펀드빌더
5일 주요 언론은, '구로다 가쓰히로' 前 산케이 서울지국장의 발언을 보도했다.
<日 구로다 "반도체 규제 경제보복 아냐…韓 발전에 일본 경제협력 덕분"> 조선일보
<“한국 경제 발전, 일본 덕분” 구로다 前산케이 지국장> 동아일보
<“요즘 한국인들은 과거 몰라… 이만큼 살게 된 건 일본 노력 덕분”> 국민일보
lglg****
구로다씨는 정확하게 fact base로 맞는 말을 했다. 이것을 망언이라고 한다면 대화가 안 되는 것이다. 국제 외교관계란 일방적으로 촛불들고 G랄하며 생떼 쓰면 다 되는 한국상황과는 다른 것이다. 조극의 앞날이 깜깜할 뿐이다.
0191****
팩트지. 옛날 저 아프리카 가난한 국가 시에라리온보다 못한 게 한국이었는데 그때 일본은 한국에 어마어마한 돈을 배상해주고 기술까지 지원해줘서 여기까지 성장한 게 팩트야. 일본이 경제 보복 한다니까 바로 망하려고 하는 한국 경제가 그 반증이고. 부정하고 싶으면 그냥 일본하고 단교해라.
star****
과거 일본정부는 한국에게 외환 보유액의 절반을 주었다. 그 돈은 한국경제 발전에 큰 도움이 된 것이 사실이다. 정부가 나서서 경제폭망시킨 것에 대한 시선을 돌리고, 친북을 위해 반일감정을 부추겼다. 대통령이라면 국익을 위해 최선을 다해야 하는데, 국익은 내팽겨치고 감정이 최우선인 나라가 되어버렸다. 우매한 국민들은 여전히 정신 못차리고 일본과 붙어보자고 한다. 쿠바, 베네수엘라 꼴 나고 싶나? 정신 좀 차려라.
wooy****
실효성 있는 대책을 세워라 wto 제소는 2년 이상 걸리고 수입선 다변화는 일본이 거의 독점하다시피 했는데 뭔 다변화? 1조 투자해서 기술개발 박차 가한다? 일본은 100년 동안 집중투자한 기술인데 몇 년 만에 기술개발한다고? 이런 핫바지 잡는 헛소릴 하고 자빠졌으니 국민들이 청와대 말을 곧이 믿을 사람 하나 없다. (발췌)
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일본 지도부의 잇단 폭탄발언 "한국에 수출된 화학물질이 北으로 넘어가 독가스 제조에 사용 의심.
그래서 규제"
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https://t.co/kSKrtk58kn
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김진태가 법사위에 나타났다! 난리난 윤석열~ 잠깐 확인만 했을 뿐인데 차고 넘친다며 비리폭로~
한국 사법부, 나아가 한국이 얼마나 썩어 있는지 놀랍다!
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imf가 파키스탄에 60억 달러의 구제금융을 승인했다. 이는 결과적으로 중국에 대한 구제금융과 같다.
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외국인들이 중국 정치에서 비정치적인 기술관료들을 보려하지만, 이는 중국 정치의 현실이 아니라, 외국인들이 중국에 대해 품고 있는 환상일 뿐이다.
닐 퍼거슨 인터뷰 일부
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https://twitter.com/i/status/1147460143195361280
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미제스와 하이에크는 부분지급준비금 제도에 대해 어떻게 생각했나?
지속적이지 않은 경기 호황은 새로 창조된 일정한 화폐가 대출 시장에 들어와 금리를 왜곡할 때 일어난다.
미제스는 부분지급준비금 제도 그 자체가 경기 순환을 촉발한다고 생각했다.
What Mises and Hayek Thought About Fractional Reserve Banking
Robert P. Murphy
[From "More Than Quibbles: Problems with the Theory and History of Fractional Reserve Free Banking" in the spring 2019 issue of The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.]
Setting aside the potential legal and conceptual problems with fractional reserve banking in order to focus on the economics, one of the key areas of dispute is whether FRB necessarily leads to an unsustainable boom as described first by Mises ([1912] 2009) and elaborated by his disciple Hayek (e.g. [1931] 1967). It is significant that both of these developers of what is sometimes called “the Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle” thought that FRB was a central element of the story. To be sure, Mises and Hayek may have been mistaken, but it is worth documenting their position because in the debate over FRB, one often hears (especially in informal venues) casual claims that only dogmatic Rothbardians could find fault with fractional reserve banking per se.
We find an unambiguous statement of Mises’s position in Human Action. Mises defines “fiduciary media” as bank-issued claims to money, payable upon demand, that are not covered by base money in the vault, and then declares:
The notion of “normal” credit expansion is absurd. Issuance of additional fiduciary media, no matter what its quantity may be, always sets in motion those changes in the price structure the description of which is the task of the theory of the trade cycle . Of course, if the additional amount issued is not large, neither are the inevitable effects of the expansion. (Mises [1949] 1998, 439, n. 17; bold added.)
Regarding Hayek, even the FRFB writers admit that his understanding of commercial bank behavior is inconsistent with their claims. For example, Larry White (1999, 761) writes that Hayek ([1925] 1984, 29) “suggested in one of his earliest writings a radical solution to the problem of swings in the volume of commercial bank credit: impose a 100 percent marginal reserve requirement on all bank liabilities….”
Mises too at some points in his career called for an explicit prohibition on additional issuance of fiduciary media, though he also wrote (for example in Human Action) in favor of “free banking” as the best practical way to restrain the issuance of fiduciary media . (Salerno 2012, 96–97) Readers should therefore not misinterpret Mises’s praise for laissez-faire in banking as an endorsement of the modern “free banking” claim that fractional reserve banking, at least under certain conditions, promotes economic stability.
To appreciate the specific problem of fiduciary media in the eyes of Mises, it is very instructive to consider where he placed the business cycle discussion in Human Action. One might have classified the periodic boom-bust cycles plaguing market economies as a result of political intervention, which would mean placing the discussion (as Rothbard did in Man, Economy, and State ) in the same section of the book that handled minimum wage laws and taxation. Yet Mises rejects this plausible approach, and his explanation illuminates his broader views on fractional reserve banking:
It is beyond doubt that credit expansion is one of the primary issues of interventionism. Nevertheless the right place for the analysis of the problems involved is not in the theory of interventionism but in that of the pure market economy. For the problem we have to deal with is essentially the relation between the supply of money and the rate of interest, a problem of which the consequences of credit expansion are only a particular instance .
Everything that has been asserted with regard to credit expansion is equally valid with regard to the effects of any increase in the supply of money proper as far as this additional supply reaches the loan market at an early stage of its inflow into the market system . If the additional quantity of money increases the quantity of money offered for loans at a time when commodity prices and wage rates have not yet been completely adjusted to the change in the money relation, the effects are no different from those of a credit expansion. In analyzing the problem of credit expansion, catallactics completes the structure of the theory of money and of interest….
What differentiates credit expansion from an increase in the supply of money as it can appear in an economy employing only commodity money and no fiduciary media at all is conditioned by divergences in the quantity of the increase and in the temporal sequence of its effects on the various parts of the market . Even a rapid increase in the production of the precious metals can never have the range which credit expansion can attain. The gold standard was an efficacious check upon credit expansion, as it forced the banks not to exceed certain limits in their expansionist ventures. The gold standard’s own inflationary potentialities were kept within limits by the vicissitudes of gold mining. Moreover, only a part of the additional gold immediately increased the supply offered on the loan market. The greater part acted first upon commodity prices and wage rates and affected the loan market only at a later stage of the inflationary process . (Mises [1949] 1998, 571–72; bold added.)
The above excerpt from Mises is extraordinarily important in understanding what role he thought the commercial banks played in a typical boom-bust cycle. Yet to correctly parse it, we should first remind ourselves what Mises means precisely by the phrase “credit expansion” (since he is contrasting it with “an increase in the supply of money proper”). Earlier in the book, Mises does not yet explain the trade cycle but defines the terminology that he will later need. He explains:
The term credit expansion has often been misinterpreted. It is important to realize that commodity credit cannot be expanded. The only vehicle of credit expansion is circulation credit. But the granting of circulation credit does not always mean credit expansion. If the amount of fiduciary media previously issued has consummated all its effects upon the market, if prices, wage rates, and interest rates have been adjusted to the total supply of money proper plus fiduciary media (supply of money in the broader sense), granting of circulation credit without a further increase in the quantity of fiduciary media is no longer credit expansion. Credit expansion is present only if credit is granted by the issue of an additional amount of fiduciary media, not if banks lend anew fiduciary media paid back to them by the old debtors . (Mises [1949] 1998, 431; italics in original, bold added.)
Putting together all three of the block quotations from Human Action that we have provided above, we can summarize Mises’s position as follows: The unsustainable boom occurs when a newly created (or mined) quantity of money enters the loan market and distorts interest rates, before other prices in the economy have had time to adjust. In principle, this process could occur even in the case of commodity money with 100 percent reserve banking.
However, in practice Mises believes such a theoretical possibility can be safely neglected, because (a) the quantity of new gold (or other commodity money) entering the economy will likely be relatively small over any short period and (b) whatever the stock of new commodity money entering the economy as a whole, typically only a small fraction of it would be channeled into the loan market upfront.
Thus, even though in principle Mises’s theory of the boom-bust cycle is fundamentally about new quantities of money hitting the loan market early on, in practice the explanation revolves around newly-created fiduciary media being lent into the market. That is why Mises described his explanation as the “circulation credit theory of the trade cycle.” When we understand how Mises thought (in principle) newly mined gold could conceivably set in motion the boom-bust cycle, it becomes crystal clear that he thought any amount of newly-issued fiduciary media—i.e., a credit expansion—would do the same. (Remember, our earlier quotation shows Mises claiming that “[i]ssuance of additional fiduciary media, no matter what its quantity may be, always sets in motion” the processes that cause the unsustainable boom.) Thus there are no caveats or other conditions to consider, on this narrow question. Mises thought fractional reserve banking per se would set in motion the business cycle.
Robert P. Murphy is a Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute and Research Assistant Professor with the Free Market Institute at Texas Tech University.
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사회주의: 인간이 만든 맬서스 함정
사회주의 정부는 산업화와 자본주의의 혜택을 되돌리려 하고 있다. 그럼으로써 사회주의는 사회를 과거의 맬서스 함정에 빠지게 하고 있다.
베네수엘라는 사회주의에 의해 나라 전체가 맬서스의 함정에 빠진 예이다.
Socialism: A Man-Made Malthusian Trap
Allen Gindler
Despite significant economic progress since ancient times, most people in agrarian societies continued to live at the subsistence minimum until modern times. By the nineteenth century, it was said that these societies fell into a "Malthusian trap." The Malthusian trap describes a situation that keeps population growth in line with available resources. The increase in income per person was not sustainable in the long run, as economic growth was inevitably consumed by population increases.
Western European countries, however, managed to escape the Malthusian trap through the Industrial Revolution which accelerated in the nineteenth century. Escaping the Malthusian trap meant an increase in both population growth and economic prosperity for the vast majority of people. For example, Europe’s population more than doubled between 1800 and 1900, but the decline of living standards no longer accompanied this growth as it had in pre-industrial societies. Economic historians explained that the phenomenon resulted from technological advances, demographic shifts due to European marriage patterns (marrying in later years, establishing a separate household, having fewer children), and increased human intelligence. All of the above are supposed to secure the systematic excess of output growth rates over the overpopulation growth rate. It seems that one crucial factor needs to be added to the list: capitalism itself, where economic laws are fully unfolded and have maximum manifestation and impact on society. Humanity entered a capitalist mode of production, which became possible by limiting absolutism and intrusion into the economy, creating democratic institutions, and improving human rights, law supremacy, and its uniform application.
The ideal market economy emerges in the society that is described as a collection of numerous self-governing producers that meet multiple independent consumers and freely exchange commodities and services according to the rates established on the market by the equilibrium between supply and demand. People behave according to the rules and freely exercise their right to enter a business transaction or refuse to participate. Such a society is characterized by the primacy of private property, an extensive division of labor and cooperation, and rich assortments of commodities and services. Economic freedom was accompanied by a high degree of personal freedom. The closest social formation of this ideal happened to be capitalism at the times of classical liberals in the course of the beginning stages of the Industrial Revolution.
Thus, we already see the following pattern: In the societies of hunter-gatherers, economic laws had minimal manifestation but the most prolonged influence (more than 150,000 years). The agricultural revolution created more stable and secure communities, but they were characterized by a lack of capital to lead to low use of more productive factors of production. Low levels of personal economic freedom also inhibited growth and productivity. Industrialization, on the other hand, offered an escape.
But the escape is not always permanent. Socialist governments often act to undo the benefits of industrialization and capitalism. Historically, socialist regimes have tried to suppress or override the natural operation of personal choice and capital accumulation in economiees. Socialism, in general, encroaches on private property rights, controls the economy, and subordinates individual decision-making to the collective. In this regard, it is appropriate to assume that socialism would push society back toward the Malthusian trap.
Let us examine this hypothesis in light of the case of Venezuela. Venezuela escaped the Malthusian trap only in the thirties of the last century, judging by the GDP output per capita (Figure 1). According to scholars, in the period from the 1920s to the 1940s, the average annual growth rate was more than 10 percent. Indeed, in order to escape the gravity of the trap, an economy needs a high magnitude of acceleration. Now it is hard to believe, but in 1950 , the country ranked fourth in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Unfortunately, as soon as Venezuela established itself as a powerhouse of South America, the government started to implement economic policies from the cookbooks of socialism. Undoubtedly, the country fell prey to the Soviet Union’s influences on Latin America during the Cold War. The main assault was directed on private property rights in the industry and in agriculture. In the late 1950s, the government nationalized the telephone company and founded state-owned metallurgical plants and petrochemical and oil corporations. The authority initiated the agrarian reform whereby the state practically expropriated lands from large landowners and redistributed it among new farmers. Despite the continuing economic growth, the Venezuelan economy was poisoned by the venom of socialism. By the 1970s, Venezuela was a mixed economy with a significant share of state-owned enterprises in the most valuable sectors, which were controlled by a central planning agency. Every new government doubled down on implementing socialist measures as a way to solve the socio-economic issues facing society. It was a continuous trend of nationalization of industries, control of prices and minimum wage, unionization, the imposition of new taxes, and administration of exchange and interest rates.
The high revenue from the oil boom fueled the economy; however, the government went on an enormous spending spree. People and the remaining business became live out of the state generosity rather than creating wealth themselves. By 1980, the economic growth stalled, and in the next decade, Venezuela’s economy experienced stagnation. Partial liberal reforms undertaken by the government in conjunction with IMF could not divert an unfavorable trend. Several fruitful years in the mid-2000s, due to a super profit from unprecedented prices for petroleum products, was the last breath before the economy went for a nosedive after the market correction. The economy was exhibiting negative growth, hyperinflation, extreme impoverishment of the population, the deficit of basic food and consumer products. How can one explain such unfortunate events? Socialism adversely affects personal and economic freedoms—the essential components of socio-economic systems that are subject to universal and natural economic laws. The implementation of socialistic measures inhibited the natural flow of market forces in the official economic sphere and funneled them to the shadow .
Venezuela has fallen into the man-made socialist Malthusian trap. The socialist Malthusian trap is a condition of politico-economic zugzwang when every consecutive move leads to an even worse situation. Whatever the government does in the framework of the socialist way of thinking will have an accumulating negative effect on people’s wellbeing. Venezuela entered the territory of a humanitarian crisis, which manifested itself in widespread hunger and weakened health care. Gregory Clark’s “A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World” determined the average daily energy intake from food per capita of about 2,300 or less, as is typical for those social systems that did not escape the Malthusian trap. At the same time, WHO established 2,100 kcal/capita/day as a minimum daily norm. Figure 2 shows that even during the years of stable GDP growth in 1960–1970, Venezuelans experienced food supply problems. This may be evidence of a socialist agricultural reform in the late 50s. Also, the inability to feed their people is a common feature of all socialist regimes. The country was counting on food imports, and when the price of oil was high, food consumption increased. In the socialistic Malthusian trap, people faced acute hunger. The recent study revealed that Venezuelans lost an average of 24 lbs in body weight in 2017. Therefore, both indexes show that socialism drove the country into the Malthusian trap. In contrast to the original trap that all societies used to experience in their history, the socialistic Malthusian trap is human-made. The economic misery was not caused by full-scale warfare or a natural disaster of biblical proportions. Instead, Venezuela had all the ingredients for success, which pre-industrial society was lacking, but stepped into the uncharted territory of socialism and lost the bet.
Socialism, as a regime of willful ignorance of fundamental economic laws and economic illiteracy, drives society back into the Malthusian trap. Venezuela is a vivid and unfortunate example of the implementing of the socialist idea in modern times. The way out of the trap is a full restoration of economic and individual freedoms that guarantee fundamental laws of the economy to unfold freely to people’s advantage. (도표 생략)
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