문재인 UN간 3가지 목적은? [박찬종 https://youtu.be/XXIDoV4tyb4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (tv조선) 문재앙 빚 4300조 돌파 ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 대구광역시사업가 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11368846886 집 담보대출, 개인대출 풀로 땡겨서 가게 유지하다가 파산한다는 내용 부채는 4300조 돌파 천조국을 뛰어넘은 대한민국 국뽕에 취한다~ ㅋㅋ 문재앙 개좃같은새끼야 ㅋㅋ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PCR검사 오류 빈발, "K방역, 처음부터 잘못 됐다" / 파이낸스 투데이 인세영 기자 국제적으로 인정 못받는 CT값 적용해서 가짜 확진자 폭증 "코로나 사기 의혹 제기돼" 이미 죽은 바이러스나 아무런 해가 없을 정도의 미세한 양의 세균이 증폭기에 의해 수백만배 증폭되어 가짜양성자로 판명될 수 있다면 이 검사 결과를 믿을 수 있을까? 국내에서 코로나19의 확진자를 가려준다는 PCR검사가 불완전 하며, 신뢰할 수 없다는 주장이 지속적으로 제기되고 있다. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 오스트리아 경제학과 과학적 사실주의 우스칼라 마키Uskala Mäki는 지난 50년간의 대표적인 경제 철학자이다. 그는 경제 이론은 실재 세계를 설명하기 위한 것이라는 과학적인 사실주의를 지지하고, 나아가 오스트리아 경제학을 과학적 사실주의에 바탕을 둔 경제학이라고 보고 있다. ‘시장’이란 모종의 결정을 내리는 살아 있는 존재가 아니라, 개개의 사람들과 그들의 자발적인 상호 교류를 가리킬 뿐이다. 경제 현상의 원천인 인간의 행동은 고정된 인과 법칙에 따라 작용하지 않는다. 정부가 통화를 증발한다 해도, 통화 증가량과 가격의 인상 사이에는 고정된 비율 관계가 존재하지 않는다. 그 이유는 경제 주체들의 창조적 혁신, 학습, 자유 의지들 때문이다. Austrian Economics and Scientific Realism David Gordon Uskala Mäki is one of the leading philosophers of economics of the past half century; moreover, he is well versed in Austrian economics, though not an adherent of the school. In this week’s column, I’d like to consider some issues he raises in his paper “Scientific Realism and Austrian Explanation” (Review of Political Economy, 1990). Mäki is unsympathetic to what he calls “instrumentalism,” the view that economic theories aren’t true descriptions of the world but rather aim at predictive success. He supports scientific realism, according to which economic theories do try to describe and explain the real world, and he sees the Austrians as important advocates of this view. For Mäki, realism is a matter of ontology. “In contrast to typical forms of instrumentalism, any version of scientific realism has to subscribe to the minimum idea that theoretical entities or scientific objects—i.e., entities postulated or hypothesized in scientific theories—exist” (p. 314, emphasis in original). Austrian economics counts as objective by this standard, because it explains economic phenomena through people and their preferences, and these without doubt exist. Austrian economists don’t postulate preferences as theoretical entities designed to explain observations: the preferences are themselves observable through introspection and are used to explain other things. As Mäki puts it, “It is well-known what the ontic furniture of the world depicted by Austrian theories consists of: human individuals, their wants, intentions, beliefs, actions, etc.” (p. 322). Mäki discusses a type of explanation he calls “explanation as redescription” and in doing so provides one of the best accounts of methodological individualism I have seen. In this kind of explanation, the Austrian economist says, “X is really Y,” that is, “X reduces to Y.” The principle of this kind of explanation that Mäki says is relevant to Austrian economics is that “[s]ocial entities are aggregates or averages of individual entities, these aggregates being invested with meaning by acting individuals” (p. 324, emphasis in original). Here is an example from Ludwig von Mises of what Mäki is talking about: “[T]he demand for money of the economic community is nothing but the sum of the demands for money of the individual economic agents composing it” (p. 326, quoting Mises, emphasis in original). Murray N. Rothbard provides this excellent illustration of the same principle: “The ‘market’ is not some sort of living entity making good or bad decisions, but is simply a label for individual persons and their voluntary interactions. If A thinks that the ‘impersonal market’ is not paying him enough, he is really saying that individuals B, C, and D are not paying him as much as he would like to receive. The ‘market’ is individuals acting” (p. 326, quoting Rothbard, emphasis in original). Mäki mentions another principle that he thinks is basic to the realism of Austrian economics, and here I am less happy with his formulation, though the problem can readily be fixed. The principle in question is “Social entities are unintended consequences of actions by human individuals” (p. 324, emphasis in original). This is a theme familiar to all readers of Hayek, but it is not characteristic of the work of Mises or Rothbard; indeed, quite to the contrary. On this topic, the classic paper is Joseph Salerno’s “Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist.” But it transpires that what Mäki has mainly in mind is that social entities and institutions come about as the consequences of human actions, and whether the actors consciously plan the outcomes is of secondary significance. In brief, Mäki is talking about the causal-genetic method pioneered by Carl Menger. He says of his own formulation of the principle: “It gives expression to the very idea of ‘causal-genetic’ explanation” (p. 235), and he to an extent allows for the point I have raised against him about conscious planning. As an example of what he means by his principle, he gives Menger’s account of the origin of money, and then says of it, “Menger admits that money, i.e., the generally accepted medium of exchange, may sometimes emerge as an intended result. However, Menger insists that it is part of the essence of money that it is a spontaneous outgrowth of an unplanned process of individual interaction” (p. 326). To take up Mäki’s word, I do not think he has here gotten to the essence. What Menger is referring to is a case in which a society already familiar with the concept of money consciously establishes a commodity as money. But the situation I have in mind is different. Suppose that a society does not have a general medium of exchange and trades through barter. Through the process Menger describes, money comes into existence. It isn’t a necessary condition for the process to come about that the people in that society didn’t intend it. Imagine a large group of people on a desert island who are familiar with the concept of money but don’t have any money—all their dollars were lost at sea. They also have read Menger and Mises and want to create money, doing so through the process the Austrians describe. They could consciously set the process in motion, and money would result. The process need not be unintended. Much more important than this slip is an insightful point Mäki makes about the Austrian view of causation. Human actions, the source of economic phenomena, do not operate through fixed causal laws. “The absence of empirically constant relationships or stable regularities in society has been forcefully underlined by several Austrian economists” (p. 333). Mäki gives an excellent example of this in a discussion of Mises’s rejection of the quantity theory of money. If the government increases the quantity of money in circulation, there isn’t a fixed proportional relation between the amount of the increase and the rise in prices: “[T]he relationship between the quantity of money and its purchasing power is not constant” (p. 332, quoting Mises). This lack of a fixed relationship comes about in part “because of creative innovation, learning and free will on the part of economic agents—factors stressed by Austrian economists” (p. 333). Mäki’s article contains much more of great interest and I hope to return to it on another occasion. I urge all of those interested in Austrian methodology to read it. For obvious reasons I won’t add “as who could not be” to the preceding sentence. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 혁신과 성장에 교육받은 사람들이 정말 필요할까? 일부 학자들 사이에는 저질 교육으로 인해 경제 성장과 혁신이 일어나기 어렵다고 탄식하지만, 산업혁명 기간에 문자 해독 능력과 학교 교육은 경제 성장에 별 영향을 끼치지 않았다. 사실은 산업 혁명 기간에 영국과 유럽에서 대부분의 혁신은 최상위 인간 자본에 의해 일어났다. 산업혁명기에 상당한 영향력을 지닌 발명가들은 정식 교육조차 받지 못한 경우가 많았다. IT를 잘 몰랐지만 그 분야의 초일류 기업을 만들어낸 스티브 잡스는 좋은 예이다. 연구자들은 혁신이 줄어드는 이유를 밝히기 위해 천재적인 소수의 경향을 분석해보는 게 더 낫다. 혁신의 성격이 바뀌는 이유는 천재적인 소수가 다른 흥미에 열중하기 때문이다. Is an Educated Population Really Necessary for Innovation and Growth? Lipton Matthews Lamentations that the waves of innovation are receding have engulfed policy circles. Distinguished economist Robert Gordon avers that the days of transformative innovations are over. Like Peter Thiel, he is disappointed at the incremental nature of modern-day inventions. The declinist thesis is predicated on the assumption that groundbreaking innovations like the steam engine, electricity, and the telephone are becoming exceedingly rare. Educing evidence to prove this observation has been quite easy, but we are less astute at understanding why innovation is declining. In his 2012 paper titled “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds,” Gordon submits that dwindling rates of educational attainment complemented by reductions in labor force participation portends doom for the future of US innovation. Educational attainment supplements economic growth and innovative activities, so Gordon is right to express concern. Yet researchers find that during the Industrial Revolution, literacy and schooling failed to exert a significant impact on economic growth. Increasing educational attainment ensures that workers are positioned to employ sophisticated technologies. Indeed, education can indirectly nurture innovation by exposing citizens to divergent ways of thinking, thereby resulting in new products and services. Currently, highly successful countries like Singapore, Finland, and Canada possess educated citizens, though there are outliers like Japan and Russia with unimpressive records. However, the slump exhibited by these countries does not undercut the theory that there is a link between educational attainment and economic growth. The sluggish conduct of Japan and Russia is attributable to regulatory burdens, excess corruption in the latter, and a host of other structural hurdles. The capacity of an educated population to unlock growth is hinged on a panoply of variables ranging from institutional quality to culture. However, the evidence revealing that Britain produced pathbreaking innovations in an era when most people were uneducated contradicts the proposition that widespread educational attainment is necessary for innovation and growth. In reality, during the industrial era in Britain and Europe more broadly innovations were determined by the prowess of upper tail human capital. This label describes highly intelligent people who demonstrate the competence to innovate. Gordon’s measurements to gauge the likelihood of innovation are inadequate. Essentially, innovations reflect the priorities and aptitude of the cognitive elite. Research estimates that the smart fraction is mainly responsible for the majority of revolutionary developments in business and science. Evaluating the impact of the different classes on development, scholars observe that the smart fraction is crucial to progress: “The intellectual class has the greatest impact on economic growth followed by average ability citizens and the non-intellectual class in that order…. The impact of the intellectual class on technological progress is exceptionally more significant than even the number of professional researchers engaged in R&D activities, with average ability citizens and the non-intellectual class not significant.” A perfect example is that during the Industrial Revolution, inventors scored highly on cognitive ability measured by the influence of their inventions, even though many lacked formal education. Moreover, a better illustration is the case of Steve Jobs, who started a superstar firm despite lacking IT credentials. Gordon’s perception that innovation is diminishing is accurate, but a concrete picture is absent in his analysis, because he is approaching the issue from the wrong angle. Some attribute the decline in innovation to subpar levels of R&D productivity and others surmise that as a consequence innovations are getting harder to materialize. Undeniably, low productivity can impede the rate of innovation, but to ascertain the true state of innovation, researchers should study the pursuits of the smart fraction. WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook were created by cognitive elites. Though disruptive technologies, these are more reflective of lifestyle innovations than revolutionary inventions. These platforms have altered the political landscape; however, most people can easily get by without social media. The ascent of social media illuminates the passion of cognitive elites. Cognitive elites recognize that to achieve stratospheric success in the present economy they must exploit the attention economy. Entrepreneurs adept at captivating the audience will maintain an elevated status, and as such, exceptionally brilliant people created platforms to indulge the desires of the attention economy. Therefore, a possible explanation for the innovation drought could be as a result of the smartest people diverting their energies to the lifestyle sector, instead of investing in the hard sciences. Unleashing breakthroughs in the hard sciences demands greater cognitive efforts than creating the next popular app or social media platform. Hence due to the potential for easier rewards in lifestyle sectors, cognitive elites are motivated to pursue social ventures. Researchers should explore the proclivities of the smart fraction to shed light on the declining rate of innovation. Zoltan Acs also echoed this sentiment in a recent interview when he noted that for innovation, only exceptional people matter, since they are responsible for designing the future. Researchers are correct to note the rarity of groundbreaking innovations, but their analyses are inaccurate. The answer is that the character of innovation is changing because cognitive elites have acquired different interests. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------