"정규재, 그 사람은 악질이다" / 현성삼 변호사의 일갈 /왜 또 말도 안되는 주장으로 욕을 퍼먹을 까 / 아직도 그런 소리라면, 정말 대책이 없어 [공병호TV] https://youtu.be/WuknaaR6Ov0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 오늘 정부 개새끼들 아프간 난민 환영식 보여주기 쑈의 절정 찍음 돈많으면너먼저때려봐 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11363190555 강성국 법무부 차관이 27일 오전 충북 진천 국가공무원인재개발원에서 아프가니스탄 특별입국자 초기 정착 지원과 관련해 브리핑하는 도중 관계자가 뒤쪽에서 무릎을 꿇고 우산을 받쳐주고 있다. 2021.8.27 자국민은 개 씨발 똥으로 여기는 문재인식 정치 방송 내보내는거 때문에 저렇게 자국민 무릎 꿇리고 20분 넘게 행사했다고한다 이게 나라냐?? --->한국의 관료들은 썩을 대로 썩었다. 한국은 지금 조선시대로 회귀하고 있다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 조선일보 [단독] 송두환 인권위장 후보, ‘박원순 서울시’에서만 48건 수임 법률자문은 63건 전관 예우 논란...헌법재판관땐 임차인 주거안정법 “합헌” 변호사땐 “위헌” -->개법관들! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 속보- AZ백신맞고 집단 사망자 발생 정부는 책임회피 논란 진격일베짱 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11363182655 오늘 하루에만 몇명이 도대체 죽는거냐 함양서 AZ 백신 맞은 60대, 30분 만에 사망 기사입력 2021.08.27. 오후 2:16 제주서 AZ 2차 접종 60대 숨진 채 발견…관련성 조사 기사입력 2021.08.27. 오전 11:36 바다수영 즐기던 70대 AZ 2차 백신 맞고 사망, 유족 "억울" 기사입력 2021.08.27. 오전 5:01 바다수영까지 즐길정도면 나이를 떠나서 백신맞고 바로 사망했다면 백신이 원인이지 이걸 또 기저질환 탓하며 정부가 책임회피 보상도 못해준다면 국정조사 청문회 열어서 진짜 정은경이랑 문재인 사형시켜야함 마두로문두로 일베 댓글달기 이스라엘 백신 2차까지 60%인데 중환자 60%가 2차까지 접종자이고 하루 확진자 1만1천명 우리나라인구로하면 8만명인데 백신을 왜 맞냐? 그런데 좌빨들과 사기탄핵파들은 '그래서 백신을 더 맞아서 90%맞아야 집단면역이된다'라고하거나 '그래서 부스터샷을 맞아야된다'는 어거지결론을가지고 백신강제접종으로 가고있다 이게 전세계적으로 일어나는일이고 이제 싸우지않으면 당할수밖에 없는거같다 쥬예지이이이이잉 댓글달기 백신이 사기이든 아니든 어차피 백신을 맞아야 한다면, 백신 맞은 후 운동은 절대 삼가하고 1주일 이상 가급적 최소한의 움직임만 하며 생활하셈 이유 : 백신 부작용의 대부분이 심장 및 혈액 관련인데 백신을 맞고 나면 심장 쪽 부담이 존나 크다는 공통점이 있음 즉, 급격한 움직밈, 과격한 운동은 평상시와 달리 백신 맞고 난 뒤 충혈되고 약해져 있는 심장에 핵폭탄을 터트리는 것과 같은 영향을 끼친다는 거지 이게 늙은이들보다 젊은 사람들이 백신부작용으로 ㅁㅈㅎ되는 경우가 더 많은 것과도 관련이 있음 운동은 심장에 무리를 주는 펌프질을 더 많이 하게 함 그러므로 백신 맞으면 움직임을 최소화 하는 것이 매우 중요함 백신 맞기 전엔 별도의 약 같은 거 안 먹는 게 좋음. 그저 순간적인 면역력을 강화시켜주는 비타민C 같은 것만 좀 더 과량으로 섭취하는 정도로 그쳐야 함 그리고 백신 맞고 난 뒤엔 타이레놀 말고 아스피린을 준비해두는 것이 좋음 아스피린은 진통, 해열, 소염 + 혈액을 묽게 해주는 효과가 있는데 타이레놀은 진통, 해열 효과만 있고 소염 효과는 존나 미미함 백신 부작용은 혈전과 기능이 저하된 심장에 염증을 유발할 수도 있으므로 염증을 완화, 치료하는 소염 기능이 있는 아스피린이 효과적임 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [윤평중 칼럼] 누가 민주주의를 두려워하는가 민주주의의 처음이자 끝인 언론 자유 질식시킬 악법 앞장서거나 방조하면서 민주주의자일 순 없다 자유 언론 두려워하는 그가 바로 파시스트다 윤평중 한신대 교수·정치철학 조선일보 --->윤평중은 가짜 민주주의자이다. 이전에 문죄인을 옹호하는 글을 써서 비난을 받은 바가 있다. 아마 본인 자신이 자유민주제를 가장 두려워할 것이다. 조선에 글 쓰는 사람들은 한번쯤 의심해 보아야 한다. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 부정선거 없다 / 음모론자라고 맹비난하던 / 조갑제, 요즘 왜 조용한가 / 뜬금없이 내년 대선 부정선거 조심해야 한다고 주장 / 이게 무슨 자다가 봉창두드리는 소린가 [공병호TV] --->아마도 다시 우파로 위장할 필요가 생긴 듯하다. 조갑제, 저 사람은 매우 교활한 좌파이다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 서평: 스탈린의 전쟁: 새로운 2차대전사 기존의 2차대전에 대한 평가는 미국이 소련과 연합해 악당 히틀러를 퇴치한 전쟁으로 본다. 그리고 스탈린은 동맹의 상대로서 고마운 존재로까지 승격된다. 하지만 새로운 2차대전사를 쓴 션 맥미킨Sean McMeekin은 기존의 2차대전관을 부정한다. 그에 따르면 철저한 막시스트인 스탈린은 자본주의 세계를 무너뜨리기 위해, 1939년 독일과 불가침조약을 맺어, 독일이 마음 놓고 폴란드를 침공할 수 있도록 했다. 그리고 독일이 영국 및 프랑스와 길고긴 소모전으로 국력을 탕진하면, 나중에 러시아가 세계 공산주의 혁명과 영토의 확장을 실행하려 했다는 것이다. 또 맥미킨에 따르면 히틀러에 못지 않게 스탈린 역시 독일 침공을 염두에 두고 병력을 배치했다는 것이다. 또 연합국의 무조건 항복 정책과 독일의 농업국가화를 겨냥한 미 국무장관 모르겐타우 계획 등은 서부 전선에서 평화적인 전쟁 종료와 히틀러의 축출 기회를 모두 방해해서, 결론적으로 소련의 정책을 도왔다. 또 무조건 항복 정책으로 인해 태평양 전쟁을 더 연장시켰고, 전쟁 막바지에 스탈린은 참전을 선언해서 영토를 획득했다. 만일 1939년 소련이 핀란드를 공격했을 때, 영국과 프랑스가 러시아가 장악하고 있던 바쿠 유전을 공습했다면, 독일에 대한 러시아의 전쟁 능력을 손상시켜서, 독소 전쟁의 참상을 방지할 수 있었을 것이다. 또 스탈린이 일본과 맺은 중립 조약은 일본으로 하여금 영국과 미국에 대립하면서 동남아와 태평양으로 진출할 수 있는 기회를 주었다. 스탈린의 전쟁은 2차대전의 원인과 결과에 관심을 가진 사람은 반드시 읽어야 할 굉창한 책이다. Review: Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II David Gordon Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II by Sean McMeekin Basic Books, 2021 831 pp. Probably the dominant mainstream view of World War II goes like this. World War II was the “good war.” Though Joseph Stalin was guilty of many crimes, Adolf Hitler, with his vast conquests accompanied by mass murder on a colossal scale, was an immediate threat to Britain and the United States, and for this reason, an alliance with Stalin was the best course of action for these countries once Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Further, once the war became a struggle between the Allied and Axis powers, the Russians bore the brunt of the war. Given the immense losses of the Russian people, both soldiers and civilians, we should regard Stalin with something approaching gratitude, however much it goes against the grain to do so, owing to his leadership of his country during this life-and-death conflict. (The philosopher Susan Neiman in her book Learning From the Germans is a good example of this viewpoint. See my review here.) To say the least, this is not Sean McMeekin’s view. He is a historian who has written outstanding studies of the Russian Revolution, the origins of World War I, and the Ottoman Empire, characterized by extensive archival research in multiple languages. In Stalin’s War, he has outdone himself. It takes over twenty pages to list the archives he has consulted (pp. 767–88), and he has examined an immense number of printed collections of documents, memoirs, and secondary sources as well. He concludes that the mainstream position is false. Stalin, from his earliest days as a revolutionary in tsarist Russia, was a committed Marxist who sought the overthrow of the capitalist world. To that end, he sought to exacerbate tension between Hitler, eager to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles, and Britain and France. He accordingly signed a nonaggression pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939, freeing the Germans to attack Poland and, not incidentally, securing substantial territory for Russia. In the world war that began with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, he hoped that the Germans would find themselves in a prolonged struggle with Britain and France, leaving both sides exhausted and clearing the way for communist revolution and Russian expansion. When the Germans subdued France with unexpected quickness in 1940, Stalin pressed his own territorial and economic demands to such an extent that the pact with Germany was strained, a situation not resolved by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940, when Molotov’s intransigence surprised and dismayed Hitler. War between Russia and Germany became increasingly likely. McMeekin stresses that Stalin deployed his forces in a way that suggests that, like Hitler, he too had an attack in mind: it is wrong to think of Operation Barbarossa as an unprovoked German assault. After the Germans invaded Russia on June 22, 1941, both Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt did everything within their power to aid Stalin. Churchill had for many years suspended his anticommunism, viewing Hitler as the greater danger, and Roosevelt, even though America was not yet in the war, gave Russia aid on much better terms than he offered Britain, a pattern that continued throughout the war’s duration. The aid Stalin received proved essential to his ability to withstand the German onslaught and, eventually, mount a counterattack, but far from being grateful, he acted with complete disregard for American and British interests. As the war continued, the pattern of American and British subservience to the Soviets continued, and McMeekin shows how again and again Roosevelt and Churchill ignored the dictates of national interest to aid Stalin. Among the examples he discusses are the abandonment of the London Polish government in exile at Stalin’s behest, the support for Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia, and the undermining of the Nationalist Chinese government. As if this were not enough, the “unconditional surrender” policy and the Morgenthau Plan, calling for the pastoralization of Germany, also aided Soviet policy in that they impeded the chances of the overthrow of Hitler and a peaceful settlement of the war on the western front. Applied to Japan, unconditional surrender prolonged the war unnecessarily and enabled Stalin, who had done nothing to help the Allies during the war, to declare war at the last moment so that he could secure territorial gains for Russia. I have been able to give only a small sample of McMeekin’s vast canvas, and I have space to comment on only a few points of interest. Readers familiar with Mises’s socialist calculation argument may wonder how it was possible for Stalin to build up a tremendous military arsenal through central planning. Part of the answer lies in the concentration of resources on military goods, to the detriment of civilian consumption, but another part of the answer is more surprising. McMeekin notes that many American businessmen invested in Russia, helped Stalin construct factories, and even exported their own plants. Here the author appropriately makes use of the pioneering three-volume study of Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (1973), as well as his own archival research (p. 677n8. Sutton’s later work Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution [1974] also merits reading but should be used with caution). In considering the events leading up to the war, McMeekin asks, Why did Britain issue a guarantee to Poland in March 1939, when there was no prospect of Britain’s coming to Poland’s defense in the event of a German invasion? Further, the guarantee did not extend to Poland’s eastern borders: Why was it more important to defend Poland from German invasion than Russian? Russia did not accept the boundaries in place after the Russo-Polish war of 1920 and wanted at least a restoration of the Curzon line boundaries of the Versailles settlement. By the way, much of the work at that conference in determining the Curzon line boundaries was done by the great Kant scholar H.J. Paton. In answer to the question of why Britain issued the guarantee, I would like to call attention to the important study by Simon Newman, March 1939: The Guarantee to Poland, (1976) suggesting that the Chamberlain government was quite willing to engage in war with Germany. In this connection, the influence of Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, who, as R.A. Butler notes in his memoirs, was the dominant influence on British foreign policy in the months after the Munich conference, should not be overlooked. McMeekin makes an intriguing remark about the effect of British pressure: “It is significant that Hitler displayed cold feet in the last days of August 1939, sensing that he was leading Germany into a larger conflict than he had bargained for” (p. 93). One of the key points in the book is the importance of control of resources such as aluminum and oil in carrying on war. In this regard McMeekin suggests that a concerted strike by the British and French against the Baku oil fields, controlled by Russia, after Stalin’s invasion of Finland in November 1939, could have crippled Russia’s ability to wage war against Germany and thus averted the horrors of the Russo-German war. “But the Allies missed their chance…. It had been a close call for Communism in its existential struggle with the capitalist world, but Stalin’s wiles had seen off real and potential threats and restored the Soviet position” (p. 155). McMeekin, in his assessment of Stalin’s policy aims before the German invasion, makes use of the excellent book by Ernst Topitsch, Stalin’s War (1987), citing his report of Stalin’s May 5, 1941, speech to the Soviet military graduates that makes clear his aggressive aims (p. 675n5). Contrary to the review of Topitsch’s book by Gerhard Weinberg in the American Historical Review (June 1989), Topitsch was by no means a Nazi ideologue. To the contrary, he was a philosopher sympathetic to the Vienna Circle logical empiricists and wrote critically of Nazi ideology. Not only did Stalin have hostile intentions toward Germany, he showed little desire for good relations with Britain and the United States. Stalin’s neutrality pact with Japan, signed by Stalin and Japanese foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka on April 13, 1941, was hostile to American interests. “With its position in Manchuria secure, Japan was now free, if it wished—and Stalin’s hint could not have been clearer—to strike into Southeast Asia and the Pacific against British and US interests” (p. 258). Matsuoka, by the way, spent his teenage years in pleasant circumstances in Portland, Oregon, and spoke fluent English. Stalin wished to embroil the United States and Japan in conflict, since peace between the two countries might encourage Japan to move against Russia. An uncompromising American policy of resistance to Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia was thus in his interest, and the communist agent Harry Dexter White, ensconced at the Treasury Department, drafted a memorandum in June 1941 that was the basis of secretary of state Cordell Hull’s demand to the Japanese on November 26, 1941, that they withdraw totally from their conquests, an ultimatum that led the Japanese to look on war with the United States as inevitable. Anthony Kubek’s How the Far East Was Lost (1972), which McMeekin lists in his bibliography, has a valuable chapter, actually written by Stephen H. Johnsson, on White’s activities in fomenting conflict between the United States and China. More generally, Charles Callan Tansill’s Back Door to War (1952), based on extensive research in the US State Department Archives, has a long account of Japanese peace efforts prior to Pearl Harbor. Tansill, once esteemed as one of America’s foremost diplomatic historians, is today seldom cited. As mentioned above, the author has rightly stressed the uncritical American and British attitude toward the Yugoslavian partisans led by Tito. The author’s excellent discussion supports the earlier study of Slobodan Draskovich, Tito: Moscow’s Trojan Horse (1957). Draskovich was the son of a Serbian minister of the interior who had been assassinated in 1921 and the brother of Milorad Drachkovitch, for many years a fellow at the Hoover Institution. More generally, later archival research has supported the findings of “premature anti-Communists” during and immediately after the war. The author’s comments on Major George Racey Jordan, who protested American shipments of uranium and other materials needed to construct atomic weapons (pp. 532–34), and on the protests on Pennsylvania governor George H. Earle to Roosevelt on unconditional surrender (p. 451 and, especially, p. 737n31) should be consulted on this point. I shall close with a remark that students of free market economics will find intriguing. McMeekin says, “[T]he proto-Keynesian fallback argument one sometimes hears—that the mobilization of the ‘arsenal of democracy’ brought the United States (and later world) economy out of the Depression in a way Roosevelt’s New Deal did not—rests ultimately on the broken-window fallacy identified by Frédéric Bastiat” (p. 664). Stalin’s War is a magnificent book and everyone interested in the causes and consequences of World War II—and what reasonable person could not be?—should read it. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------