https://youtu.be/0-ylN6rqLbY
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정작 자신들의 특활비 공개판결에 반발해 상고를 하면서
대법원에 국회 특활비 공개하면 국익 해친다는 궤변을
제출했다는데 분노가 치민다.
그 이유로 ' 국회 고도의 정치적 행위가 노출돼 궁극적으로
국가의 중대한 이익을 해칠 우려 '가 있다는 것인데,
진짜 고도의 정치 행위는 대통령이 할 것이고, 국가를
대표해서 활동하는데, 박근혜 대통령 관련 특활비만
공개하려는 짓거리야말로, 국익뿐 아니라 국제 사회와의
신뢰도 무너뜨릴 수 있는데 역대 정권 모두의 특활비도
아니고, 박 대통령만 겨냥해서, 특활비를 범죄처럼
몰아가는 정치 검찰에 대해서는 비판하지 않고,
오히려 여론 선동에 앞장서듯, 박 대통령의 특활비를
물고 늘어지는 자들이, 정작 국민으로부터 가장 불신받는
집단이면서, 법원에서 특활비 공개하라는 판결이 나왔음에도
상고하면서 이런 궤변이나 이중성을 보이는 의견서를
제출했다는 것은 얼마나 이들이 이율배반적인 행위를
하고 있고, 민심과 동떨어진 집단인 지를 보여준다.
이를 봐도, 얼마나 이번 탄핵이 잘못된 집단에 의해서
저질러 졌는 지, 박 대통령 관련 수사와 재판이
아주 편파적이고, 정치적이라 것을 알 수 있다.
[출처] (속보) 朴 대통령 특활비 공격해대던 파렴치한 국회, 정작 "국회 특활비 공개하면 국익 해쳐" ? 궤변과 내로남불 의견 대법원에 제출 논란/ 일베
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데모크러시가 아니라 데마르키로 가자
아리스토텔레스부터 몽테스키외까지 서구의 민주제란 사실 데마르키, 즉 추첨에 의한 대표자 선출을 의미했다.
데마르키는 부정을 사전에 막고, 선거 비용을 줄이고, 정치적 기회주의자들을 제거하며, 작은 정부를 만든다.
(본인의 책 <대한민국, 이렇게 망한다>에서도 역시 데마르키를 도입해야 한다고 주장했다.)
Forget Electoral Democracy — Give "Demarchy" a Chance
•Antony P. Mueller
Demarchy — also called sortition — is a form of governance that selects the representatives of the people as a random sample from a pool of candidates. Such a governance by selecting the people's representatives by lottery instead of elections can look back on a venerable history.
For Aristotle, to select the people's political representatives by lot instead of voting distinguishes the democracy from oligarchical rule: ‘So it is ... democratic to occupy the offices by lot, and for the oligarchy by vote’ (Aristotle, Politics, IV, 9, 1294b 7-9). Likewise, for Montesquieu in "The Spirit of the Laws," the lottery procedure corresponds to "the nature of democracy."
In the ancient Greek polis, for the "Great Council of the 500," as well as for judges and for some state officials, selection took place by the lot — as it is still partly the case in Switzerland.
In the Republic of Venice, the selection procedure for the government and its members used the lottery in many ways. Until the 17th century, England also practiced the lottery system. Today, modern technology offers the possibility to apply random selection procedures to large populations.
The following advantages of demarchy are evident:
•High degree of popular legitimacy
•Independence of the representatives
•Absence of corruption
•No political parties
•Representation by normal people instead by political power seekers
•Elimination of the costs of the election campaigns
•Reduction of the overall cost of the political apparatus
•Comprehensible laws
•End of the inflation of laws, rules, and regulations
•Minimization of the state (less government spending, lower taxes).
Critics of demarchy claim that a parliament, whose members are selected by chance, has less expertise than an elected parliament, and that this would increase the power of the bureaucracy. The truth, however, is that the specific knowledge that is now present in the assemblies, exists in knowing how to gain and to exert power, and non-political competence is missing. Even more so, the current system of party politics has led to a huge bureaucracy and a massive build-up of the power of the state apparatus. The political parties and the bureaucracy cooperate to maximize their power which they achieve by having more state, not less.
The libertarian revolution is a soft revolution without violence. This is and will make the big difference between the anarcho-capitalist order and all other forms of governance. For the libertarian revolution to succeed, one must not ‘"take power," but conquer the public opinion by persuasion.
With the support of the public to change the structure of the party democracy, the first step would be to complement the present system with an additional chamber. In this chamber — a kind of "Senate" or "Upper House" — members chosen by lot would possess veto rights over the decisions taken by the parliament (Congress) and government (Presidency) including the judiciary (Supreme Court). Such a "fourth power" is the "voice of the people.". Although it is not yet a government and not yet the lawgiver, the ‘Senate’ composed by members chosen by lot has the right to stop the encroachments of government and of the state bureaucracy because of the veto power it holds.
The next step would be to create a "General Assembly" to serve as the prime law-giving body. The Assembly must be large enough to represent the people. For that purpose, it must comprise persons who are selected randomly among the constituency. Establishing the General Assembly requires a reform of the election laws. In order to achieve this, the libertarians must get a majority in the existing parliament (Congress). The final step in the reform of the state structure is to add a supervisory body and an executive branch of the Assembly.
The resulting institutional setting would include three organs: The General Assembly as the representative of the people and the prime law-giver, the Supervisory Body as a special committee to supervise the Executive branch that manages the current affairs of the polity. The last step would be the outsourcing of the governmental function to a private government management company under the supervision of the General Assembly.
German-born Antony Mueller teaches economics at the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil. See his website, blog, youtube channel, tumblr.
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[탄핵의 비밀 3회] 태블릿 주소록에 '선생님'이 어떻게 들어갔을까?
https://youtu.be/UOsxbKjAdNk
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[탄핵의 비밀 3회] 태블릿 주소록에 '선생님'이 어떻게 들어갔을까?
https://youtu.be/UOsxbKjAdNk
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방법론적 개인주의를 어떻게 이용할 것인가?
전체 사회 현상의 발현, 변형, 쇠퇴를 그 근본 원인까지 파고들어가려면, 개인 행동의 분석을 피할 수 없다.
그는 반드시 개인들의 선택을 다뤄야 하고, 그들이 행동하는 맥락에 개인들이 부여하는 의미, 또 중요한 대안적 옵션 등을 다뤄야 한다.
아리스토텔레스부터 존 로크까지의 사상가들은 화폐의 기원이 일종의 집단적 토론에서 나온 것이라고 추론했다.
하지만 칼 멩거는 그러한 집합적 의사 결정 과정 없이 발생했다고 주장했다.
방법론적 개인주의는 개인적 인식, 목적, 가치 등에서 비롯된 전체 사회 현상을 설명하는데 매우 유용했다. 다시 말해 그것은 역사적 분석에서 가치를 발휘했다. 하지만 경제 이론의 명제들은 원인과 결과의 항구적인 관계에 대한 주장이다.
방법론적 개인주의는 개인들의 행동에서 어떻게 전체 현상이 발생하는지 이해할 수 있도록 해준다. 하지만 그것은 원인과 결과에 대한 불변의 명제를 증명하는 데는 도움을 주지는 못한다.
방법론적 개인주의는 관찰된 행동을 우발적인 개인의 동기에서 비롯된 것으로 설명한다. 하지만 경제 법칙은 대안적이고 대체적인 행동에 비교해서, 불변하는 인간 행동의 원인과 그 결과를 설명한다.
How to Use Methodological Individualism
•Jörg Guido Hülsmann
I first met Professor Salin in late 1997, in his office at the University of Paris-Dauphine. When I mentioned that I had been drawn to the Austrian School not least of all because of Mises's epistemology, he raised his eyebrows and put on a skeptical face. I stopped talking and he threw in with amusement, "And all of economics is for you nothing but applied epistemology."
I protested that this was not my opinion, but the point was well taken. Economics is not a branch of epistemology; and one cannot say anything meaningful about its epistemology before one is perfectly familiar with its contents. My interest in the logical and epistemological problems of economics has remained unshaken, but I took Pascal Salin's reproach to heart and over the following years focused on economic theory proper. Now is the time to make an exception. The present paper is an epistemological bouquet for my dear mentor, thankfully remembering that he admonished me not to confuse the florist's job with that of the gardener.
I
Many writers who have set out to describe the logical and epistemological character of economic science consider the precept of methodological individualism to be among the distinctive features of economic analysis. This point of view is especially widespread among Austrian economists. According to this precept, the analysis of individual behavior is not only necessary to understand microphenomena such as consumer expenditure; it is also indispensable to grasp macrophenomena such as inflation, unemployment, and economic crises. The reason is that these aggregate or macrophenomena do not exist independent of human action, but result from the interaction of various individuals.
There cannot be the slightest doubt that this basic rationale for methodological individualism is simple, solid, and clear. Whoever wants to trace back the emergence, transformation, and decline of aggregate social phenomena to their root causes cannot sidestep the analysis of individual actions. He must deal with the choices of individuals. He must deal with the meaning that individuals attach to the context in which they are acting, and to the alternative options that they believe are at stake.
It is a very different question, however, whether methodological individualism is a method of economics or, more precisely, of economic theory. In what follows, we will argue that it is not. Based on the Misesian distinction between theory and history, we will show that, while methodological individualism is properly applied in history, it is not a method that we use in theory.
II
In the causal analysis of individual human behavior we must distinguish between invariant and contingent factors.
Any human action has certain invariant causes and consequences. Invariant consequences result from like action at any place and any time and are said to follow from it by necessity or law. For example, an increase of the quantity of money tends to entail an increase of the price level above the level it would otherwise have reached, irrespective of when and where the money supply is increased. According to Ludwig von Mises, the study of such consequences is the task of praxeology and economic theory.
But human action also has contingent causes and consequences. The very same action — increasing the quantity of money — can be inspired by different ideas and value judgments. And the objective consequences resulting from any action can provoke very different individual reactions at different times and places. In other words, the causal chains through which ideas and value judgments are connected with human action are contingent. According to Mises, the elucidation of these contingent causal chains is the specific task of historical research.
Mises did not exclude that individual value judgments and ideas had invariant causes, but neither he himself nor anybody else knew what they were. At present, only some of the contingent causes of human action can be identified by historical understanding on a case-by-case basis. And even this analysis is not likely to give the full picture. There is an unfathomable remnant that defied any explanation whatever: historical individuality. Mises explained:
The characteristics of individual men, their ideas and judgments of value as well as the actions guided by those ideas and judgments, cannot be traced back to something of which they would be the derivatives. There is no answer to the question why Frederick II invaded Silesia except: because he was Frederick II.
Historical analysis, if it just sticks to the known facts, must explain all social phenomena as resulting from individual action, and the causal chain of events must start and end with the ideas and value judgments of individuals. History describes in retrospect how the acting person perceived the situation in which he had to act, what he aimed at, what he believed to be the means at his disposition. And it uses the laws provided by economics and the natural sciences to describe the objective impact that the acting person had through his behavior. Thus the mission of history is to describe the drama of social and economic evolution from the point of view of its protagonists. Its own specific tool in this task is "psychology" or — Mises's favorite expression — "thymology."
III
With these distinctions in mind, let us turn now to the precept of methodological individualism and see where it applies. As a matter of fact, it has shown its usefulness in a number of important cases. The best-known example is the explanation of the origin of money.
Thinkers from Aristotle to John Locke have explained the origin of money with the help of an intellectual shortcut. They have suggested that money, being a social institution, has come about by some sort of collective deliberation. Money is indeed so useful that it would have to be invented if it did not already exist. So what is more natural than to assume that a group of wise men decided to sit together and institute the use of money? The problem is that no such convention is known ever to have existed.
But as Carl Menger has famously argued, there is no need to postulate that money came into being through the deliberation of such a mysterious council. Money would have come into being even in the complete absence of a coordinated collective decision-making process. Consider that in the absence of money, only barter exchanges (one-step) are possible and that the opportunities for barter are severely restricted by great problems, in particular, by the requirement that there must be a double coincidence of wants. Two-step "indirect exchanges" (with the help of a medium of exchange) help to overcome this limitation. Most importantly, indirect exchange can be beneficial even with an ad hoc medium of exchange, that is, even if there is yet no such thing as a generally accepted medium of exchange.
Media of exchange become ever more generally accepted to the extent that they are objectively more suitable than their competitors in arranging indirect exchanges. Silver is more suitable as a medium of exchange than cherry cakes because it is durable, divisible, malleable, homogeneous, and carries a great purchasing power per weight unit. Market participants are likely to recognize this relative superiority in a process of learning and imitation, and eventually most of them will use silver to carry out their transactions. Hence, one can explain why the technique of indirect exchange is adopted on an individual level; and one can explain why specific media of exchange become generally accepted and thus gradually turn into money. It is not necessary to postulate the creation of money through collective deliberation.
Methodological individualism has also been successfully applied to a number of other cases, such as the origin of the division of labor, the origin of nations, and to rather technical issues such as the explanation of redistribution effects resulting from money production. It has proved its utility especially in those cases in which we set out to explain aggregate social phenomena as resulting from individual perceptions, ends, and values. In short, it has proved its case in historical analysis.
IV
To understand our point that methodological individualism is not a method of economic theory, it is best to start with a few examples of what economic theory is all about. Consider the following economic laws:
More-roundabout production is more productive (in physical terms) than less-roundabout production.
When X persons divide labor amongs themselves, their work is more productive (in physical terms) than when it would have been if these same X persons had produced the same type of products in isolation from one another.
Under indirect exchange the market (and thus the division of labor) is greater than under direct exchange.
Any quantity of money can serve as an intermediary for any volume of trade, except for technological constraints (e.g., coin size).
These propositions are genuinely theoretical propositions in the Misesian sense. They make assertions about time-invariant relations between cause and effect. Indirect exchange for instance is not said to have produced greater exchange opportunities than direct exchange last year in Brazil — or that it will have this effect next month on the French Riviera. It is said to have this effect at all times and all places.
The question is whether methodological individualism is needed to demonstrate such propositions. The answer is in the negative. Methodological individualism helps us to understand why and how aggregate phenomena can result from individual actions. But it does not help us to demonstrate propositions about invariant — or even necessary — relationships between cause and effect. It is, for example, not strictly speaking impossible to introduce money through collective deliberation at a council; and neither is it impossible that increases of the money supply do not bring about redistribution effects. By contrast, the propositions of economic theory, according to Mises, purport to make statements about necessary causation.
Let us examine our first example in more detail to make our point. We come to know about the effects of roundabout production in two steps: first we analyze the conditions of production in general, and then we study how a more- or less-roundabout production process affects these conditions. In the first step, we realize that the physical productivity of labor is subject to the law of returns. In the second step we learn that more-roundabout production means to take time off from the production of consumers' goods in order to increase the supplies of the other factors, so that human labor becomes more productive. Notice that here we do not take our departure from any concrete choice. Rather we compare the consequences of two different hypothetical actions: more-roundabout as compared to less-roundabout production. These two hypothetical courses of action are a priori causally related to one another by the fact that they are choice alternatives. Their causal nexus is scarcity — the fact that the choice of one course of action prevents the realization of all other actions that could also have been chosen. The choice of the one alternative necessarily causes the renunciation of the others.
Our comparative analysis provides insights about the relative consequences of choosing one rather than the other — irrespective of which one would actually be chosen. If these relative consequences are invariant, as they are in the present case, then we have identified an economic law, that is, a necessary relationship between the choice alternatives on the one hand and their relative consequences on the other hand. In the present case, as we have seen, the law can be formulated as follows: "More-roundabout production is more productive (in physical terms) than less-roundabout production."
Now suppose we apply this law to explain observed behavior. Then the law still keeps its comparative nature, but the comparison is no longer a purely hypothetical one. It turns into a counterfactual comparison as we compare the observed behavior to alternative courses of action that could also have been chosen. For example, if we watch Smith hunting rabbits with bow and arrow, we might explain, "Smith kills more rabbits than he could have killed with his bare hands because he took some time off to first make bow and arrows." And with just as much exactness, those who see the glass half empty might explain, "Smith kills much less rabbits than he could have killed because he did not take enough time off to first make a shotgun."
Methodological individualism plays no role in this demonstration. Neither would it have played any role if we had examined the other three initial examples in more detail. The reason is that it serves a very different type of explanation than the one offered by economic theory. It serves to explain observed behavior as resulting directly from (contingent) individual motivations that prompted this very behavior. By contrast, economic laws serve to explain the (invariant) causes and consequences of human behavior in comparison to completely different, alternative courses of action which are related to the observed behavior through the a priori nexus of scarcity.
Methodological individualism is therefore not some sort of a basic foundation on which we erect the edifice of economic theory. It is actually the other way round. Only if we first have a correct economic theory can we then successfully apply methodological individualism to reconstruct the emergence of aggregate phenomena. For example, in the Mengerian explanation of the origin of money, the starting point is the fact that indirect exchange at all times and places creates more exchange opportunities than barter. If it were not for this economic law, Menger's account of the origin of money would not make any sense at all. If indirect exchange were more beneficial than barter only at some times and places, but not at others; or if silver were more suitable as a medium of exchange than butter only at some times and places, but not at others; then one could not argue that the technique of indirect exchange becomes ever more widespread through a process of learning and imitation. People can learn about something only if this something remains constant through time. It is only because there is an economic law at play that one can successfully apply methodological individualism to explain the origin of money.
V
Methodological individualism is a precious tool for historical analysis. But it is not a foundation of economic theory. One could, of course, define economic theory in such a large sense that it would include even those elements that are indeed obtained with the help of methodological individualism, such as Menger's explanation of the origin or money. But this would be a purely verbal finesse. There is a fundamental difference between the logical character of explanations based on economic laws on the one hand, and the logical character of explanations based on methodological individualism on the other hand. The purpose of the foregoing essay was to emphasize and explore this difference.
This paper was first published under the title "Methodological Individualism is Not the Method of Economics" in M. Laine and J.G. Hülsmann (eds), L'homme libre — Festschrift in Honour of Pascal Salin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006), pp. 122–128.
Also published on Mises Daily July 27, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------Life Passes By
Music and Lyrics by Colleen Kobussen.
https://youtu.be/-j_Gd0n_ox4?list=PL79956A7CD3C56D2E
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