윤서인은 어려운 경제 용어를 쓰지 않고, 서민적인 언어로 좌파들의 모순과 허위를 보여주고 있다. 잘한다!

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최저임금 대폭 오르고 나서부터 소비심리 쭉 하락

거기다 일용직들 대거 실직에다 고용감소는 덤

 [출처] 최저임금 오르면 소비증진 된다는애들 어디갔냐?/ 일베

---> 세상에 없는 희한한 소득 주도 성장론을 펴는 미친 경제학자들의 목을 쳐야 한다. 전에도 말했지만 이 미친 경제학은, 사실은 소비를 통해 경제적 번영을 이룰 수 있다는 케인즈 이론에 근거하고 있다.

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김 씨는 지난달 구속 된 이후 자신이 운영하던 블로그 '드루킹의 자료창고'의 모든 게시글을 '비공개'로 전환했다가, 지난 17일 블로글 글 중 일부를 선별적으로 '공개' 모드로 전환했다. 드루킹의 자료창고 개방으로 영부인의 경인선 까발리자 화들짝 놀란 법원이 드루킹 입막았다    입막는다고 불법 여론조작건 않밝혀질까,내생각으로는 드루킹의 시간표에 의해 하나둘씩 밝혀지리라 본다,드루킹정도 되면 자신을 살려줄 구명줄 하나정도는 가지고 있을것 갔다

[출처] ((법원))드디어 드루킹 입막았다.../ 일베

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2012년 8월 경제.경영부문의 저명한 더난출판사에서 [위험한 정치경제학: 정치와 경제의 은밀한 거래에 관한 보고서]를 출판한 이후 종북좌파가 떠들어대던 '김대중이 IMF사태를 해결했다'는 소리가 마파람에 게눈 감추듯 사라졌다.
아래 그림은 [위험한 정치경제학] p.38에서 가져온 것인데, 한국금융연구원 최공필 박사의 1999년 연구 "정치적 불안의 경제적 영향"에서 발췌한 것이다. 이 그림에서 정치불안 관련지수에 외환시장 압력지수가 후행했다. 정치불안 관련지수가 증가하면 며칠 후 외환시장 압력지수가 증가했고 정치불안 관련지수가 감소하면 며칠 후 외환시장 압력지수가 감소했다. 

 도대체 왜 이런 현상이 발생하는가?
정치과 금융은 동전의 양면이다. 1712년 런던에서 금융시장이 발생한 것은 동인도회사를 비롯한 금융기관들이 발행하는 금융상품에 대한 지불보증을 했기 때문이다. 금융상품은 토지와 달리 구체적(concrete)이지 않고 추상적(abstract)이어서 정치권의 지불보증이 없으면 존재할 수 없다. 따라서 정치권의 지불보증이 없으면 금융시장이 성립할 수 없다. 
이러한 결론은  노벨경제학 수상자 Douglass C. North와 그의 제자 Barry R. Weingast의 논문("Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England" Journal of Economic History. 1989. Vol.49: 803-32) 그리고 프린스턴대학교의 경제사회학자 Bruce G. Carruthers의 저서(City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)에서 도출해낸 것이다. 
위의 그림에서 1997년 1-4월 한보그룹, 삼미그룹 그리고 진로그룹이 부도를 냈고 정치권 관련설이 언론을 대대적으로 장식해서 정치관련 불안지수가 급등했다. 그 후 외환시장 압력지수가 증가했다. 
그런데 1997년 5월 강경식 당시 경제부총리가 '신자유주의 금융개혁법안'을 발표하자마자 정치불안 관련지수가 급락했고 그 후 외환시장 압력지수가 감소했다.
이로써 금융불안이 사라졌고 금융위기를 설명하는 모든 경제이론이 설득력을 잃었다. 금융시장이 국회에서 금융개혁법안을 통과시키면 금융불안이 해소된다고 믿은 것이다. 금융시장은 국회가 금융개협법안을 거부할 것이라고는 꿈에도 생각하지 않았다.  
1997년 7-9월 기아그룹 부도사태가 진행되었으나 정치권 관련설이 없었고 정치관련 불안지수가 약간 증가했으나 1-4월 수준보다 낮았고 외환시장 압력지수도 낮았다. 1997년 10월 동남아에 투자된 네델란드계 자본과 일본계 자금이 금융위기를 피해 한국으로 들어왔다. 이러한 현상은 1997년 봄 동남아에서 발생한 금융위기가 기아그룹 부도사태로 인해 그해 11월 한국으로 전염되었다는 김대중 세력의 전염이론(contagion theory)을 완벽하게 부인한다. 
그런데 1997년 10월 강삼재 당시 신한국당 사무총장이 김대중 비자금 640억원(일본의 거물정객 우스노미야 도쿠마를 통해 김일성이 김대중에게 전달한 4천만 달러)이 들었다는 통장 사본을 공개하면서 DJ비자금 공방이 발생했고, 국회가 금융개혁법안을 거부할 것이라는 소문이 떠돌면서 정치불안 관련지수가 급등했고 며칠 후 외환시장 압력지수도 급등하기 시작했다.  
1997년 11월 그해 12월 대선에서 당선이 유력했던 김대중이 국회 내 자신의 추종세력에게 표를 떨어뜨리는 신자유주의 금융개혁법안 거부를 지시했고 국회가 금융개혁법안을 거부하자마자 즉각 금융위기가 터졌고 IMF사태가 발생했다. 1997년 11월은 위 그림에서 정치불안 관련지수가 정점을 찍은 시점이다.  

[출처] 김대중이 일으킨 IMF사태 ... [위험한 정치경제학]/ 일베

----> 1997년 김대중이 금융개혁법안에 거부권을 행사하게 해서,  금융 불안을 폭등시켰고, 곧바로 금융위기가 터졌다. 이것이 IMF사태의 원인이다.

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드루킹 8억도 문제지만 직원 3명인 회사에 통장이 132개~!
그 통장 중 4개에서 8억이 나왔고
거래시점이 대선 전후라고
경찰과 검찰이 조직적으로 은폐를 했다는데
나머지 132개에서는 무엇이 나올래나~?
핸드폰도 170대~!
재벌기업 운영했나~!? 출처: 일베    

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기후 변화는 갈등의 주요 원인이 아니다. 그보다 가난과 실패한 정치가 더 문제이다.
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아마존에 올라온 영국의 철학자 존 그레이가 쓴 책 <무신론의 7가지 형태>의  소개글
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Gene Callahan의 탈레브 신간 <스킨 인 더 게임> 서평

Under the Skin
 

 

The multitalented writer, businessman, and academic Nassim Nicholas Taleb hates being called an “intellectual,” so let’s instead refer to him as a thinker and note that he is one of the more important thinkers of our time. That importance comes not so much from the volume of work he has produced as from the fact that, with each new book, he gives his readers a significant and novel lens through which to look at the world. Each book has grown out of the previous one, so that something mentioned briefly in the last can become the subject of the next. Yet all of Taleb’s work is unified by its theme of confronting “the dark forces of time and ignorance,” is informed by a deep knowledge of probability and statistics, and is gleeful in its skewering of those who understand just enough about uncertainty to screw things up massively.

 

Taleb made a significant amount of money as an options trader, and his experience dealing with risk in that market has had a significant impact on his thought. After achieving financial independence, he went on to earn a PhD in management from the University of Paris. He has since held a variety of academic posts, including a position as distinguished professor at the NYU Tandon School of Engineering.

 

In The Black Swan, his most famous work, Taleb highlighted how little we really can say about the “tails” of probability distributions. The importance of so-called tail risk might be understood as follows: banks investing in mortgages relied on models that assumed the risk of a nationwide decline in housing prices in the U.S. to be minute. But how “minute” is minute? Once in one hundred years? Once in one thousand years? Once in ten thousand years? The banks chose the “extremely unlikely” end of that spectrum—but they did so based on only a few decades of data! The Black Swan, published in 2007, has been credited with foreshadowing the financial crisis of the following year.

 

“Anti-fragility” was a minor theme in The Black Swan but became the major one of Taleb’s next full-length work, which appeared in 2012. Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder introduced a new category into our thinking about randomness. Before Taleb identified a new class of phenomena, entities were generally thought of as being robust—able to withstand random shocks—or fragile and easily broken by such shocks. Antifragile insisted on the need for a third category, signifying things that become stronger when stressed. The concept caught on slowly at first but is now finding applications in medicine, nutrition, exercise, finance, politics, physics, and information technology.

 

Antifragile also introduces a story that is probably crucial to understanding Taleb’s famously cantankerous public personality. (Full disclosure: Taleb is my colleague at NYU Tandon, and in person he is polite and friendly.) When Taleb’s great-grandfather was dying, he called his son—Taleb’s ­grandfather—to his bedside. He let his son know how disappointed he was in the fact that no one was bad-mouthing him. In his opinion, that meant his son was too wimpy to generate envy.

 

Taleb has made sure he will never face such criticism himself. He takes glee in launching feuds with prominent intellectuals such as Steven Pinker, Mary Beard, Cass Sunstein, and Paul Krugman. In fact, he coined a new term to describe such foes: IYIs, or “intellectuals yet idiots.” Among the characteristics of IYIs is that they trumpet their concern for the poor but never hang out with people of lower social status; praise “diversity” but have never gotten drunk with a minority cab driver or spent time in a Jamaican nightclub; are proud of their braininess but have never read Michael Oakeshott or John Gray; are self-proclaimed egalitarians but are obsessively concerned with their status in their university or their reviews in the New York Times.

 

The issue is bigger than hypocrisy. IYIs place great faith in “statistical” studies without understanding the foundations of statistics and pretend to be good “Darwinists” while holding in contempt traditions that have survived for thousands of years. Because they claim to know more than they really do, IYIs pose a serious threat to wise government and social stability.

 

Taleb’s new book, Skin in the Game—dedicated to Ron Paul and Ralph Nader—takes up this theme by extending his observations about asymmetrical risk into a thesis about how human institutions “learn” over time. Taleb begins by discussing Antaeus, the son of Mother Earth and Poseidon. According to Greek myth, Antaeus was unbeatable in a fight as long as he remained in contact with the ground. But Hercules was able to defeat him by lifting him in the air. For Taleb, the story teaches us to “keep our feet on the ground,” i.e., to keep in contact with the practical world. Nevertheless, we are plagued by theorizers lacking all practical experience. As Taleb puts it, “The curse of modernity is that we are increasingly populated by a class of people who are better at explaining than understanding.”

 

Taleb extends this trope to foreign policy. He goes after “interventionistas” who have repeatedly urged us to intervene in foreign countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria—whose governments did not meet abstract standards of political acceptability. Each of those interventions made conditions significantly worse in the country being “saved.” Yet the interventionistas pay no price for wrecking the lives of millions. Instead they keep appearing on CNN and PBS as “experts” who should guide us in choosing what country to bomb next.

 

Taleb then describes what he calls the “Bob Rubin trade.” Robert Rubin, who was Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, returned to the “private sector” at Citigroup, from which he received $120 million in compensation in the decade after leaving “public service.” But when the economic house of cards that his advice helped to construct collapsed in 2008, he suffered no consequences. Instead, it was hardworking plumbers and fishermen and farmers and Spanish-grammar specialists who paid the price, in the form of trillion-dollar, taxpayer-funded bailouts of insolvent banks. Taleb is not offering a personal attack: Rubin is merely a synecdoche for “banking professionals” in general. When the government decides that certain banks are “too big to fail,” it permits top employees of those banks to take extraordinary risks for extraordinary short-term profits, as those bankers know they will suffer few if any consequences should their actions ultimately result in catastrophic losses.

 

Many IYIs claim that more intensive oversight of the financial industry can limit this danger. Taleb, however, argues that the idea we can regulate our worries away is nonsense. Indeed, regulation was a partial cause of the financial crisis. Taleb notes that “the move [toward hedge funds] took place mostly because of the overbureaucratization of the system as paper shufflers (who think work is mostly about paper shuffling) overburdened the banks with rules—but somehow, in the thousands of pages of additional regulations, they avoided considering skin in the game.” In other words, lawmakers could have made bankers personally responsible for the meltdowns they create, for example by fining Rubin for his role in the 2008 financial crisis.

 

Taleb’s preference for personal responsibility over technocratic regulation leads us to the application of his “skin in the game” principle to ethics. Taleb contends that you shouldn’t put someone else’s skin in the game without putting your own in it as well. Taleb shows that this idea is at least as old as the Code of Hammurabi, which declared that if a builder constructed a house that collapsed and killed the occupant, the builder should be put to death. The “eye-for-an-eye” equivalence behind Hammurabi’s code does not need to be taken literally: we don’t need to cut off the leg of the surgeon who accidentally amputated the wrong leg of a patient. Taleb assures us that it is probably enough to “cut off” the surgeon’s golf club membership with a large lawsuit settlement, so that the patient is not the only one at risk during the operation.

 

More generally, Taleb urges us to be open to the lessons of experience. The “Lindy effect,” discussed in Antifragile, gets its own chapter in the new book. This principle derives its name from the story of actors meeting at Lindy’s, a New York City deli famous for its cheesecake. Those actors, speculating on how long some Broadway show would remain onstage, suggested that the best predictor of a show’s future run was how long it had already run. If a show had been running for three days, one’s best bet would be that it would run another three days. And if it had run for 30 years, the best bet is that it would run for another 30. This principle, Taleb contends, also applies to other social institutions and practices. If, for instance, Buddhism has lasted 2,500 years, it will probably be around for another few millennia. Meanwhile, the current progressive obsession with identity politics, which emerged 10 or 15 years ago, will most likely disappear in another decade or two. It is time, and not the opinion of “experts,” that is the ultimate judge of social practices.

 

The test of time is the basis for Taleb’s analysis of religion. He contends that we know far too little to determine the “rationality” of religious beliefs. Instead, we need to look at the effect they have on believers’ behavior and on their society as a whole. This approach, I think, is a shortcoming in Taleb’s work. While he defends traditional religions, he does so based solely on their beneficial practical effects. The idea that there might be transcendent truth at the core of religion, something worth respecting even if the practical effects of doing so might prove disastrous, does not seem to be of concern to him. Even Christology is examined in light of the book’s overarching theme. Taleb finds that the Church Fathers were wise: Christ had to be fully human, or he wouldn’t have had “skin in the game.” A divine figure just playing at being human, like Zeus or a visiting angel, isn’t really risking anything.

 

The conclusion of the book addresses why “ensemble risk” cannot be treated the same as “time risk.” The difference can be understood by considering a game of Russian roulette with a bullet in one of six chambers. The rules are that if the “house” pulls the trigger and you live, you get $6 million. If one hundred people play, we can say that the expected payoff for each averages out to $5 million. But we can’t say that the expected payoff for a single person playing one hundred times is $500 million. Instead, we expect, with near certainty, that he will be dead. And if he dies on the second trigger pull, he does not get to play the other ninety-eight times. This demonstrates why an individual cannot expect to get the “average” return from the market: at some point, he will lose enough that he will “cry uncle” and leave the market. Taleb contends that social scientists repeatedly confuse ensemble risk and time risk, leading to, for instance, their condemnation of risk aversion as “irrational.”

 

Taleb packs plenty more into a relatively slim volume. If you have enjoyed his previous books, this one will not disappoint you. And if you are unfamiliar with his work, Skin in the Game is a great place to remedy that problem. In this intellectual climate dominated by “interventionistas” and “IYIs,” nothing is more salutary than a bold and original thinker willing to call a fool a fool and a knave a knave.

 

Gene Callahan teaches computer science and mathematics at the NYU Tandon School of Engineering. He is the author of Economics for Real People and Oakeshott on Rome and America.

 

내가 보기에는 지금까지 가장 잘 쓴 탈레브 책의 서평이다.

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현대 경제학의 곤경

경제적 변수들에 미치는 다양한 요인의 인과적 효과를 이해하려면 먼저 이론이 필요하다. 데이터로 이론을 만든다는 말은 어둠 속에서 스위치를 찾으려고 더듬는 짓과 같고, 나아가 전등 자체를 발명하려는 일과 같다.

 

The Woes of Economics

•Carmen Elena Dorobăț

 

The Economist has lately been running a series of articles on the shortcomings of the economics profession. Its most recent piece argues the important point that “the [2008-2009] crisis exposed the economic profession’s continued ignorance of the business cycle.” One reason for this ignorance is, they observe, a lack of data: while crises do happen repeatedly, they do not happen often enough for statistical analysis of them to be rigorous. Another reason—underlying the ongoing debate between neoclassical and New Keynesian camps on monetary policy—is represented by the “epistemological woes” of macroeconomics, which the profession “must get to grips with… if it hopes to maintain its influence and limit the damage done by the next crisis.”

 

However, The Economist is not suggesting an overhaul of the methods and tools of macroeconomics. Far from it. In mapping out the disagreement between schools of thought, they fall clearly on the side of fiscal and monetary intervention, lumping together classical economists with monetarists, non-interventionists, rational expectations economists, and conservatives. In pointing out epistemological woes, they deplore only unsuccessful forecasts, like “underestimating the risks of targeting a low rate of inflation.” In showing avenues for research, they want to bring back to the old discredited Phillips curve.

 

It is thus not the superficial content of their analysis, but their discussion and approach to these issues which showcase the true shortcomings of the modern, mainstream economics profession.

 

First, analysis of empirical data remains the fountainhead of economic theory instead of human action. But there will never be enough data to give birth to economic theory, simply because, as Mises explained,

 

“We grasp the effect of changes in the data by means of our theory” (Mises 2003, 170).

 

How else would economists know what data to look for, what data to ignore, and why there is not enough data on business cycles? It is through theory that we can disentangle the causal effects of multiple factors on economic variables, not the other way around. Letting data drive theory is like groping in the dark hoping to find not only a light switch, but the very idea of a light switch as well.

 

On the other hand, and as a result, theory can help us predict the quality and trend—but not the quantity—of the consequences of past changes in the data. In this sense, therefore, macroeconomic models can quantitatively predict the working of the economy much like driving a car with square wheels can predict the results of Formula One racing. There can be no successful forecasts in this sense. As Mises put it,

 

“All the endeavors that have been and are being devoted to the construction of a quantitative theory of catallactics must, therefore, come to grief. All that can be accomplished in this area is economic history. It can never go beyond the unique and the nonrepeatable; it can never acquire universal validity” (2003, 170).

 

Moreover, with models that lack insight into the role of time, capital, entrepreneurship, money and economic calculation, qualitative prognostications are equally fruitless. Until we get rid of these methodological woes, modern macroeconomics will continue to lack any power in limiting the damage done by the next crisis.

 

So if you really need to know about the epistemological problems of economics, don’t listen to The Economist. Read Mises instead.

 

 

Carmen Dorobăț has a PhD in economics from the University of Angers, and is Assistant Professor of Business at Leeds Trinity University.

 

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흥청망청 지출로 경제 부양을?

정부의 과도한 지출은 한 곳의 지출을 다른 곳으로 바꿀 뿐이다. 우리가 유럽인에게 돈을 더 주어서 미국 상품을 사게 하면, 우리가 우리 상품을 살 수 있는 돈은 그만큼 줄어들게 된다.

우리가 무기 생산에 돈을 더 쓰면, 티비와 냉장고, 또는 식품을 살 돈은 그만큼 감소하게 된다. 나치들도 총과 버터 둘 중에 하나를 선택해야 한다는 것을 알고 있었다.

화폐의 증발(增發)과 은행 여신에 의한 재정 적자만이 경제 부양을 할 수 있다. 하지만 그것은 단지 통화 인플레를 뜻할 뿐이다. 그런 조치는 호경기를 연장할 수 있지만, 마침내는 더 큰 불황을 몰고 오게 된다.

 

Salvation through Squandering?

 

•Henry Hazlitt

 

 

[Newsweek column from May 9, 1949, and reprinted in Business Tides: The Newsweek Era of Henry Hazlitt.]

 

We are now being told that our prosperity has been kept going in the last few years by our huge government spending, particularly on armaments and foreign aid. Any decline in this spending, we are now warned, would bring a recession. We are told, in fact, that if further signs of recession develop the Government must spend still more to keep the boom whipped up.

 

This doctrine is completely false. Assuming a balanced budget, an increase in government spending does not on net balance stimulate business activity at all. For every dollar that the government spends, the tax-payers have been deprived of a dollar to spend. All that a heavy government spending program can do is to divert spending from one channel into another. If we give Europeans more money to buy American goods, we have just that much less money left to buy our own goods. If we spend more for armament, we have just that much less left for television sets, refrigerators, or food. Even the Nazis knew they were choosing between guns and butter.

 

A huge government spending program with a balanced budget not only fails to stimulate economic activity but greatly reduces economic welfare. A $15,300,000,000 armament program, regardless of its military justification, leaves us just that much less resources to build new housing or to increase or improve our tools of production for civilian goods. Whether or not our new $5,000,000,000 ERP donation is now needed in Europe, it must obviously force us either to reduce our own consumption or to retard our own capital development by that amount. We cannot give our cake away and eat it too.

 

The more sophisticated advocates of a “compensated economy” recognize that huge government expenditures do not in themselves create prosperity. They put their emphasis on the amount of monetary purchasing power that government spending adds. This, they point out, is determined by the excess of government expenditures over tax collections. Put more bluntly, the prosperity would be brought about by government deficits. It is not the total size of the government expenditures but the size of the deficits that “adds to purchasing power.”

 

But when the compensated-economy doctrine is clearly stated in this form it has implications that its proponents have never clearly recognized. The official estimate of government receipts for the 1950 fiscal year is $41,000,000,000. Suppose it were decided that what was necessary to keep the boom whirling was a deficit of $5,000,000,000. This could, of course, be achieved by spending $46,000,000,000 (Mr. Truman has already put forward more than enough schemes to do that easily). But the inflationary deficit could be achieved just as well by holding expenditures to $41,000,000,000 and reducing taxes to $36,000,000,000. Or even by reducing expenditures to $36,000,000,000 and reducing taxes to $31,000,000,000. We could cut expenditures indefinitely, in other words, and still get our added inflation, provided only that we cut taxes still more.

 

Moreover, taxes could be either reduced or restored quicker than expenditures could be increased or halted. Increased expenditures create determined vested interests and tend to become permanent. Higher taxes to support higher spending destroy incentives and production. Lower taxes increase incentives and production. In short, if we wish to embark upon deficit financing again to keep our inflationary boom going, doing it through tax reductions is more flexible, more effective, and less dangerous than doing it through higher government spending.

 

But all this merely emphasizes the bankruptcy of the whole compensated-economy doctrine. Increased government expenditures balanced by increased taxes do not keep a boom going at all. Only deficits, financed by the creation of more money and bank credit, could do that. But this would mean merely a resumption of monetary inflation. It could prolong the boom only at the eventual cost of a bigger bust.

 

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