LA 시사논평 / 문재인-윤석열을 살리기 위한 9월 7일의 거대한 사기쑈 / 가세연 체포 관련 수상한 이야기들 (생방송 9. 8. 2021) https://youtu.be/FI7APqZ7sXM --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 중국에서 망명한 국방부 차관급 동징웨이가 미국에게 제공한 정보! 서울굿맨 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11365606086 코로나 바이러스 초기 연구자료 미국에 뿌려져 데미지를 입힐 코로나 바이러스의 시뮬레이션 모델 코로나 개발에 자금을 대준 조직들과 정부기관들의 금전적인 기록 중국에게 인텔을 제공하는 미국인 목록 미국에서 직장생활이나 유학으로 가장한 중국 스파이 목록 중국에게 돈을 받은 미국 기업인과 정부 관계자 목록 중국 스파이와 러시아의 SVR과 내통한 미국 정부관계자들의 해당 미팅에 관한 자세한 정보 중국 정부가 CIA 내부 시스템에 잠입해, CIA를 위해 일하는 중국인 스파이가 수십명 살해되도록 하게 된 방법과 과정 동징웨이는 DIA에게 미국에 유학하는 중국 유학생의 최소한 1/3이 스파이 이며 천재양성 플랜의 일부라고 밝혔다. 그들은 공산당 고위 간부 자녀들이기 때문에 가명으로 활동한다고 함. 일단 대략 37만명의 대학생중에 1/3이니 최소한 124,000 명의 스파이가 있는것이고, 이는 곧 중국 군대가 미국 국경안에 주둔하고 있는것과 같다. 그들은 모든곳에 침투해서 미국을 망가뜨려 놓았기 때문에 트럼프가 모든 비밀을 공개하는데 시간이 걸리는 것이다. 동징웨이는 현재 DIA가 보호하고 있다고 함. 그런데 동징웨이는 왜 바이든 정권에서 망명했을까? 사실 그 전에 왔었는데 3개월 전에야 공개된거라고 본다. 바이든은 최근 코로나 바이러스의 근원지를 조사하라는 행정명령을 내렸는데 이는 트럼프가 뒤에서 힘을 쓴거라고 Patel Patriot는 생각하더라. 왜냐면 이 행정명령은 원래 트럼프가 내렸던 명령이고 바이든이 들어와서 철회를 시켰는데 갑자기 다시 명령을 내리는게 말이되냐고 하더라. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 알리바바, 완다, 그리고 통렌탕의 비극/비리공안 2만명 자수, 비판투쟁시작/국민장인 시아버지의 근황 박상후의 문명개화 중공에서 만인에 대한 만인의 투쟁이 시작됐습니다. 종신집권을 꿈꾸고 있는 시진핑이 원하고 있는 것은 자신에 대한 절대충성과 돈입니다. 그가 공도부유, 3차 분배를 부르짖자 대기업들이 일제히 기업의 재산을 바치고 있습니다. 일당 생존을 도모하기 위해서입니다. 그리고 공동부유에 기여하겠다면서 지방정부마다 모금행사를 벌이고 있습니다. 기업가, 공무원뿐만 아니라 공안도 공포에 떨고 있습니다. 정법계통의 대숙청은 몇달전에 이미 개시했습니다. 무려 2만명에 달하는 비리공안이 자수했다고 합니다. 비리가 두려워 드러나면 가중처벌이 두렵기 때문입니다. 기업인들이 속속 지분이나 보유하고 있는 정보를 헌납하고 있지만 이들의 운명은 가늠할 수 없습니다. 제2의 문혁이 진행되고 있는 지금 눈여겨 볼 과거가 중공의 유서깊은 약방 통렌탕이 사례입니다. 통렌탕의 13대 사주 유에송성은 모택동시기 충성을 바치고 공사합영제에 자발적으로 협력해 지분을 모택동에게 공개적으로 내놨지만 문혁때 그의 모친과 처는 홍위병의 구타로 희생되고 본인도 비극적인 최후를 마쳤습니다. 이번 방송에서는 한때 아시아 최고 거부로 등극했던 완다 그룹 회장 왕졘린의 근황도 소개합니다. 회사는 거의 파산지경이고 본인은 피골이 상접한 모습으로 나타나 중공사람들을 놀라게 했습니다. 이번 방송에서는 중공에서 과연 자본가는 무엇인지를 쉽게 소개했습니다. https://youtu.be/dJmsvMnIV3o ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 중국 … 리먼사태와 심오한 혁명, 진행 중! ... 상위 0.1%에 진입하려면 [박훈탁TV] 상위 0.1%에 진입하려면 [박훈탁TV] 중국 최대 부동산개발업체 Evergrande 파산; 관련 은행과 기업 줄 파산;북경당국 개입하지 않으면 금융위기; 북경정부, 기업의 이윤을 빼앗는 ‘심오한(profound)’ 혁명 진행 중; 중국 주식시장, 즉각적 반응; 이미 주식시장 붕괴 시작 … https://youtu.be/fStG28nUW9E -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 자유를 외친 프러시아의 귀족 계몽주의가 전파된 이후로 독일에도 자유주의 사상가들이 나타났는데, 빌헬름 훔볼트는 그중에 최고이다. 훔볼트는 1767년 융커 가족에서 태어나 자유주의 사상의 중심지였던 괴팅겐 대학에서 공부했다. 1789년 훔볼트는 그의 선생인 캄페Campe와 프랑스를 여행하고 <신 프랑스 헌법을 보고 느낀, 헌법에 대한 생각들>이란 소책자를 출판했다. 당시 훔볼트는 영국의 버크의 책을 읽지 않았지만, 놀랍게도 그와 유사한 결론에 다다른다. 그는 다음과 같이 썼다. <이성은 이미 있는 사물에 형태를 줄 수는 있지만, 새로운 사물을 창조할 수는 없다. 마치 나무를 접붙이듯이, 헌법을 사람들에게 접붙일 수는 없다.> 즉 새로운 정치 질서가 성공하려면, 시간과 자연이 사전에 정지작업을 해야 한다는 것이다. 그는 사람의 본성을 고찰한 뒤에, “인간에서 번성하려면 그것은 안에서 우러나와야 하며, 밖에서 주입되어서는 안 된다‘는 결론에 이르렀다. 그는 개명된 국가 가부장주의를 신봉하던 친구 칼 폰 달버그와 의견을 교환하다, 그의 권유로 1792년에 <국가 행위의 한계 The Limits of State Action>라는 책을 집필한다. 이 작은 책자는 스튜어트 밀에게도 영향을 미쳐 그가 <자유론>을 쓰는 계기가 되기도 했는데, 책에는 자유주의의 주요 논거들이 제시되었다. 훔볼트는 국가의 권력 행사보다도, 국가의 목적이 무엇이고, 국가 행위에는 어떤 한계가 있어야 하는지 등을 논했다. 그는 자유로운 국가에서 각 개인이 자신의 이성을 자신의 생활과 환경에 적용하면, 그것이 곧 다른 사람들의 교육에 도움이 되고, 개인들은 그들의 경험에서 다시 배우게 된다고 믿었다. 그는 이렇게 개인의 진보가 일어날 수 있는 국가는 자유로운 국가 뿐이라고 주장했다. 독재국가에서는 자신이 원하지 않는 일을 기계적으로 하기 때문에, 그런 개인의 발전이 일어날 수가 없다는 것이다. 폴라니 교수는 일찍이 과학자에게 완전한 독립성을 주어야 과학이 발전할 수 있으며, 따라서 개인주의가 우월한 체제라고 말한 바 있다. 아인슈타인이 위원회로부터 허가를 받아야 연구를 했다면 과학이 발전할 수 없었듯이, 헨리 포드가 자신의 생각을 마음대로 실행하지 못했다면 산업의 발전 역시 지체되었을 것이다. 훔볼트는 국가의 행위는 외세의 침입에 대한 안전 그리고 국내에서의 치안의 보장에 그쳐야 하고, 그것이 국가 행위의 핵심이어야 한다고 주장한다. 메테르니히는 일찍이 1814년 훔볼트를 ‘자코뱅’이라고 불렀다. 훔볼트는 국내의 궁정에서 프러시아의 반동적인 정책을 반대했고, 그로 인해 미움을 받았다. 1819년 해임된 그는 여생을 언어학에 바쳤고, 그 분야의 개척자로 이름을 날렸다. 그는 1835년 사망했다. The Prussian Aristocrat Who Spoke Out for Liberty Ralph Raico When Oswald Spengler, in one of his minor books, scornfully characterized German classical liberalism as “a bit of the spirit of England on German soil,” he was merely displaying the willful blindness of the school of militaristic-statist German historians, who refused to acknowledge as a true compatriot any thinker who did not form part of the “intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollern.” Spengler had apparently forgotten that Germany had had its Enlightenment, and the ideals of freedom which were conceived and propagated in England, Scotland, and France towards the end of the eighteenth century had found an echo and a support in the works of writers such as Kant, Schiller, and even the young Fichte. Although by 1899, William Graham Sumner could write that “there is today scarcely an institution in Germany except the army,” it is nevertheless true that there existed a native German tradition of distinguished, libertarian thought, which had, in the course of the nineteenth century, to some degree at least been translated into action. Of the thinkers who contributed to this tradition, Wilhelm von Humboldt was unquestionably one of the greatest. Born in 1767, Humboldt was descended from a Junker family which had faithfully served the rulers of Prussia for generations—a fact which was later to cause surprise to some of those who heard young Humboldt in conversation passionately defend personal liberty. He was educated at Frankfurt-am-Oder, and later at Gottingen, at that time one of the centers of liberal ideas in Germany. Ideas on the Constitutions of States In the summer of 1789, Humboldt undertook a trip to Paris in the company of his former tutor, Campe, who was a devotee of the philosophes, and now eager to see with his own eyes, “the funeral rites of French despotism.” His pupil did not share his enthusiasm for the revolution, however; for from what Humboldt had witnessed at Paris and from conversations with Friedrich Gentz (at that time a supporter of the French Revolution) there came a brief article, “Ideas on the Constitutions of States, occasioned by the New French Constitution.” This little essay, originally intended as a letter to a friend, is noteworthy for a number of reasons. In the first place, Humboldt appears to have arrived at some of the major conclusions of Burke, without at that time being familiar with the latter’s work. He states, for instance, that “reason is capable to be sure of giving form to material already present, but it has no power to create new material… . Constitutions cannot be grafted upon men as sprigs upon trees.” For a new political order to be successful, it is necessary for “time and nature” to have prepared the ground. Since this has not been the case in France, historical analogy compelled an answer of “no” to the question of whether this new constitution will succeed. In addition, this essay anticipates an idea central to the thesis of Humboldt’s most important work on political theory, which was never far from his mind whenever he deliberated on the nature of man—the notion that, “whatever is to flourish in a man must spring from within him, and not be given from without.” On his return to Berlin, Humboldt had been given a minor post at the law court. But the relative freedom of thought which had been enjoyed in Prussia under Frederick the Great was at this time being replaced by persecutions of the press and religious intolerance; Humboldt did not find the atmosphere of public life congenial. Added to this was the disinclination which he felt to interfere in the lives of others (a nicety of feeling almost grotesquely out of place in a “public servant”). Most important of all, perhaps, was the new conception which he was beginning to formulate of the legitimate functions of government, a conception which virtually compelled him to look on the states of his time as engines of injustice. In the spring of 1791, Humboldt resigned his position. The Limits of State Action The genesis of his major work on political theory, and the one of most interest to individualists, is also to be found in discussions with a friend—Karl von Dalberg, who was a proponent of the “enlightened” state paternalism then prevalent in Germany. He pressed Humboldt for a written exposition of his views on the subject, and Humboldt responded, in 1792, by composing his classic, The Limits of State Action. This little book was later to have a good deal of influence. It was of importance in shaping some of John Stuart Mill’s ideas in this field, and may even have provided the immediate occasion for his On Liberty. In France, Laboulaye, the late-nineteenth-century individualist, owed much to this work of Humboldt, and in Germany it exercised an influence even over such a basically unsympathetic mind as von Treitschke’s. But it is also a book which has an inherent value, because in it are set forth—in some cases, I believe, for the first time—some of the major arguments for freedom. Humboldt begins his work by remarking that previous writers on political philosophy have concerned themselves almost exclusively with investigating the divisions of governmental power and what part the nation, or certain sectors of it, ought to have in the exercise of this power. These writers have neglected the more fundamental questions, “To what end ought the whole apparatus of the state to aim, and what limits ought to be set to its activity?” It is this question that Humboldt intended to answer. “The true end of man—not that which capricious inclination prescribes for him, but that which is prescribed by eternally immutable reason—is the highest and most harmonious cultivation of his faculties into one whole. For this cultivation, freedom is the first and indispensible condition.” Humboldt thus begins by placing his argument within the framework of a particular conception of man’s nature, but it ought to be noted that the validity of his argument does not depend upon the correctness of his view of “the true end of man.” Of primary importance are his ideas in regard to the mechanism of individual and social progress; and here even such a socially-minded utilitarian as John Stuart Mill could find instruction and inspiration. For the full flourishing of the individual, Humboldt asserts, there is requisite, besides freedom, a “manifoldness of situations,” which, while logically distinct from freedom, has always followed upon it. It is only when men are placed in a great variety of circumstances that those experiments in living can take place which expand the range of values with which the human race is familiar. It is through expanding this range that increasingly better answers can be found to the question, “In exactly what ways are men to arrange their lives?” A free nation would, according to Humboldt, be one in which “the continuing necessity of association with others would urgently impel each gradually to modify himself” in the light of his appreciation of the value of the life-patterns others have accepted. In such a society, “no power and no hand would be lost for the elevation and enjoyment of human existence.” Each man, in applying his reason to his own life and circumstances, would contribute to the education of other men, and would, in turn, learn from their experience. This is Humboldt’s view of the mechanism of human progress. It should be clear, however, that this progressive refinement of the individual personality can take place only under a regime of freedom, since “what is not chosen by the individual himself, that in which he is only restricted and led, does not enter into his being. It remains foreign to him, and he does not really accomplish it with human energy, but with mechanical address.” This is one of the central ideas of the book, and merits some discussion. It is an idea which no one will dispute when it involves a question of scientific progress. No one expects worthwhile scientific thought to take place when the scientist is compelled or restricted in some important facet of his work. He must be free to develop his ideas, in accordance with the self-imposed standards of his profession, out of his own originality. But scientific knowledge is only one type of knowledge; there are other types, some at least as socially useful. There is the knowledge which consists in skills and techniques of production, and the type which, as we have seen, is embedded in values and ways of life: Besides knowledge which is acquired through abstract thought, there is the sort of knowledge acquired through practical thought and through action. The argument for freedom in the elaboration of scientific knowledge, therefore, is simply a special instance of the argument for freedom in general. Freedom and Science Professor Michael Polanyi has described the benefits of “individualism in the cultivation of science.” The pursuit of science can be organized … in no other manner than by granting complete independence to all mature scientists. They will then distribute themselves over the whole field of possible discoveries, each applying his own special ability to the task that appears most profitable to him. Thus as many trails as possible will be covered, and science will penetrate most rapidly in every direction towards that kind of hidden knowledge which is unsuspected by all but its discoverer, the kind of new knowledge on which the progress of science truly depends. Few will doubt that scientific progress would have been appallingly retarded if, for instance, Einstein had been compelled to obtain permission from a board in charge of “planning science” before he could undertake his researches (or if a government commission had been empowered to pass on Galileo’s intended work!). But if men like Henry Ford had not been free to put their ideas into operation, industrial progress would have been no less stanched. We may concede freely that the abstract scientific thought of an Einstein is a loftier thing, representing a greater achievement of the human mind. But this has no bearing on the argument. We believe that individual scientists should be unhindered in the pursuit of their aims, because those who would be in charge of the central direction of scientific research, or those who had power to restrict scientists in essential ways, would not know as well as the scientists themselves—each of whom has an immediate knowledge of the relevant factors in his particular situation—which are the most promising lines to be explored. In addition, a self-chosen activity, or one which may be followed up freely in all of its ramifications, will summon forth energy which will not be available in cases where a task is imposed from without, or where the researcher meets up against countless frustrations in the pursuit of his goal—the free activity, in other words, will command greater incentive. But both of these propositions are equally true of activities involving practical knowledge, or knowledge in action, of which techniques of production are an example. The socialist who believes in central direction of economic activity ought, consistently, to believe also in the central planning of science; those who favor widespread government control of economic life, because the state “knows better,” should, if they were consistent, favor a return to the system that shackled the scientific enterprise as well. It was partly because force necessarily interferes with individual self-development and the proliferation of new ideas, by erecting a barrier between the individual’s perception of a situation and the solution he thinks it best to attempt, that Humboldt wanted to limit the activities of the state as severely as possible. Another argument in favor of this conclusion is that a government wishing to supervise to even a modest degree such a complex phenomenon as society, simply cannot fit its regulations to the peculiarities of various concatenations of circumstances. But measures which ignore such peculiarities will tend to produce uniformity, and contract the “manifoldness of situations” which is the spur to all progress. But what is the indispensible minimum of government activity? Humboldt finds that the one good which society cannot provide for itself is security against those who aggress against the person and property of others. His answer to the question which he posed at the beginning of his work—“What limits ought to be set to the activity of the state?”—is “that the provision of security, against both external enemies and internal dissentions, must constitute the purpose of the state, and occupy the circle of its activity.” As for the services which it is commonly held must fall within the scope of government action—as, for instance, charity—Humboldt believes that they need not be provided by political institutions, but can safely be entrusted to social ones. “It is only requisite that freedom of association be given to individual parts of the nation or to the nation itself,” in order for charitable ends to be satisfactorily fulfilled. In this, as, indeed, throughout his whole book, Humboldt shows himself to be a thoughtful but passionate believer in the efficacy of truly social forces, in the possibility of great social ends being achieved without any necessity for direction on the part of the state. Humboldt thus allies himself with the thinkers who rejected the state in order to affirm society. Parts of Humboldt’s book appeared in two German periodicals in 1792, but difficulties with the Prussian censorship and a certain apparently innate lack of confidence in his own works caused him to put off publication of the book until it could be revised. The day for revision never came, however, and it was only 16 years after the author’s death that The Limits of State Action was published in its entirety. An Anomaly in Government For ten years after the completion of this book, Humboldt devoted himself to traveling and private studies, principally in aesthetics, the classics, linguistics, and comparative anthropology. From 1802 to 1808 he served as Prussian minister to Rome, a post which involved a minimum of official business and which he accepted chiefly out of his love for that city. Humboldt’s real “return to the state” occurs in 1809, when he became director of the Section for Public Worship and Education, in the Ministry of Interior. In this capacity, he directed the reorganization of the Prussian public education system, and, in particular, founded the University of Berlin. That so unquestionably sincere a man as Humboldt could have acted in such disharmony with the principles set forth in his only book on political philosophy (including the concept that the state should have no connection with education), requires some explanation. The reason is to be sought in his patriotism, which had been aroused by the utter defeat suffered by Prussia at the hands of Napoleon. Humboldt wished to contribute to the regeneration of his country which was being undertaken by men such as Stein and Hardenberg, and the reform of the educational system fitted his abilities and inclinations. This task completed, Humboldt served in various diplomatic posts for a number of years, including that of Prussian minister to the Congress of Vienna, and, after peace had been established, as a member of the Council of State. But the spirit which now predominated in Berlin, as well as throughout Europe, was the spirit of Metternich—who, always able to identify accurately the enemies of his system, had already (in 1814) termed Humboldt a “Jacobin.” Humboldt’s opposition to the reactionary policies of his government gained him as much ill-will at court as it did popularity among the people. He was hated and intrigued against by the reactionaries at court; they went so far as to open his mail, as if he had in actuality been a Jacobin. When, in 1819, Metternich induced Prussia to agree to the Karlsbad Decrees, which attempted to establish a rigid censorship for all of Germany, Humboldt termed the regulations “shameful, unnational and provoking to a great people,” and demanded the impeachment of Bernstorff, the Prussian minister who had signed them. It was clear that a man like Humboldt was an anomaly in a government which treacherously refused to fulfill its wartime promises of a constitution, and whose domestic policies were largely dictated by Metternich. In December 1819, Humboldt was dismissed. He refused the pension offered him by the king. The rest of his life he devoted to his studies, of which the researches into linguistics were the most important, and gained for him the reputation of a pioneer in the field. He died in 1835. If we ask what are the primary contributions of Humboldt to libertarian thought, we will find the answer in his ideas on the value of the free, self-sustaining activity of the individual, and of the importance of the unhindered collaboration—often unconscious—of the members of society. These are ideas which are finding increasing application in fields such as psychology, linguistics, economics, and social theory. (Occasionally, as with F.A. Hayek and Noam Chomsky, contemporary thinkers in these areas even make the connection to Humboldt explicit.) That ideas which were set forth by Humboldt should be proving so relevant to contemporary research into man and society is a sign of the clearly discernible trend towards individualism in present-day thought at the highest levels. Ralph Raico's essay on Wilhelm von Humboldt originally appeared in the Spring 1961 issue of New Individualist Review, of which he was editor in chief. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 한스 헤르만 호프의 책 <경제, 사회, 역사> 서평 호프는 프랑스 혁명이 이념 전쟁의 시초이고, 이전의 어느 전쟁보다 파괴적이었다고 본다. 이념 전쟁은 20세기까지 지속되어 두 번의 대전으로 이어졌다. Review: Economy, Society, and History David Gordon Economy, Society, and History by Hans-Hermann Hoppe Mises Institute, 2021 191 pp. In 2004, Hans Hoppe delivered a series of lectures at the Mises Institute about his theory of social evolution, and we are fortunate to have this volume, based on a transcript of those lectures, now available. As one would expect, the book contains much of interest, and in what follows I shall comment on only a few of the topics that this gifted and erudite scholar discusses. Hoppe is a close student of Ludwig von Mises, and he emphasizes with great force some often neglected insights to be found in his work. One of the most valuable of these is that the advantages of exchanges using money over barter extend to worldwide trade as well as to trade within the local community or nation. Now, as we imagine that the division of labor expands and ultimately reaches and encompasses the entire globe, as different regions begin to trade with each other, we can see that there will be in the market also a tendency for one type of regional money to outcompete other regional types of money, with the ultimate result to be expected being that there will be only one, or at most two types of money left over, which are used universally. (p. 45) As Hoppe points out, Mises uses this insight about the benefits of widely extended trade to counter the social Darwinist claim that national or racial groups advance through violent struggle. It is, by the way, the height of ignorant fatuity to say that Mises himself was a social Darwinist, as the leftist historian Quinn Slobodian, for one, has not scrupled to do. If violent struggle explains social advancement, Mises asks, why would it not also apply to individuals within a group? “The next problem, the more decisive one, is that people who accept these Darwinian interpretations have to explain why there should be division of labor and peaceful relationships within a group but not between different groups. After all, the same principles seem to be at work.” (p. 46) Hoppe is much more than an insightful expositor of Mises and Murray Rothbard. He has applied their views in new contexts, often in daringly speculative ways. Both of these thinkers say that time preference is a necessary feature of human action. Given a choice between the identical good now and, say, one year from now, people will not think that the two choices provide equal satisfaction but will require a premium to accept the future good. By investment in capital equipment people can obtain more consumption goods than if they immediately consume what is on hand, and the rate of time preference determines their willingness to postpone consumption and invest. Those who do not require much of a premium have low time preference, and those who do have high time preference. Societies composed of people with low time preference will increase their supply of capital goods more than those with high preference and so prosper in future. So much is not controversial, but Hoppe speculates on which groups have high time preference, and on one occasion, his doing so led to trouble for him. “I made the point that if you compare homosexuals to regular heterosexuals with families, you can say that homosexuals have a higher time preference because life ends with them. I always thought that that was so obvious, almost beyond dispute … these harmless remarks have led to three months of harassment at my university and the whole thing is still not over yet” (p. 60). I am glad to report that, in the years since these lectures were delivered, Hoppe has been vindicated, and we may deplore the “woke” culture, which has only intensified in recent years, by which academic freedom is suppressed when “protected” groups object to something. Speculations about the rates of time preference of different groups must be supported empirically, and until this has been done, they must be regarded as conjectures, however plausible one may find them. Also, a caution needs to be borne in mind, though in pointing this out, I do not intend to suggest that Hoppe lacks awareness of it. If one says that a group has a higher time preference than another group, that is a comparative judgment, not a judgment on an absolute scale, and it does not immediately follow that the former group has a high time preference rate. By analogy, if doctors are smarter than nurses, it does not follow that nurses are stupid. Hoppe, as will already be evident, does not hesitate to defy conventional opinion, and he does so in one way that will surprise many libertarians, who celebrate the common law of England, seeing in it a bastion of English and later American liberty. Hoppe says, Anglo-Saxons looked down on codified law and hailed their own noncodified common law. I just want to remark that, for instance, Max Weber had a very interesting observation regarding this. He sees the reason for the noncodification of the common law in the self-interest of the lawyers to make the law difficult to understand for the layman and thus make a lot of money. He emphasizes that codified law makes it possible for the layman on the street who can read to study the law book himself and go to court himself and point out, here, that this law is written down. So maybe the excessive pride that the Anglo-Saxons have in their common law might be a little bit overdrawn. (p. 111) The book is filled with insights, and I shall close with just one more. Hoppe sees the French Revolution as beginning a trend toward ideological wars, much more destructive than the limited wars of the previous century. The French Revolution represents, in a way, a return to these religious types of wars that I mentioned earlier. It is an ideologically motivated event…. For the first time was seen now, during the French Revolution, and in particular after Napoleon comes to power, the draft, a mass draft. All the people of the French population are somehow made participants in the war. There exists no clear-cut distinction anymore between combatants and noncombatants; the resources of the entire nation are put at the disposal of the warring armies. (pp. 164–65) Ideological wars continued in the twentieth century, giving us the two world wars, with all their horrors and catastrophes. Economy, Society, and History is a major work, allowing readers to benefit from Hoppe’s insights into a number of areas he has not addressed in other books. No reader can fail to be instructed and enlightened by it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------