특집) 헬조선은 사라지고, 지상천국이 왔습니다. 시대정신 연구소 https://youtu.be/I8wmbDtVZ5k ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- K-주사기 사기쇼의 실체를 알려준다 ADEQTR http://www.ilbe.com/view/113256175738 하도 호들갑을 떨어대길래 난 진짜 한국이 세계최초로 lds주사기 발명이라도 한줄 알았음. 근데 실상을 보면 전혀 그런게 아님. 팩트만 나열하면 아래와 같음: 1. LDS주사기는 전세계적으로 개나소나 다 만들고 있는 유형의 주사기임. 한국좆소중에서만도 신아양행, 두원메디, 풍림파마텍, 세곳이나 생산하고 있음. 이번에 뉴스 타고있는 풍림파마텍은 오히려 뒤늦게 lds주사기 생산을 시작한편임. 그래서 한국정부랑 계약조차 못함 2. 화이자가 존나 애매하게 병을 만들어서 반드시 특수주사기인 lds주사기를 써야지만 병당 6회분을 뽑을수 있게 만든다음에 그 수량을 기준으로 FDA에 등록함. 그런데 전세계적으로 특수 주사기 수요가 평소에 그렇게 높지 않았다보니 생산량이 턱없이 부족해서 지금 화이자가 개욕쳐먹고 있는 상황임. 단지 화이자 백신 수요가 어마어마하다보니 부족할 뿐이지 한국보다 훨씬더 lds주사기 많이 생산하고 있는 업체는 널려있음. 예를들어 유럽의 vernacare가 올해에만 10억개분량 생산할 예정임 3. 한국 기레기들은 자꾸 특수주사기로 20%증산 효과가 발생했다는식으로 쓰레기 기사 써제끼는데 전혀 아니고 화이자를 제외한 모더나나 아스트라제네카에는 전혀 그런 증산효과가 발생하지 않음. 지금 사태는 화이자가 양아치짓해서 발생항 특수한 상황에 불과함 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [속보] 檢, 중간간부 인사 단행…임은정 중앙지검 검사 겸임 발령 nati**** 임은정 검사님 감축드리옵나이다~!! 그렇게 정권에 아부하면서 딸랑딸랑거리더니 드디어 영전하셨습니다~!! 양심과 부끄러움을 죄다 내던져버려서 비둥해진 몸뚱아리가 많이 날렵해지셨겠습니다~!! / 세계일보 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 민경욱 후보 페이스북 정규재의 펜앤마이크라는 매체가 부정선거 생방송을 하겠다면서 국투본 소속 박주현, 문수정 두 분 변호사를 불렀습니다. 두 시간만 자고 밤을 새워 방송용 PPT를 만들어서 스튜디오로 갔더니 갑자기 생방송이 녹화방송으로 바뀌었다고 했습니다. 그러더니 녹화방송도 취소됐다고 했습니다. 도대체 왜 이러는 거냐고 했더니 정규재의 펜앤마이크 구독자와 후원자들이 부정선거를 싫어하기 때문에 그렇다고 하더랍니다. 음... 공중파도 이런 짓은 안 합니다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [특별기고] “정치논리로 보를 허물지 말라!” -박석순 교수에 답한다. 송재윤 (캐나다 맥매스터 대학 역사학과 교수) 지난 2021년 2월 9일, 필자는 조선일보 <조선칼럼> “강의 자연화는 인간의 동물화와 같은 말이다”를 발표했다. 최근 4대강 보(洑)의 해체를 결정한 국가물관리위원회의 입장을 비판하기 위해서 이 칼럼은 환경사(環璟史)의 입장에서 “강의 재자연화”란 주장 속에 담긴 비과학성과 몰역사성을 지적하고 있다. ---> <강의 자연화는 인간의 동물화와 같다> 간결한 문장에 핵심을 요약했다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 靑내부 “민주주의 4.0 멤버들, 그들이 다 해먹어” 임기말 친문핵심들 국정전횡 우려 노석조 기자 여권 내부에서는 ‘4번째 정권 창출’이 최대 목표인 ‘민주주의 4.0’과 정권 임기 말 검찰과의 원만한 관계 설정에 주력한 신 수석 간의 충돌이 이번 사태의 근본 원인이라는 이야기가 나온다./ 조선일보 --->4.0 멤버들이 실질적으로 한국을 움직이고 있다고 보아도 무방하다. 저들은 지난 4. 15 총선에서도 부정선거를 총지휘한 사령탑일 것이다. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Britain Is Entering a Parallel Universe Brexit, natural disaster, wokeness and a loss of enlightenment values – Philip Pullman’s novels are an intimation of the post-pandemic world. By Niall Ferguson 팬데믹 이전의 정상적인 생활로 돌아간다고 기대하지 말라, 영국에서는 특히 그러 하다. 한국도 우한 폐렴만 끝나면 이전의 삶으로 돌아간다고 믿고 있는 사람들이 있는데, 이는 착각이다. 경제는 망가졌고, 정치는 부정선거로 불가역적으로 사회주의화 되어가고 있고, 사회는 세기말처럼 불안하고 우울하다. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 통화, 금리, 경기순환 물가가 오르고 경기가 흥청거리면 집권당은 선거에서 승리할 가능성이 높다는 말이 있다. 그래서 “호경기”를 원하는 전세계의 정부는 은행이 여신을 팽창하도록 유도한다. 여신이 팽창되면 자본과 저축이 실제보다 더 풍성해보이고, 어제만 해도 금리가 높아 가능하지 않았던 사업들이 가능하게 보인다. 기업가는 낮은 금리로 인해 자본재를 넉넉히 사용할 수 있다는 착각에 빠진다. 즉 자본재가 실제보다 더 많다는 판단 착오를 유도한다는 것이다. 결국 여신 팽창은 기업가를 오도해서 생산을 왜곡하고 경제적으로 악성 투자를 낳게 만든다. 하지만 일반적으로 우리는 그런 현상을 호경기라고 본다. 중앙은행에 권한을 내주는 데에 저항이 있어 왔지만, 전세계의 모든 나라에서 이런 저항은 모두 무력화되었다. 그래서 미국은 중앙은행에서 돈을 빌려오게 되었는데, 이 경우 중앙은행은 정부의 채권을 사주고 여신을 팽창해서, 즉 신권을 발행해서 정부에 돈을 빌려주게 되므로, 그 결과는 인플레이션이고, 또 물가와 임금의 상승이었다. 19세기에 경제학자들은 주기적인 경기의 순환에 주목해 그 원인을 밝혀내려 했는데, 그들 대부분은 잘못된 대답을 내놓았다. 그중 하나는 윌리엄 제본스의 것으로, 그는 태양의 흑점으로 인해 흉작이 나타나고, 그로 인해 경기가 순환한다고 믿었다. 어느날 은행이 여신 팽창을 중단하면, 기업들은 진행 중인 투자 사업에 돈을 줄 수가 없게 되고, 그래서 할 수 없이 가지고 있던 모든 자산을 헐값에 팔아 사업을 청산하게 된다. 그러면 사람들이 점차 공포에 빠지고 기업들이 줄줄이 도산하면서 불경기가 시작된다. 내(미제스)가 화폐와 여신에 대해 공부할 때, 전세계의 학자 중에 스웨덴의 윅셀만이 여신 팽창의 문제를 알고 있었다. 여신 팽창은 근본적으로는 민권의 문제이다. 정부가 법적으로 정한 세금으로 정부의 비용을 충당하지 못할 때, 정부는 은행에서 돈을 빌리는데, 이는 곧 여신 팽창으로 이어진다. 19세기의 근본적인 문제는 사람들이 여신 팽창이 불경기를 불러온다는 사실을 알지 못했다는 것이다. 그 결과 자본주의가 불신 받았다. 주기적인 불황이 자본주의 현상이라고 믿은 것이다. Money, Interest, and the Business Cycle Ludwig von Mises [This essay is a selection from lecture 7 in Marxism Unmasked: From Delusion to Destruction.] The banks very often expand credit for political reasons. There is an old saying that if prices are rising, if business is booming, the party in power has a better chance to succeed in an election campaign than it would otherwise. Thus the decision to expand credit is very often influenced by the government that wants to have “prosperity.” Therefore, governments all over the world are in favor of such a credit-expansion policy. On the market, credit expansion creates the impression that more capital and savings are available than actually are, and that projects which yesterday were not practical because of the higher interest rate are feasible today because conditions have changed. Businessmen assume that the lower interest rate signals the availability of sufficient capital goods. This means that credit expansion falsifies the businessman’s economic calculations; it gives the impression to him, to the nation, and to the world, that there are more capital goods than there really are. By credit expansion, you can increase the accounting concept of “capital”; what you cannot do is create more real capital goods. As production is necessarily always limited by the amount of capital goods available, the result of credit expansion is to make businessmen believe that projects are feasible which actually cannot be executed on account of the existing scarcity of capital goods. Thus credit expansion misleads businessmen, results in distorting production and causes economic “malinvestment.” When the credit expansion causes businessmen to undertake such projects, the result is called a “boom.” We must not overlook the fact that all during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was always an obsession, unfortunately not against credit expansion, but at least against giving the government too much power in matters of credit expansion. The main object was to limit the government’s influence with regard to the central banks. In the course of history, governments have used the central banks again and again for borrowing money. The government can borrow money from the public. For instance, a person who has saved one hundred dollars could hold them as dollars or invest them. But instead of doing either of these things he can buy a new government bond; this purchase doesn’t change the amount of money in existence; the money he pays for the bond passes from his hands to those of the government. But if the government goes to the central bank to borrow the money, the bank can buy government bonds and lend money to the government simply by expanding credit, in effect creating new money. Governments have a lot of good ideas as to how to carry out this borrowing. There has always been a struggle between parliaments and the executive concerning the government’s influence on the central banks. Most of the European legislatures said very clearly that their central banks must be separate from the government, that they must be independent. And in this country, you know there is a continual conflict between the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury. This is a natural situation caused by economic laws and government legislation. Some governments have found it very easy to violate the legislation without violating the letter of the law. The German government, for instance, borrowed from the public during World War I because the Reichsbank had promised to give it loans. Private individuals who bought German government bonds needed to pay out only 17 percent of the amount of the bond, and this 17 percent gave them a yield of 6 or 7 percent. Hence, 83 percent of the price of the bond was supplied by the Bank. This meant that when the government borrowed from the public, it was actually borrowing indirectly from the German Reichsbank. The result was that in Germany the U.S. dollar went from 4.20 Marks pre–World War I, to 4.2 billion Marks by the end of 1923.1 There has always been resistance to giving power to the central banks, but in the last decades this resistance has been by and large completely defeated in all countries of the world. The U.S. government has used the power of the central bank, the Federal Reserve, to borrow from it to obtain a considerable part of the money it needs to fund its expenditures. The consequences have been inflation and a tendency for prices and wage rates to rise. There is no doubt that the credit expansion brings about a drop in the rate of interest. Why then does this not mean that the rate of interest can always remain low and that interest could really disappear completely? If it is true that the rate of interest is not a monetary phenomenon but a general phenomenon of the market, which reflects the fact that future goods are traded at a discount as compared with present goods, we must ask ourselves, “What is the nature of the process which, after the initial drop of the interest rate due to credit expansion, finally brings about step by step a return of the rate of interest to that level which reflects market conditions and the general state of affairs?” That is, if the rate of interest is a general category of human action, and yet if an increased supply of money and bank credit can bring about a temporary drop in the rate of interest, how does the interest rate return once more to the rate that reflects the discount of future goods over present goods? In answering this question, we are also answering a question that has occupied people for decades, even centuries in some countries that have had central banks and a system of credit expansion. This is the problem of the trade cycle—the regular return of periods of economic depression. In Great Britain from the end of the eighteenth century on, and later in those countries of the world that entered step by step into the system of modern capitalism and modern banking methods, we could observe from time to time an almost regular occurrence of events, i.e., the emergence of periods of economic depression, economic crises. We do not mean economic crises brought about by some obvious event that makes it possible to explain the emergence of this crisis. For instance, in the early 1860s the American Civil War made it impossible to ship cotton from the United States to Europe; and the U.S. Southern states were at that time the only suppliers of cotton to Europe. There was a very bad economic crisis, starting in the cotton-goods industries in Europe and as a consequence other industries suffered also. But everyone realized what was causing this crisis—it was the American Civil War and the stoppage of shipments of cotton to Europe. We do not deal with such crises due to a definite identifiable situation. We deal with a genuine crisis in all branches of business—although it is sometimes worse in some branches than in others—a crisis for which people couldn’t see any special reason. From the beginning of the nineteenth century on, people began to consider these periodic crises as one of the most important problems of economic research. In the 1830s and 1840s British economists answered this question by saying, “What we have to study is not the economic depression. This depression is always the consequence of a preceding boom. We must ask ourselves not ‘What is the cause of the crisis?’—we must ask ‘What is the cause of the preceding boom?’ And we must ask ourselves what is the reason why the unquestionable and certain development of economic conditions that takes place in all countries with capitalism does not proceed steadily upward, but follows a wave-like movement, a movement in which there are repeated boom periods that always are followed by periods of depression.” In this way the crisis problem was transformed into the problem of the trade cycle. And for the problem of the trade cycle many more or less wrong explanations were offered. I want to mention only one. This was the doctrine of an otherwise famous economist, William Stanley Jevons [1835–82]. His doctrine acquired some fame. He attributed economic crises to sunspots. He said that sunspots bring about bad harvests, and this means bad business. If this was so, why then didn’t business adjust to this natural phenomenon as it learned to adjust to other natural phenomena? If there is credit expansion, it must necessarily lower the rate of interest. If the banks are to find borrowers for additional credit, they must lower the rate of interest or lower the credit qualifications of would-be borrowers. Because all those who wanted loans at the previous rate of interest had gotten them, the banks must either offer loans at a lower interest rate or include in the class of businesses to whom loans are granted at the previous rate less-promising businesses, people of lower credit quality. When individuals consume less than they produce, the surplus production is set aside as savings. Thus when the money given out in loans comes from savers, it represents actual goods which are available for further production. But when the loans are granted out of credit expansion, businessmen are misled; there are no goods standing behind them, only newly created credit. This leads to a falsification of economic calculation. Credit expansion brings about a systematic falsification—it gives to the individual businessman the impression that a project that couldn’t be executed yesterday because there were not enough capital goods, can now be executed on account of the credit expansion. As a result, there is an intensification of business activity, which means that higher prices are offered for the factors of production. But there has been no increase in the quantity of capital goods. Therefore the intensification of business activity means an artificial boom. Producers of factors of production are happy when they see that the prices they are getting are higher than they were yesterday. But this cannot go on forever, because no more material factors of production have been produced. The prices of these factors of production are going up more and more as borrowers of the new credit compete and bid up their prices. Then finally two alternatives are possible. Business is asking for more and more credit. Either (1) the banks grant this demand by creating more and more credit (this happened in Germany in 1923, when it led to a complete breakdown of the currency). Or (2) one day, because they realize for some reason or other that they must stop credit expansion, the banks do stop creating new credit to lend. Then the firms that have expanded cannot get credit to pay for the factors of production necessary for the completion of the investment projects which they have already committed themselves. Because they cannot pay their bills, they sell off their inventories cheap. Then comes the panic, the breakdown. And the depression starts. On account of the credit expansion the whole economic system of the country or of the world is in the situation of a man who has a limited supply of building materials available and wants to construct a home. But being poor in technological calculations, he makes some mistakes. He thinks he can build a bigger house out of his limited supply of building materials than he really can. Therefore, he starts by constructing too large a foundation. Only later does he discover that he has made a mistake and that he cannot finish the house in the way he had intended. Then he must either abandon the whole project, or use the materials still available to build a smaller house, leaving part of the foundation unused. This is the situation in which a country or in which the world finds itself at the end of a crisis caused by credit expansion. Because of the easy credit businessmen make mistakes in their economic calculations and find themselves with over-ambitious plans which cannot be completed because of insufficient factors of production. In every boom period that precedes a crisis, in Great Britain and then later in other parts of the world, indeed, in every country in the world which has experienced credit expansion, you always find people who have said, “This is not a boom that will be followed by a crisis; only people who do not know what is going on can say such a thing. This is the final prosperity—an everlasting prosperity. We will never again have such a crisis.” The more people believe in this slogan of everlasting prosperity, the more desperate they become when they discover that the “everlasting” prosperity doesn’t last forever. One thing that made matters worse following 1929, than in preceding periods of depression, was that the American unions were really very powerful and they would not tolerate that the crisis should bring about those results which were the consequence of earlier crises in this country and in other countries—i.e., they would not tolerate a considerable drop in money wage rates. In some branches of business, money wages went a little bit down. But by and large the unions were successful in maintaining the wage rates which had been developed artificially during the boom. Therefore, the number of unemployed remained considerable, and unemployment continued for a very long time. On the other hand, those workers who did not lose their jobs enjoyed a situation in which their wages did not drop to the same extent as commodity prices. The living conditions of some groups of labor even improved. This was the same situation that led to the conditions in England in the latter part of the 1920s, which were important in bringing about the doctrines of Lord Keynes and the ideas of credit expansion that have been practiced in recent years. The British government made a very serious mistake in the 1920s. It was necessary for Great Britain to stabilize the currency. But they did not simply stabilize. In 1925, they returned to the pre-war gold value of the pound. That meant that the pound was a heavier pound afterwards and had a greater purchasing power than the pound, of let us say, 1920. A country like Great Britain that imports raw materials and foodstuffs and exports manufactures should not have made the pound more expensive. As Hitler expressed it, “They must either export or starve.” In such a country, in which the unions did not tolerate a drop in wage rates, it meant that the costs in pounds of manufacturing British products were increased in relation to production costs in countries which had not made a similar return to the gold standard. With higher costs, you must ask higher prices to stay in business. So you can sell fewer units and must cut production. Therefore, unemployment increased, and there was permanent mass unemployment. Because it was impossible to deal with the unions concerning this problem, the government proceeded in 1931 to devalue the pound much more than it had been revalued in 1925, in order, they said, to encourage export trade. Other countries did the same. Czechoslovakia did it twice. The United States followed in 1933. The countries of the French standard (France, Switzerland) followed in 1936. I mention this because it is necessary to realize why the crisis of 1929—it was merely a crisis of credit expansion—had much longer and more serious consequences than those crises in preceding times. Of course, the Marxians say, every crisis must be worse and worse; the Russians, they say, have no trade cycle. Of course the Russians don’t; they have a depression all the time. We must realize the tremendous “psychological” importance, the enormous importance of the fact that in the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, credit expansion was limited. Nevertheless, it was the general opinion of businessmen, economists, statesmen, and the people, that bank credit expansion was necessary, that the rate of interest was an obstacle to prosperity, and that an “easy money” policy was a good policy to have. Everyone, businessmen as well as economists, considered credit expansion necessary and they became very angry if somebody tried to say that it might have some drawbacks. At the end of the nineteenth century, it was considered practically indecent to support the British Currency School, which was opposed to credit expansion. When I started to study the theory of money and credit I found in the whole world of literature only one living author, a Swedish economist, Knut Wicksell [1851–1926], who really saw the problems in credit expansion. The idea prevails even today that we cannot do without credit expansion. It will be impossible, without a very serious struggle which really has to be fought, to defeat all those ideological forces that are operating in favor of credit expansion. Most people, of course, don’t give any thought to credit expansion. But the governments have a very clear idea about it—they say, “We can’t do without it.” Credit expansion is fundamentally really a problem of civil rights. Representative government is based on the principle that the citizens need to pay to the government only those taxes that have been legally promulgated in a constitutional way: “No taxation without representation.” However, governments believe they cannot ask their citizens to pay as much in taxes as is needed to cover the whole of government expenditures. When governments cannot cover their expenses out of legally enacted taxes, they borrow from the commercial banks and so expand credit. Therefore, representative government can actually be the instigator of credit expansion and inflation. If the institution of credit expansion and other types of government inflation had been invented in the seventeenth century the history of the struggle of the Stuarts with the British Parliament would have been very different. Charles I [1600–49] wouldn’t have had any problems in getting the money he needed if he could simply have ordered the Bank of England, which didn’t exist in his time, to grant him credit. He would then have been in a position to organize an army of the King and to defeat Parliament. This is only one aspect. The second aspect—I don’t believe that this country could stand psychologically a recurrence of a crisis like that of 1929. And the only way to avoid such a crisis is by preventing the boom. We are already very far along in this boom, but we could still stop it in time. However, there is a great danger. While capital goods are limited in amount and are scarce and would, therefore, limit those projects which can be executed and make many projects appear impossible for the time being, credit expansion can hide by the illusion of an increase in the capital reported in dollars on the books. Credit expansion creates the illusion of available capital, while in fact there is not. The fundamental problem of the nineteenth century was that people didn’t realize these things. As a result, capitalism was very much discredited, for people believed that the almost periodic occurrence of depressions was a phenomenon of capitalism. Marx and his followers expected the depressions to get progressively worse, and Stalin still says openly every day: “We have only to wait. There will be a very bad crisis in the capitalist countries.” If we want to thwart these plans we must realize that sound credit policies acknowledge the fact that there is a scarcity of capital goods, that capital cannot simply be increased by credit expansion. This must come to be recognized by our businessmen and politicians. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------