2021년 8월 5일 목요일
가계부채·자산버블 13년만에 최악
한은도 금융취약성 경고… 가계부채·자산버블 13년만에 최악
한은 “금융취약성 심각” 경고
빚으로 만든 부동산·주가 거품
금리 인상땐 도미노 타격 우려 / 매경
응읭 일베 댓글
2021년 7월 외환보유고 4300억달러가 있지만 95%는 미국 국채와 금으로 보관 중이고
나머지는 5%만 나라에서 운영가능한 실질적인 돈
95%는 미국 국채는 기존 국가 부채에 대한 담보로써 어떠한 일이 있어도 매각 불가능한 돈(은행에 담보로 잡힌돈)
한국은 200억 달러로 원유 사고 수입하고 과자도 구입하는 돈 이란다.
십새들아 ㅋㅋㅋ 부동산이고 어느자산이고 안전하지가 않다.
좀 무조건 우상향할거라는 대가리 골빈 새키들은 금융보고서 이런거 좀 찾아보고 지껄이던가
아니면 걍 닥치고 부동산 고점에 샀으면 평생들고 가라 남한테 떠넘기고 사기칠 생각하지 말고...
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중앙선관위, 숨겨왔던 것들 수면 위로 / 그토록 집요하게 통합선거인명부 제출 거부한 이유 /
유권자들의 투표 성향을 속속들이 파악 / 끝까지 숨기고 싶었던 것
[공병호TV]
https://youtu.be/r0vTRBOp1Lw
중앙선관위, 위변조본 제출 / 결국 투표소에 가지 않았던 사람들, 다수가 들어있을 것 / 법원 증거명령 이후에서야 위변조본을 마저 못해 제출한 이유 / 유령투표지 [공병호TV]
https://youtu.be/2_2UPm3Xtsk
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‘스텔스기 반대’ 국보법 혐의자, 김일성 회고록 읽기 운동
조선일보
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국정원이 심상치 않다. 간첩이 간첩잡는 나라. 삼민투와 국정원의 혈투
시대정신 연구소
https://youtu.be/1_BpZDV20Uc
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꺼져가는 나라를 구한 한 소녀의 외침!!
뉴올프레스
https://youtu.be/Fdd_We6tLFg
---->소녀는 아니고 50- 60대의 여성이다.
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거리두기를 끝내라!
만일 새로운 바이러스나 그 변종이 나타날 때마다 셧다운(거리두기)을 해야하고 백신을 맞아야 한다면, 우리는 개인의 의료 결정에서, 끝없이 국가의 간섭을 받아야 하는 디스토피아적 지옥을 경험하게 될 것이다.
End the Shutdown, Again
MISES WIRE , The Editors
If every new virus or variation warrants shutdowns or new vaccines, we will face an unending dystopian hellscape of state intervention in our medical decisions.
https://mises.org/wire/end-shutdown-again
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나는 왜 국가를 반대하는가!
한스-헤르만 호프의 국가 반대론
모든 자원은 결핍하다는 진실은 변하지 않는다.
공공재를 만들기 위해서는 사적인 재화는 희생될 수 밖에 없다. 더구나 국가는 “경제적”으로 자원을 사용하는 기구가 아니다.
The Role of Intellectuals and Anti-intellectuals
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else. —Frédéric Bastiat
Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving him be adjudicated by him or his agent. And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent’s power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.
Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position.
More difficult to understand is how anyone can get away with controlling a state. Why would others put up with such an institution?
I want to approach the answer to this question indirectly. Suppose you and your friends happen to be in control of such an extraordinary institution. What would you do to maintain your position (provided you didn’t have any moral scruples)? You would certainly use some of your tax income to hire some thugs. First: to make peace among your subjects so that they stay productive and there is something to tax in the future. But more importantly, because you might need these thugs for your own protection should the people wake up from their dogmatic slumber and challenge you.
This will not do, however, in particular if you and your friends are a small minority in comparison to the number of subjects. For a minority cannot lastingly rule a majority solely by brute force. It must rule by “opinion.” The majority of the population must be brought to voluntarily accept your rule. This is not to say that the majority must agree with every one of your measures. Indeed, it may well believe that many of your policies are mistaken. However, it must believe in the legitimacy of the institution of the state as such, and hence that even if a particular policy may be wrong, such a mistake is an “accident” that one must tolerate in view of some greater good provided by the state.
Yet how can one persuade the majority of the population to believe this? The answer is: only with the help of intellectuals.
How do you get the intellectuals to work for you? To this the answer is easy. The market demand for intellectual services is not exactly high and stable. Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the fleeting values of the masses, and the masses are uninterested in intellectual-philosophical concerns. The state, on the other hand, can accommodate the intellectuals’ typically over-inflated egos and offer them a warm, secure, and permanent berth in its apparatus.
However, it is not sufficient that you employ just some intellectuals. You must essentially employ them all—even the ones who work in areas far removed from those that you are primarily concerned with: that is, philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities. For even intellectuals working in mathematics or the natural sciences, for instance, can obviously think for themselves and so become potentially dangerous. It is thus important that you secure also their loyalty to the state. Put differently: you must become a monopolist. And this is best achieved if all “educational” institutions, from kindergarten to universities, are brought under state control and all teaching and researching personnel is “state certified.”
But what if the people do not want to become “educated”? For this, “education” must be made compulsory; and in order to subject the people to state controlled education for as long as possible, everyone must be declared equally “educable.” The intellectuals know such egalitarianism to be false, of course. Yet to proclaim nonsense such as “everyone is a potential Einstein if only given sufficient educational attention” pleases the masses and, in turn, provides for an almost limitless demand for intellectual services.
None of all this guarantees “correct” statist thinking, of course. It certainly helps, however, in reaching the “correct” conclusion, if one realizes that without the state one might be out of work and may have to try one’s hands at the mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning oneself with such pressing problems as alienation, equity, exploitation, the deconstruction of gender and sex roles, or the culture of the Eskimos, the Hopis and the Zulus.
In any case, even if the intellectuals feel underappreciated by you—that is: by one particular state administration—they know that help can only come from another state administration but not from an intellectual assault on the institution of the state as such. Hence, it is hardly surprising that, as a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of contemporary intellectuals, including most conservative or so-called free market intellectuals, are fundamentally and philosophically statists.
Has the work of the intellectuals paid off for the state? I would think so. If asked whether the institution of a state is necessary, I do not think it is exaggerated to say that 99 percent of all people would unhesitatingly say yes. And yet, this success rests on rather shaky grounds, and the entire statist edifice can be brought down—if only the work of the intellectuals is countered by the work of intellectual anti-intellectuals, as I like to call them.
The overwhelming majority of state supporters are not philosophical statists, i.e., because they have thought about the matter. Most people do not think much about anything “philosophical.” They go about their daily lives, and that is it. So most support stems from the mere fact that a state exists, and has always existed as far as one can remember (and that is typically not farther away than one’s own lifetime). That is, the greatest achievement of the statist intellectuals is the fact that they have cultivated the masses’ natural intellectual laziness (or incapacity) and never allowed for “the subject” to come up for serious discussion. The state is considered as an unquestionable part of the social fabric.
The first and foremost task of the intellectual anti-intellectuals, then, is to counter this dogmatic slumber of the masses by offering a precise definition of the state, as I have done at the outset, and then to ask if there is not something truly remarkable, odd, strange, awkward, ridiculous, indeed ludicrous about an institution such as this. I am confident that such simple, definitional work will produce some very first, but serious, doubt regarding an institution that one previously had been taken for granted—a good start.
Further, proceeding from less sophisticated (yet, not coincidentally, more popular) pro-state arguments to more sophisticated ones: To the extent that intellectuals have deemed it necessary to argue in favor of the state at all, their most popular argument, encountered already at kindergarten age, runs like this: Some activities of the state are pointed out: the state builds roads, kindergartens, schools; it delivers the mail and puts the policeman on the street. Imagine there would be no state. Then we would not have these goods. Thus, the state is necessary.
At the university level, a slightly more sophisticated version of the same argument is presented. It goes like this: True, markets are best at providing many or even most things; but there are other goods markets cannot provide or cannot provide in sufficient quantity or quality. These other, so-called “public goods” are goods that bestow benefits onto people beyond those actually having produced or paid for them. Foremost among such goods ranks typically “education and research.” “Education and research,” for instance, it is argued, are extremely valuable goods. They would be under-produced, however, because of “free riders,” i.e., “cheats,” who benefit—via so-called neighborhood effects—from “education and research” without paying for it. Thus, the state is necessary to provide otherwise unproduced or under-produced (public) goods such as education and research.
These statist arguments can be refuted by a combination of three fundamental insights: First, as for the kindergarten argument, it does not follow from the fact that the state provides roads and schools that only the state can provide such goods. People have little difficulty recognizing that this is a fallacy. From the fact that monkeys can ride bikes it does not follow that only monkeys can ride bikes. And second, immediately following, it must be recalled that the state is an institution that can legislate and tax; and hence, that state agents have little incentive to produce efficiently. State roads and schools will only be more costly and their quality lower. For there is always a tendency for state agents to use up as many resources as possible doing whatever they do but actually work as little as possible doing it.
Third, as for the more sophisticated statist argument, it involves the same fallacy encountered already at the kindergarten level. For even if one were to grant the rest of the argument, it is still a fallacy to conclude from the fact that states provide public goods that only states can do so.
More importantly, however, it must be pointed out that the entire argument demonstrates a total ignorance of the most fundamental fact of human life, namely, scarcity. True, markets will not provide for all desirable things. There are always unsatisfied wants as long as we do not inhabit the Garden of Eden. But to bring such unproduced goods into existence scarce resources must be expended, which consequently can no longer be used to produce other, likewise desirable things. Whether public goods exist next to private ones does not matter in this regard—the fact of scarcity remains unchanged: more “public” goods can come only at the expense of less “private” goods. Yet what needs to be demonstrated is that one good is more important and valuable than another one. This is what is meant by “economizing.”
Yet can the state help economize scarce resources? This is the question that must be answered. In fact, however, conclusive proof exists that the state does not and cannot economize: For in order to produce anything, the state must resort to taxation (or legislation)—which demonstrates irrefutably that its subjects do not want what the state produces but prefer instead something else as more important. Rather than economize, the state can only redistribute: it can produce more of what it wants and less of what the people want—and, to recall, whatever the state then produces will be produced inefficiently.
Finally, the most sophisticated argument in favor of the state must be briefly examined. From Hobbes on down this argument has been repeated endlessly. It runs like this: In the state of nature—before the establishment of a state—permanent conflict reigns. Everyone claims a right to everything, and this will result in interminable war. There is no way out of this predicament by means of agreements; for who would enforce these agreements? Whenever the situation appeared advantageous, one or both parties would break the agreement. Hence, people recognize that there is but one solution to the desideratum of peace: the establishment, per agreement, of a state, i.e., a third, independent party as ultimate judge and enforcer. Yet if this thesis is correct and agreements require an outside enforcer to make them binding, then a state-by-agreement can never come into existence. For in order to enforce the very agreement that is to result in the formation of a state (to make this agreement binding), another outside enforcer, a prior state, would already have to exist. And in order for this state to have come into existence, yet another still earlier state must be postulated, and so on, in infinite regress.
On the other hand, if we accept that states exist (and of course they do), then this very fact contradicts the Hobbesian story. The state itself has come into existence without any outside enforcer. Presumably, at the time of the alleged agreement, no prior state existed. Moreover, once a state-by-agreement is in existence, the resulting social order still remains a self-enforcing one. To be sure, if A and B now agree on something, their agreements are made binding by an external party. However, the state itself is not so bound by any outside enforcer. There exists no external third party insofar as conflicts between state agents and state subjects are concerned; and likewise no external third party exists for conflicts between different state agents or agencies. Insofar as agreements entered into by the state vis-à-vis its citizens or of one state agency vis-à-vis another are concerned, that is, such agreements can be only self-binding on the State. The state is bound by nothing except its own self-accepted and enforced rules, i.e., the constraints that it imposes on itself. Vis-à-vis itself, so to speak, the state is still in a natural state of anarchy characterized by self-rule and enforcement, because there is no higher state, which could bind it.
Further: If we accept the Hobbesian idea that the enforcement of mutually agreed upon rules does require some independent third party, this would actually rule out the establishment of a state. In fact, it would constitute a conclusive argument against the institution of a state, i.e., of a monopolist of ultimate decision-making and arbitration. For then, there must also exist an independent third party to decide in every case of conflict between me (private citizen) and some state agent, and likewise an independent third party must exist for every case of intra-state conflict (and there must be another independent third party for the case of conflicts between various third parties)—yet this means, of course, that such a “state” (or any independent third party) would be no state as I have defined it at the outset but simply one of many freely competing third-party conflict arbitrators.
Let me conclude then: the intellectual case against the state seems to be easy and straightforward. But that does not mean that it is practically easy. Indeed, almost everyone is convinced that the state is a necessary institution, for the reasons that I have indicated. So it is very doubtful if the battle against statism can be won, as easy as it might seem on the purely theoretical, intellectual level. However, even if that should turn out to be impossible—at least let’s have some fun at the expense of our statist opponents.
And for that I suggest that you always and persistently confront them with the following riddle. Assume a group of people, aware of the possibility of conflicts between them. Someone then proposes, as a solution to this human problem, that he (or someone) be made the ultimate arbiter in any such case of conflict, including those conflicts in which he is involved. Is this is a deal that you would accept? I am confident that he will be considered either a joker or mentally unstable. Yet this is precisely what all statists propose.
This text is chapter 1 of The Great Fiction and originally appeared in Libertarian Alliance in 2008.
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계광운 의사의 의이부자패장산 임상 경험
季光运用薏苡附子败酱散临床经验撷菁
季光主任医师是享受国务院特殊津贴的名老中医,从医数十载,学验俱丰。笔者为其子,在伺诊期间,于其博大精深中觅得一鳞半爪,现将其运用薏苡附子败酱散治疗临床诸病的经验总结如下,以飨同道。
1.治疗肠道诸疾
薏苡附子败酱散是家父推崇并经常使用的一张名方,其出自张仲景《金匮要略》“肠痈之为病,其身甲错,腹皮急,按之濡,如肿状,腹无积聚,身无热,脉数,此为肠内有痈脓,薏苡附子败酱散主之。”故本病临床常用于肠痈脓已成而未溃之病证,即现代医学所说的急性阑尾炎、阑尾周围脓肿、慢性阑尾炎、腹内脓肿等。
阑尾炎是外科的常见病,居各种急腹症之首。本病70%-80%具有典型的转移性腹痛。中医学认为本病病因为湿热内蕴,邪毒瘀积,寒温失调,饮食失节,情志失畅,糟粕停滞等;病机为气滞血瘀,瘀久化热,甚则肉腐化脓。家父临床运用薏苡附子败酱散合大黄牡丹汤治疗急性阑尾炎有确切的疗效,同时对化脓性阑尾炎、阑尾周围脓肿及老年阑尾炎等,也均获 效满意。早在上世纪50年代末与60年代初,即中西医结合治疗急腹症的鼎盛期,运用该方加味治疗“肠痈”具有大量的病例资料可供参考。临床运用本方可视病情轻重、有脓无脓、邪毒性质、正气盛衰,而灵活选用其药味,增减其药量。
本方对腹内脓肿(腹膜内脓肿、腹膜后脓肿、腹腔内脏脓肿)同样具有很好的疗效。虽然三者具有不同的临床特征,但大多数腹内脓肿会引起发热,脓肿附近出现不同程度的腹部不适、疼痛或局限性腹膜炎,常见厌食、恶心、呕吐、腹泻或便秘。本病病机当属热毒壅滞,阻滞营卫,热化成脓。治以清热解毒、排脓消痈,方选薏苡附子败酱散加银花、蒲公英、枳实、厚朴、丹皮、当归、赤芍、生大黄、生甘草。若体虚气弱者,加党参、黄芪,酌减银花、蒲公英、大黄;热甚伤阴者减生大黄,加生地、玄参、太子参、麦冬等。《金匮要略方义》认为:薏苡下气则能排脓,附子微用,意在直走肠中屈曲之处,加以败酱之咸寒,以清积热。服后以小便下为度者,小便者,气化也,气通则痈结可开,滞者可行,而大便必泄污秽脓血,肠痈可已矣。《本草纲目》中亦记载:大黄下瘀血,血闭寒热,破癥瘕积聚,留饮宿食,荡涤肠胃,推陈致新,通利水谷,调中化食,安和五脏。故原方中加大黄、枳实、厚朴峻下热结,荡涤肠胃瘀热;合银花、蒲公英清热解毒;丹皮、赤芍清热凉血;当归活血通络;生甘草解毒调和诸药。全方共奏清热解毒,排脓消痈之效。
慢性结肠直肠炎属中医学“泄泻”、“痢疾”范畴,病机关键为脾虚湿盛化热,久泻脾肾阳虚,寒热虚实错杂,胃肠气机阻滞。治疗采用薏苡附子败酱散加大黄、丹皮。方中薏苡仁、败酱草善治大肠之湿热壅滞,有泄热散结利湿之功;附子辛热温阳散结,意在振奋肠中之阳,温运气机,解散阴寒内结;加大黄助清泄湿热之功;加丹皮助散瘀滞之力。全方通因通用,故收效颇著。
2.治疗妇科诸疾
慢性盆腔炎是妇科最常见的疾病之一,临床多表现为下腹痛,发热,阴道分泌物增多,及(或)异常子宫出血,或尿频尿急,或肛门坠胀、里急后重。症状常于月经期或月经后加重。本病可归属于中医学“少腹痛”、“癥瘕”、“积聚”、“带下”、“淋证”、“不孕”等范畴,属本虚标实证。由于本病病程较长,患者正气衰减,又因湿热、寒湿瘀滞凝结于胞宫、胞络,导致气血瘀阻、不通则痛。治疗予以薏苡附子败酱散加赤芍、丹皮、川楝子、延胡索、土茯苓、车前子、甘草。若热毒瘀结,伴有发热者,加银花、生大黄以加强清热凉血、解毒破瘀之功;若湿热与瘀浊搏结,伴见脓带、腹痛甚者,加萆薢、赤小豆、冬葵子以加强清热利湿排脓之功;若热毒积聚、血瘀气滞,伴见腹中包块者,加皂角针、穿山甲、昆布破坚散结、消痈排脓;若病情反复发作,并出现不同程度的盆腔粘连者,加三棱、莪术、桃仁、红花、血竭等;若合并月经迁延不净者,加茜草炭、蒲黄炭、银花炭等;体虚者加党参、黄芪;腰痛剧者加牛膝、杜仲、桑寄生等。
卵巢囊肿一般无症状,但可有压迫、疼痛或沉重感,通过B超即可确诊。一般认为卵巢囊肿大致相当于中医学“癥瘕”、“积聚”、“肠覃”范畴,或散见于“痛经”、“带下”中。治疗以薏苡附子败酱散辅以桂枝茯苓丸、当归芍药散加减。对于双侧、单侧、多发或单个卵巢囊肿均有较好的疗效。
宫外孕包块多见于非休克型输卵管妊娠,属中医学“血瘀少腹”、“癥瘕”、“腹痛”范畴。宫外孕患者在包块形成的早期,多见腹痛拒按,阴道出血,舌质偏红、苔微黄,脉弦或弦细略数等瘀热互结表现。若在胚胎被杀灭后,立即服用中药以消包块,不但可以达到早期治愈的目的,还能避免输卵管的局部病变。一般治以薏苡附子败酱散加红藤、蒲公英、生地炭、桃仁、赤芍、冬瓜仁。阴道出血未止者,附子减量,加炒阿胶、仙鹤草、茜草炭;发热者去附子,加忍冬藤、连翘;热甚者加炒丹皮、焦山栀;腹痛者加乌药、川楝子;便溏者去冬瓜仁;大便秘结者加生大黄。方中败酱草、红藤既有清热作用,又有散瘀之力,为本方君药,正如《本草纲目》云“败酱草善排脓破血”。加赤芍、桃仁、生地炭既可消痈去瘀,又可防止因活血祛瘀过猛而造成出血不止和包块破裂,若宫外孕包块在2个月或更长时间内未消者,则应重用活血祛瘀之品;选用附子取“结者非温不行”之义,血得温而行,遇寒则凝,凡痈肿瘀结症伴有热象者,若过用清热,则热清而瘀结难散,借附子辛散之力,使结者散之、消之。
输卵管积液是由输卵管急慢性炎症或毒性较低的细菌上行性感染所致。本病可归属于中医学“癥瘕”、“肠覃”的范畴,因寒凉伤于气机,水湿积聚不散而致。若病程日久,寒湿化热,煎熬水液,则成脓、成痰。但因气凝水聚,损碍部位局限,故对冲、任二脉影响尚小,月经仍可按时来潮。治疗以消水散结、温阳化瘀为大法,符合薏苡附子败酱散之方义。全方重用附子,并在其基础上加冬瓜子、莱菔子。气虚者加党参、黄芪、白术;腰骶部疼痛者加川断、杜仲;心烦易怒者加青皮、川楝子、黄芩;热重便干者减附子,加蒲公英、紫花地丁、红藤、白花蛇舌草;湿重者加泽兰、泽泻、苍术;血瘀者加蒲黄、五灵脂、三棱、莪术;痰凝不化者加南星、海藻、昆布、牡蛎、海蛤壳;包块质硬者加皂角刺、穿山甲、王不留行等。
3.治疗其他诸疾
乳腺小叶增生属中医学“乳癖”范畴,是最常见的乳房良性病症,临床表现为随月经周期出现的经前乳房疼痛,可触及大小不等的包块。多因肝郁日久化热,热蕴成痰,气机不畅,血行受阻成瘀,痰瘀互结于乳房而成乳癖。治疗以疏肝解郁理气为先,同时佐以化瘀散结软坚之品。家父多选用薏苡附子败酱散加贝母、川芎、香附、橘核,临床应用每获佳效。
慢性前列腺炎是临床常见病、多发病,多发于中老年人,以尿频、尿急、尿痛、尿线细、尿等待、尿分叉、小腹胀为主要症状。本病相当于中医学“癃闭”范畴,临床多见两种证型,一为肾中阴阳亏耗、湿热蕴着证,一为肾阳虚衰、膀胱湿热、寒热互结证。其中后者临床还表现为会阴部以及睾丸胀痛、发凉,并伴腰膝冷痛、喜温喜按、手足不温等症状。治宜温阳利湿、清热散结,可选用薏苡附子败酱散加王不留行、冬葵子、瞿麦、竹叶。若腰痛明显,可加怀牛膝、山茱萸等补肝肾、强筋骨;若夹血瘀证,可加大黄、桃仁,以取《伤寒论》桃仁承气汤之意。全方活血化瘀,泄热散结,通利水道,其中大黄又善治茎中痛,故收效满意。
4. 体会
薏苡附子败酱散,是张仲景用于治疗“肠痈”已成脓的一张名方。方中重用薏苡仁排脓消痈利肠胃,轻用附子振奋阳气、辛热散结,佐以败酱草破瘀排脓。探究该方,因其具排脓化毒、祛湿除邪、破瘀散结的功效,用于临床多种疾病均获良效。然家父认为,原方药仅三味,而临床病证多症杂势重,恐有药力不任之虑,故家父临床运用原方时,多在辨证的基础上采取加味配伍法。同时家父在多年的临床实践中体会到,只要辨证准确,加味药物方证配伍相宜,附子用量适度,对未成脓而证相符的病例同样可以运用本方。尤其对慢性阑尾炎、慢性盆腔炎、慢性前列腺炎、慢性结肠炎病变位于回盲部与降结肠至直肠段,同时证见寒热、痰瘀、湿浊交互者,在原方基础上据证加味配伍,多获良效。
▍版权声明:
○ 本文摘自《江苏中医药》2006年第12期
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대황목단탕, 의이부자패장산의 올바른 사용법
大黄牡丹汤薏苡附子败酱散证治推论的意义
现代所谓盲肠炎病,以割去盲肠为惟一治法。大黄牡丹汤薏苡附子败酱散,治盲肠炎病,则系运动全身为惟一执法、治法。人身构造复杂极矣。但总不外左升右降,以成一整个圆运动的功能。大病将愈,每于半夜阳生之时,感觉身体左右,形成一个太极相抱的圆。此日即大见起色。大黄牡丹汤,所以去圆运动之滞碍,使本身之运动迅速恢复其圆。薏苡附子散,所以赔补其本身圆运动之原素,使本身之运动恢复其圆也。人身是无数个细胞成的,而无数个细胞的运动规则,与最切一个细胞无异,圆运动而已。肠痈病如此,一切病亦复如此。若谓此二方,是运动肠的一部分的不运动之法,离开整个而运动局部,运不动也。虽治局部,仍治整个。此古中医学工功参造化之妙也。
如疮痈不在腹内,而在腹外,以荣卫为主。以脏腑之虚实寒热为据。
一人右腹痛,右腿不能伸。医谓盲肠炎,宜速割。诊其脉,沉细不舒。余用四逆散加栀仁贝母一剂而愈。四逆散柴胡白芍枳实炙甘草,柴胡白芍升降滞气,枳实疏通肠胃积滞,甘草养中以助升降,加栀仁贝母清热消滞故愈。病在里,故脉沉。热而滞故脉细。一剂之后,滞气疏通,脉来活泼,故病愈也。四逆散,治肠痈初起。大黄牡丹汤,治肠痈将成。薏仁附子败酱散,治肠痈已成。各有层次,不可混乱。
疮科书以徐灵胎外科正宗、张山雷疮痈纲要为最好。按其所用药性,以伤寒论荣卫脏腑、中气阴阳,本气自病,虽实亦虚之理求之。认明阳证阴证,勿蹈拔毒外出之谬,而使中气消亡。勿犯先时溃口之戒,而致荣卫难复。便能学着其好处,疮科非热实脉实,大渴口臭,苔黄腹满便结,不可用凉药。凉药败中气,败荣卫,疮家大忌也。
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