조선일보 “성남 대장지구, 100대1 경쟁하는데, ‘화천대유’는 수의계약”(feat. 김경율&이슈포청천) red6**** 논란은 2015년 2월 13일 성남시 산하 성남도시개발공사가 공모를 낸 해당 사업에 참여하게 된 화천대유가 공모 일주일 전인 2월 6일 설립된 것에서부터 시작한다. 당시 3개 컨소시엄이 공모했고, 하나은행을 대표사로 둔 ‘성남의뜰’이 그해 3월 우선협상대상자로 선정됐는데, 여기에 화천대유가 지분 14.28%(4999만원)로 참여했다. 즉, 공모가 나오기 1주일 전 만들어진 미리 만들어진 영세 업체가 사업 규모 1조원이 넘는 프로젝트에 참여한 것이다. 5000 만원을 투자하고 1년 557억을 배당금을 받았다 점재명 많이도 먹었다. daso**** 화천대유는 4000억 배당금 외에 수천억의 택지개발 이득까지 챙겼다. 화천대유는 12개의 아파트 부지 중 전체부지의 40%(1,2,11,12번 구역)를 입찰과정 없이 수의계약으로 매입했다. 경쟁입찰을 한 나머지 구역은 186대1의 치열한 경쟁율로 토지 공급가액보다 비싼가격에 낙찰받았지만 화천대유는 금싸라기 땅을 경쟁없이 남들보다 싼 가격으로 쓸어가면서 화천대유가 얻은 이익은 정확한 산정조차 안되고 있다. 3억5000만원 댄 민간사업자가 수천억을 가져갔는데 5천억의 개발이익을 성남시에 환수한 모범사업이라고 떠드는 이재명은 사기꾼이다. hq08**** 성남시는 대장동 개발사업에 참여하려면 반드시 자산관리회사를 지정해서 들어오라는 이상한 모집공고를 냈다. 1조5000억원 규모 사업 계획서를 하루 만에 셀프심사한 성남시는 자산관리에는 문외한인 김만배가 사업자 공모 1주일전에 설립한 화천대유자산관리가 포함된 성남의 뜰을 우선협상으로 선정됐다. 성남의뜰은 지분 50%를 가진 성남도시개발공사1830억, 1%지분의 화천대유 577억, 6% 지분의 sk증권에 3460억라는 이상한 배당금을 지급했다. 화천대유는 4000억 배당금 외에 수천억의 택지개발 이득까지 챙겼다. 화천대유는 누구건가요? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 광주형 일자리 캐스퍼가 소름끼치는 이유 ADEQTR http://www.ilbe.com/view/11367158810 왜냐면 이게 좌파의 진정한 민낯을 보여주는 사례이기 때문임 니들도 알다시피 좌파는 극단적인 친노조임. 그런데 현대차 노조의 1/3 연봉만 받는 공기업으로 이른바 광주형 일자리를 만들어서 파업을 금지시키고 온라인판매를 통해 싸게 차를 팔겠다면서 나온게 캐스퍼 거든 당연히 노조입장에서는 극렬 반대하는 중임. 그런데 그 민노총의 숙주와도 같은 문재앙이 직접 나서서 캐스퍼를 홍보하고 있으니 기괴하지. 근데 사실은 광주형 일자리야말로 좌파들이 지향하는 일자리 거든 니들도 알겠지만 좌파들은 친중인데 중국은 노조가 법으로 금지되어있음. 그렇다면 진정한 친노조라면 당연히 중국 공산당을 혐오하고 싫어해야하는데 왜 좌파들은 정반대로 친중행보를 할까? 그건 사실 좌파라는건 "친노조" 가 본질이 아니고, "반기업"이 본질이기 때문임. 정확히 말하면, 좌파는 "사기업"을 망하게 하고 모든걸 공공부문으로 전환시켜 중국처럼 정치꾼들이 모든 부와 권력을 쥐고 국가를 쥐락펴락할수 있는 그런 나라를 꿈꾸고 있기 때문에, 광주형 일자리같은 사기업 죽이기 공공부문 일자리를 밀어주는것임 쉽게말해서 노조vs사기업 갈등에선 무조건 노조편만 들어서 사기업을 망하게 만들고, 그 일자리를 공공부문으로 흡수시켜서 정치인 손아귀에 넣고 싶어한다는 말임. 거기선 노조 금지시키고 그 음흉한 속내를 대놓고 드러낸 결과물이 캐스퍼기 때문에 소름이 끼치는것 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 사기의 대제국 헝따. 대륙의 스케일/중공발 금융위기 터지나? 박상후의 문명개화 중공전역이 헝따의 사기극으로 발칵 뒤집혔습니다. 헝따는 전기자동차, 농업, 양돈, 광천수, 금융, 부동산등 뛰어들지 않은 분야가 거의 없습니다. 그런데 모든게 사기인 것으로 드러났습니다. 전기차분야에 진출해서는 양산차 한대 없이 업계 2위에 오르는 기염을 토하기도 했지만 지금은 시가총액이 10분의 1이하로 줄어들었습니다. 자동차를 만드는 시늉만 했을 뿐 지금까지 한대로 판매하지 못한 메이커가 헝따자동차입니다. 헝따 CEO 쉬쟈인의 특징은 끝마무리를 안한다는 점입니다. 부동산의 제국으로 크게 성장해 글로벌 500대기업이 됐지만 거의 모든 사업부문이 사기였습니다. 부동산 부문에서는 공사를 중단한 현장이 부지기수입니다. 또 헝따차이푸란 금융회사는 높은 이자를 준다면서 고객들을 유인했지만 지급불가 상태에 빠졌습니다. 중공당국은 이 같은 헝따의 행태를 알고 있었습니다. 때문에 헝따가 위기에 빠졌지만 도와주기는 커녕 헝따부동산의 담보가치를 부인하는 스탠스를 취하고 있습니다. 구제하기보다는 파산을 기다리는 것으로 보입니다. 헝따가 성장한 배경은 쟝저민, 후진타오시절의 인맥, 특히 쩡칭홍, 쟝저민 인맥이 대다수로 시진핑과는 무관합니다. 이제 헝따의 제국은 파산만 남은 것으로 보입니다. 글로벌 500대기업이라는 헝따의 피해자는 줄잡아 500만명은 되는 것으로 추산되고 있습니다. 이번 방송에서는 헝따의 비지니스 스타일 그리고 최근의 속보를 총정리했습니다. https://youtu.be/xR-hfWwSRK0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 연방은행이 경제적 불평등의 주범이다 연방은행이 소득의 불평등에 관심을 갖고 있다면, 무엇보다 먼저 저금리 정책과 양적 완화를 끝내야 한다. 저금리 정책과 양적 완화는 주식과 부동산의 소유자들을 더 부유하게 만들고, 반대로 일반인들은 실업, 저성장, 치솟는 생활비로 고통받게 한다. 최근 카렌 페트루는 를 출간했는데, 그녀는 이 책에서 지난 10 여년간의 연방은행의 양적 완화와 저금리 정책이 어떻게 부자들을 더 부자로 만들고, 보통 사람들을 힘들게 했는지 밝히고 있다. 2008년의 경기 불황 이후로 연방은행은 8조 달러 이상을 시장에 쏟아부었다. 그리고 그 결과로 주가가 치솟아 올랐고, 부동산을 비롯한 기타 자산들의 가격도 상승했다. 그 결과 2010년부터 2020년까지의 기간에 연방은행의 시장 개입으로 인해 현대에 가장 완만한 경제 회복을 보였다는 것이다. 저금리와 양적 완화로 인해 기존의 은행들이 일반인들에게 대출을 해주는 대신, 주식에 투자하고 부자들에게 대출하는 일에 열중함으로써 저금리의 효과는 저소득층으로 흘러가지 않았다. 그녀의 책은 연방은행이 빈곤화와 경제적 정체 그리고 불평등의 주범임을 분명히 하고 있다. The Fed Is Bailing Out the Wealthy as Everyone Else Pays the Price Ryan McMaken The Federal reserve says that inequality is a problem. At the same, the Fed also pretends to have nothing to do with it. Last September, for instance, Jerome Powell bemoaned the "relative stagnation of income" for people with lower incomes in the United States, but then claimed the Fed "doesn't have the tools" to address this issue. Instead, Powell, being the chairman of this ostensibly "independent" and "nonpolitical" central bank, called for the federal government to engage in fiscal policy efforts at income redistribution. Powell, of course, is wrong, and he probably knows he's wrong. In any case, if the Fed were actually concerned about wealth and income inequality, the Fed would stop doing what it has done over the past decade. It would end its ultralow interest rate policy and quantitative easing. These policies have been at the center of the post–Great Recession economy, in which wealthy owners of stocks and real estate become ever more fabulously wealthy, even as ordinary people face stagnating employment, low economic growth, and a rising cost of living. This only accelerated during the economic crises of 2020, when endless Fed efforts to prop up the stock market meant that financial markets soared—and with them the portfolios of the wealthy—even as unemployment rose to record levels. Even Jim Cramer could see what was happening and declared Fed policy to be a part of "one of the greatest wealth transfers in history." The ways that the Fed effects wealth transfers to the financial sector and the state—at the expense of everyone else—have long been the domain of Austrian school critics of central banks. That is, we've long noted in these pages how financial repression and so-called easy money have fueled vast riches for Wall Street, while leaving the middle classes and lower-income Americans behind. But one need not rely on Austrian critics to get insight into the damage done by modern monetary policy. In her new book, Engine of Inequality: The Fed and the Future of Wealth in America, Karen Petrou looks in detail at how Fed policy over the past decade—especially quantitative easing (QE) and ultralow interest rates—have benefited the wealthy while leaving most ordinary people behind. Petrou is one of the more interesting and informative analysts examining the financial services sector. As the head of Federal Financial Analytics Inc., she has provided research on the banking sector for more than thirty years, but in recent years she's become more focused on exposing and examining the unhealthy and destructive effects of Fed policy. Petrou takes a different approach from the Austrians. She appears to have arrived at her conclusions from observing the trends and outcomes produced by Fed policy and then working backward into a theoretical framework. The data seems to have prompted her to ask why things have gone so badly after more than a decade of "unconventional" Fed policy. When it comes to identifying the problem, she's come to the right conclusions. In any case, Petrou's book is important because it is the work of a Wall Street insider who no longer swallows the Fed's propaganda line that the Fed's interest rate manipulation—as Powell puts it—"supports the economy across a broad range of people." The reality is something different. As Petrou notes, the "perverse effect" of Fed policy has been to create "acute inequality and resulting risks to both growth and financial stability." The Mythical "Wealth Effect" How did this happen? Since the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve has increasingly ratcheted up its efforts to increase liquidity and drive down interest rates. This is done as part of an effort to prop up the financial sector. It is assumed that a robust financial sector will grease the wheels of the economy overall and that the wealth in the financial sector will somehow trickle down to the rest of the economy via a theoretical "wealth effect." Specifically, to do this, the Fed engages in quantitative easing, in which it purchases government bonds and financial assets. These assets are placed in the Fed's portfolio in exchange for dollars, which then flow into the financial sector. This raises the prices of financial assets while lowering yields and interest rates. It also increases the money supply. Since the Great Recession began, the Fed has added more than $8 trillion in assets to its portfolio—which means trillions of dollars have poured into banks and nonbank financial institutions. [Read More: "Financialization: Why the Financial Sector Now Rules the Global Economy" by Ryan McMaken] As Petrou notes, the effect of this policy has been extremely beneficial for the wealthy. Because so much money has been injected into the financial sector, stock prices have skyrocketed, and the prices of other assets—especially real estate—have soared. Petrou shows that if we look at the data, however, we find that this economic boon hasn't done much for those who don't already have robust stock market portfolios and real estate assets. That is, the lower half of the US in terms of wealth and income. In fact, from 2001 to 2016, the median wealth of Americans in the bottom 80 percent of income earners has fallen. According to Petrou's analysis, as stock prices and real estate prices have climbed, the economic prospects of many ordinary people have remained flat, or worse. She notes that from 2010 to 2020, employment growth was unimpressive and that during this period "Fed intervention led only to the slowest economic recovery in modern memory." She writes: US economic growth was at best lackluster before COVID and the "full" employment about which the Fed was wont to brag was in fact less impressive when labor-participation rates and other factors are carefully considered. On the eve of the 2020 financial collapse, the US's economic recovery could only be described as "fragile" and disappointing for anyone who wasn't in the top quintiles of earnings and wealth. Soaring prices in stocks cannot be shown to have benefited those who don't own many stocks. Moreover, since the Great Recession, housing prices were largely flat among lower-priced homes in middle American markets. The benefits of asset price inflation in housing is felt far more in expensive coastal cities, where the wealthy own higher-priced real estate. How Ultralow Rates Punish Ordinary Savers In addition to asset price inflation is the problem of yield chasing, fueled by ultralow interest rates. This doesn't just leave low- and moderate-income families behind as asset price inflation does. Ultralow interest rates actually punish ordinary, conservative savers who lack the wealth or sophistication necessary to gain the benefits of high-risk yield chasing in the markets. Banks and hedge fund managers have access to many tools to take on higher risk and seek out the corners of the market where higher interest offers a better yield. So, ultralow interest rates still leave Wall Street a variety of options. Most ordinary families don't have those options. Petrou explains: Ultra-low rates fundamentally eviscerated the ability of all but the wealthy to gain an economic toehold; instead they lead investors to drive up equity and other asset prices to achieve their return … but average Americans hold little, if any, stock or investment instruments. Instead, they save what they can in bank accounts. The rates on these have been so low for so long that these thrifty, prudent households have in fact set themselves back with each dollar they save. Pension funds are just as hard-hit meaning not only that average Americans can't save for the future, but also that the instruments on which they count for additional security are unlikely to meet their needs." Moreover, as banks and other lending institutions searched for higher yields, they lost their interest in lending to regular people: As a result [of QE], the Fed's ultra-low rates led to the yield-chasing that propelled financial markets ever higher even as regulated financial institutions changed their business model from taking deposits and making loans to average households to one betting on stocks and offering loans and other services to wealthy households, financial markets, and giant corporations. Ultra-low rates failed to trickle down to low-, moderate-, and even middle-income households. This is not due only to interest rate policy, however. Petrou also explains how banking regulations after the Great Recession have further driven banks away from lending to small businesses and ordinary borrowers. Federal regulation has further fueled a strengthening of megabanks, which are better able to meet regulatory benchmarks. Community banks, meanwhile—which serve smaller markets and small-time borrowers—are increasingly disappearing. Consequently, wealth continues to be centralized in Wall Street. Petrou presents all of this information using evidence from countless quantitative studies from a variety of sources, including the Bank of International Settlements and even some member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Hundreds of footnotes enable the reader to follow these reports back to their sources and see for themselves what has happened: Fed policy has done wonders for billionaires and hedge fund managers. The data suggests others have clearly done less well. Petrou's book certainly has its shortcomings. The book's monetary policy discussion doesn't begin until chapter 5, nearly sixty pages in. Before that, the reader must slog through an overly long discussion about the evils of inequality. Petrou's discussion on digital currency appears to be out of place, and her conclusions are not terribly convincing. And the final quarter of the book is a laundry list of recommended regulations and changes that amount to little more than tinkering with monetary policy. That is, this book is far too timid in calling for any real restraint on Fed power. But as a resource for quantifying the results of the Fed's unconventional monetary policy, this book is valuable indeed. There is a well-researched and well-detailed hundred-page core in this book that shows in a dozen different ways what should be regarded as undeniable at this point: the Fed is a force for impoverishment, economic stagnation, and inequality. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------