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꽤 긴 글인데 조리 있게 잘 썼다.
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이언주 페이스북
문재인 정부의 엉터리 경제정책이 '정부 주도 스태그플레이션(government-led stagflation)'이라는 웃지못할 현상을 만들어냈습니다.
문재인 정부, 이래도 소득주도 성장 계속할 건지요? 얼마나 많은 사람이 도산 폐업하고 일자리 잃고 길거리에 나앉아야 당신들은 잘못을 인정할 겁니까? 우리 국민들이 당신들 그 잘난 좌파 경제이론을 실증하기 위한 '모르모트'인가요? 소득주도 성장은 실은 좌파경제이론인 임금주도 성장(wage-led growth)을 이름만 바꾼 거고 한번도 실증된 적이 없는 것이라 당장 집어치우라고 많은 이들이 말했건만 뭣 때문에 고집피웁니까?
문 정부의 어리석음과 오만함으로 지금 우리 경제는 경기침체 중에 물가만 오르는 최악의 스태그플레이션을 향해 치닫고 있습니다. 한 마디로 '소득주도 성장'이 아니라 '정부 주도 스태그플레이션(government-led stagflation)'입니다. 내년에는 상황이 더욱 심해질 걸로 예상되는데 이는 실물위기라 예년의 외환위기 혹은 금융위기에 비해 훨씬 더 혹독하고 오래갈 것으로 우려됩니다. 설마 중산층 몰락으로 무산계급을 늘여서 '사회주의 이상사회'를 우리나라에서 실현해 보겠다는 건 아니겠지요?
당장 이 어리석은 짓을 중단하고 고부가가치형 산업전환을 통해 우리 경제를 선진국형 경제로 전환시키는데 집중하지 못하면 우리는 이제 그나마 울궈먹던 산업마저 중국 등 상대적으로 원가는 저렴하고 기술수준은 대등해지고 있는 개발도상국에 따라잡혀 망국적 상황에 놓일 것입니다.
지금 우리 청년들이 최악의 실업에 신음하며 희망을 잃어가고 있습니다. 우리 경제에 새로운 돌파구가 필요합니다. 한편으론 기술혁신을 통해 고부가가치 첨단기술산업을 발전시키고 다른 한편으론 금융 회계 법률 컨설팅 같은 고부가가치 서비스산업을 발전시켜야 합니다. 즉 산업을 선진국형으로 발전시켜야 하는 것입니다.
고부가가치형 첨단기술 산업으로의 혁신은 연구개발 투자가 필요하므로 원가압력 제거 등 기업들의 이윤확보를 가능하게 하고 기업가 정신을 키우는 사회 분위기, 첨단기술 인력 발굴과 양성이 가능한 경쟁력 있는 교육시스템이 전제되어야 합니다. 고부가가치형 서비스산업의 발전을 위해서는 규제혁신과 인재발탁과 육성이 필요하고 그걸 위한 시장의 자율성 및 고등교육의 자율성이 필요합니다.
그런데 문재인 정부는 소득주도 성장이란 엉터리 정책으로 모든 원가를 올리고 물가를 올려 혁신을 위한 자본축적을 방해하고, 노동과 자본의 이분법에 빠져 실은 자본주의의 지속가능 발전을 위해 제기되었던 경제민주화를 계급투쟁과 자본가 척살의 도구로 변질시켜 기업가들을 옥죄며 탄압하고, 공무원 잔뜩 뽑아 규제의욕 고취하고 서로 고발하고 처벌, 규제하는 억압적 분위기로 몰아가니 어느 누가 투자하고 채용하고 일을 만들고 싶겠습니까?
노동력 즉 인적자원을 위한 교육은 어떻습니까? 진취적으로 인재를 발굴 육성해야 할 때에 기계적 평준화에 집착하고 첨단기술인재들이 발탁되어 자유롭게 경쟁하며 도전해야 하는데 어릴 때부터 점점 가족과 유리되고 획일화되는 유아교육에 고등교육조차 획일화 평준화시키고 있습니다. 이런 환경에서 어떻게 대한민국을 먹여살릴 개성있고 창의로운 융합적 인재, 첨단 기술인재들이 배출되겠습니까?
한 마디로 문재인 정부는 이 시대에 대한민국이 가야 하는 길과 정반대로 폭주하며 경제자살로 몰아가고 있습니다. 어이가 없습니다. 다시한번 문재인 정부에 부탁드립니다. 예전에 이미 경고했지만 아직도 심각성을 모르는 듯해서요…위에서 간단히 언급했지만 나라경제를 위해 마땅히 가야 할 방향으로 갈 게 아니라면 차라리 대한민국과 국민들을 위해 아무것도 하지 말아주십시오. 반대방향으로 폭주하는 걸 중단이라도 해야 다음 정권이 그나마 덜 힘들지 않겠습니까? 제발 부탁드립니다.
--->지금이라도 최저임금, 노동시간 따위에 자율성만 주어도 경제가 살아난다. 가장 필요한 것은 시민들과 기업가들의 자유다. 그리고 적폐 청산이라는 문화혁명도 당장 멈춰야 한다. 북한의 남침 우려에 이미 3만 명이 넘는 사람들이 외국으로 나갔다.
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Scott Lee
안희정, 이재명, 박원순, 김경수(김부겸?) 제거?
안희정은 주사파는 아니다 (과거는!)
이재명은 양아치, 박원순은 남로당 코드, 김경수는 친노 따까리.
안희정은 주사파는 아니다 (과거는!)
이재명은 양아치, 박원순은 남로당 코드, 김경수는 친노 따까리.
이 모든 사태의 배후는 전대협과 임종석이 있다....
임종석과 전대협은 호남인이 주축이긴 한데, 호남향우회의 대표주자는 아니다.
그러나 나설 경우, 호남 지역주의의 대표가 될 수 있다.
정동영 같은 호남 토호가 상품성이 떨어지는 것은 저들도 잘 알지.
임종석과 전대협은 호남인이 주축이긴 한데, 호남향우회의 대표주자는 아니다.
그러나 나설 경우, 호남 지역주의의 대표가 될 수 있다.
정동영 같은 호남 토호가 상품성이 떨어지는 것은 저들도 잘 알지.
임종석이 이런 무리한 정적 죽이기를 하는 이유는 두가지다.
Now or Never !
지금이 일생일대의 마지막 공산화의 기회다.
1. 무리수가 있더라도 시도해야 하는 절박한 상황이다.
시간은 자유진영의 편이기 때문이다. 중국조차 흔들리고 있다.
그러나, 중도좌익과 남로당 계열을 잃고 호남 난닝구를 선동해도 여전히 세가 부족하다.
2. 결국 이 부족한 세를 북한의 무력 개입이 떠 맡아줄 것으로 판단하고 있는 것 같다.
그래서 휴전선을 열고 있는 것이다.
북한이 일단 서울 바로 위까지만 접수하면 핵무기로 협박을 가할 수 있기 때문에, 호남과 전대협 등 극좌만을 가지고도 남한을 접수할 수 있다고 방정식을 만든 거지.
nuclear cannon 핵대포 때문이다. 스커드 미사일은 요격이 가능하다.
그러나 대포는 요격이 불가능하다. 관성에 의해 이동하는 물체일 뿐이다. 자체 추진체가 없으니 요격 불가능.
의정부, 김포 정도면 수도권 어디든 순간적으로 삭제 가능하다.
상수는 전라도와 전대협 주사파, 변수는 북한군 침투....
내가 임종석이라고 가정하고 머리 함 굴려봤다.
Plan을 짜고보니 시도해볼만 하다.
Plan을 짜고보니 시도해볼만 하다.
시간은 자유진영의 편이다. 속전속결로 문제를 풀어야 한다.
문재인은 현재 뇌가 기능을 상실한 반병신 꼭두각시에 지나지 않는다.
남조선 군대는 개쓰레기라는 것은 정경두를 보면 알 수 있고.
문재인의 입을 빌려서 북한군 침투를 용이하게 만들고 있다.
어떻게 생각하시는가? 나름 가능한 시나리오 같은데...
내 생각에는 문재인은 탄핵이 아니라, 임종석과 함께 그냥 제거해야 한다.
빠를 수록 좋다.
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지역 언급에 대해 비판하시는 분들이 좀 계신데, 지금 이 상황의 근본적 원인은 호남의 '앙심' resentment 이다.
'르쌍띠망'...... 이런 단어는 희안하게 미국에서도 불어 발음으로 말한다.
빠를 수록 좋다.
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지역 언급에 대해 비판하시는 분들이 좀 계신데, 지금 이 상황의 근본적 원인은 호남의 '앙심' resentment 이다.
'르쌍띠망'...... 이런 단어는 희안하게 미국에서도 불어 발음으로 말한다.
정치학 단어는 불어발음을 해야 있어 보이나?
100년을 주기로 이 앙심이 날뛰면서 피바람을 일으킨다.
100년전의 피바람은 동학난이다.
이제는 문제의 본질을 집지 않으면 피바람을 피할 수 없다.
100년전의 피바람은 동학난이다.
이제는 문제의 본질을 집지 않으면 피바람을 피할 수 없다.
(난 이북실향민 부계, 경남 모계다. 중학생까지 부산에서 보냈기에 지역감정에서 완전히 자유롭지는 않겠지만,
객관적으로 사태를 지켜보고 내린 결론이다.)
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성남공항에서 우간다로 뜬 항공기가 수상하다 [이봉규의 정치옥타곤]
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"거의 무장해제" 한 정도가 아니라, "완전한 무장해제"이다.
북한 전략은, 국군 복장으로 위장한 10만 명 특수부대를 서울에 투입하고, 동시에 핵 공갈로 미국, UN과 협상하겠다는 것.
이런 전략을 빤히 알면서도, 이런 정도로 무장해제 하는 건, 사실상 "항복"이다.
자!! 그럼 왜, 무엇때문에 항복했을까.
● 그걸 알기 위해서는 가능한 모든 시나리오에 각각에 대해, 이러한 선제적 무장 해제가 갖는 효과를 예상해 보면 되겠다.
● 가능한 시나리오. (북한은 절대 자발적으로 비핵화하지 않을 것이고, 할 수도 없다는 걸 전제로 함)
1. 계속적 경제 제재에 이어, 드디어 해상 봉쇄.
이 상황이 되면 북한은 핵무장을 최대로 활용하는, 기습전을 벌일 수밖에 없게 된다.
이때, 지금 같은 무장해제는, 최소한의 한국군 희생으로, 북한 특수 군이 손쉽게 서울을 점령하고,
최단 시간에 핵 공갈로 美 ㆍUN과 협상할 수 있게 하는,
결정적 전술적 이득을 북한에 보장해 준다.
● 즉, 사실상 서울 시민을 정부가 스스로 인질로 삼아, 북한군 총구 앞에 내놓고, 미국에 경고하는 셈이다.
"너희가 해상봉쇄하면, 서울을 북한에 점령당하게 하겠다. 그래도 해상 봉쇄 할 수 있겠나? 경제 제재를 그래도 풀지 않겠느냐? 서울 경기를 잃고 싶은가?"
2. 북폭.
1번과 마찬가지.
그런데, 북폭은 미국이나 서방 연합국들 단독으로 기습적으로 할 수밖에 없다.
韓美가 합동 공격하려 하면 이미, 그 정보는 북한에 긴급 타전됐을 테고, 두세 시간 안에 북한 특수부대 10만 명이 세종로와 테헤란로에서 뛰어다닐 거다.
● "웰컴 투 동막골"을 기억하는 Seoulite들은 북한 특수부대를 보고 반갑게 악수하자고 손 내밀지도 모르겠다.
즉시 사살당할 거다. 북한군 입장에서는 누가 주사파이고, 누가 자유파인지 알 수 없기 때문이다.
해서, 북한군은 서울 시민을, 보는 대로 사살할 수밖에 없다. 너무 섭섭하게 생각하지 말라.
● 그러게, 현실은 영화와는 전혀 다르다. 영화 한편 보고 원전 다 때려치자는 미친놈들에게 해 주고 싶은 이야기.
● 결론:
지금 보는, 자발적, 선제적 무장 해제는 미국과 UN이 주도할, 경제 제재 장기화 ㅡ 해상 봉쇄 ㅡ 북폭 등, 모든 가능성을 사전에 좌절시키는 묘수임.
즉, 서울ㅡ경기 2천만 명의 목숨과 영토를 셀프 인질로 삼아, 북한에 갖다 바침으로써, 미국을 협박하는 전술이라고 나는 생각한다.
● 다시 말해, 한국민을 북한에 인질로 잡혀서라도 미국ㆍ유엔의 강경책을 좌절시키겠다는 의도다.
그렇게 해서, 얻을 평화가 전쟁보다는 훨씬 낫다는 생각의 소치인 것 같다.
이런 생각은, 전쟁하느니, 김정은을 통일 대통령으로 모시는 게 훨씬 낫다는, 주사파의 오랜 생각과도 궤를 같이 한다.
● 아마, 대부분 2030도, 특히 여성은 더욱더, 전쟁하느니, 귀여운 복돼지 김정은 통일 대통령을 모시고 평화롭게 살자고 하지 않을까?
작금의 이러한 국민적 멘탈 해체ㅡ멘붕을 유도하려고 웰컴 투 동막골 등 모든 분야에서, 그토록 가열차게 진지전을 벌여 오지 않았던가.
[출처] 무장해제ㆍ남북 군사합의서를 설명하는, 거의 유일한 합리적 분석.
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Got a lecturer who still praises Marxism? Send them Jordan Peterson's preface to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago:
소련, 중공, 캄보디아, 쿠바, 베네수엘라 등에서 실험된 공산주의는 엄청난 인명 피해를 남기고 모두 실패했다. 공산주의만큼 광범위한 지역에서, 다양한 사람들에 의해, 그리고 그렇게 많은 나라에서 실험되고, 그렇게 철저하게 파멸적으로 실패한 정치적 사례는 없었다. ---조던 피터슨 (솔제니친의 수용소군도 서문에서)Why is it still acceptable to regard the Marxist doctrine as essentially accurate in its diagnosis of the hypothetical evils of the free-market, democratic West; to still consider that doctrine “progressive” and fit for the compassionate and proper thinking person? Twenty-five million dead through internal repression in the Soviet Union (according to The Black Book of Communism). Sixty million dead in Mao’s China (and an all-too-likely return to autocratic oppression in that country in the near future). The horrors of Cambodia’s killing fields, with their two million corpses. The barely animate body politic of Cuba, where people struggle even now to feed themselves. Venezuela, where it has now been made illegal to attribute a child’s death in hospital to starvation. No political experiment has ever been tried so widely, with so many disparate people, in so many different countries (with such different histories) and failed so absolutely and so catastrophically.
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케인즈와 화폐
완전 고용 정책으로 인해 실업이 발생한다.
처음에 수요의 분포에 변화를 주어서, 실업자와 취업자 모두를 그쪽으로 끌어 모으는데, 인플레가 끝나게 되면, 직업이 사라지면서 그들이 모두 실업자가 되는 원리이다.
Money, Keynes, and History
Friedrich A. Hayek
The chief root of our present monetary troubles is, of course, the sanction of scientific authority which Lord Keynes and his disciples have given to the age-old superstition that by increasing the aggregate of money expenditure we can lastingly ensure prosperity and full employment.
It is a superstition against which economists before Keynes had struggled with some success for at least two centuries. It had governed most of earlier history. This history, indeed, has been largely a history of inflation; significantly, it was only during the rise of the prosperous modern industrial systems and during the rule of the gold standard, that over a period of about two hundred years (in Britain from about 1714 to 1914, and in the United States from about 1749 to 1939) prices were at the end about where they had been at the beginning. During this unique period of monetary stability the gold standard had imposed upon monetary authorities a discipline which prevented them from abusing their powers, as they have done at nearly all other times. Experience in other parts of the world does not seem to have been very different: I have been told that a Chinese law attempted to prohibit paper money for all times (of course, ineffectively), long before the Europeans ever invented it!
Keynesian rehabilitation
It was John Maynard Keynes, a man of great intellect but limited knowledge of economic theory, who ultimately succeeded in rehabilitating a view long the preserve of cranks with whom he openly sympathised. He had attempted by a succession of new theories to justify the same, superficially persuasive, intuitive belief that had been held by many practical men before, but that will not withstand rigorous analysis of the price mechanism: just as there cannot be a uniform price for all kinds of labour, an equality of demand and supply for labour in general cannot be secured by managing aggregate demand. The volume of employment depends on the correspondence of demand and supply in each sector of the economy, and therefore on the wage structure and the distribution of demand between the sectors. The consequence is that over a longer period the Keynesian remedy does not cure unemployment but makes it worse.
The claim of an eminent public figure and brilliant polemicist to provide a cheap and easy means of permanently preventing serious unemployment conquered public opinion and, after his death, professional opinion too. Sir John Hicks has even proposed that we call the third quarter of this century, 1950 to 1975, the age of Keynes, as the second quarter was the age of Hitler. I do not feel that the harm Keynes did is really so much as to justify that description. But it is true that, so long as his prescriptions seemed to work, they operated as an orthodoxy which it appeared useless to oppose.
Personal Confession
I have often blamed myself for having given up the struggle after I had spent much time and energy criticising the first version of Keynes's theoretical framework. Only after the second part of my critique had appeared did he tell me he had changed his mind and no longer believed what he had said in the Treatise on Money of 1930 (somewhat unjustly towards himself, as it seems to me, since I still believe that volume II of the Treatise contains some of the best work he ever did). At any rate, I felt it then to be useless to return to the charge, because he seemed so likely to change his views again. When it proved that this new version—the General Theory of 1936—conquered most of the professional opinion, and when in the end even some of the colleagues I most respected supported the wholly Keynesian Bretton Woods agreement, I largely withdrew from the debate, since to proclaim my dissent from the near-unanimous views of the orthodox phalanx would merely have deprived me of a hearing on other matters about which I was more concerned at the time. (I believe, however, that, so far as some of the best British economists were concerned, their support of Bretton Woods was determined more by a misguided patriotism—the hope that it would benefit Britain in her post-war difficulties than by a belief that it would provide a satisfactory international monetary order.)
The Manufacture of Unemployment
I wrote 36 years ago on the crucial point of difference:
It may perhaps be pointed out that it has, of course, never been denied that employment can be rapidly increased, and a position of "full employment" achie ved in the shortest possible time, by means of monetary expansion—least of all by those economists whose outlook has been influenced by the experience of a major inflation. All that has been contended is that the kind of full employment which can be created in this way is inherently unstable, and that to create employment by these means is to perpetuate fluctuations. There may be desperate situations in which it may indeed be necessary to increase employment at all costs, even if it be only for a short period—perhaps the situation in which Dr Brüning found himself in Germany in 1932 was such a situation in which desperate means would have been justified. But the economist should not conceal the fact that to aim at the maximum of employment which can be achieved in the short run by means of monetary policy is essentially the policy of the desperado who has nothing to lose and everything to gain from a short breathing space.
To this I would now like to add, in reply to the constant deliberate misrepresentation of my views by politicians, who like to picture me as a sort of bogey whose influence makes conservative parties dangerous, what I regularly emphasize and stated nine months ago in my Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture at Stockholm in the following words:
The truth is that by a mistaken theoretical view we have been led into a precarious position in which we cannot prevent substantial unemployment from re-appearing: not because, as my view is sometimes misrepresented, this unemployment is deliberately brought about as a means to combat inflation, but because it is now bound to appear as a deeply regrettable but inescapable consequence of the mistaken policies of the past as soon as inflation ceases to accelerate.
Unemployment via 'full employment policies'
This manufacture of unemployment by what are called 'full employment policies' is a complex process. In essence it operates by temporary changes in the distribution of demand, drawing both unemployed and already employed workers into jobs which will disappear with the end of inflation. In the periodically recurrent crises of the pre-1914 years the expansion of credit during the preceding boom served largely to finance industrial investment, and the over-development and subsequent unemployment occurred mainly in the industries producing capital equipment. In the engineered inflation of the last decades things were more complex.
What will happen during a major inflation is illustrated by an observation from the early 1920s which many of my Viennese contemporaries will confirm: in the city many of the famous coffee houses were driven from the best comer sites by new bank offices and returned after the 'stabilization crisis', when the banks had contracted or collapsed and thousands of bank clerks swelled the ranks of the unemployed.
The lost generation
The whole theory underlying the full employment policies has by now of course been thoroughly discredited by the experience of the last few years. In consequence the economists are also beginning to discover its fatal intellectual defects which they ought to have seen all along. Yet I fear the theory will still give us a lot of trouble: it has left us with a lost generation of economists who have learnt nothing else. One of our chief problems will be to protect our money against those economists who will continue to offer their quack remedies, the short-term effectiveness of which will continue to ensure them popularity. It will survive among blind doctrinaires who have always been convinced that they have the key to salvation.
The 1863 penny
In consequence, though the rapid descent of Keynesian doctrine from intellectual respectability can be denied no longer, it still gravely threatens the chances of a sensible monetary policy. Nor have people yet fully realised how much irreparable damage it has already done, particularly in Britain, the country of its origin. The sense of financial respectability which once guided British monetary policy has rapidly disappeared. From a model to be imitated Britain has in a few years descended to be a warning example for the rest of the world. This decay was recently brought home to me by a curious incident: I found in a drawer of my desk a British penny dated 1863 which a short 12 years ago, that is, when it was exactly a hundred years old, I had received as change from a London bus conductor and had taken back to Germany to show to my students what long-run monetary stability meant. I believe they were duly impressed. But they would laugh in my face if I now mentioned Britain as an instance of monetary stability.
Excerpted from Choice in Currency
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정부가 반드시 실패하는 10가지 이유
Ten Reasons Why Governments Fail
Antony P. Mueller
When politicians and bureaucrats fail to deliver what they promise — which happens a lot — we're often told that the problem can be solved if only we get the right people to run the government instead. We're told that the old crop of government agents were trying hard enough. Or that they didn't have the right intentions. While it's true that there are plenty of incompetent and ill-intentioned people in government, we can't always blame the people involved. Often, the likelihood of failure is simply built in to the institution of government itself. In other words, politicians and bureaucrats don't succeed because they can't succeed. The very nature of government administration is weighted against success.
Here are ten reasons why:
I. Knowledge
Government policies suffer from the pretense of knowledge . In order to perform a successful market intervention, politicians need to know more than they can. Market knowledge is not centralized, systematic, organized and general, but dispersed, heterogeneous, specific, and individual. Different from a market economy where there are many operators and a constant process of trial and error, the correction of government errors is limited because the government is a monopoly. For the politician, to admit an error is often worse than sticking with a wrong decision - even against own insight.
II. Information Asymmetries
While there are also information asymmetries in the market, for example between the insurer and the insured, or between the seller of a used car and its buyer, the information asymmetry is more profound in the public sector than in the private economy. While there are, for example, several insurance companies and many car dealers, there is only one government. The politicians as the representatives of the state have no skin in the game and because they are not stakeholders, they will not spend much efforts to investigate and avoid information asymmetries. On the contrary, politicians are typically eager to provide funds not to those who need them most but to those who are most relevant in the political power game.
III. Crowding out of the Private Sector
Government intervention does not eliminate what seem market deficiencies but creates them by crowding out the private supply. If there were not a public dominance in the areas of schooling and social assistance, private supply and private charity would fill the gap as it was the case before government usurped these activities. Crowding-out of the private sector through government policies is constantly at work because politicians can get votes by offering additional public services although the public administration will not improve but deteriorate the matter.
IV. Time Lags
Government policies suffer from extended lags between diagnosis and effect. The governmental process is concerned with power and has its antenna captures those signals that are relevant for the power game. Only when an issue is sufficiently politicized will it find the attention of the government. After the lag, until an issue finds attention and gets diagnosed, another lag emerges until the authorities have found a consensus on how to tackle the political problem. From there it takes a further time span until the appropriate political means have found the necessary political support. After the measures get implemented, a further time elapses until they show their effects. The lapse of time between the articulation of a problem and the effect is so long that the nature of the problem and its context have changed - often fundamentally. It comes as no surprise that results of state interventions, including monetary policy , do not only deviate from the original goal but may produce the opposite of the intentions.
V. Rent Seeking and Rent Creation
Government intervention attracts rent-seekers. Rent seeking is the endeavor of gaining privileges through government policies. In a voter democracy, there is a constant pressure to add new rents to the existing rents in order to gain support and votes. This rent creation expands the number of rent-seekers and over time the distinction between corruption and a decent and legal conduct gets blurred. The more a government gives in to rent-seeking and rent creation, the more the country will fall victim to clientelism, corruption, and the misallocation of resources.
VI. Logrolling and Vote Trading
The public choice concept of ‘ logrolling ’ denotes the exchange of favors among the political factions in order to get one’s favored project through by supporting the projects of the other group. This conduct leads to the steady expansion of state activity. Through the ‘quid pro quo’ of the political process, the lawmakers support pieces of legislation of other factions in exchange for obtaining the political support for their own project. This behavior leads to the phenomenon of ‘legislative inflation’, the avalanche of useless, contradictory and detrimental law production.
VII. Common Good
The so-called ‘ common good’ is not a well-defined concept. Similar terms, such as that of the ‘public good’, which is defined by non-excludability and non-rivalry, misses the point because it is not the good that is ‘common’ or ‘public’ but its provision when this is deemed more efficient by collective than individual efforts. However, this is the case with all goods and the market itself is a system of providing private goods through cooperative efforts. The market economy is a collective provider of goods as it combines competition with cooperation. Any of the so-called ‘public goods’, which the government supplies, the private sector can also deliver, and cheaper and better as well. In contrast to the state, the cooperation in a market economy includes competition and thus not only economic efficiency but also the incentive to innovate.
VIII. Regulatory Capture
The term ‘ regulatory capture ’ denotes a government failure where the regulatory agency does not pursue the original intent of promoting the ‘public interest’ but falls victim to the special interest of those groups, which the agency was set up to regulate. The capture of the regulatory body by private interests means that the agency turns into an instrument to advance the special interests of the group that was targeted for regulation. For that purpose, the special interest group will ask for extra regulation to obtain the state apparatus as an instrument to promote its special interests.
IX. Short-Sightedness
The political time horizon is the next election. In the endeavor that the benefits of political action come quickly to their specific clienteles, the politician will favor short-term projects over the long-term even if the former bring only temporary benefits and cost more in the long run than an alternative project where the costs come earlier and the benefits later. Because the provision of public goods by the state severs the link between the bearer of the cost and the immediate beneficiary, the time preference for the demand for the goods that come apparently free of charge by the state is necessarily higher than in the market system.
X. Rational Ignorance
It is rational for the individual voter in a mass democracy to remain ignorant about the political issues because the value of the individual's vote is so small that it makes not much difference for the outcome. The rational voter will vote for those candidates who promise most benefits. Given the small weight of an individual vote in a mass democracy, the rational voter will not spend much time and effort to investigate whether these promises are realistic or in a collision with his other desires. Thus, the political campaigns do not have information and enlightenment as the objective but disinformation and confusion. What counts, in the end, is to get votes. Not the solidity of the program is important but the enthusiasm a candidate can create with his supporters and how much he can degrade, denounce, and humiliate his opponent. As a consequence, election campaigns incite hatred, polarization, and the lust for revenge.
Antony P. Mueller is a German professor of economics who currently teaches in Brazil
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12. Unconstrained Growth -- Irreversibility of Government Institutions. Once implemented, government programs are rarely reduced or scaled back even when the reason for the program has long vanished. Government grows without restrain because (1) bureaucrats and politicians charged with overseeing government programs do not benefit from reducing government spending or scaling back programs and are never held politically accountable for government growth, even when it is unwise; (2) the governed defaults to demanding more rather than less government to address real world problems; and, (3) government inevitably resorts to financing programs with borrowing (essentially taxes on future generations who have no voice in the wisdom of programs) and/or devaluing currency (printing money).
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