2019년 9월 24일 화요일

北 39호실 고위 관리 출신 탈북자
"미국이 나서서 문재인 사회주의 정권 무너뜨려야"
리정호씨
“문재인 정권은 중국 북한 편으로 기울면서 주한
미군 철수 분위기 만들어. 철수는 시간문제.＂
그는 주한미군이 철수하면 한국이 큰 경제 위기를 맞을 수 있고 김정은 정권이 무조건 항복을 요구하고 나설 수 있다고 했다. 북한은 중국과 러시아라는 후방 지원 세력이 있지만 미군이 철수한 한국에는 지원 세력이 없어 북한에 쉽게 당할 것이라고도 내다봤다....
그는 이를 위해서 미국 정부가 할 수 있는 몇 가지를 제안했다.
그는 미국 정부가 문재인 정권이 제재를 위반하고 있고 남북 정상회담의 대가로 수십 억 달러의 비자금을 북한에 전달했다는 스캔들을 폭로해야 한다고 했다. 이런 스캔들이 폭로되면 문재인 정권이 큰 타격을 받을 것이라는 설명이다. 한국 기업과 은행이 북한의 석탄을 불법으로 구입하고 수십 만 톤의 한국의 석유가 북한으로 들어가는 것을 한국 정부가 방조해온 것도 폭로해야 한다고 했다. 한국의 對北제재 위반 사례를 공개하면 문재인 정권을 끌어내릴 수 있다고 했다. 그는 미국과 유엔이 한국이 對北제재를 강력하게 이행하도록 해야 한다고 덧붙였다.  (조갑제닷컴 발췌)
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홍준표

비록 텅빈 광장에서 나홀로 부르는 노래가 될지라도 그것이 우리들의 노래가 되고 전국민의 노래가 될 때까지 나는 부르고 또 부를 것이다. 자유 대한민국 만세!
  10월 3일 광화문에서 시작합시다.
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세금 쏟아 붓는 중


2달 동안 연기금 4조 9천억 매수
외국인과 개인은 매도.
곳간 텅텅 비는 중..   / 일베
흙기사+42019.09.25 09:10:18 
주식을 매수하면 주주가 되어 경영에 참여하지만
국민연금으로 주식을 매수하면 그러지 못하는데
그 법을 국민몰래 바꿨다고 한다.

책임없는 투자운영에 대한 손해로 내가 받을 연금감소에만 관심있는데
앞으로 정부는 연기금으로 매수한 주식으로 대기업 경영에 관여하고 통제하게 된다. 나라 기업들이 통째로 공기업화 될수도 있다.

좌빨들이 그토록 바라던 공산주의 국가는 우리가 모르는 사이 이렇게 진척되고 있다. 뭐라도 해야되는데 안타깝다.
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조국 사모펀드는 분명 더불어민주당 핵심 관계자까지 연루된 초대형 권력형게이트라고 했건만,
어찌 더불어민주당 핵심 의원들이 소환됐다는 소식은 전혀 들리지도 않는 것인가?

관련하여 뉴스 기사 한 줄 뜨지도 않는구나
정말 어찌 이럴수가 있는가

정경심 검찰소환은 10월 초순이 지나서야 한다고 하는구나
도대체 왜 이렇게 검찰 소환을 늦추는 것인가?
지금으로부터 열흘가량 또 늦춘다는게 이게 말이되는 이야기인가?

증거인멸이 완벽하게 이뤄진 자택을 뒤늦게 압수수색한것도 그러하다
정경심은 검찰 수사팀에에 친절하게 짜장면 배달까지 시켜주며 시종일관 여유있게 수사팀을 대했다고 한다. 아주 자신만만했던 것이다
압수수색이 끝나자마자 어떻게 했는가? 조국과 정경심은 바로 눈물로 피해자 코스프레를 하였다
"국민들이 압수수색 당할때 고통을 체감할수 있었다. 어떤일이 있어도 검찰개혁 완수하겠다"
"딸 생일에 아들 검찰 소환, 피눈물이 쏟아져"
이렇게 국민여론전으로 사태를 끌고 가고 있고
마치 정확하게 짜여진 각본처럼 여론조사기관들은 검찰의 조국 가족 수사가 해도 해도 너무 한다는 식으로 여론조사 결과를 발표하고 있다

뭔가 정말 돌아가는게 이상하구나

일베
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국제정치] 2050년 동북아의 최종 모습(?)//

중국의 국가전략 분석

김필재 TV


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Gordon G. Chang‏ 
#XiJinping is the world's most dangerous figure. He has fueled almost every aggressive trend in #China. There cannot be enduring peace as long as he rules.

시진핑은 세계에서 가장 위험한 인물이다.
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Harlan Z. Hill

So climate activist sued 15

countries for their alleged roll in climate change.

But China — the biggest polluter on the PLANET

— is not one of those 15 countries.
That’s how you know these people aren’t genuine.

Their goal is destroy western civilization. Period.

환경운동가(?) 그레타 툰베리가 기후변화에서의 역

할로 15개국을 고발했다. 하지만 지구 최대의 환경

오염국인 중국은 제외되었다. 이를 보면 환경운동의

목적은 환경이 아니라, 서구문명을 파괴하는 것이

다.

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Great news, Boston Dynamics made its own

Simone Biles

보스톤 다이내믹스에서 개발한 로봇

https://twitter.com/PopSci/status/1176519162384003072

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Ali Wyne‏

"From 2000 to 2017, while China's share of global

R&D rose from 4.9% to 25.3%, the U.S. share fell

from 39.9% to 27.7%."

 2000 ~ 2017년 사이에 세계에서 중국의 연구개발비

 비중이 4.9%에서 25.3%로 증가한 반면, 미국은

39.9%에서 27.7%로 하락했다.

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Tuesday, September 24, 2019
The Rasmussen Reports daily Presidential Tracking Poll for Tuesday shows that 53% of Likely U.S. Voters approve of President Trump’s job performance. Forty-five percent (45%) disapprove.

라스무센은 2016 대선때  유일하게 트럼프 당선을 정확히 에측했던 매우 공신력 있는 여론조사기관임.
일부에서 보수성향이라고 매도하는데 절대아님.
한국의 리얼미터 처럼 일일여론을 통한 일주일 평균치를 냄.

탄핵은 개뿔!!!!!    / 일베
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Niall Ferguson‏인증된 계정 

The core issues: How far has China's rise been based on breaking or bending the rules of international trade? Is the Trump administration right to seek to thwart China's overtaking the US? Is the trade war an aberration or the start of Cold War II?

핵심 사안은 이것이다: 중국이 경제대국이 되는 길에서 국

제 무역규범 위반이 차지하는 비중은 얼마인가? 또 이번 무

역 전쟁이 냉전 two의 변형된 형태인가 아니면 그 시작인

가?

Steve Lee‏ 

 @nfergus and Justin Yifu Lin kicking off World

Knowledge Forum in Seoul and talking about G2

economic war. Fascinating session it was
퍼거슨이 매경이 주최하는 토론회에 참석한 듯한다.

 --------------------------------------------------------The apotheosis of St Greta
The Thunberg phenomenon is apocalyptic religion for rich whites

신이 되어버린 성 그레타

툰베리 현상은 부자 백인들을 위한 종말론적 종교이다.

An earlier angry Euroteen, Fred Nietzsche, noticed that there is always something filthy and furtive about a prophet. ‘Whenever on earth the religious neurosis has appeared,’ Nietzsche wrote in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), ‘we find it tied to three dangerous dietary demands: solitude, fasting and sexual abstinence’. Greta came to New York in the ostentatious solitude of a racing yacht. In her auto-hagiography, she describes how she stunted her growth and deferred her physical development by starving herself. She is a child bride, betrothed to the earth as in some tedious Nordic saga.

A culture without purpose seizes on a false prophet because she signifies a faith that it has lost. This is why the cult of St Greta attracts converts in the affluent classes of western Europe and North America. American pollution and carbon emissions have been falling for decades, and the majority of the world’s pollution and carbon emissions come from India, China and Africa, but the stations of her martyrdom are in Stockholm, London and New York. Not just because the Chinese police would make short work of her and her PR handlers if they tried any nonsense near the Great Hall of the People, but because this daft circus only means something in the decaying West.

As with all apocalyptic visions, the sure way to turn them from warnings to realities is to follow their prescriptions. If Western governments commit themselves to zero-growth economies and demographic wastage, they’ll quickly collapse beneath the twin challenges of Asian economies and mass migration. Our environments will be ruined and our world ended — just like Greta said. It would take a heart of unmelted ice not to laugh.

https://spectator.us/apotheosis-st-greta/

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Joe Norman
You can’t weigh the risks of “doing something” vs “doing nothing”
 
There are simply too many “somethings” — many of which much worse than doing nothing
 
“무엇인가를 하는 것”과 “아무 것도 하지 않기” 양자의 위험을 측정할 수 없다.
“무엇”이라고 하는 게 너무나 많아서, 때로는 그것들이 “아무 것도 안하기”보다 훨씬 위험하기 때문이다.
 
Joe Norman
 
“We must do something” quickly transforms into “we must do THIS”, where THIS is of course central control of all facets of life.
 
“우리는 무엇인가를 반드시 해야한다”는 곧 “우리는 이것을 해야 한다”로 변질된다. 그리고 이것이란 인간의 모든 삶을 중앙에서 통제하는 것이다.
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친중 정권 승리를 위한 / 중국의 신무기

[공병호TV



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로스바드의 복지 경제학
 
복지는 사회에 있는 객관적이고 물리적인 소비재의 양에 달려 있지 않고, 그보다 사람들이 기호하는 상품이나 서비스의 기능과 그것들이 사람들을 만족시키는 능력에 있다.
한계 혁명이 나타나 주관주의적이고 개인주의적인 복지 개념을 강조하면서, 고전적 복지 경제학은 배격되었다.
이어 피구, 마셜 등 신고전 경제학자들이 나타나 새로운 가치 이론과 한계 효용 체감의 법칙 등을 이용해 구(舊)복지경제학을 만들어냈다. 그들에 따르면, 부자에서 가난한 사람으로 소득을 이동하고, 그것이 생산을 과도하게 방해하지 않는다면, 전체 공리를 높이게 되어 경제적으로 정당하다는 것이었다. 이런 이론은 현대의 정치가들도 이용하고 있다.
구복지 이론가들은 공리를 계량할 수 있는 물리적 크기로 보았고, 그래서 상호간의 공리 비교가 가능하며, 비록 일부 사람들이 더 나빠졌다 해도, 전체 공리는 증가했다고 판단하는 게 가능하다고 믿었다.
하지만 라이오넬 로빈스가 나타나, 그들 경제학자들이 한계효용 체감의 법칙을 잘못 적용했다는 것을 논증하자, 이들의 학설을 붕괴하고 말았다.
즉 개인이 자신의 가치 판단에 따라 상품에 순위를 매기고, 상품을 소비함에 따라 각 단위마다 한계 효용이 체감한다고는 말할 수 있다. 하지만 각자의 가치 판단이 다르기 때문에, 개인들 사이에서 이들 순위를 비교할 수는 없는 것이다.
개인 상호간의 공리 비교를 못하게 되자, 경제학자들은 파레토 원칙을 채용했다. 파레토 원칙이란 한 개인이 타인에게 해를 끼치지 않고 복지가 개선되었을 때, 사회 공리가 증가했다고 말할 수 있다는 것이다.
하지만 20세기 중반의 신복지 경제학은 파레토 규칙을 회피해서, 국가의 개입을 정당화하는 방법을 고안해 냈다.
이에 반해 로스바드는 모든 자발적인 교환은 공리를 상승시킨다고 주장했다. 로스바드는 자유시장이 최대의 사회적 복지를 생산하며, 복지에서 정부 개입은 정당화 될 수 없다는 것을 보여주었다.
 
 
Rothbardian Welfare Economics
 
Ohad Osterreicher
 
Every economics undergraduate is taught that economics is a positive science. Introductory textbooks always take the space to emphasize that the economist qua economist can never establish ethical judgments. In his capacity as a social scientist investigating economic problems, he can only describe and explain the world as it is, never as it ought to be.
 
For example, basic economics teaches us that fixing the price of milk below the price that would have been established on the free market, will lead to a shortage. Likewise, setting wages above market clearing prices will bring about involuntary unemployment. These propositions say nothing about the desirability of their consequences. They are wertfrei.
 
But then a different question arises: can economics tell us the effect that a particular change will have on social welfare? Can it establish when "social utility" is maximized, and if so, how do we arrive there? If the answer to these questions is affirmative, it would seem that prima facie the economist could nevertheless make political-ethical statements without violating the value-free character of his science.
 
The branch of economics that deals with these questions is known as welfare economics. It is an arcane subfield that historically went through rough patches, ups and downs, premature deaths, and several reincarnations. In what follows, we will briefly outline the evolution of welfare economics up to the time of Rothbard's contribution, discuss its implications, and review the critiques charged against it.
 
Background
The classical economists like Smith, Ricardo, and Mill had a primitive, pre-subjective conception of welfare. They argued that one should adopt those public policies that aim to maximize physical output (usually referred to as "Bushels of Corn"). Based upon their positive analysis, the way to achieve this goal was straightforward: promote the scope of the division of labor to the greatest possible extent and accumulate the largest amount of capital.
 
While the classical economists were mostly correct in their analysis of the effects of the division of labor and capital accumulation, they erred in thinking that the physical results alone could furnish them with justification for their policies. For the subjectivist, neoclassical economist the fault in their thinking is obvious: welfare is not dependent upon the objective, physical amount of consumer goods in society; it is rather a function of people's preferences and their ability to satisfy them.
It is quite possible that more consumer goods, all other things being equal, can mean a higher level of welfare, but these goods must come at a cost. If the cost to produce them, e.g., forgone leisure, is of higher value than the needs that these goods will satisfy, then more goods would lead to less welfare.
 
Moreover, following the reasoning of the classical economists, one would think that it is possible to increase social welfare by forcing people to work more than they wish to, or by transferring wealth from poor individuals with high time preference to wealthy individuals with lower time preference, thus increasing the total amount of capital.
 
 
The Rejection of Old Welfare Theory
With the arrival of the marginal revolution and its emphasis upon the subjective, individualistic conception of welfare, Classical Welfare Economics was rejected. Instead, neoclassical economists, led by Pigou, Edgeworth, and Marshall, utilized the new value theory and the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (LDMU) to develop what came to be known as Old Welfare economics. The main argument was that since everyone has a diminishing utility of money, the marginal utility of income of a rich person is smaller than that of a poor person. Therefore, a transfer of income from the rich to the poor, given that it would not overly hamper production, will increase "total utility," and is thus economically legitimized.
 
If this argument sounds familiar, it is no accident. Politicians and economists appeal to this line of reasoning even to this day. Recently, Paul Krugman used it to support the attempt by U.S representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez to introduce a higher top marginal income tax rate.
 
This argument might seem convincing at first glance, so it is worthwhile to spell out precisely the assumptions it involves. First, the Old Welfare theorists assumed that all people have the same capacity for satisfaction. They admitted that this was no more than a metaphysical presupposition, but it was a reasonable starting point and mostly harmless. Second, and of much greater importance, was the assumption of cardinal utility. Following the pioneers of the marginal revolution, Jevons and Walras, the Old Welfare theorists understood utility as a quantifiable physiological magnitude that has an existence beyond the choice of the individual. They thought that this quantity lends itself to mathematical operations and aggregation. Under this assumption, Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (IUC) are permissible, and therefore, it makes sense to conclude that "total utility" has increased, even if some people are worse off.
 
The endeavors of the Old Welfare theorists came to an abrupt end with Lionel Robbins's demonstration of the futility of IUC. Robbins showed that these economists erred in extending the LDMU beyond its proper field, for the LDMU applies only to the economizing individual in employing means to satisfy his ends. We can speak of an individual ranking goods on his value scale and the diminishing utility of additional units. We can explain an exchange by referring to the opposing ranking of the goods on the individuals' value scales. It is an entirely different thing, however, to compare this value rank between individuals. Furthermore, since there is no objective unit of measurement for utility, it is impermissible to speak of quantitative differences in satisfaction. Thus, Robbins concluded, the argument advanced by the Old Welfare theorists is nothing but an ethical judgment, and as such, must be excluded from the economic science.
 
Barred from making IUC, economists were forced to adopt the so-called Unanimity or Pareto Rule. The Pareto Rule, first developed by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto in 1906, maintains that we can speak of increasing social utility only when one individual is better off without causing another to be worse off. When a change brings this about, it is called Pareto-Superior. When there are no more Pareto-Superior moves left, the situation is called Pareto Optimality; otherwise, the situation is Pareto Inferior.
 
The Pareto Rule stood as the test which all statements concerning social welfare must pass if they are to remain value-free. If two individuals partake in a trade or an individual acts without harming anyone else, then the economist would be permitted in deducing that social welfare has indeed increased. However, if a group of individuals gains at the expense of another group, as happens with all state interventions, then the economist cannot conclude anything meaningful about social welfare.
 
It is this constraint that the New Welfare Economics of the mid-twentieth century sought to evade and instead made an economic case for state intervention. Two different paths were taken to this end: the first, associated with Harvard University, trivialized the Pareto Rule by incorporating it into a general equilibrium framework. The second, emerging from London School of Economics, circumvented the rule with the help of the Compensation Principle. The first path led to the development of the social welfare function (SWF) and the concept of market failure, the second to the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Criterion.
 
The social welfare function was first pioneered by American economist Abram Bergson and later developed by Paul Samuelson. This approach trivialized the Pareto Rule by adopting the Pareto Optimality version of it, thus focusing on the static, end-state market outcome. By establishing several efficiency conditions, the SWF would derive an Optimal Pareto equilibrium which maximized social welfare. Failure to achieve this maximum could be then used to justify state intervention.
 
This procedure is analogous to finding the optimal consumer goods bundle for an individual's utility function subject to a budget constraint. Only that instead of an individual's indifference curve and a budget constraint, a social indifference curve is maximized at the point of tangency with a so-called Utility Possibility Frontier, similar to a Production Possibility Frontier.
 
Right from the start, the SWF went through harsh criticism by fellow neoclassical economists, mostly because it failed to eliminate cardinal utility and IUC from its analysis. However, the final nail in the coffin came with Kenneth Arrow's famous "Impossibility Theorem." Arrow demonstrated that it is impossible to construct a SWF that simultaneously satisfies several elementary conditions. Hence, there is no method of aggregating individual preferences which leads to a consistent social preferences scale. The SWF had to be abandoned.
 
The market failure approach had a much more fruitful existence. This relies on the so-called first and second Fundamental Welfare Theorems. The first welfare theorem states that under the assumption of perfect competition, the market will inevitably arrive at a Pareto Optimal equilibrium. The second theorem states that allowing for an initial transfer of income between individuals and then letting the market run its course, the market would still reach a Pareto Optimum.
 
The appeal of this approach lies in the fact that economists could then point to cases in the real world where the market fails to achieve this result. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, hundreds of papers were published on this topic, each trying to find new types of market failures, and calling for state intervention to fix them. Among the cases of market failure that have survived in the literature up to this day are public goods, asymmetric information, natural monopoly, and externalities.
 
Alongside the Harvard approach, LSE economists John Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor developed the "Compensation Criterion." This criterion states that we may speak of increasing social welfare when the winners can hypothetically compensate the losers and remain better off. That this compensation need not actually take place is irrelevant. Economists could utilize this criterion to recommend certain policies without involving value judgments yet remain within the Pareto Rule.
 
A classic example frequently used to illustrate the superiority of the Compensation Criterion over the Pareto Rule was that of the repeal of the Corn Law in the nineteenth century. Economists have pointed out that it would be impossible for the economist qua economist to support this kind of measure. Despite obviously making everyone better off in the long run, abolishing the tariff would have hurt the short-run interests of the landlords. Hence, Kaldor and Hicks argued, the Compensation Principle avoids this pitfall by only asking that the gains be hypothetically distributed among the losers.
 
Rothbard Enters the Scene
This was the state of welfare economics when Murray Rothbard arrived on the scene with his seminal article "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics." There was at the time but a few dying theories scattered around without any viable future in sight. Rothbard's solution for the revival of the field was simple yet profound. It consisted of placing the Pareto Rule within the constraint of demonstrated preference. The notion of demonstrated preference is straightforward: the economist can only know of the individual's preferences through their actions. Every action implies a choice; when an individual chooses A over B, he demonstrates that he prefers A. The economist cannot deduce from this how much does the individual prefers A, for this is purely subjective and ordinal and is not revealed to him through action. Moreover, under demonstrated preference, it is impermissible to construct hypothetical value scales that contradict the preferences which individuals themselves make known in action.
 
As Rothbard went on to show, the implications of confining welfare economics within demonstrated preference were far-reaching. First, the whole focus on conditions of Pareto Optimality was fallacious. Since the never-never land of perfect competition could not materialize in the real world, it is thus futile to analyze changes in social welfare under these ideal conditions. On the contrary, preference can only be demonstrated in real-world markets, where actors are neither price takers nor omniscient. Hence, complaints about producers selling products at above marginal costs, asymmetric information, and natural monopolies, are irrelevant.
 
Instead, welfare economics teaches us that by participating in the free market, both parties to every exchange demonstrate that they expect to benefit themselves. In other words, every voluntary exchange increases utility in the ex-ante sense. According to Rothbard, then, at every point in time, by going from one Pareto-Superior move to another, the free market maximizes social welfare.
 
Furthermore, restricting statements about social welfare to demonstrated preference illustrates the absurdity of the Compensation Criterion. If no actual compensation from the gainers to the losers takes place, then the economist cannot conclude anything meaningful about social welfare. He cannot know whether people actually prefer the new situation to the old one. However, if the compensation really did happen, given that it was made voluntarily, then the Compensation Criterion merely collapses into the old and familiar Pareto Rule.
 
In the aftermath of Rothbard's article, several economists have criticized his thesis. First, it was argued that Rothbard's approach still fails to solve the problem of escaping from the status quo, as in the example of the repeal of the Corn Law. The landlords, it is said, preferred having the tariff in place, as demonstrated by their vocal opposition to Parliament's decision. However, it is wrong to assert that this opposition shows that the landlord's welfare was reduced after the change. As far as the economist knows, the landlords could be lying or just playing a game. What the economist can observe, however, is that after the laws were repealed, the landlords reentered voluntary contracts, demonstrating they were benefiting from the free market. Therefore, in the new state of affairs, all parties mutually gained; as opposed to the old state of affairs, where the welfare of the rest of the population was reduced due to the tariff.
 
In his controversial article, economist Bryan Caplan objected that the same argument above could be pointed against Rothbard's thesis. Regarding the claim that the emotions of a third party cannot invalidate the conclusion that each voluntary exchange increases social welfare, since (as Caplan quotes Rothbard) "even if he publishes a pamphlet denouncing these exchanges, we have no ironclad proof that this is not a joke or a deliberate lie," Caplan writes:
 
"Rothbard could have taken this principle further. When two people sign a contract, do they actually demonstrate their preference for the terms of the contract? Perhaps they merely demonstrate their preference for signing their name on the piece of paper in front of them. There is no "ironclad proof" that the signing of one's name on a piece of paper is not a joke, or an effort to improve one's penmanship."
 
However, signing a contract is not just penmanship or a game; it is rather, as Walter Block points out, a binding activity that transfers ownership of goods from one person to another. It, therefore, obligates the person to act according to the terms of the contract. Thus, a person entering a legal agreement cannot be said to engage in play.
 
In addition, economist Roy Cardato has argued that Rothbard is mistaken in focusing on utility ex-ante alone. In reality, people may have false expectations of the future and thus can and do lose utility in the ex-post: "Rothbard's welfare economics... ignores the fact that preferences are expressed sequentially through time, as part of a general set of goal-oriented activities."
 
Although Cardato is correct in his observation, he is mistaken in thinking that this poses a problem to Rothbard. First, as economists, we cannot infer anything about ex-post utility from demonstrated preference. This knowledge is barred to us. It is, therefore, irrelevant for all welfare economics, not just Rothbard's. Second, as Austrian economics teaches us, the unhampered market is the best institution for mitigating errors and thus maximizing ex-post utility. The market has a built-in mechanism for eliminating unsuccessful entrepreneurs and unwanted products. It is certainly possible that a consumer may be unsatisfied with a single purchase, but it is hard to imagine that the seller of the product would stay in business for long.
 
Lastly, Cardato misunderstood Rothbard's objective. Rothbard did not try to create a whole ethical or philosophical basis for the free market with his welfare economics. This could be found in his natural law theory of property rights. Instead, he only set out to show how demonstrated preference can be utilized to salvage this field from pure ruin, providing us with a framework upon which ethical claims could be based.
 
Now just one last obstacle remained for Rothbard. The First Welfare Theorem, if it can fit into Rothbard's analysis, would not apply to the unreachable state of perfect competition. Instead, it would apply to real-world markets, stating that the free market ensures the highest level of welfare possible, compared to other actual institutional systems. However, the Second Welfare Theorem was left untouched by Rothbard. Economists could still advocate for a single lump-sum transfer of income to achieve their preferred state of equality, and then let the market run its course.
 
It was left to Rothbard's protégé, Hans Hoppe, to find the solution. Hoppe pointed out that the New Welfare economists were entangled in a logical contradiction. On the one hand, they accepted the social welfare consequences of voluntary exchange from the individuals' point of view. Thus implicitly embracing the principle of self-ownership. But on the hand, they refused to accept its logical consequence — the Lockean principle of homesteading and acquisition.
 
If welfare economics must start from the undeniable fact of self-ownership, then it must apply the Pareto Rule both to the use of property and its acquisition. As Hoppe wrote:
 
"a person's original appropriation of unowned resources, as demonstrated by this very action, increases his utility (at least ex-ante). At the same time, it makes no one worse off, because in appropriating them he takes nothing away from others. For obviously, others could have homesteaded these resources, too, if only they had perceived them as scarce. But they did not actually do so, which demonstrates that they attached no value to them whatsoever, and hence they cannot be said to have lost any utility on account of this act. Proceeding from this Pareto-optimal basis, then, any further act of production, utilizing homesteaded resources, is equally Pareto optimal on demonstrated preference grounds… And finally, every voluntary exchange starting from this basis must also be regarded as a Pareto-optimal change, because it can only take place if both parties expect to benefit from it."
 
Conclusion
Rothbard, probably against the wish of his fellow economists, succeeded in reconstructing welfare economic by confining it to the Pareto Rule and demonstrated preference. He showed that the free market, i.e., the network of voluntary interactions between individuals, always produces the greatest degree of social welfare possible. Government intervention, on the other hand, could never be justified in terms of welfare. And while Rothbard’s contribution probably ranks among his least-known achievements, it is truly a tour de force and another tribute to his great originality and talent as an economist.
 
 
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