서울신문 의사까지 동참, 1023명 백신패스 반대 집단소송 의대 교수 등 1023명 집단 소송 “백신패스는 정부 재량권 남용” ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 연합뉴스 월북자 CCTV에 찍히고 경보 울렸는데도…軍, 감시망에 구멍 GOP 철책 감시장비로 '이중' 포착했으나 3시간 다 돼서야 인지 철책 귀순 땐 '장비 먹통' 핑계…이번엔 정상 작동해도 놓쳐 논란 khd0**** 경찰이경찰이아니고 군인이 군인이아닌 공무원으로 만들어논 문재인정권..ㅋㅋ 전쟁나면 진짜 일주일함락이다 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 작년 서울 아파트 역대급 '거래절벽'…집값 급락한 2012년 수준 가격 2006년 이후 최대 상승했는데 거래량은 9년 만에 최저 기록 9∼11월 거래량 금융위기 수준 급감…12월은 '역대 최저' 전망 대출규제-집값 고점 인식-대선 겹쳐 거래가뭄…집값 하락 신호탄될까 (서울=연합뉴스 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 부정선거침묵은개돼지 일베 댓글 이미 시스템 절반은 중공식 전체 사회주의 통제 체재 정착됨 너네 잘 들여다봐라 지금 민좃당이 과거 대선처럼 상대당 후보를 향한 비방 비난 비판 수위를 비교해봐라.지난 박근혜때는 민좃당과 좌빨이 얼마나 씹어댔었노 그런데 이번 대선판엔 희안하게도 거의 안하는 수준이다. 이건 윤이돼든 찢이돼든 민좃당과 문죄인에겐 데미지가 없다는거다. 그렇게 작전짜고 대선판 움직이는거다. 문죄인은 우파들의 정권교체 열망의 심리를 이용해서 문죄인이가 반간계 쓰는거다. 애초부터 야권 국민들 대다수가 정권교체와 문죄인을 감방에 쳐넣고자하는 열망이 있으니 자신을 보호해주고 지난 부정선거를 잠재우고 더나아가서는 부정탄핵의 진실도 잠재울 적임자가 자기에게 충성했던 윤석열이라보고 국짐당내 중진기득권들이 주축인 부정탄핵파들과 밀당하고 부정경선질로 윤석열을 선출하거다. 섹스톤은 이같은 의심을 잠재우게하는 바람잡이 훼이크 역횔인거다. 두놈다 민좃당 스탠스이고 지금까지 그래왔던 놈들인건 야권 우파들은 알만한 사람 다알고 있지만 순서로 봤을때 단순히 야권이 정권교체의 주인이 되길 원하니까 입맞에 맞는 윤석열을 후보로 만든거다. 우파국민들은 문죄인의 반간계 전술에 말려든거여 국민들 일찌감치 눈치채고 윤석열이가 최종후보 안되게 여론을 형성해야 되는데 정권교체에 눈이멀어서 결국 이 사단이 나는거다. 윤석열로의 정권은 무늬만 바뀌는 대문 교체일뿐이다. 사분오열 따로국밥으로 놀고있는 우파 개돼지 새끼들은 이런건 전혀 눈치도 못채는 순수 개돼지 근성이므로 필요할때 철저히 한몸 으로 뭉치는 현 좌빨정권의 좌파들 절데 못이긴다. 이해찬의 백년 집권정당이라는 말이 그냥 나온게 이니다. 지금이라도 우파국민들이 연대하여 혁명 후보를 선출해야된다. 윤석열이 정권잡으면 그나마 남아있는 우파들을 지난번 탄핵 정국때처럼 싸그리 궤멸시키고 내각제 다음 고려연방제 다음 시진핑이 원하는 중공식 사회주의 통일로 가게되이 있다. 우파들은 이제 저항하지 않는한 자유민주주의 대한민국은 지구에서 영원히 사라질거다. 반박 불가 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 조갑제의 안내원과 문관의 안내원은 반역의 전교사 장교들 https://youtu.be/chx3SYEAXeY --->조갑제의 정체를 알면 놀라 자빠질지도 모른다. 그는 이미 기자 시절에 입이 무거워서 크렘린이란 별명을 얻었는데, 그가 자신에 대해 말하지 않는 데는 깊은 이유가 있을 것이다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [박정권 원상회복] 변희재 우종창 두 기자가 설명하지 못하는 부분 https://rumble.com/vrqhs5-46585733.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 한전 빚 100조인데 한전 대학까지 설립 가미가제 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11387137083 한전은 본사가 전라도다. 원래는 본사 전라도 아닌데 무"슨" 이유로 인해서 옮기게 됨. 빚만 100조, 이자만 어마어마하게 나가서 우리나라의 재정상태를 매우 안좋게 하는 기업이다. 근데 이런 상태에서 한전은 대학을 세워 호화스러운 비용을 연구비라는 명목으로 지출함. 이를 민주당 내부에서 지적하면 프락치로 몰린다. 왜냐고? 다같이 뜯어먹어야 되니까. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 첫번째 경제학 강의 경제학의 핵심을 한 문장으로 요약하면, 하나의 행동이나 정책의 효과를 볼 때, 단기적이거나 한 집단에 국한된 효과를 보지 않고, 장기적이고 전체 집단에 미치는 효과를 관찰한다는 것이다. 바스티아가 든 깨진 유리창의 오류는 현재까지도 수백가지 형태로 끈질기게 경제학에 남아 있다. 그리고 과거보다 현재에 더 성행하고 있다. 그들은 거대한 파괴에서 파생하는 혜택이 무궁무진하다며 감탄한다. 그들은 평화시보다 전시에 우리가 경제적으로 얼마나 더 유복한지 설명한다. The First Economics Lesson Henry Hazlitt Economics is haunted by more fallacies than any other study known to man. This is no accident. The inherent difficulties of the subject would be great enough in any case, but they are multiplied a thousandfold by a factor that is insignificant in, say, physics, mathematics, or medicine—the special pleading of selfish interests. While every group has certain economic interests identical with those of all groups, every group has also, as we shall see, interests antagonistic to those of all other groups. While certain public policies would in the long run benefit everybody, other policies would benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The group that would benefit by such policies, having such a direct interest in them, will argue for them plausibly and persistently. It will hire the best buyable minds to devote their whole time to presenting its case. And it will finally either convince the general public that its case is sound, or so befuddle it that clear thinking on the subject becomes next to impossible. In addition to these endless pleadings of self-interest, there is a second main factor that spawns new economic fallacies every day. This is the persistent tendency of men to see only the immediate effects of a given policy, or its effects only on a special group, and to neglect to inquire what the long-run effects of that policy will be not only on that special group but on all groups. It is the fallacy of overlooking secondary consequences. In this lies almost the whole difference between good economics and bad. The bad economist sees only what immediately strikes the eye; the good economist also looks beyond. The bad economist sees only the direct consequences of a proposed course; the good economist looks also at the longer and indirect consequences. The bad economist sees only what the effect of a given policy has been or will be on one particular group; the good economist inquires also what the effect of the policy will be on all groups. The distinction may seem obvious. The precaution of looking for all the consequences of a given policy to everyone may seem elementary. Doesn't everybody know, in his personal life, that there are all sorts of indulgences delightful at the moment but disastrous in the end? Doesn't every little boy know that if he eats enough candy he will get sick? Doesn't the fellow who gets drunk know that he will wake up next morning with a ghastly stomach and a horrible head? Doesn't the dipsomaniac know that he is ruining his liver and shortening his life? Doesn't the Don Juan know that he is letting himself in for every sort of risk, from blackmail to disease? Finally, to bring it to the economic though still personal realm, do not the idler and the spendthrift know, even in the midst of their glorious fling, that they are heading for a future of debt and poverty? Yet when we enter the field of public economics, these elementary truths are ignored. There are men regarded today as brilliant economists, who deprecate saving and recommend squandering on a national scale as the way of economic salvation; and when anyone points to what the consequences of these policies will be in the long run, they reply flippantly, as might the prodigal son of a warning father: "In the long run we are all dead." And such shallow wisecracks pass as devastating epigrams and the ripest wisdom. But the tragedy is that, on the contrary, we are already suffering the long-run consequences of the policies of the remote or recent past. Today is already the tomorrow which the bad economist yesterday urged us to ignore. The long-run consequences of some economic policies may become evident in a few months. Others may not become evident for several years. Still others may not become evident for decades. But in every case those long-run consequences are contained in the policy as surely as the hen was in the egg, the flower in the seed. From this aspect, therefore, the whole of economics can be reduced to a single lesson, and that lesson can be reduced to a single sentence: The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups. Nine-tenths of the economic fallacies that are working such dreadful harm in the world today are the result of ignoring this lesson. Those fallacies all stem from one of two central fallacies, or both: that of looking only at the immediate consequences of an act or proposal, and that of looking at the consequences only for a particular group to the neglect of other groups. It is true, of course, that the opposite error is possible. In considering a policy we ought not to concentrate onlyon its long-run results to the community as a whole. This is the error often made by the classical economists. It resulted in a certain callousness toward the fate of groups that were immediately hurt by policies or developments which proved to be beneficial on net balance and in the long run. But comparatively few people today make this error; and those few consist mainly of professional economists. The most frequent fallacy by far today, the fallacy that emerges again and again in nearly every conversation that touches on economic affairs, the error of a thousand political speeches, the central sophism of the "new" economics, is to concentrate on the short-run effects of policies on special groups and to ignore or belittle the long-run effects on the community as a whole. The "new" economists flatter themselves that this is a great, almost a revolutionary advance over the methods of the "classical" or "orthodox" economists, because the former take into consideration short-run effects which the latter often ignored. But in themselves ignoring or slighting the long-run effects, they are making the far more serious error. They overlook the woods in their precise and minute examination of particular trees. Their methods and conclusions are often profoundly reactionary. They are sometimes surprised to find themselves in accord with 17th-century mercantilism. They fall, in fact, into all the ancient errors (or would, if they were not so inconsistent) that the classical economists, we had hoped, had once for all got rid of. It is often sadly remarked that the bad economists present their errors to the public better than the good economists present their truths. It is often complained that demagogues can be more plausible in putting forward economic nonsense from the platform than the honest men who try to show what is wrong with it. But the basic reason for this ought not to be mysterious. The reason is that the demagogues and bad economists are presenting half-truths. They are speaking only of the immediate effect of a proposed policy or its effect upon a single group. As far as they go they may often be right. In these cases the answer consists in showing that the proposed policy would also have longer and less desirable effects, or that it could benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The answer consists in supplementing and correcting the half-truth with the other half. But to consider all the chief effects of a proposed course on everybody often requires a long, complicated, and dull chain of reasoning. Most of the audience finds this chain of reasoning difficult to follow and soon becomes bored and inattentive. The bad economists rationalize this intellectual debility and laziness by assuring the audience that it need not even attempt to follow the reasoning or judge it on its merits because it is only "classicism" or "laissez faire" or "capitalist apologetics" or whatever other term of abuse may happen to strike them as effective. We have stated the nature of the lesson, and of the fallacies that stand in its way, in abstract terms. But the lesson will not be driven home, and the fallacies will continue to go unrecognized, unless both are illustrated by examples. Through these examples we can move from the most elementary problems in economics to the most complex and difficult. Through them we can learn to detect and avoid first the crudest and most palpable fallacies and finally some of the most sophisticated and elusive. To that task we shall now proceed. The Broken Window Let us begin with the simplest illustration possible: let us, emulating Bastiat, choose a broken pane of glass. A young hoodlum, say, heaves a brick through the window of a baker's shop. The shopkeeper runs out furious, but the boy is gone. A crowd gathers, and begins to stare with quiet satisfaction at the gaping hole in the window and the shattered glass over the bread and pies. After a while the crowd feels the need for philosophic reflection. And several of its members are almost certain to remind each other or the baker that, after all, the misfortune has its bright side. It will make business for some glazier. As they begin to think of this they elaborate upon it. How much does a new plate glass window cost? Fifty dollars? That will be quite a sum. After all, if windows were never broken, what would happen to the glass business? Then, of course, the thing is endless. The glazier will have $50 more to spend with other merchants, and these in turn will have $50 more to spend with still other merchants, and so ad infinitum. The smashed window will go on providing money and employment in ever-widening circles. The logical conclusion from all this would be, if the crowd drew it, that the little hoodlum who threw the brick, far from being a public menace, was a public benefactor. Now let us take another look. The crowd is at least right in its first conclusion. This little act of vandalism will in the first instance mean more business for some glazier. The glazier will be no more unhappy to learn of the incident than an undertaker to learn of a death. But the shopkeeper will be out $50 that he was planning to spend for a new suit. Because he has had to replace a window, he will have to go without the suit (or some equivalent need or luxury). Instead of having a window and $50 he now has merely a window. Or, as he was planning to buy the suit that very afternoon, instead of having both a window and a suit he must be content with the window and no suit. If we think of him as a part of the community, the community has lost a new suit that might otherwise have come into being, and is just that much poorer. The glazier's gain of business, in short, is merely the tailor's loss of business. No new "employment" has been added. The people in the crowd were thinking only of two parties to the transaction, the baker and the glazier. They had forgotten the potential third party involved, the tailor. They forgot him precisely because he will not now enter the scene. They will see the new window in the next day or two. They will never see the extra suit, precisely because it will never be made. They see only what is immediately visible to the eye. The Blessings of Destruction So we have finished with the broken window. An elementary fallacy. Anybody, one would think, would be able to avoid it after a few moments thought. Yet the broken-window fallacy, under a hundred disguises, is the most persistent in the history of economics. It is more rampant now than at any time in the past. It is solemnly reaffirmed every day by great captains of industry, by chambers of commerce, by labor union leaders, by editorial writers and newspaper columnists and radio commentators, by learned statisticians using the most refined techniques, by professors of economics in our best universities. In their various ways they all dilate upon the advantages of destruction. Though some of them would disdain to say that there are net benefits in small acts of destruction, they see almost endless benefits in enormous acts of destruction. They tell us how much better off economically we all are in war than in peace. They see "miracles of production" which it requires a war to achieve. And they see a postwar world made certainly prosperous by an enormous "accumulated" or "backed-up" demand. It is merely our old friend, the broken-window fallacy, in new clothing, and grown fat beyond recognition. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------