미제스가 말하는 가치 중립이란? 미제스: 경제학이 객관성을 확보하는 이유는 그것이 주관주의에 근거하고 있기 때문이다. 미제스의 말 뜻은, 경제학은 사람들의 궁극적인 선호(選好)를 이미 주어진 전제로 여긴다는 것이다. 미제스가 주장하는 바는, 사람들의 궁극적인 가치 판단을 받아들이고, 그것을 획득하는 방법만을 생각하면, 우리가 객관적이고 가치 중립적으로 학문을 할 수 있다는 것이다. 예를 들면, 최저임금은 그 정책이 목표하는 바를 도달할 수 없다고 주장하는 것은 가치중립적이다. 노동자들의 복지 향상은 최저임금이라는 방법으로 성취할 수 없다는 객관적인 사실만을 말하고 있기 때문이다. Mises's Vision for Value-Free Economics David Gordon Near the beginning of Human Action, Mises makes a remarkable statement: “it is in this subjectivism that the objectivity of our science [economics] lies” (p. 21). What does he mean by this? How can a science be objective by being subjective? Mises’s answer is that economics takes the ultimate preferences of people as given, not an occasion for further analysis by economics. This leads to another question. What is an “ultimate” preference? Mises’s answer starts from the fact that we want some things as means to achieve something else, e.g., we want food to satisfy hunger. Not everything that we want, though, is a means to some further end. Perhaps we satisfy our hunger not as an ultimate end but as a means to keep alive, but it does not seem plausible that “keeping alive” is a means to some further end. (There are exceptions to this claim that I’ll ignore here.) There has to be some ultimate end. There can’t be an endless series in which everything is a means to something else. It doesn’t follow from this, though, that there must be some one thing that is the ultimate end of all our actions. Rather, each chain of the form A is a means to B, B is a means to C,…etc., must finish with an ultimate end, but the ultimate end that is the termination point of each chain doesn’t have to be the same. To think otherwise would be to commit a logical fallacy, just as it does not follow from “Every man has a father” that “Some man is everybody’s father.” Some people think Aristotle made this mistake, but that is disputed. With this understood, Mises’s argument becomes clearer. He says, Because it is subjectivistic and takes the value judgments of acting man as ultimate data not open to any further critical examination, it is indifferent to the conflict of all schools of dogmatism and ethical doctrines, it is free from valuations and preconceived ideas and judgments, it is universally valid and absolutely and plainly human. Mises takes ultimate ends as purely formal. The truths of praxeology apply to all human actions, regardless of their ultimate end. In particular, he stresses that economics doesn’t assume that people aim only at getting wealthy. He says, Economics does not assume or postulate that men aim only or first of all at what is called material well-being. Economics, as a branch of the more general theory of human action, deals with all human action, i.e., with man's purposive aiming at the attainment of ends chosen, whatever these ends may be. To apply the concept rational or irrational to the ultimate ends chosen is nonsensical. We may call irrational the ultimate given, viz., those things that our thinking can neither analyze nor reduce to other ultimately given things. Then every ultimate end chosen by any man is irrational. It is neither more nor less rational to aim at riches like Croesus than to aim at poverty like a Buddhist monk. Mises’s fundamental point is that if you don’t question people’s ultimate value judgments, but confine yourself to a discussion of means, you can be strictly objective and value-free. If you say to someone that he won’t get what he is aiming for by using the means he has chosen, you aren’t making a value judgment yourself. You are making a strictly scientific statement. Mises explains this essential issue in this way: An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g, an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If this economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. In this sense the free-trade economists attacked protection. They demonstrated that protection does not, as its champions believe, increase but, on the contrary, decreases the total amount of products, and is therefore bad from the point of view of those who prefer an ampler supply of products to a smaller. It is in this sense that economists criticize policies from the point of view of the ends aimed at. If an economist calls minimum wage rates a bad policy, what he means is that its effects are contrary to the purpose of those who recommend their application. I have so far just given an account of what Mises says. It seems to me exactly on target. But there is one area, though, in which he may be open to criticism. He rightly says that economists don’t tell people what they should do, where “should” implies an ethical judgment. Economists apply the purely scientific truths of praxeology to show whether means are suitable to attain ends. There is another area, though, where there is a contrast between “formal” and “material,” and that is within a type of ethical theory. Utilitarians in the nineteenth century often said that people ought to maximize “pleasure” or “utility,” where this meant a particular kind of felt experience. This has in more recent times largely though not entirely given way to what is called “preference utilitarianism,” where the aim is to maximize the realization of one’s preferences, whatever they turn out to be. Mises refers to this when he says, “If Eudaemonism says happiness, if Utilitarianism and economics say utility, we must interpret these terms in a subjectivistic way as that which acting man aims at because it is desirable in his eyes. It is in this formalism that the progress of the modern meaning of Eudaemonism, Hedonism, and Utilitarianism consists as opposed to the older material meaning” (p. 21, emphasis mine). Where I think Mises goes astray is that he did not distinguish adequately between preference utilitarianism and economics. The former is not strictly scientific. It is an ethical theory, and someone who adopts it is engaged in philosophy and not praxeology. Mises is both a praxeologist and a preference utilitarian of a very distinctive sort, but you can be one without being the other. Murray Rothbard, for example, was a praxeologist but in ethical theory supported natural law, not preference utilitarianism. As Bishop Butler says, “Everything is what it is, and not another thing.” ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 야뇨와 요실금을 가진 91세의 노인 夜尿频多、尿失禁朋友的叔祖爷爷，91岁，鳏寡一生，与朋友爷... 夜尿频多、尿失禁 朋友的叔祖爷爷，91岁，鳏寡一生，与朋友爷爷一家同住，每日散散步，顺便捡些废品卖卖，自得其乐。 有一样，便是尿频尿急，只要喝水或喝汤多一些，半小时就要小便一次，且一旦有尿意即迫不及待。有时自己不知道，胯下已咕咕而流，湿了裤子。夜尿频多，每天总有五六次上下。“作天阴”，天气晴朗时稍微好一些。 据我了解，鳏寡孤独者和惯于手淫者多有此症。 我看老人家虽四方脸丘壑纵横，呈辛苦劳作一生的老农所常有的暗黄与红黑相杂肤色，却也精神矍铄，给人开朗慈柔之感，绝无萎靡低落之态。然而独身一辈子无儿无女，不足之意，难免情郁于中。故以四逆散五苓散合方，吃了十几剂，效果在有无之间。 又考虑到其有“作天阴”、腰腿凉的毛病，以四逆散五苓散肾著汤三管齐下，也没什么明显改观。 老先生和蔼慈善，通达世情，反而安慰我说病了一辈子，哪能说好就好？ 问他年轻时是否也是这么清瘦，他说比现在胖有20斤以上。我心里一动，再请其伸出舌头看看，也看不出所以然，想了又想，撕下孩子的作业纸，写下桂枝加龙骨牡蛎汤与缩泉丸的合方，说再试试再试试。 那一刻，真有病高一丈我高一毫之感。 谁知这次效果竟然很是明显，7剂后夜尿由五六次减为一两次。原方再进14剂，白天尿频尿急的情况也得到了根本性的改善，虽未达到我心目中的理想效果，老先生及朋友全家已是十分激赏，逢人就说我治好了老人准备带到墓窑里的老病根子。 사역산, 오령산, 신착탕이 실패하고, 계지가용골모려탕 합 축천환으로 치료 계지, 작약 30, 건강(乾薑) 10, 자(炙)감초 20, 용골, 모려 30, 익지인 15, 오약 10 , 산약 20, 대추 84 개 / 7첩