make a business of selling Beanie Babies or even to simply sell your collection, you would be forced to confront the reality of the marketplace. Covid-19 and the Socialist Calculation Problem You may well ask what this has to do with covid-19. covid-19 isn't a marketable good. It isn't owned by anyone. No one wants it. Quite the opposite in fact. True. Nevertheless, government's response to covid-19 assumes that it knows everyone's personal risk hierarchy and can tailor an appropriate public response. This is as impossible as knowing values in a socialist commonwealth. In the place of a hierarchy of wants, we have a hierarchy of risk. And just as everyone's hierarchy of wants is different, everyone's hierarchy of risk is different. No one can deny this. We see it played out everywhere. Young people in college assess their personal health risk from covid-19 as very low. The aged and those suffering from other illnesses assess their personal health risk as very high. Furthermore, one's response is determined by what one gives up. The elderly living on pensions may be giving up very little in a lockdown or quarantine other than their social lives. Certainly they are not giving up their life-sustaining income by staying in semi-isolation. But those still of working age have a very different tradeoff. Business owners who are forced to shut down may lose their entire wealth. Salaried and hourly workers may see a slower drain on their wealth, but the longer the lockdowns continue, the more accumulated wealth they will see drain away. I have used stereotypical broad categories here for illustrative comparisons only. Of course, those of the same age, health profile, wealth accumulation, etc. may have entirely different personal risk assessments. The old adage applies that no two people are alike. These facts of human existence make universally acceptable public policy responses to covid-19 not just difficult but impossible. The only acceptable public response is one of perfect liberty; i.e., each individual decides his own response to covid-19 as long as he does no harm to others. What about Externalities? This brings up a common retort that perfect liberty does harm others. A typical government justification for coerced lockdowns and quarantines was that there was a need to conserve hospital beds for the expected onslaught of covid-19 patients. Sounds reasonable at first, but not upon further examination. This so-called line of reasoning rests upon faulty externality theory; i.e., that everything you do affects others in some degree. By this logic government has a right to regulate everything you do. Forgetting for a moment that government's access to information is no greater than that of thousands of others, there is the ethical problem of government's right to determine to whom a private entity may offer services. For example, a private hospital may refuse patients who wish to have elective surgery in order to preserve beds for what the hospital considers more important patients, but government may not insert its power of coercion into this decision. Like the socialist allocation problem, government has no "skin in the game" and, therefore, it has nothing upon which to make a universally applicable policy except the temporary prejudice of those currently elected to office and/or those currently working for government. Perhaps an even more damning criticism of the externality rationale is that there is no attempt and probably no definitive calculation of the many adverse consequences to lockdowns and quarantines, from delayed medical treatment that leads to worsening health (both physical and mental) or even death to permanent loss of one's ability to feed, house, and clothe one's family adequately. The Double Standards of Politicians So, we are left with these conclusions: since all risk is personal, no one knows the risk tolerance of others. Therefore, one's response to covid-19 is a personal decision based upon one’s personal risk assessment. In other words, perfect liberty must be respected, because it is the only rational option. Impractical? This is the very policy actually followed by many of the authors of the current restrictions. Governor Newsom of California attended a lavish dinner party after issuing new and more onerous restrictions on public and private gatherings. Illinois Governor Pritzker has been unapologetic about visiting his many out-of-state residences after telling his constituents not to do the same. Other politicians have been similarly embarrassed. Are they taking unnecessary risks, both to themselves and others? There is no definitive answer. By the very fact that they violated their own restrictions, we can conclude that they valued their freedom to do so above their personally perceived risk. Why should not that same right be available to all of us? Patrick Barron is a private consultant to the banking industry. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 오류와 편견이 있는 책 <자유의 역사> 자유주의자들은 자유를 “정부 권력으로부터의 자유”를 의미한다고 믿는다. 하지만 네덜란드의 사학자인 드딘de Dijn은 그것은 미국 혁명 이후의 자유의 개념이고, 그 이전에는 자유는 대중적인 자치 정부를 의미했다고 말한다. What Does "Freedom" Mean? There Are Many Different Answers. David Gordon Freedom: An Unruly History by Annelien de Dijn Harvard University Press, 2020 426 pages1 Those of us who follow Mises and Rothbard think that freedom means “freedom from.” In Rothbard’s view, rights are negative. People aren’t at liberty to use force or threats of force against you or your property; but there are no positive enforceable rights to come to your assistance. Annelien de Dijn, a Dutch historian who specializes in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French political thought, argues that this conception of freedom, and others like it, is a modern innovation. (By “modern,” she means the time since the American and French Revolutions. She says, These days most people tend to equate freedom with the possession of inalienable individual rights, rights that demarcate a private sphere no government may infringe on. But has this always been the case?…Our current conception of liberty must be understood as a deliberate and dramatic rupture with long established ways of thinking about liberty….For over 2,000 years…freedom was equated with popular self-government….It was only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that political thinkers in Europe and the United States began to propagate a different way of thinking about liberty. Freedom, many came to argue, was not a matter of who governed. Instead what determined freedom was the extent to which one was governed. (pp. 1–3, emphasis in original) De Dijn is a historian of great learning, and her book is well worth reading, a task made easier by her clear writing. (I regret to say, though, that she confuses “flaunt” with “flout” [see pp. 225 and 244].) The book consists of three main parts: “The Long History of Freedom,” on the Ancient Greeks and Romans; “Freedom’s Revival,” on the Renaissance and the Atlantic [principally American and French] Revolutions; and “Rethinking Liberty,“ about the modern conception of liberty that she deems counterrevolutionary. I’ll try to show that her main argument doesn’t succeed. (I follow her in not making a distinction between “freedom” and “liberty.”) The main problem in her argument is that it slides between two positions, the first, that the older conception of freedom rated popular self-government an essential part of freedom, much more plausible than the second, that self-government was the sum and substance of the older conception. It’s clear that the second, more extreme view isn’t true. The ancient Greeks and Romans valued living life as they chose, as well as the freedom to govern themselves collectively. She stresses herself that it is sometimes claimed that the ancient Greeks had no interest in individual independence, only in the collective freedom of the community to govern itself. But writings by Herodotus and others let us see that they believed freedom—the ability to control the way we are governed—was also crucial to the preservation of personal security and individual independence. Far from privileging collective freedom above personal security, the Greeks believed that one could not exist without the other. (pp. 33–34) Despite this forthright statement, she later treats any emphasis on individual rights, especially property rights, as a break with the older conception. She gets into another tangle when she comes to John Locke. She views him as a defender of the older view, but in doing so she must confront an obvious objection: Doesn’t Locke believe in individual rights, including property rights? Doesn’t this put him close to the “counterrevolutionary” position that she says arose over a century after the Second Treatise? She deals with the problem in this way. But, as he also made clear, the freedom men enjoyed as members of a political community—what Locke called civil freedom—had nothing to do with an absence of state interference. It had been said, Locke wrote, that freedom was “a liberty for everyone to do what he lists [likes], to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws.” But this was quite wrong. Civil liberty—the liberty one enjoyed as a member of a political community—was not about being able to do whatever you wanted without outside interference. Instead, Locke explained, “freedom of men under governmen” was “to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it.” If we want to understand what Locke meant by this somewhat enigmatic formula, we need to keep in mind that ‘standing rules,” or laws, should be made with the consent of the people or of their standing representatives. (p. 176) De Dijn’s response to the objection rests on a false antithesis. She is correct that Locke distinguishes liberty from license, but you are free according to him to do whatever doesn’t violate the law of nature, i.e., what doesn’t violate the rights of others. The only right you surrender to the community is the right to enforce the law of nature. The legislature is not free to enact whatever “standing rules” for which it can secure a majority. To be fair to her, some scholars agree with her interpretation, and she recognizes that the “interpretation of Locke [she favors] is controversial,” citing a “a very different reading” to be found in a book by John Marshall (p. 377n132); but she does not cite the works of A. John Simmons and Eric Mack that put Locke in the very limited government camp. It is, though, an admirable feature of the book that she often acknowledges in her endnotes competing interpretations to her own. It would seem that the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution is a counterexample to her thesis that advocating limited government came after the “Atlantic Revolutions.” It consists, after all, of a list of stringent limits on government. Her response will probably surprise you. Madison, the drafter of the Bill of Rights, was a proponent of the freedom-as-self-government view, and he really didn’t want a bill of rights anyway. Madison’s own support for a bill of rights as a way to protect liberty always remained lukewarm….More generally, Madison’s writings show that a bill of rights was never his preferred solution to majority tyranny. In his most influential writings of the 1780s—his contributions to the Federalist Papers—Madison reflected extensively on the danger of majoritarian tyranny. But here, he did not refer to a bill of rights as a solution; instead he maintained that the tyranny of the majority could best be avoided by creating “extended” republics…in short, by issuing declarations of rights, American revolutionaries…continued to think about freedom as something that could be established only through the imposition of popular control over government.” (p. 221) She does not mention the main reason Madison opposed a bill of rights: because the power to interfere with the rights mentioned in it had not been included in the strictly limited powers granted by the Constitution to the central government, the bill was not needed. The American revolutionaries did, as she says, believe that popular control of government is necessary for freedom, but unlike her, they did not think it sufficient. As you would expect, her knowledge of nineteenth-century French sources in superb. We learn, for example, that “the Statue of Liberty was a brainchild of the French Americanophile Édouard de Laboulaye.” (p.308) The statue had nothing to do with immigration: “it was meant to propagate the antidemocratic understanding of freedom held by nineteenth-century liberals. Laboulaye and other supporters of the project wanted the statue to encourage an association among liberty, order and personal security, That is why they deliberately rejected the traditional symbol of freedom: the cap of liberty,” replacing it with a crown of stars. (p.308) The “cap of liberty” is a leitmotif of the book and it is featured in many of the illustrations that accompany the text. But when she strays from her specialty, she sometimes errs. She says that Herbert Spencer ‘went on to write a wide variety of influential works, mostly arguing against what he called ‘over-legislation.’ (p.296). The bulk of Spencer’s work isn’t about politics. He wrote vast tomes on cosmology, biology, and anthropology, among other subjects, and his nineteenth-century reputation as a thinker rested mainly on them. She also says that “the reception of The Road to Serfdom also demonstrated how the advent of the Cold War gave new credibility to the idea that any kind of state intervention—no matter how much democratic support it enjoyed—should be seen as an infraction on liberty.” (p.334) She doesn’t mention that this isn’t the view Hayek takes in the book. He explicitly says that limited welfare measures are consistent with his idea of the rule of law, not retreats in the face of democratic pressure that must be grudgingly accepted as infractions of it. Mises criticizes Hayek for undue concessions to the welfare state, a fact she does not mention, although readers will be pleased to know that she does briefly discuss Mises, and refers to Ron Paul as well. Despite my criticisms, you ought to read Freedom: An Unruly History. You will learn a lot from it, but don’t believe everything it says. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 우한 폐렴을 폐장肺瘴의 일종으로 보고 치료한다. 从肺瘴论治新冠病毒疾病 随着新冠疫情的发现，我们英国中医师学会学术团队、欧洲中医抗疫专家团队、新冠肺炎/流感交流群、全球中医抗疫群等群的专家们，密切关注疫情、交流中医防疫治疫学术，积极探讨中医在新冠临床的应用。近4个多月全民居家避疫后，通过在线会诊、寄送处方中药及指导患者应用中医刮痧、拔罐、指压及导引、食疗等自我治疗确诊或疑似病例约200余例，并帮助和指导近千留守学生应用中医药方法抗疫，获得满意效果。今分享相关经验，抛砖引玉，欢迎同道批评指正。 一，新型冠状病毒疾病属于中医肺瘴疫病的范畴 新冠疾病的发生与19年运气失调、气候反常，自然生态失衡（如夏秋之交全球气候炎热干燥，美国、澳大利亚、亚马逊流域、西伯利亚和非洲持续数月的大面积森林火灾，导致地球大气和气候环境变化、影响蝙蝠等野生动物活动、自然界生态失衡、人类对疾病易感性变化）等因素密切相关。 在《内经》热病及疫疠学术思想、张仲景《伤寒论》、晋·葛洪《肘后方》之《治瘴气疫疠温毒诸方》专论（录防治瘴气瘟疫方十余首，多用肉桂、干姜、苍术、花椒及麻黄、附子、细辛等散寒、除湿、温阳、健脾中药为主）、隋太医令巢元方主持的国家编修病因证候学专著《诸病源候论·瘟疫病诸候》（该章4/5左右篇幅为《瘴气病诸候》，详细阐述了瘴气病机治法，倡用汗吐下三法治疫，开启后瘟疫病学术思想之先导）学术思想基础上，结合新冠病毒疾病的临床表现，我提出了从肺瘴论治新冠病毒疾病的观点。 瘴病就是野生动物传播于人类引起的传染性发热性疫病。《廣韻》指瘴为熱病。《玉篇》说“瘴，疠也”。《正字通》则明指瘴是“山川疠气成疾也”（所谓“山川疠气”，实为山野间野生动物所携带的具有传染性和致病性的病毒、细菌等病原微生物）。现代病原学研究揭示，78%的传染病来源于野生动物携带的病原体。新冠虽然临床表现复杂，但是新冠肺炎是最具代表性和最常见致死因素，并具有阴湿性质的病机证候特点，所以应名为肺瘴。 二，我从肺瘴辨治新冠病毒肺炎的经验 新冠瘴毒为阴湿疫毒，易损阳气。初起损伤肺脾、表里阳气两伤；继之三焦气机失调，水津不布与痰湿水饮内生、燥湿互见，上下内外同病，临床多见干咳伴随痰湿阻肺的浊腻苔；脾虚运化失司则腹胀腹泻、清阳不上充头面官窍故嗅觉味觉丧失、困乏多寐头晕；阳气不达四肢末故乏力肢痛、指趾冻疮样变；阳气障隔，不仅水湿不化、血循亦不畅而瘀滞血栓；瘴毒犯于腠理三焦膜原，正气与之相争而发热或高热憎寒。瘴为阴湿之邪，下午、入夜或阴雨天阳退阴进时症状加重；夏天人体得自然界阳气之助，故青壮年和体质较强者感染可无症状，因此“新冠病毒毒力减弱”的说法并不可靠。虽见症纷繁，但主要属于湿性瘴毒伤阳的病机。 针对上述病机，以解毒除瘴、宣通肺气，健脾除湿、调畅三焦为大法，拟定了治疗新冠肺瘴的主方除瘴散。以“疑病从有、既病防变”为原则，“截断扭转”积极治疗确诊者和轻症、防止轻症转重形成肺闭、重症转危形成阴盛隔阳呼衰、心衰的危症。 对肺脾心肾阳气不足、兼痰湿水饮气滞血瘀的新冠易感体质或轻症患者，我常以五积散为基础加灵芝（或黄芪）、黄芩、艾叶为主作为预防，或合用柴胡除瘴散做早期治疗。并在清宫太医院辟瘟（烧熏）方基础上加味配制了辟瘟除瘴防疫香囊（羌活、白芷、苍术、艾叶、吴茱萸、藿香、升麻等）。 对高热、呼吸困难的急症患者，在收到中药前，指导患者或护理人应用中医刮痧拔罐或食疗等方法自治，以缓解病情，再用中药善后治疗。 三，用于治疗新冠（肺瘴）的除瘴散 除瘴散组成：藿香9-12克，苏叶9-15克，升麻6-18克，贯众9-30克，柴胡9-30克，甘草3-12克。 用法：水煎服，一日一剂。病机证候符合的重症咳煎药做茶，时时温服之，一日可用2-3剂。单用本方用较大剂量，合用他方他药，可酌用较小量。浓缩药粉按比例处方。 临床应用：新冠状病毒疾病及疑似病例，证属肺脾阳虚或痰湿阻滞，肺气不宣、脾为湿困，以前述临床表现为主，舌淡、淡红或偏红，舌苔满布舌面、舌苔白厚、白腻、白润、白厚腻，或偏黄腻者；其他如中东呼吸综合征、非典等冠状病毒疾病或流感病毒疾病，如果出现上述临床表现，亦可于临床试用。 禁忌：素体阴虚或素有内热，瘴毒从阳化热、伤阴损液、动风、动血；下元大虚、真阳欲脱，头晕心悸，面色晄白、冷汗淋漓；舌质红絳、舌面光净无苔者，应当禁用或慎用，或酌情减去藿香升麻，加对证方药同用。 方解：根据新冠病毒疾病（肺瘴）核心病机，以藿香芳香醒脾、除瘴化湿，苏叶宣畅肺气，和畅中焦，共为君药；升麻升阳除瘴解毒，贯众清解瘴毒，柴胡宣畅三焦气机升降，推陈致新，共为臣药，甘草通行十二经而解瘴毒，且能和合诸药之性而为使药。药仅六味，功能除瘴解毒、透达肺脾三焦。 临床可根据全身或局部见症和表里寒热虚实不同，随证合用小柴胡汤（柴胡除瘴散/寒热虚实错杂）、败毒散（败毒除瘴散/瘴毒夹风寒湿肢体肌肉疼痛）、五积散（五积除瘴散/瘴毒所伤表寒里湿兼痰食瘀郁）、三仁汤（三仁除瘴汤/感受瘴毒湿重于热、咳嗽低热疲乏等症）、甘露消毒丹（除瘴甘露丹/热重于湿咽痛咳嗽发热舌红苔黄腻等）或五苓散（水气不化小便不利等）等；兼咳喘气紧，则酌寒热痰饮轻重合桂枝加厚朴杏子汤或麻杏石甘汤、小青龙汤或射干麻黄汤、泽漆汤等（可用苏叶代麻黄）；胸闷胸痛、舌红苔黄者合小陷胸汤、千金苇茎汤。如心衰肾衰辨证使用葶苈大枣泻肺汤、茯苓四逆汤、真武汤等加减变通。 四，临床典型验案举隅 案例1，柴胡除瘴散治疗新冠确诊案例 Mr.A，英国白人，新冠病房护士，5月9日在线会诊。因发烧3天、头晕头痛、疲乏多寐，卧床休息并服解热镇痛药体温仍高，昨日做新冠检测，1小时前得到通知被确诊为新冠病毒感染。除前症外，自觉头颈灼热而身寒冷，舌淡尖红，苔厚腻泛黄，右侧舌根有小块剥苔，前部两侧有齿痕。2个月前曾因发烧咽痛恶心，诊为流感。 诊断：肺瘴（新冠状病毒疾病）； 病机证候：瘴毒自口鼻而入，表里两伤；三阳经气郁遏，肺脾阳气受损。 治法：除湿解毒，宣肺和中，畅达三焦表里阳气。 方药：柴胡除瘴散合葛根汤、麻杏石甘汤加减（浓缩药粉）： 藿香9克，苏叶9克，柴胡9克，葛根12克，麻黄3克（可用苏叶代），桂枝6克，白芍药6克，干生姜3克，甘草3克，桔梗9克，杏仁6，薏苡仁12克，黄芩6克，连翘9克，贯众9克，升麻9克。每次5克，每天3次，开水冲服。嘱清淡、温暖饮食，充分休息，避免受凉。 5月13日反馈（译文）“感觉好多了，也不发烧了”。 16日“中药还没有吃完，但是在我需要的时候非常有帮助。现在因工作需要我已经回来工作了。我不发烧了，感觉已经好了，谢谢您对我病中的帮助”（见截图）。 案例2，刮痧结合中药治疗新冠疫期持续高热咳嗽案 W，10岁，男。4月5日在线诊。6天前夜间突发高热寒战（38.5℃以上），咳嗽不止至今。现体温38.2-38.8℃，咳嗽频繁剧烈、咽痛，脘腹不舒、大便溏软日数次、排不净，其父查按脐右轻压痛。舌淡红有瘀点，苔白腻，伸舌无力，中有纵行深裂（见图）。 诊断：肺瘴。 辨证：（少年生机勃勃阳气较旺）感染瘴毒，从阳化热，阳郁湿阻，湿热伤阴。 治法：解毒除瘴，开三阳之郁，宣化太阴湿浊。以柴胡除瘴散合甘露消毒丹去藿香升麻。与其父五积散加灵芝、黄芩、苏叶、藿香预防。 刮痧：嘱其父亲在收到中药前为其尺泽、上背部华佗夹脊与委中穴刮痧。方法：患儿放松，以鸡蛋清涂于经穴部位及上下，用刮痧板或边缘较钝的汤匙，与皮肤呈45度角自上向下反复刮擦5-10分钟，皮下发红或轻微瘀点为度。刮后放松休息30-60分钟，谨避风寒。 6日反馈：昨日刮痧后烧退，夜间也未再发烧，咳减。今日体温最高37.8℃。 4月13日，服中药6天后，其父述“他应该是好了！烧退了，咳嗽也好了很多”；“尺泽穴很管用，咳得厉害的时候，刮几下就发红，刮完咳的就少了”。舌淡红，舌边腻苔减退，舌苔转黄（阴寒湿证，转热为顺）且同时中间裂纹消失，瘀点也消，伸舌好转（见图）。一周后随访，药尽病愈。 刮痧在新冠临床应用及案例二诊治体会 刮痧是中医临床重要的外治疗法之一，其作用机制是通对十二皮部施治，激发经络脏腑自我调节、祛除病邪疫毒，以促进康复。疫期临床应用，疗效颇佳。如案二根据病机证候，选取手太阴肺经穴尺泽、足太阳经穴委中以及上背部华佗夹脊穴部刮痧治疗，以宣透肺卫太阳之表，祛瘴疫而退烧；亦振奋肺脾阳气、宣肺止咳；结合中药除瘴散以除瘴毒，小柴胡汤透发三焦膜原之疫毒，甘露消毒丹解毒除湿；瘴毒祛除，升降得和，营卫三焦通利，故气血津液得以正常代谢敷布，而迅速康复。虽仅数日，不仅自觉症状好转，舌象亦明确显示出来。在现代实验室理化检验产生以前，中医四诊，主客观结合，且不依赖现代技术条件，在特殊时期特殊条件下，具有重要临床意义。 作者/袁炳胜 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------