공산화된 방송을 보고도 무심한 한국인들 이 같은 상태는 박근혜 정부에서도 마찬가지였다. 사장은 인민위원회의 기능을 하는 노조들에 둘러싸여 감시를 받으며 겨우 겨우 공영 방송의 체면을 유지하는 정도였다. 조금만 노조에 거슬리는 행동을 하면 폭로가 이어지고 이를 해명하면서 양보하고 그런 식으로 방송들이 운영되었다. 그렇게 명맥만 유지하던 공영 방송들은 문재인 정권이 들어서자마자 노조 지배의 방송으로 완전하게 바뀌어 버렸다.   Communism is worker control of the means of production.   공산주의라는 것은 노동자들이 생산 수단을 지배하는 것을 의미한다.   생산 수단의 공동 소유 또는 생산 수단의 노동자 지배, 이것은 공산 혁명의 최종 목표다. 한국의 공영 방송이 노동자들에 의해 서비스를 제작(생산)하는 전파, 장비, 건물, 경영권 등이 장악됐다는 것은 사실상 방송국이 공산화되었다는 것을 의미한다. 공산화를 위한 수단으로서의 방송 장악이며, 스스로 공산화에 성공을 한 것이다. 노동자들이 이사들을 갈아 치운다는 것은 주인을 갈아 치우는 것과 동일한 것이다. 이런 상태의 공산주의는 공산주의 가운데서도 가장 마르크스주의에 가까운 공산주의 형태다.     왜 한국 사회는 사회 각 분야에서 이처럼 명백하게 공산화가 진행되는데도 별다른 저항이 없을까? 그 이유는 여러가지가 있겠지만 무엇보다도 이념에 대한 프레임이 장착되지 못했기 때문이다. 한국인들은 이념을 기준으로 싸우는 것이 아니라 사람을 기준으로 싸우다 보니 이념은 사람을 기준으로 파편화되어 있다.  (월명, 조갑제닷컴 발췌) --------------------------------------------------------------------------   이 정권의 4대 핵심 키위드가 있다고 합니다.   정치는 보복,   경제는 무능,   외교는 굴욕,   사회는 재앙,      이런 말들이 회자될 때 정권은 무너집니다. 명심하십시요. 홍준표(자유한국당 대표) 페이스북                               ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 엘리자베스 키이스가 그린 1920년 경 한국 풍경 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 김미영 제가 유영하 변호사에 대해 문제제기를 시작한 것은 재판 초기부터입니다. 그러나 왜 모기만한 소리로 말했을까요? 소위 우파들에게 다구리당하지 않기 위해. 더 많은 사실을 알지만 말 안 합니다. 대중들은 진실을 소화할 수 있는 내장을 대부분 갖고 있지 않고 거짓과 쇼에 돈을 지불하고라도 집중하기 때문입니다. 우종창 기자가 중요한 얘기를 몇 가지 잘 말씀해 주고 계십니다. 꼭 들어보시기 바랍니다. 제가 이 얘기를 늘어놓기 싫어하는 가장 큰 이유는 유영하라는 인물은 제가 흥미를 느끼지 못하는 인간 유형이기 때문입니다. 너무 빤하다고 할까요? 우종창 기자도 잘못 말씀하시는 것이 있군요. 다른 변호인들도 여러번 박대통령을 만났습니다. 다같이도 만나고 독대도 하고. 도태우 변호사도 한 차례 길게 만났고 유변을 제외하고 다른 변호사끼리도 만났습니다. 한 가지 더. 한변을 만든 건 채명성 변호사가 아니라 김태훈 변호사일 것입니다. 도태우 변호사는 한변 출신이 아니고 제3의 인물의 추천으로 민사와 형사를 모두 맡게 되었습니다. 유영하 변호사는 다른 변호사들이 밤새 준비한 변론을 가져가 자신의 것으로 하고 다른 변호인들의 입을 막기도 하는 전횡을 하는가 하면 [내 친정이 검찰이다. 검찰과 척지면 돌아갈 데가 없다]는 말같지도 않은 말을 늘어놓는가 하면 김한수 진실에 관해서는 충격적인 자백을 다른 변호사에게 털어놓기도 합니다. 검찰 편에 서서 철저히 다른 변호사들을 우습게 여기고 태극기를 들고 진실을 구하겠다고 나선 국민들을 능멸했습니다. 그러나 여러분 제발 충격도 받지 말고 절망도 하지 마십시오. 그래서 우리가 박근혜 대통령 공정재판을 위한 법률지원단을 만들어 재판 내내 유영하를 견제하고 결국 테블릿PC 포렌식을 받아내지 않았습니까? 지는 것같지만 이깁니다. 박근혜 대통령은 독특한 분입니다. 잘 모르지만 또 알고 있습니다. 역사의 거대한 물결과 함께 가는 존재가 주는 불가사의를 느낍니다. 그러나 우리는 박근혜 개인 우상화를 통해 권력을 추구하는 사람들을 미워합니다. 우리는 박대통령의 애국심과 결백을 믿고 그 분을 구해 드리는 것이 이 나라를 살리는 길임을 알기 때문에 묵묵히 동행합니다. 궁극적으로 박대통령과 우리는 대한민국을 사랑함으로써 함께 고난의 길을 걷고 있는 순례자일 뿐이지요. 심기일전하시고 끝까지 가서 승리합시다! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 갈 데까지 간 좌파들을 행태. -------------------------------------------------------------- 이번 트럼프의 세금 감면으로 한 직원이 1,000 달러를 더 받게 되었다. 민주당의 낸시 펠로시는 이런 것을 별거 아니라고 하지만, 서민들에게 대단히 힘이 되는 일이다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 모든 종류의 이민을 허용해야 한다는 민주당. -------------------------------------------------------------------------          불법 이민의 신화 http://victorhanson.com/wordpress/mythologies-of-illegal-immigration/ ------------------------------------------------------------

스튜어트 밀은 가장 검열이 심한 19세기 도덕가 중의 한 사람이었다.

밀이 사상의 자유를 주창한 이유는 종교적 신념을 타파하고, 그 대신에 이타주의와 기타 고상한 도덕에 기반한 사회 질서를 세우기 위한 것이었다.

정치학자 라이더Raeder의 분석에 따르면 밀은 자유의 진실한 벗이 아니었다.

자유주의가 그 반대 의미를 가지게 된 결정적인 원인은 스튜어트 밀에 있다.

 

 

John Stuart Mill and the New Liberalism

 

 

•Ralph Raico

 

 

Much of the confusion prevailing in the historical study of liberalism can be traced to John Stuart Mill, who occupies a vastly inflated position in the conception of liberalism entertained by English-speaking peoples. This "saint of rationalism" is responsible for key distortions in the liberal doctrine on a number of fronts. In economics, Mill's opinion that "the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade," provided ammunition for the protectionist arsenal, and accepted and even elaborated socialist arguments (Mill 1977: p. 293; Mises 1978a: p. 195; Raeder 2002: p. 357 n. 76 and p. 374 n. 23; and especially Rothbard 1995 2: pp. 277–85).3

 

Mill rejected the liberal notion of the long-run harmony of the interests of all social classes, including entrepreneurs and workers, on the grounds that "to say that they have same interest … is to say that it is the same thing to a person's interest whether a sum of money belongs to him or to someone else" (Ashcraft 1989: p. 114). Following that odd and shortsighted reasoning would reveal a very large number of hitherto unsuspected conflicts of interest in society (e.g., between any two people who passed each other in the street). Indeed, in arguing that anticapitalism is one of the hallmarks of liberalism, Alan Ryan (1993: p. 302) invokes none other than John Stuart Mill, who wrote (1965: p. 209), "The generality of laborers in this and most other countries have as little choice of occupation and freedom of locomotion … as they could … on any system short of actual slavery" — this at a time when English and other "serfs" were migrating in the millions to the towns and cities and even to foreign lands.

 

In international affairs, Mill repudiated the liberal principle of nonintervention in foreign wars, whose most trenchant exponent was Richard Cobden (1973). Where Cobden feared that such entanglements would undermine liberty at home, Mill provided interventionists with what has become a favorite argument — that a strong and free country like Britain has a moral obligation to come to the aid of peoples struggling for their freedom if they are threatened by outside powers. That such a standing policy of intervention would most likely compromise domestic freedom was not a problem that Mill, or those who have followed his lead, cared to address.

 

Worst of all was Mill's deformation of the concept of liberty itself. Liberty, it seems, is a condition that is threatened not only by physical aggression on the part of the state or other institutions or individuals. Rather, "society" often poses even graver dangers to individual freedom. This it achieves through "the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling," the tendency "to impose, by other ways than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them," to "compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own" (1977: p. 220). True liberty requires "autonomy," for adopting "the traditions or customs of other people" is simply to engage in "ape-like" imitation.

 

Where others see men and women choosing goals laid out for them by institutions whose authority over them they freely accept, Mill perceives the extinction of freedom. In a striking and utterly preposterous illustration, the saint of rationalism writes, "An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement a slave of his order" (1977: p. 308). One wonders what is supposed to follow from this. Must we form abolitionist associations to emancipate the willing "slaves" of the Society of Jesus? How should we go about selecting our John Brown to lead the storming of the slave-pits of Fordham and Georgetown Universities? One wonders by what right Mill and his alter ego Harriet Taylor could ever have imagined themselves entitled to legislate on the status of members of Catholic or Orthodox orders, of Orthodox Jews and devout Muslims, or of any other believers.

 

His comment on the Jesuits illustrates a facet of Mill too rarely noticed — he was, in the words of Maurice Cowling, "one of the most censorious of nineteenth century moralists." He constantly passed judgment on the habits, attitudes, preferences, and moral standards of great numbers of people of whom he knew nothing. As Cowling dryly observes, "Bigotry and prejudice are not necessarily the best descriptions of opinions which Comtean determinism has stigmatized as outdated" (1963: pp. 143–44, emphasis in original).

 

In a posthumously published work, Joseph Hamburger (1999) examines the "dark side" of John Stuart Mill. Here Hamburger, who tells us that he long entertained the conventional view of Mill as a consummate proponent of individual freedom, analyzes Mill's On Liberty, but also his other writings and letters and the reports of his intimate friends. His conclusion is that the freedom of opinion espoused in On Liberty was largely part of Mill's grand strategy — to demolish religious faith, especially Christianity, and received mores, on the way to erecting a social order based on "the religion of humanity." True individuality would be incarnated in the future "Millian man," dreamt of by Mill and Harriet Taylor, a being in whom selfishness and greed would be replaced by altruism and the constant cultivation of the loftier faculties.

 

"For a century now, controversy has raged over the true meaning of liberalism."

 

The pioneering revisionism of Cowling and Hamburger has been confirmed by Linda C. Raeder. In her John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity (2002), Raeder thoroughly examines all of Mill's major works and other relevant materials to uncover the pattern behind Mill's "self-avowed eclecticism" and his easy employment of "the idiom of the liberal tradition he knew so well." This pattern she finds in the early and permanent influence on Mill of philosophers Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. The notion of progress entertained by these positivist philosophers was the steady advance to a this-worldly "religion of humanity" in which all of mankind would instinctively share. Mill's "aspirations for human beings were not for the flowering of their unique individuality but for their conformity to his personal ideal of value and service." In the end, Raeder concludes (p. 338), Mill was no "true friend of liberty."

---> 하이에크의 책 <과학의 반혁명>에 이미 밀이 콩뜨의 영향을 받았다는 사실이 적시되어 있다.

 

The fateful linking of liberalism to an adversarial stance vis-à-vis received religion, tradition, and social norms is due to John Stuart Mill more to than anyone else. It has unfortunately become standard. In a typical example, Owen Chadwick, Dixie Professor Emeritus of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge, writes (1975: p. 22),

 

A liberal was one who wanted more liberty, that is, more freedom from restraint; whether the restraint was exercised by police, or by law, or by social pressure, or by an orthodoxy of opinion which men assailed at their peril. … The liberal thought that men needed far more room to act and think than they were allowed by established laws and conventions in European society.

 

Note how in this statement no distinction is made between state coercion on the one hand, and social pressure, orthodox opinion, and conventions on the other. John Dunn states (1979: p. 29, emphasis in original),

 

 

If the central dispositional value of liberals is tolerance [sic], their central political value is perhaps a fundamental antipathy towards authority in any of its forms. … Dispositionally, liberalism has little regard for the past.

 

So much for Macaulay, Thierry, Lecky, Acton, and the other great liberal historians of the 19th century. Descriptions such as Chadwick's and Dunn's are much more expressive of the "antinomian" mentality of contemporary Western academics than of liberalism historically.

 

Mill's view tends to erase the rather critical distinction between "incurring social disapproval and incurring imprisonment" (Burke 1994: p. 30),9 and leads to pitting liberalism against innocent, noncoercive traditional values and arrangements, especially religious ones. It also forges an offensive alliance between liberalism and the state, even if contrary to Mill's intentions, since it is hard to see how one can be sure of uprooting traditional norms except through the massive use of political power. Contemporary writers like Steven Lukes, committed to the Millian project of enjoining "autonomy," do not shrink from advocating this course, presumably unaware of its totalitarian implications.

 

It is not disputed that the popular meaning of liberal has changed drastically over time. It is a well-known story how, around 1900, in English-speaking countries and elsewhere, the term was captured by writers who were essentially social democrats. Joseph Schumpeter (1954: p. 394) ironically observed that the enemies of the system of free enterprise paid it an unintended compliment when they applied the name liberal to their own creed, historically the opposite of what liberalism stood for from the start.

 

For a century now, controversy has raged over the true meaning of liberalism (Meadowcroft 1996b: p. 2). Stephen Holmes (1988: p. 101) scoffs at the dispute as involving nothing more than "bragging rights." That does not stop him, though, from joining others of the camp Schumpeter referred to in fighting to secure the label for themselves. There is a profound truth in Thomas Szasz's proposition (1973: p. 20): "In the animal kingdom, the rule is, eat or be eaten; in the human kingdom, define or be defined." This is nowhere clearer than in the "political kingdom."

 

How did this momentous transformation of the term liberal — what Paul Gottfried (1999: p. 29) calls "a semantic theft" — come about?

 

"The fateful linking of liberalism to an adversarial stance vis-à-vis received religion, tradition, and social norms is due to John Stuart Mill more to than anyone else."

 

This is the conventional interpretation — liberals from the 18th century on characteristically believed in laissez-faire. Beginning in the last decades of the 19th century, however, British thinkers like T.H. Green and L.T. Hobhouse (and their counterparts in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere) realized that laissez-faire was totally inadequate to the conditions of modern society. Often inspired by John Stuart Mill — in Hobhouse's reverent words (1964: p. 63), "The teaching of Mill brings us close to the heart of liberalism" — they undertook to give liberalism a more up-to-date shape. As one expositor of the conventional view has written,

 

 

The central value of the liberated individual, of man as far as possible his own sovereign, did not change; the understanding of that value and the means for achieving it did. (Smith 1968: p. 280)

 

In particular, the state, which earlier liberals had feared as the enemy of individual liberty, was now seen as a potent engine for furthering it in vital ways. The old liberalism gave way to the new.

 

The first thing to be pointed out is the political purpose behind the semantic change. It was to ease the way for the revolutionary extension of the state's agenda (ultimately, this has become in principle a limitless agenda). The crying need for such an extension, however, was grounded in a highly questionable theory, which is still operative. It is that the "old" liberalism of laissez-faire had been made obsolete by deep-seated changes in society. The pioneers of the "new liberalism" and their successors based their claims on the supposedly overwhelming power of business enterprise over consumers and workers. But, despite all their propaganda, such a power cannot be shown, empirically or theoretically, to exist (Rothbard 1970: pp. 168–73; Hutt 1954; Armentano 1982; Reynolds 1984: pp. 56–68; DiLorenzo and High, 1988).

 

Moreover, and decisively, the standard rationale for speaking of a "new liberalism" is analytically flawed. For the end of achieving "the liberated individual" cannot be definitive of liberalism. Other ideologies, among them communist anarchism and many varieties of socialism, share that end.

 

Consider this statement by Eduard Bernstein, the founder of revisionist socialism (1909: pp. 129, emphasis in original):

 

The development and protection of the free personality is the goal of all socialist measures, even of those which superficially appear to be coercive. A closer examination will always show that it is a question of a coercion that increases the sum of freedom in society, that gives more freedom, and to a wider group, than it takes away.

 

How does this differ from the standpoint of the "new liberals" for the past century and more? What divides liberalism from opposing ideologies is precisely its substantive program, the means it advocates — private property, the market economy, and the minimizing of the power of the state and of state-backed institutions.

 

In Anglophone countries, those who anywhere else would be straightforwardly identified as social democrats or democratic socialists shy away from acknowledging their proper name. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this is essentially a matter of political expediency. For some reason, labels suggestive of socialism have not been popular in countries of English heritage (cf. Gottfried 1999: p. 9).

 

This stark political fact was clear to Edward Bellamy, author of the socialist classic Looking Backward. In 1888, in a letter to William Dean Howells, Bellamy weighed what to call his doctrine. He rejected the term "socialist." That was a word he "never could well stomach," since it is foreign "in itself and equally foreign in all its suggestions." "Whatever German and French reformers may choose to call themselves, socialist is not a good name for a party to succeed with in America," he confided to Howells (Schiffman 1958: pp. 370–71). Bellamy chose instead the name "nationalist." Others, on similar grounds, have preferred the label "liberal."

 

The social-democratic commandeering of liberal met with great success, leading some laissez-faire liberals to incline towards describing themselves as individualists (Raico 1997). Amusingly, the next step was for socialists like John Dewey to try to capture that term as well. It turned out, according to Dewey, that there was an old individualism before the age of great corporations and modern social science; that kind must now be replaced by a new individualism (Dewey 1930).

 

One product of this "new individualism" would be "a coordinating and directive council in which captains of industry and finance would meet with representatives of labor and public officials to plan the regulation" of the economy. While this was obviously a replica of the corporate state that Mussolini was erecting in Italy, Dewey chose to ignore that parallel. The power center he proposed would have a voluntarist, and thus appropriately American, slant, as the United States set out constructively "upon the road which Soviet Russia is traveling" in such a deplorably destructive way (Dewey 1930: p. 118). So, after the concept of liberalism was transformed to exclude adherents of the market economy and private property, now individualism was also to be redefined, to the same end. It is almost as if socialists like Dewey were trying simply to define the advocates of free enterprise out of existence, and debate, altogether.