"북한을 폭로한 요리사" 일베글을 보고 지금 온몸에 소름이 돋았다. 전라도우파 / 일베 북한이 우간다에 호텔과 비행장을 위장 건물로 짓고, 그 밑에 땅굴을 파서 마약과 무기공장을 지어서 마약과 무기 장사를 한다는게 그 영국과 미국 CIA의 협조를 받아 정보수집을 활동을 하는 요리사를 통해 알려진게 현재 들어난 내용. 그런데 이 윤미향 씨발년이 그 정보원들이 정보수집을 위해서 북한에 투자하고 있는 내용과 똑같은 일을 했음. 윤미향 이 씨발년이 우간다에 10에이커(약 1만2천평) 규모의 땅을 사서 씨발 이름도 모르는 우간다 단체에 그냥 기부해버림. 이거 무기하고 마약만들라고 북한에 장소 제공해준거지, 우간다 땅이 위안부 할머니들하고 무슨 관계가 있노?? 예전엔 윤미향 씨발년이 지 주머니 체울려고 우간다에서 돈세탁 해서 지 해외 계좌로 꽂았나 보다 했는데. 저 다큐를 보고 나니까, 윤미향 이 씨발년 북한에 상납한거 였음. 나 지금 농담 아니라 온몸에 소오름이 돋았다. 씨발 민주당 516 빨갱이 새끼들이 평소 북한 주체 사상을 좋아하고, 자꾸 사회주의를 우리나라에 도입할려고 해서 나는 이 새끼들이 빨갱이다 빨갱이다 했던건데.. 이 다큐를 보고 나니까, 이 민주당 개새끼들은 빨갱이가 아니라 전부 간첩들이다 ㅅㅂ. 지금 씨발 코로나가 중요한게 아니라 이 586 문재인 정부가 전부다 간첩새끼들임. 아이즈원 박지원 씨발놈같은 새끼가 우리나라 국정원장이란게 소름끼친다.. 이미 대한민국 모든 정보는 북한에 보내졌을것 같다. 나 소름돋아서 지금 다큐 다운받아서 직접 보려고 한다. 게이들아 그 정보 게이가 올린 "북한을 폭로한 요리사"글들 꼭 읽어봐라. --->윤미향은 민주당 내에서 아무도 건드릴 수 없는 거물이다. 그녀를 재판한 판사마저도 급사했다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 미 공화 상원의원 "대선결과 의회 인증 앞서 이의제기할 것" 임주영 기자 일부 하원의원 움직임에 상원서 첫 동조…CNN "결과 못 바꿔" --->이런 법률적인 방법으로 과연 대통령직을 유지할 수 있을지가 문제다. 만일 1월 6일의 투쟁에서 트럼프가 패했을 때, 그는 또 한장의 히든 카드를 준비해놓은 것일까? 아니면 그대로 백악관에서 짐싸서 나올 것인가? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1월6일 … 트럼프 팀, “구체적 증거 제시!” … DC에 1백만명 운집 중! ... 이슈진단#.227 ... 2020.12.31. ... [박훈탁TV] 미주리주 공화당 상원의원, Josh Hawley ... “민주당이 2004년과 2016년에 그랬듯이, 나도 이번에 선거인단 투표에 반대할 것이다.” … 1월6일 상원과 하원에서 11월3일 대선의 부정과 불규칙성에 관한 토론 진행되고 … 트럼프 팀, 구체적인 증거 제시 … 미국사회, 주류언론 통해 이것을 듣고 보게 된다 … 하원의 다수를 차지한 민주당, 재선을 위해 선거인단 투표 거부에 동참할 수 밖에 없다 .. Washington DC에 민간조직 “Stop the Steal”이 트럼프 지지자, 1백만명을 모으고 있다 https://youtu.be/YGlliM30gdg ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ David Boxenhorn I understand (and agree with) the logic of vaccinating older people first, but from an epidemiological point of view it would be better to vaccinate people randomly 노인들부터 백신 주사를 맞힌다는 데 동의하지만, 전염병학의 관점으로 보면, 무작위로 백신 접종을 하는 게 더 좋다. Nassim Nicholas Taleb Most effective is to focus on 1) superspreaders (when they can be identified), 2) integral of exposure over time (hospital workers) & 3) vulnerability (older etc.), but (2) overlap with (1). Current focus is on (2)& (3), less optimal. (1)>>>(2)+(3) 가장 효과적인 방법은 1, 수퍼전파자 2. 병원 근무자들처럼 전염병에 노출 시간이 가장 높은 사람들 3. 노인들처럼 전염병에 가장 취약한 사람들에 집중하는 것이다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 금본위제를 고수한 자크 루프 자크 루프Jacques Rueff는 프랑스의 경제학자로 고전적인 금본위제도를 주창하고, 금환 본위 제도Gold Exchange Stadard를 반대했다. 루프는 시장 가격 시스템을 위협하는 최대의 적은 인플레이고, 인플레는 시장의 조정 기능market coordination을 방해한다. 그리고 정부를 인플레 정책으로 나아가게 하는 주범은 적자 지출이다. 그에 따르면 인플레는 악마의 짓거리이고, 국가를 전체주의로 몰고간다. 1차대전 후에 주민들의 갖가지 요구에 부딪친 정부들은 적자 지출, 인플레, 물자 배분, 가격 지정 등으로 나아갔다. 그리고 사회의 요구가 많아지고 혼란스러워지면서, 이를 해결하기 위한 전체주의적 방법이 부상했다. 사유재산권이 파괴되고, 사회의 헌법적, 법률적 기반이 뿌리 뽑히면서, 전체주의가 탄생할 환경이 조성되었다는 것이다. The Disaster of Bretton Woods vs. a Real Gold Standard David Gordon The Monetary Conservative: Jacques Rueff and Twentieth-Century Free Market Thought by Christopher S. Chivvis Northern Illinois University Press, 2010 xiv + 234 pages The French economist Jacques Rueff was the foremost opponent in the twentieth century of the gold exchange standard, and his defense of the classical gold standard deserves close study. In this outstanding intellectual biography of Rueff, Christopher Chivvis, a political scientist working for the RAND Corporation, shows that belief in monetary stability dominated Rueff’s long and distinguished career. Rueff’s commitment to the free market stemmed from his days as a student at L’École polytechnique, “a venerable training ground for future servants of the French state” (p. 19). Here he came under the influence of the economist Clément Colson, a strong supporter of the free market, although he was not a strict supporter of laissez-faire in the style of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, the leader of the “Paris school.” Rueff adopted the position he had learned from Colson and held it throughout his professional life: although the free market was for the most part desirable, there was a role for the state as well. He did not fully share what in an essay in honor of Mises he called the latter’s “intransigence,” though on the deficiencies of the gold exchange standard he equaled or exceeded it. Rueff’s fundamental argument is this. The greatest danger to the system of market prices is inflation, which impedes, if it does not altogether prevent, market coordination. What leads a government to inflate is deficit spending. If government programs are not paid for through taxes, the market is disoriented. People make investment and consumption decisions that lack a basis in genuine preferences because of the false prices that guide their actions. Inflation was “the work of the devil, because it respects appearances without destroying anything but the realities” (Rueff, qtd. on p. 105). Rueff argues that inflation leads to totalitarianism. Rueff’s analysis of the consequences of inflation is clearly rooted in and intended as an explanation of the interwar crisis. Faced with a cacophony of demands in the wake of World War I, one European government after another was driven down the road toward deficit spending, inflation, and eventually rationing and price fixing. Price fixing only created false rights…as social disorder increased, so did the appeal of totalitarian solutions to society’s problems. The destruction of property rights and the uprooting of the legal and constitutional foundation of society thus created the perfect environment for the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, which came to be seen as the only means of repressing inflation and restoring order. (p. 108) The battle against inflation must be waged in the international monetary system as well as within each national economy, and here Rueff’s struggle against the gold exchange standard comes to the fore. In the Bretton Woods arrangements after World War II, the US dollar was convertible into gold at a fixed rate of exchange, but other countries’ monies needed only to be convertible to dollars. Rueff’s central claim was that the U.S. deficit was the product of the Bretton Woods system…the problem was rooted in the growing use of dollars as foreign exchange reserves, which allowed the United States to run a balance of payments deficit without experiencing any contraction of domestic credit. Though dollars might theoretically be converted into gold, thus leading to a contraction in the U.S. monetary base, in practice, countries were very unlikely to contract when they could simply reinvest their dollars in U.S. money markets, which, unlike gold, earned interest….As long as this was the case, however, the U.S. deficit would continue to plague the system, and the dollar’s gold link would grow increasingly tenuous. (pp. 163–64) Rueff turned out to be right, and under Nixon, the Bretton Woods system collapsed. But the US substituted for it an even more expansionary arrangement, just the opposite of the solution Rueff favored: Rueff’s remedy for this situation was an end to the use of dollars as foreign exchange reserves and a return to convertible money. If the use of the dollar as a reserve currency were eliminated and the gold standard were reestablished, he wrote, the U.S. deficit would automatically require a restriction in the U.S. monetary base, a contraction in the United States, and a reduction of the U.S. deficit. In other words, a return to the gold standard would impose discipline on the United States, forcing it to spend within its means, while at the same time reducing the global inflationary impulse the Bretton Woods system was engendering. The deficit would come to an end, as would the arbitrary growth of government credit. (p. 165) Rueff’s steadfast defense of the classical gold standard set him at odds with Keynesian economics, and Rueff proved equal to the challenge. He developed a penetrating critical analysis of Keynes’s General Theory. In brief, Keynes argues that the sum of consumption and investment spending can be insufficient to generate full employment if hoarding of money is widespread. Rueff responds that, given price flexibility, the demand to hold cash will not cause unemployment. Instead, it will shift resources to meet this demand. Rueff attacked Keynes’s argument on the grounds that a shift from demand for goods and services to demand for liquidity or cash balances could not have a significant long-term effect on an economy. The claim was most easily illustrated in the case of the gold standard, where an increase in demand for cash would create an increased demand for gold and thus shift resources away from the production of other goods and services toward gold. This, in turn, would tend to increase the profitability of producing gold, increasing employment in that sector, and thereby resolving the unemployment that the original shift away from consumption had created. Rueff had more difficulty explaining how this same mechanism would function under a nonmetallic system, but he insisted that it did. (p. 135) One could wish that Chivvis had made more of an effort to explain Rueff’s reasoning. If we turn to Rueff’s article “The Fallacies of Lord Keynes’ General Theory” (available in The Critics of Keynesian Economics, ed. Henry Hazlitt, pp. 238–63), it is easy to excuse Chivvis’s truncated exposition. Rueff has his own way of explaining things, in large part influenced by his training as an engineer at the Polytechnique, and he is frequently hard to follow. For that reason, the article has been neglected (though Rothbard cites it in Man, Economy, and State), but it is a major effort of striking originality and depth. Much of The Monetary Conservative offers a detailed account, here passed over, of Rueff’s long career in high financial circles. One can only admire the consistency of Rueff’s defense of sound money from the days of Raymond Poincare in the 1920s to Charles de Gaulle in the 1950s and ’60s. I hope that Chivvis’s book will lead to a revival of interest in this great economist and defender of freedom. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------