6·25 이후 최대의 혼란(混亂)과 위기(危機)
문무대왕(회원)
지금 대한민국은 6·25동란 이후 최대의 위기(危機)와 혼란(混亂)에 직면해 있다. 경제는 가라앉고 있고 교육은 기본(基本)이 무너지고 국가안보(國家安保)는 흔들리고 있다. 남북미(南·北·美) 정상회담이 몰고 온 회오리바람은 대한민국이란 거함(巨艦)이 어디로 흘러갈지 모르는 예측불허의 풍파(風波)를 일으키고 있다.
한반도 정세가 이처럼 급박하게 돌아 간적이 6·25동란 이후 처음이고 심지어 위기감마저 들게 한다. 국내정세의 혼란스러움도 극에 달했다. 2명의 대통령을 구속시키고도 한이 차지 않아 전직 대법원장에게까지 숙청의 칼날을 들이대고 있다. 6·25동란 이후 최대의 혼란과 위기에 대해 밤잠 이루지 못하는 국민들이 늘어나고 있다. 깨어 있는 국민이라야 나라를 지켜낼 수 있다.
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이자지급 없는 박원순 부부의 이상한 사채
기탁금반환 조항도 기자들에 거짓해명
- 변희재 mediasilkhj@gmail.com
- 등록 2013.04.02 17:28:51
“(전체 꼴찌가) 자랑스럽다. 그 흔한 위장전입 한 번 하지 않았고 주식 한 번 사본 적이 없고 부동산 투기 제대로 하지 못했으니 어찌 보면 바보고 어찌 보면 참 다행이다”
박원순 서울시장은 전체 공개 대상 고위공직자 1933명 가운데 가장 재산이 적은 5억9474만원의 부채를 총재산으로 신고했다. 한 해 전인 2011년 말보다 빚이 2억8417만원 늘어났다. 이에 대해 박시장은 “자랑스럽”다고 자랑했고, 한겨레, 오마이뉴스 등 친노종북 언론은 물론 심지어 조선일보가지 찬양보도를 쏟아냈다.
그러나 공개된 재산 목록을 하나하나 따져보면 정상적인 재산관리로 보기엔 석연치 않은 대목이 눈에 띈다. 특히 기탁금 반환 조항 같은 것은 박원순 시장 측이 기자들에 정치자금법 조항을 잘못 알려주어, 언론사 전체가 연쇄오보를 내기도 했다.
박원순 서울시장 측, 정치자금법 상 기탁금 반환 조항 기자들에 거짓 해명
박원순 시장 본인의 예금이 후보자 선거 반환기탁금 및 보전 비용 중 일부를 사회복지기관에 기부하거나 펀드 상환에 써 1억6943만9천원에서 4426만9000원으로 줄었다고 신고했다. 이중 기부액수는 약 9천 2백만원 정도이고, 4천만원 가량이 서울시장 선거 때 모은 펀드의 이자 비용으로 지급됐을 것으로 파악된다.
문제는 이미 박원순 시장 본인이 신한은행, 농협 등에서 1억 5천만원 가량의 채무를 지고 있고, 부인 강난희씨의 경우 개인 간의 사채만 무려 4억 2천의 빚을 졌으면서, 대체 무슨 목적으로 1억원의 기부를 했냐는 것이었다.
이런 논란이 트위터에서 확산되자, 박원순 시장 측은 “반환 기탁금 및 보전 비용에 관한 규정을 보면, 무소속 후보자는 반환된 선거 기탁금을 정당이 아닌 국고에 귀속하거나 사회복지시설에 기부하게 돼 있다. 무소속으로 출마했던 박 시장도 돌려받은 선거비용 1억원 가까이를 여러 사회복지시설에 기부했다”고 해명, 한겨레, 데일리안 등등의 10여개 언론사가 그대로 받아적었다.
그러나 이는 사실과 다른 해명이다. 정치자금법 제 58조의 반환기탁금 규정은 다음과 같다.
“제58조(후보자의 반환기탁금 및 보전비용의 처리) ① 공직선거의 후보자가 후원회의 후원금 또는 정당의 지원금으로 「공직선거법」 제56조(기탁금)의 규정에 의한 기탁금을 납부하거나 선거비용을 지출하여 같은 법 제57조(기탁금의 반환 등) 또는 제122조의2(선거비용의 보전 등)의 규정에 의하여 반환·보전받은 경우 그 반환·보전비용 [자신의 재산(차입금을 포함한다)으로 지출한 비용을 모두 공제한 잔액을 말한다]은 선거비용을 보전받은 날부터 20일 이내(이하 이 조에서 "인계기한"이라 한다)에 정당추천후보자는 소속정당에, 무소속후보자는 공익법인 또는 사회복지시설에 인계하여야 한다”
즉, 기탁금과 선거운동 비용을 후원금이나 정당 보조금으로 충당한 경우에만 각각 정당과 공익법인에 인계하도록 되어있는 것이다. 즉 자기 돈으로 선거를 치른 후보자는 반환받아 다시 자기 재산으로 귀속시킬 수 있고, 바로 이 조항은 개인돈을 들이지 않고도 선거를 치를 수 있도록 하는 선거공영제의 핵심조항이다.
즉, 박원순 시장이 자신의 돈으로 기탁금과 선거운동비용을 마련했다면, 공익법인에 인계해야할 이유가 없는 것이고, 만약 후원금 등으로 충당했으면 본인의 재산이 줄어들 이유가 없는 것이다. 박원순 시장측은 재산 신고란에는 “후보자선거 반환기탁금 및 보전비용 일부 사회복지관에 기부 및 펀드 상황”으로 기록해놓았다. ‘인계’가 아니라 ‘기부’라는 표현을 썼다는 것은 자기 자신의 재산으로 기부했다는 뜻이다. 박원순 시장의 부부는 채무만 6억원이 넘는 상황에서 추가로 1억원 가량의 돈을 기부하며 총채무가 7억 2천만으로 집계되었다.
이런 반환기탁금 관련 거짓해명은 박원순 시장의 김재춘 보좌관이 기자들에게 퍼뜨린 것으로 알려졌다.
부인 강난희씨의 사채 4억 2천만원에 대한 이자지급 내역 전혀 없어
더 이상한 점은 재산신고시 재산변동 사항으로 채무에 대한 이자지급이 전혀 없다는 점이다. 박원순 시장의 부인 강난희씨는 이미 서울시장 후보로 나서기 전부터, 인테리어 사업 자재구입 명목으로 사채만 4억 2천만원의 빚을 지고 있었다. 이번 재산신고에선 이중 7천만원을 갚았으나 여전히 사채가 3억 5천만원이다. 통상적인 개인간의 사채 이자율을 최소한으로 잡아도 연 10% 정도로 감안하고, 은행 채무를 연 5% 정도로 잡는다 해도, 박원순 시장 부부는 연 5천만원의 이자를 지급해야 한다.
현재 박원순 시장의 현금은 1억 6천 9백만원에서 4천 4백만으로 줄었고, 부인 강난희씨는 170만원에서 2500만원으로 오히려 늘었다. 이 현금의 흐름에서 매년 지급해야할 이자 5천만원이 완전히 제외된 것이다.
정치자금법상, 정치인은 돈을 빌릴 때, 차용증 작성은 물론 법정 이자도 정확히 지급해야 한다. 만약 이자를 지급하지 않고 있다면, 이것은 정치적 불법 후원금으로 간주되어, 정치자금법 위반으로 처벌받을 수 있는 사안이다.
또 하나 논란이 되는 점은, 박원순 서울시장이 우리은행으로부터 1억원의 대출을 받은 것. 이미 박원순 시장 개인이 1억 5천만원의 은행 빚을 지고 있어, 이 자체만으로도 서울시장의 연봉의 한계를 넘어선다. 더구나 부인 강난희씨는 3억 5천만원의 사채에 이번에 자신의 사업을 정리하면서 7천만원의 빚과 은행채무 4천만원을 더 지고 있다. 이런 빚더미에 오른 부부에게 우리은행은 1억원의 추가 대출을 해준 것이다. 박원순 시장 부부의 부동산은 경남 창녕의 약 4천만원 가량의 논이 전부이니 담보 대출일 가능성도 없다.
서울시 주거래 은행, 우리은행의 1억원 추가 대출도 특혜 논란
우리은행은 서울시의 주거래 은행이다. 박원순 시장은 1억원의 대출금으로 부인 강난희씨의 사업 부채를 정리했다고 신고했다. 6억원의 빚을 지고 있는 부부의 사업빚을 정리하기 위해 시중은행이 1억원의 추가대출을 담보없이 해주었다는 것은 평범한 서민으로서는 상상하기 어려운 행태이다.
한국인터넷미디어협회는, 서울시 측에 박원순 서울시장 부부의 이자지급 누락과, 정치자금법 상 기탁금 반환 조항을 잘못 설명한 부분에 대한 해명을 요청하는 공문을 보내기로 했다. 또한 공직자윤리위원회 측에는 박원순 서울시장의 이자지급 누락 등등을 재조사할 것을 요청할 것이고, 우리은행 측에도 서울시와의 특수 관계로 인한 특혜대출 여부를 묻는 공문을 발송할 계획이다.
박원순 서울시장은 전체 공개 대상 고위공직자 1933명 가운데 가장 재산이 적은 5억9474만원의 부채를 총재산으로 신고했다. 한 해 전인 2011년 말보다 빚이 2억8417만원 늘어났다. 이에 대해 박시장은 “자랑스럽”다고 자랑했고, 한겨레, 오마이뉴스 등 친노종북 언론은 물론 심지어 조선일보가지 찬양보도를 쏟아냈다.
그러나 공개된 재산 목록을 하나하나 따져보면 정상적인 재산관리로 보기엔 석연치 않은 대목이 눈에 띈다. 특히 기탁금 반환 조항 같은 것은 박원순 시장 측이 기자들에 정치자금법 조항을 잘못 알려주어, 언론사 전체가 연쇄오보를 내기도 했다.
박원순 서울시장 측, 정치자금법 상 기탁금 반환 조항 기자들에 거짓 해명
박원순 시장 본인의 예금이 후보자 선거 반환기탁금 및 보전 비용 중 일부를 사회복지기관에 기부하거나 펀드 상환에 써 1억6943만9천원에서 4426만9000원으로 줄었다고 신고했다. 이중 기부액수는 약 9천 2백만원 정도이고, 4천만원 가량이 서울시장 선거 때 모은 펀드의 이자 비용으로 지급됐을 것으로 파악된다.
문제는 이미 박원순 시장 본인이 신한은행, 농협 등에서 1억 5천만원 가량의 채무를 지고 있고, 부인 강난희씨의 경우 개인 간의 사채만 무려 4억 2천의 빚을 졌으면서, 대체 무슨 목적으로 1억원의 기부를 했냐는 것이었다.
이런 논란이 트위터에서 확산되자, 박원순 시장 측은 “반환 기탁금 및 보전 비용에 관한 규정을 보면, 무소속 후보자는 반환된 선거 기탁금을 정당이 아닌 국고에 귀속하거나 사회복지시설에 기부하게 돼 있다. 무소속으로 출마했던 박 시장도 돌려받은 선거비용 1억원 가까이를 여러 사회복지시설에 기부했다”고 해명, 한겨레, 데일리안 등등의 10여개 언론사가 그대로 받아적었다.
그러나 이는 사실과 다른 해명이다. 정치자금법 제 58조의 반환기탁금 규정은 다음과 같다.
“제58조(후보자의 반환기탁금 및 보전비용의 처리) ① 공직선거의 후보자가 후원회의 후원금 또는 정당의 지원금으로 「공직선거법」 제56조(기탁금)의 규정에 의한 기탁금을 납부하거나 선거비용을 지출하여 같은 법 제57조(기탁금의 반환 등) 또는 제122조의2(선거비용의 보전 등)의 규정에 의하여 반환·보전받은 경우 그 반환·보전비용 [자신의 재산(차입금을 포함한다)으로 지출한 비용을 모두 공제한 잔액을 말한다]은 선거비용을 보전받은 날부터 20일 이내(이하 이 조에서 "인계기한"이라 한다)에 정당추천후보자는 소속정당에, 무소속후보자는 공익법인 또는 사회복지시설에 인계하여야 한다”
즉, 기탁금과 선거운동 비용을 후원금이나 정당 보조금으로 충당한 경우에만 각각 정당과 공익법인에 인계하도록 되어있는 것이다. 즉 자기 돈으로 선거를 치른 후보자는 반환받아 다시 자기 재산으로 귀속시킬 수 있고, 바로 이 조항은 개인돈을 들이지 않고도 선거를 치를 수 있도록 하는 선거공영제의 핵심조항이다.
즉, 박원순 시장이 자신의 돈으로 기탁금과 선거운동비용을 마련했다면, 공익법인에 인계해야할 이유가 없는 것이고, 만약 후원금 등으로 충당했으면 본인의 재산이 줄어들 이유가 없는 것이다. 박원순 시장측은 재산 신고란에는 “후보자선거 반환기탁금 및 보전비용 일부 사회복지관에 기부 및 펀드 상황”으로 기록해놓았다. ‘인계’가 아니라 ‘기부’라는 표현을 썼다는 것은 자기 자신의 재산으로 기부했다는 뜻이다. 박원순 시장의 부부는 채무만 6억원이 넘는 상황에서 추가로 1억원 가량의 돈을 기부하며 총채무가 7억 2천만으로 집계되었다.
이런 반환기탁금 관련 거짓해명은 박원순 시장의 김재춘 보좌관이 기자들에게 퍼뜨린 것으로 알려졌다.
부인 강난희씨의 사채 4억 2천만원에 대한 이자지급 내역 전혀 없어
더 이상한 점은 재산신고시 재산변동 사항으로 채무에 대한 이자지급이 전혀 없다는 점이다. 박원순 시장의 부인 강난희씨는 이미 서울시장 후보로 나서기 전부터, 인테리어 사업 자재구입 명목으로 사채만 4억 2천만원의 빚을 지고 있었다. 이번 재산신고에선 이중 7천만원을 갚았으나 여전히 사채가 3억 5천만원이다. 통상적인 개인간의 사채 이자율을 최소한으로 잡아도 연 10% 정도로 감안하고, 은행 채무를 연 5% 정도로 잡는다 해도, 박원순 시장 부부는 연 5천만원의 이자를 지급해야 한다.
현재 박원순 시장의 현금은 1억 6천 9백만원에서 4천 4백만으로 줄었고, 부인 강난희씨는 170만원에서 2500만원으로 오히려 늘었다. 이 현금의 흐름에서 매년 지급해야할 이자 5천만원이 완전히 제외된 것이다.
정치자금법상, 정치인은 돈을 빌릴 때, 차용증 작성은 물론 법정 이자도 정확히 지급해야 한다. 만약 이자를 지급하지 않고 있다면, 이것은 정치적 불법 후원금으로 간주되어, 정치자금법 위반으로 처벌받을 수 있는 사안이다.
또 하나 논란이 되는 점은, 박원순 서울시장이 우리은행으로부터 1억원의 대출을 받은 것. 이미 박원순 시장 개인이 1억 5천만원의 은행 빚을 지고 있어, 이 자체만으로도 서울시장의 연봉의 한계를 넘어선다. 더구나 부인 강난희씨는 3억 5천만원의 사채에 이번에 자신의 사업을 정리하면서 7천만원의 빚과 은행채무 4천만원을 더 지고 있다. 이런 빚더미에 오른 부부에게 우리은행은 1억원의 추가 대출을 해준 것이다. 박원순 시장 부부의 부동산은 경남 창녕의 약 4천만원 가량의 논이 전부이니 담보 대출일 가능성도 없다.
서울시 주거래 은행, 우리은행의 1억원 추가 대출도 특혜 논란
우리은행은 서울시의 주거래 은행이다. 박원순 시장은 1억원의 대출금으로 부인 강난희씨의 사업 부채를 정리했다고 신고했다. 6억원의 빚을 지고 있는 부부의 사업빚을 정리하기 위해 시중은행이 1억원의 추가대출을 담보없이 해주었다는 것은 평범한 서민으로서는 상상하기 어려운 행태이다.
한국인터넷미디어협회는, 서울시 측에 박원순 서울시장 부부의 이자지급 누락과, 정치자금법 상 기탁금 반환 조항을 잘못 설명한 부분에 대한 해명을 요청하는 공문을 보내기로 했다. 또한 공직자윤리위원회 측에는 박원순 서울시장의 이자지급 누락 등등을 재조사할 것을 요청할 것이고, 우리은행 측에도 서울시와의 특수 관계로 인한 특혜대출 여부를 묻는 공문을 발송할 계획이다.
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현직 대법관 7명, 김명수 대법원장 행보에 반발…"檢 수사 반대"
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조갑제
https://youtu.be/o4zyfdXa4sA
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“Epic and debate-shifting.” —David Brooks, New York Times
"More than any book published so far in this century, it deserves to be called a conservative classic." —Yuval Levin, National Review
With his trademark blend of political history, social science, economics, and pop culture, two-time NYT bestselling author, syndicated columnist, National Review senior editor, and American Enterprise Institute fellow Jonah Goldberg makes the timely case that America and other democracies are in peril as they lose the will to defend the values and institutions that sustain freedom and prosperity. Instead we are surrendering to populism, nationalism and other forms of tribalism.
Only once in the last 250,000 years have humans stumbled upon a way to lift ourselves out of the endless cycle of poverty, hunger, and war that defines most of history—in 18th century England when we accidentally discovered the miracle of liberal democratic capitalism.
As Americans we are doubly blessed that those radical ideas were written into the Constitution, laying the groundwork for our uniquely prosperous society:
· Our rights come from God not from the government.
· The government belongs to us; we do not belong to the government.
· The individual is sovereign. We are all captains of our own souls.
· The fruits of our labors belong to us.
In the last few decades, these political virtues have been turned into vices. As we are increasingly taught to view our traditions as a system of oppression, exploitation and “white privilege,” the principles of liberty and the rule of law are under attack from left and right.
At a moment when authoritarianism, tribalism, identity politics, nationalism, and cults of personality are rotting our democracy from within, Goldberg exposes the West’s suicidal tendencies on both sides of the ideological aisle. For the West to survive, we must renew our sense of gratitude for what our civilization has given us and rediscover the ideals that led us out of the bloody muck of the past – or back to the muck we will go.
Suicide is painless, liberty takes work.
아마존의 책 홍보 글
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Will Trump Fire John Bolton Next?
케인즈 경제학의 모순
케인즈의 신 경제학은 시장에서 정부로, 또 시장 가격에 있어서 경제적으로 정당한 변화에서 정부 지출에 있어서 정치적으로 정당한 변화로 관심을 돌렸다.
존 스튜어트 밀이나 미제스, 하이에크 등 케인즈 이전의 경제학자들은 결핍의 개념을 강조했는데, 이는 소비재의 생산과 투자재의 생산 사이의 근본적인 맞교환을 의미한다. 한 가지를 더 얻게 되면, 다른 한 가지는 그만큼 덜 얻게 되는 것이다.
플랜트와 장비의 추가적인 건설은 반드시 증가된 저축에 의해 수행되어야 하는데, 이는 다시 말하면 현행 소비를 감소해야 한다는 것이다.
하지만 케인즈의 총합aggregates은 자원의 시제時際적 배분과 거시경제적 안정에 필수적인 이런 메커니즘을 은폐하고 만다.
케인즈 이론에서는 소비와 투자 사이의 맞교환이 사라져버리고, 더 많은 투자를 하면 더 많은 소득이 나오고, 그것은 다시 더 많은 소비를 낳고, 그 소비는 다시 더 많은 투자를 유발한다고 되어 있다. 하지만 이것은 시장 경제의 근본적인 불안정을 의미한다.
케인즈의 승수 이론은 소비와 투자의 실제 수준을 결정하는 게 무엇인지, 또는 그들이 왜 상승하거나 감소하는지 등을 설명하지 못한다.
윌리엄 허트와 하이에크는 케인즈 이론을 “방치된 자원의 이론” 또는 “풍요의 경제학”이라고 불렀다.
케인즈 정책은 일단의 자기 정당화 정책 처방전일 뿐이다.
정치적으로 볼 때, 케인즈 정책을 옹호하고 이행하는 것은 선거 승리의 최고의 방법이다.
이 정책은 효과가 금방 나타나지만, 그로 인한 비용은 나중에 발생하고, 전체 인구에 고르게 분산되어서, 주민들이 그 정책과 그 장기적 부작용과의 관계를 알아채지 못한다.
The Absurdity of Keynesian Economics
•Roger W. Garrison
The economics of John Maynard Keynes as taught to university sophomores for the last several decades is now nearly defunct in theory but not in practice. Keynes’s 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, portrayed the market as fundamentally unstable and touted government as the stabilizer. The stability that allegedly lay beyond the market’s reach was to be supplied by the federal government’s macroeconomic policymakers—the president (with guidance from his Council of Economic Advisers), the Congress, and the Federal Reserve.
The acceptance in the economics profession of fundamentalist Keynesianism peaked in the 1960s. In recent decades, enthusiasm for Keynes has waxed and waned as proponents have tried to get new ideas from the General Theory or to read their own ideas into it. And although the federal government has long since become a net supplier of macroeconomic instability, the institutions and policy tools that were fashioned to conform to the Keynesian vision have become an integral part of our economic and political environment.
A national income accounting system, devised with an eye to Keynesian theory, allowed statisticians to chart the changes in the macroeconomy. Dealing in terms of an economy-wide total, or aggregate, policy advisers tracked the production of goods and services bought by consumers, investors, and the government. Fiscal and monetary authorities were to spring into action whenever the economy’s actual, or measured, total output, which was taken to reflect the demand side of markets, fell short of its potential output, which was estimated on the basis of the supply side. Cutting taxes would allow consumers and investors to spend more; government spending would add directly to the total; printing money or borrowing it would facilitate the opposing movements in the government’s revenues and its expenditures.
A chronic insufficiency of aggregate demand, which implies that prices and wages are somehow stuck above their market-clearing levels, was believed to be the normal state of affairs. Why might there be such pricing problems on an economy-wide scale? What legislation and government institutions might be standing in the way of needed market adjustments? These questions were eclipsed by the more politically pressing question of how to augment demand so as to clear markets at existing prices. The New Economics of Keynes shifted the focus of attention from the market to the government, from economically justified changes in market pricing to politically justified changes in government spending.
Politicians still appeal to basic Keynesian notions to justify their interventionist schemes. The continued use of demand-management policies aimed at stimulating economic activity—spending newly printed or borrowed money during recessions and before elections—requires that we understand what Keynesian economics is all about and how it is flawed. Also, identifying the flaws at the sophomore level helps students to evaluate in their upper-level and graduate courses such modern modifications as Post-, Neo-, and New Keynesianism as well as some strands of Monetarism.
The extreme level of aggregation in Keynesian economics leaves the full range of choices and actions of individual buyers and sellers hopelessly obscured. Keynesian economics simply does not deal with supply and demand in the conventional sense of those terms. Instead, the entire private sector is analyzed in terms of only two categories of goods: consumption goods and investment goods. The patterns of prices within these two mammoth categories are simply dropped out of the picture. To make matters worse, the one relative price that is retained in this formulation—the relative value of consumer goods to investment goods as expressed by the interest rate—is assumed either not to function at all or to function perversely.
Keynes’s Neglect of Scarcity
Pre-Keynesian economics, such as that of John Stuart Mill, as well as most contemporaneous theorizing, such as that by Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek, emphasized the notion of scarcity, which implies a fundamental trade-off between producing consumption goods and producing investment goods. We can have more of one but only at the expense of the other. The construction of additional plant and equipment must be facilitated by increased savings—that is, by a decrease in current consumption. Such investment, of course, makes it possible for future consumption to increase. Identifying the market mechanisms that allocate resources over time is fundamental to our understanding of the market process in its capacity to tailor production decisions to consumption preferences. But as Hayek noted early on, the Keynesian aggregates serve to conceal these very mechanisms so essential to the intertemporal allocation of resources and hence to macroeconomic stability.
In Keynesian theory the long-established notion of a trade-off between consuming and investing is simply swept aside. Consistent with the assumed perversity of the price mechanism, the levels of consumption and investment activities are believed always to move in the same direction. More investment generates more income, which finances more consumption; more consumption stimulates more investment. This feature of Keynesian theory implies an inherent instability in market economies. Thus the theory cannot possibly explain how a healthy market economy functions—how the market process allows one kind of activity to be traded off against the other.
The “Multiplier-Accelerator” Theory
The inherent instability makes its textbook appearance as the interaction between the “multiplier,” through which investment affects consumption, and the “accelerator,” through which consumption affects investment. The multiplier effect is derived from the simple fact that one person’s spending becomes another person’s earnings, which, in turn, allows for further spending. Any increase in spending, then, whether originating from the private or public sector, gets multiplied through successive rounds of income earning and consumption spending.
The accelerator mechanism is a consequence of the durability of capital goods, such as plant and equipment. For instance, a stock of ten machines, each of which lasts ten years, can be maintained by purchasing one new machine each year. A slight but permanent increase in consumer demand for the output of the machines of, say, 10 percent, will justify maintaining a capital stock of eleven machines. The immediate result, then, will be an acceleration of current demand for new machines from one to two, an increase of 100 percent.
The multiplier-accelerator theory explains why consumption is increasing, given that investment is increasing, and why investment is increasing, given that consumption is increasing. But it is incapable of explaining what determines the actual levels of consumption and investment (except in terms of one another), why either should be increasing or decreasing, or how both can increase at the same time. Students are left with the general notion that the two magnitudes, investment and consumption, can feed on one another, in which case the economy is experiencing an economic expansion, or they can starve one another, in which case the economy is experiencing an economic contraction. That is, Keynesian theory explains how the multiplier-accelerator mechanism makes a good situation better or a bad situation worse, but it never explains why the situation should be good or bad in the first place.
Only at the two extremities in the level of economic activity is a change in direction of both consumption and investment sure to occur. After a long contraction, unemployment is pervasive and capital depreciation reaches critical levels. As production essential for capital replacement stimulates further economic activity, the macroeconomy begins to spiral upward. After a long expansion, the economy is bulging at the seams. Markets are glutted with both consumers’ and producers’ goods. As unsold inventories trigger production cutbacks and worker layoffs, the macroeconomy begins to spiral downward. Keynes held that the economy normally fluctuates well within these two extremes experiencing a general insufficiency—and an occasional supersufficiency—of aggregate demand.
Textbook Keynesianism
In the simplistic formulations of macroeconomic textbooks, investment is simply “given”; in Keynes’s own formulation, the inclination of the business community to invest is governed by psychological factors as summarized by the colorful term “animal spirits.” Keynes recognized that there are some “external factors” at work, such as foreign affairs, population growth, and technological discoveries. The market is envisioned, in effect, to be some sort of economic amplifier which converts relatively small changes in these external factors into wide swings of employment and output. This is the basic Keynesian vision.
Wage rates and prices are assumed either to be inflexible or to change in direct proportion to one another. In either case the real wage (W/P) is forever constant. The actual level of wages and prices is believed to be determined (again) by external factors—this time, trade unions and large corporations. If the real wage is too high, there will be unemployment on an economy-wide basis. There will be idle labor and idle resources of every kind. The opportunity cost of putting these resources back to work is nothing but forgone idleness, which is no cost at all. The assumed normalcy of massive resource idleness assures that the perennial problem of scarcity never comes into play. William H. Hutt and F. A. Hayek were justified in referring to Keynesian economics as the “theory of idle resources” and the “economics of abundance.”
Textbook Keynesianism has a certain internal consistency or mathematical integrity about it. Given the assumptions that prices and wages do not properly adjust to market conditions—that is, the assumption that the price system does not work—then the Keynesian relationships among the macroeconomic aggregates come into play. Even the policy prescriptions seem to follow: If wages and prices do not adjust to the existing market conditions, then market conditions must be adjusted (by the fiscal and monetary authorities) to the externally determined prices and wages.
In the final analysis, however, Keynesian theory is a set of mutually reinforcing but jointly unsupportable propositions about how certain macroeconomic aggregates are related to one another. Keynesian policy is a set of self-justifying policy prescriptions. For instance, if the government is convinced that wages will not fall and is prepared to hire the unemployed, then unemployed workers will not be willing to accept a lower market wage, ensuring that wages, in fact, will not fall. Thus, while the intention of Keynesian policy is to stabilize the economy, the actual effect is to “Keynesianize” the economy. It causes the economy to behave in exactly the same perverse manner that is implied by the Keynesian assumptions. This convoluted interrelationship between theory and policy has long obscured the fundamental flaws in the theory itself.
Students often ask the obvious question: Why is government policy grounded in such a flawed theory? From a political point of view, advocating and implementing Keynesian policy is the surest way to election and reelection. The gains from printing and spending money are immediate, highly visible, and can be concentrated on individuals who make up powerful voting blocs. The costs of this policy are incurred at a later date and can be spread thinly across the entire population, making the link between policy and long-run consequences difficult for the voting public to perceive.
The fading in recent years of old-line Keynesianism in academic circles provides little comfort. Even as the number of demand-managers continues to decline, it is from this shrinking group of economists that government officials seek advice and reconciliation. And opportunities to lecture to the seats of power rather than in the halls of learning have a way of changing some economists’ minds about the advisability (political if not economic) of managing aggregate demand. Printing and spending money in pursuit of short-run stimulation if not long-run stability remain the order of the day.
There is good reason, then, to study Keynesian theory: It helps us understand what the policymakers in government are likely to do in any given circumstance. But to understand the actual effects of their demand-management policies in the long run as well as the short, we need a more enlightening theory—one that recognizes what market forces can do on their own to maintain macroeconomic stability and how those forces are foiled by government-supplied stabilization.
Originally published as The Trouble with Keynes in The Freeman, October 1993.
Roger W. Garrison received his doctorate degree from the University of Virginia in 1981. He is now Emeritus Professor of Economics at Auburn University in Alabama, where he taught Macroeconomics and History of Economic Thought (among other courses) from 1978 to 2012.
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경기 회복을 가져다 준 것은 마셜 플랜이 아니라, 전쟁 기간 동안의 시장 통제가 사라지고 시장 경제가 회복되었기 때문이다.
The Marshall Plan Isn't the Success Story You Think it Is
Ryan McMaken
To this day, the Marshall Plan, that enormous government program for foreign aid and wealth redistribution, is still held up as a model of good government planning, and of the benefits of forcibly redistributing the taxpayers' money.
In American politics, this opinion has nearly risen to the level of gospel truth. For example, while domestic welfare programs are often met with derision from American conservatives, the Marshall Plan, which is founded on the same ideological foundation as the American welfare states, receives almost universal approval from Americans left and right.
Thus, it is not surprising that politicians and pundits continue to invoke the Marshall plan to push for more modern day programs based on the idea that if governments spread around the wealth, then prosperity will naturally result.
Tuesday in Europe, for example, European Parliament President Antonio Tajani invoked the Marshall plan to push for more EU spending programs in Africa designed to attract wealth there via sweetheart deals between European regimes and African contractors. Many of those firms, of course, are likely to be European-owned. And the scheme is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan. so it's sure to be a success!
Not coincidentally, Tajani delivered his remarks on the 71st anniversary of Secretary of State George Marshall's June 5, 1947 speech calling for what became the Marshall Plan. He outlined the plan to flood Europe with government welfare checks in order to help Europe overcome the fact that much of the continent's capital had been destroyed in World War II.
The money spent totaled over 100 billion dollars in today's dollars. And given that the American economy was but a small fraction of what it is today, this was an enormous sum.
The rhetoric behind the idea was nothing new. In 1947, it was routine to claim that government spending of the New Deal and World War II had ended the poverty of the Great Depression. That's not the reality, of course. As economic historian Robert Higgs has shown, the New Deal made the Depression worse . Nor did World War II end the Depression . But at the time, this was a common misperception.
So, if redistributing the wealth worked so well to end poverty in the 1930s, why not do it all again in post-war Europe?
Moreover, it was a winning political strategy for President Truman. As noted by Charles Mee in his book The Marshall Plan:
[Truman needed] some large program that would let him recapture the initiative, something big enough to enable him to gather in all the traditional factions of the Democratic Party and also some middle-of-the-road Republicans, and at the same time, something that would hamper the Republican phalanx.
So, the US government set to work funneling taxpayer dollars to both foreign regimes and to American corporations who could leverage their political influence with foreign regimes to get some of that money.
But here's the rub. There's not actually evidence that this worked.
As Thomas Woods notes in this lecture on foreign aid, it's easy to see why the Marshall Plan has the reputation it does. After all, the Marshall Plan was implemented in the late forties, and during that time, the economies of Western Europe greatly recovered.
But this is a case of mere correlation being woefully insufficient to prove causation.
After all, as Woods further notes:
•"Britain received twice as much aid as West Germany did, but economic growth in Britain dramatically lagged behind that of the Germans."
•"France, [West] Germany, and Italy began their economic recoveries before they started getting Marshall Aid."
•"Austria and Greece received a lot of Marshall Aid, per capita, and yet their economic recovery only got under way as Marshall aid was being phased out."
Woods concludes "given this, I think its increasingly plausible to suggest perhaps the Marshall plan was not responsible for the recovery...what was responsible for the recovery? Well, the return to market economies after the war ... there were tremendous wartime economic controls, in all these countries and with the end of the war came the end of those controls."
And with that came economic prosperity. After all, the German Economic Miracle was based on ending the economic controls of the Nazi-era.
D.W. Mackenzie writes:
Marshall Plan aid consisted of only a tiny percentage of German GDP. Also, the money that West Germany paid in reparations offset Marshall Plan aid. West Germany received military defense from the U.S. and England, but paid substantial fees for this service. The German Economic Miracle began with a radical program of privatization and deregulation, beginning in 1948. This ended the regulatory controls and elaborate tax system imposed by Hitler and his National Socialists.
Foreign aid had, at best, minimal influence on the West German revival. A free and nondemocratic Germany experienced a strong recovery.
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, politicians were busy at work attempting to continue wartime economic controls into peacetime . Government planning won the war, the thinking went, so why not continue with government controls in order to "win the peace"? Not surprisingly, German economic growth quickly began to outpace British growth where the economy continued to be mired in government planning.
But, given that the UK received more Marshall aid than West Germany, we shouldn't be surprised that government grew more in the UK. As Woods notes "the way the Marshall plan was set up, for every dollar that you got in Marshall plan assistance, the government of the recipient country had to increase government expenditures by one dollar."
That is, the Marshall Plan mandated that governments grow in relation to a country's GDP as a condition of receiving aid.
But, when it comes to real economic recovery, the same principles applied in Europe as applied in the United States. Where we saw large amounts of economic growth after the war — in the United States, for instance — growth was connected to large declines in government spending and the repeal of many government controls from the war years.
Nor is Germany the only example. Mackenzie continues:
Hong Kong rebuilt with minimal governmental interference. This resulted in rapid economic development and a steadily rising standard of living for the people of Hong Kong. This progress benefited not only highly skilled upper income workers, but also low paid unskilled workers.
Japan also experienced great success due to a relative lack of governmental interference. Low taxes and high savings rates translated into strong economic growth in postwar Japan. Once again, foreign aid and intervention were too small to have accounted for this success. Japan did not need massive intervention to recover...
Nevertheless, politicians who speak out against welfare at home sing its praises internationally. George W. Bush, for example, routinely extolled the benefits of the Marshall Plan when calling for ever more foreign aid for Iraq and Afghanistan, which the US had recently bombed into rubble in many areas.
Of course, few would argue that the post-war record in Iraq and Afghanistan is anything to brag about today. And indeed, foreign aid in general — of which the Marshall Plan is the modern progenitor — is no success story.
But that failure isn't nearly enough to destroy the Marshall Plan myth that endures.
There is, however, another component of the Marshall plan, and that is, as Hal Brands contends today, the necessity of "the deft use of economic tools for geopolitical gain." That is, the Marshall plan should be seen less as a tool of economic policy, and more as a tool of foreign and geopolitical strategy.
In this respect then, the idea of the Marshall Plan is really to buy loyalty from foreign regimes and to execute public relations upon foreign populations. But there's a problem here too. Given that the Marshall Plan didn't actually improve the European economy — and given that the plan required the additional fleecing of the American taxpayer — why not implement a plan to actually helps to both build goodwill and improve economic growth at the same time?
This, of course, could have been achieved by the adoption of unilateral free trade on the part of the Americans. While it's true that the Marshall Plan was part of a strategy to increase trade among European states, and trade in general, the tools used were the same that we see today: managed trade deals controlled by states and built upon an edifice of international bureaucracy. By necessity, plans like this always involved central planning to the extent that government planners pick winners and losers by designing trade agreements.
Unilateral free trade, however, offered — and still offers — a true laissez-faire solution. Imagine moreover, how the post-war world offered an excellent opportunity in this regard. The Japanese and European economies had been temporarily destroyed by the war. The US, meanwhile, was in an excellent position to offer — through markets — both capital and American consumers to the globe. Faced with free and open access to American markets, and with American firms prepared to invest capital overseas, the US had the chance to build greater cultural and economic ties with its former enemies and longtime allies in both Europe and Asia. The US need not even ask these foreign regimes to reciprocate. Opening up American markets to these foreign regimes would have made sense both geopolitically and economically. It would have offered American consumers access to less expensive goods, while also building new trade opportunity for foreign entrepreneurs. No redistribution schemes were necessary. All that was needed was for the US regime to embrace true, free, and open trade.
Politically speaking, this might even have been an easier sell than usual. Most industrialized foreign economies had been destroyed in the war, and the US was in a position to dominate the global economy. Was it really necessary to protect American markets anymore? The answer is always no, of course, but the case could have possible been made more forcefully at that time than ever before.
Unfortunately, that's not what happened. Guided by bad economics, and bad ideologies, the US was simply not prepared to embrace true free trade or free economies of any kind. The chosen path was one that afforded governments the chance to continue to control and direct markets, and to decide who gets what and when. That's always been a pretty hard deal for governments to give up.
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