뉴시스 부스터샷도 뚫렸다. 추가접종후 돌파감염 첫 발생 --->백신을 2번이나 맞고 또 거기다 추가 접종까지 했지만, 아무 소용이 없었다. 서울대 바이러스 전문가인 이왕재 교수가 백신으로는 우한 폐렴을 예방할 수 없다고 목소리를 높였지만, 아무 과학적 근거도 없고 상식에도 맞지 않는 백신 반강제 접종으로 금전전 손해, 인명 손실, 부수적인 의료 사고 등만 얻었다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 뉴스1 [속보] 바이든 "하나의 중국 정책 지지..대만 독립 지지 안해"-CCTV ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 동아일보 “韓, 中 중시하다 美 정책결정시 간과될 위험성 있어”…반박 당한 최종건 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 문화일보 <사설>“국민 90% 이득” 李후보의 위험한 국토세 신설 선동 kjwo**** 부동산하나를 두고 종부세 보유세 양도세 상속세 이제는 토지세까지 차라리 국가소유로 전부 몰수 한 다음에 공동농장으로 만들어 공동으로 일하고 공동으로 배분하지 그리고 삼성 현대 등 회사도 전부 몰수하여 국민100% 에게 분배하라 재명아 너 사이코패스 맞다 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 조선일보 태영호 국민의힘 의원은 15일 이재명 더불어민주당 대선 후보를 향해 “북한도 평양에 찾아온 미국 정치인들에게는 100년 전 역사 따지지 않는다”고 했다. 이 후보가 존 오소프 미국 상원의원을 만나 ‘한국이 일본에 합병된 이유는 미국이 가쓰라-태프트 협약을 통해 승인했기 때문’이라고 한 발언을 겨냥한 것이다. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (日,언론..文春)..한국 부동산 버블붕괴 임박..그야말로 고비를 맞게 될것 아베노문시키 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11378298417 서울 아파트 개거품 가격의 현장... 버블붕괴임박… “한국 부동산 버블”의 너무나 위험한 현상 《문재인의 대실책》 マンション価格は2倍近くに高騰」崩壊間近か… “韓国不動産バブル”のヤバすぎる現状《文在寅の大失策》 (日,언론..文春)..2021/11/15 한국에서는 지금 부동산 개거품이 심각하다. 부동산 가격은 문 정권 발족 이후 4년만에 2배 가깝게에 개폭등. 이 버블이 꺼지면 경제 재건이 어려워질 가능성이 높지만 그래도 한국 부동산이 계속 상승할 것인지, 개폭락할 것인지 많은 한국인들뿐만 아니라 전 세계가 촉각을 곤두세우고 있다. 　韓国では今、不動産バブルが深刻だ。不動産価格は文在寅政権発足からの4年間で2倍近くに高騰。このバブルが崩壊すると経済再建が難しくなる可能性が高く、今後も上昇し続けるのか、あるいは暴落するのか、多くの韓国人のみならず、世界中がその動向に注目している。 부동산정책 남발 문 정권은 2017년 5월 발족한 이후 대선에서 공약한 집값 안정을 실현하기 위해 25차례나 부동산 정책을 발령했지만 부동산 개거품 사태는 수렁에 빠져들고 있다. 올해 한국 수도권의 아파트 값은 19년 만에 가장 높은 개폭등을 기록했다. 不動産政策を乱発 　文在寅政権は2017年5月の発足以降、大統領選で公約に掲げた「住宅価格の安定」を実現するため、25回にわたって不動産政策を発令した。賃貸事業者を廃止し、個人の多住宅保有に懲罰的な税金を課すなど何でもありで、事態は泥沼に陥っている。 　地方の不動産価格は下落傾向にある一方で、都心はますます高騰。今年、首都圏のマンション価格は19年ぶりの高い上昇率を記録した。 한국의 경제시민단체 거시기?에 따르면 박근혜 정권(2013년 2월~2017년 3월)의 부동산 가격 상승률은 4년간 7.6%, 이명박 정권(2008년 2월~2013년 2월)는 5년간 2%였다. 韓国有数の経済市民団体の一つである経済正義実践市民連合（経実連）によると、朴槿恵政権時（2013年2月～2017年3月）の不動産価格の上昇率は4年間で7.6％、李明博政権時（2008年2月～2013年2月）は5年間で2％だった。 文在寅大統領　©AFLOhttps://bunshun.ismcdn.jp/common/images/bunshun/v1/article/photo/icon-gallery-lap@3x.png 3x" alt="" src="https://bunshun.ismcdn.jp/common/images/bunshun/v1/article/photo/icon-gallery-lap.png"> 文在寅大統領　©AFLO この記事の画像（2枚） 　 경제시민단체 거시기?는 올 6월 기자회견에서 문 통령 취임 이후 4년간 서울 75개 아파트단지(11만5000채)의 시세가 평당 2061만원에서 3971만원까지 93%나 개폭등 했다고 밝혔다. その経実連は今年6月の記者会見で、文大統領の就任からの4年間で、ソウルにある75か所のマンション団地（11万5000戸）の相場が一坪あたり2061万ウォンから3971万ウォンまで93％も上昇したと明らかにした。 한국정부에는 '포기의 분위기'도 감돈다 문 정권의 부동산 정책은 계속 역효과를 내고 있다. 예를 들어 부동산 가격이 급등하는 원인이 투기에 있다고 보고 다주택 보유를 억제하기 위해 주택 공급을 줄이고 주택 대출을 규제했다. 그러자 돈을 빌려 집을 사려는 패닉 바잉(Panic Buying)이 일어났다. 지금 한국의 표준 30평형 아파트는 한 채당 무려 10억원을 넘는다. 사정이 이렇다 보니 한국정부에는 이미 체념의 분위기마저 감돌고 있다. 국무총리도 올해 6월 국회에서 집값(급등) 해법이 있다면 어디서 훔쳐오고 싶다. 모두가 이 수렁에서 벗어나고 싶어 하지만 헤어날 수 없다며 절망적인 심경을 드러냈다. 政府内には“諦めムード”も漂う 　文政権の不動産政策は裏目に出続けている。例えば、政府は不動産価格が高騰している原因は投機にあると考え、多住宅保有を抑制するため、住宅供給を減らして、住宅融資を規制した。だが、その影響で「一日でも早くお金を借りて住宅を購入しよう」というパニック・バイイング（Panic Buying）が起きた。今では、韓国の標準的な30坪型マンションは、一戸あたり10億ウォンを超えている。 　こうした状況を前に、政府にはもう諦めムードさえ漂っている。金富謙（キム・ブギョム）首相も今年6月、国会で「住宅価格（高騰）の解決策があるのなら、どこかから盗んできたい気持ちだ。皆がこの泥沼から抜け出したいと思っているが、抜け出せない」と、絶望的な心境を露わにした。 부동산 버블 붕괴 예감 한국의 이런 비정상적인 부동산 버블은, 가까운 시일내에 붕괴하는 것은 아닌가--. 한국에서는 그렇게 속삭이는 목소리도 늘어나고 있다. 지난 7월에는 국무총리 직속기관인 금융위원회 부위원장까지 나서 금융리스크대응팀 화상회의에서 "부동산 시장에 '먹구름'이 다가오고 있다는 전문가들의 경고를 무시해선 안 된다"고 말하는 등 경제 붕괴 우려를 표명했다. 不動産バブルが崩壊する予感 　この異常な不動産バブルは、近いうちに崩壊するのではないか――。韓国では、そう囁く声も増えてい る。 　今年7月には、首相（国務総理）直属の機関である金融委員会の都圭常（ト・ギュサン）副委員長までもが、金融リスク対応チームのテレビ会議で「不動産市場に“暗雲”が近づいているという専門家の警告を無視してはならない」と述べるなど、経済崩壊への懸念を表明した。 ソウルの集合住宅群　©AFLOhttps://bunshun.ismcdn.jp/common/images/bunshun/v1/article/photo/icon-gallery-lap@3x.png 3x" alt="" src="https://bunshun.ismcdn.jp/common/images/bunshun/v1/article/photo/icon-gallery-lap.png"> ソウルの集合住宅群　©AFLO 　 한국의 부동산 버블상황을, 일본의 버블기와 겹쳐 보는 시각도 많다. 일본의 버블의 주된 요인에는, 저금리 정책이 있었다. 1985년 플라자 합의 이후 일본 정부가 금리를 내리면서 유동성 자금이 커져 주가와 부동산 가격이 상승. 그러나 1990년 하시모토 쪽발이 당시 재무상이 대출총량규제를 발표하면서 대출 없이는 매매가 어려운 부동산 거래가 주춤하고 부동산 가격이 개폭락했다. この状況を、日本のバブル期と重ね合わせて見る向きも多い。日本のバブルの主な要因には、低金利政策があった。1985年のプラザ合意以後、日本政府が利下げを行ったことで流動性資金が増大し、株価と不動産価格が上昇。しかし、90年に橋本龍太郎大蔵相（当時）が「融資総量規制」を発表したことで、融資なしでは売買が難しい不動産取引が停滞し、不動産価格が暴落した。 이것이 일본의 잃어버린 30년의 시작이었다. 그리고 문 정권의 임기 종료가 다가오는 한국도 그와 똑같은 흐름을 타고 있다. 부동산 가격이 개폭등하자 한국은행이 금리를 올리고 대출도 통제되기 시작한 것이다. これが、日本の「失われた30年」の始まりだった。 　そして、文在寅政権の任期終了が近づく韓国は、それと同様の流れを辿っている。不動産価格の高騰を受けて中央銀行（韓国銀行）が金利を引き上げ、融資も規制されはじめたのだ。 한국의 부동산 거래가 격감하고 있다 코로나 사태의 영향으로 한국에서는 지난해 5월 기준금리가 0.5%로 인하된 이후 동결됐다. 그러나 한국은행 총재가 지난 6월 이같은 완화적 통화정책을 "질서 있게 정상화해 나가야 한다"고 말하면서 8월에 0.25%포인트를 올렸다.이후 연내에는 추가 인상이 이뤄질 것이라는 전망이 우세하다. 그리고 대출 규제도 시작됐다.소득에서 차지하는 부채비중이 늘어나면서 내수경제가 위축되고 나아가 고용난이 장기화될 것이라며 금융기관들이 가계대출의 문턱을 높이부고 있는 것이다. 그러한 영향은 숫자로도 나타나고 있다.서울시의 10월 17일 발표에 따르면 9월 서울시내 아파트 거래건수는 2348건으로 8월 4178건에서 43.8%나 감소했으며 전년 같은 달 3775건과 비교해도 37.8%나 줄어들어었다. 不動産取引が激減している 　新型コロナウイルスの影響を受けて、韓国では昨年5月に政策金利が0.5％に引き下げられ、それ以来、据え置かれていた。しかし、韓国銀行の李柱烈（イ・ジュヨル）総裁が今年6月、そうした緩和的通貨政策を「秩序をもって正常化していかなければならない」と述べ、8月に0.25％引き上げた。その先、年内には、さらなる引き上げが行われるという見方が強まっている。 　そして融資規制も始まった。所得に占める負債割合が増えると内需経済が萎縮し、ひいては雇用難の長期化につながるとして、銀行をはじめとする金融機関が家計向け融資の敷居を高めているのだ。 　そうした影響は数字にも現れている。ソウル市の10月17日の発表によると、9月の市内のマンション取引件数は2348件で、8月の4178件から43.8%も減少しており、前年同月の3775件と比べても37.8%少なかった。 부동산 거래 격감은 시장이 상승에서 하락세로 전환하는 신호라는 거시기여. 그러나 집을 사려는 사람이 줄어드는 반면 서울의 고층아파트는 계속 늘어나고 있다. 부동산 빅데이터업체 거시기가? 집계한 서울의 최근 아파트 물량은 4만1890건으로 두 달 전보다 11.4% 많았다. 부동산 관계자는 집값이 오를 것으로 생각하는 매입 희망자가 여름까지는 많았지만 대출 규제 보도 이후 문의가 뚝 끊겼다고 이바구했단다. 不動産取引の激減は、市場が上昇から下降に転換するシグナルだ。しかし、家を購入する人が少なくなった一方で、ソウルの高層マンションは増え続けている。不動産ビッグデータ会社「アシル」が集計したソウルの直近のマンション物件は4万1890件で、2か月前より11.4%多かった。不動産関係者は「住宅価格は上昇すると考える購入希望者が夏までは多かったが、融資規制の報道以降、問い合わせが途絶えた」と話している。 일본의 버블 붕괴보다 더 심각한 참상발생…… 한편, 일본과 한국의 부동산 버블에는 큰 차이도 있다. 일본에서는 주로 기업이 부동산 부채를 떠안고 있었지만 한국에서는 대부분 개인이 떠안고 있는것이다. 금년 4 월 시점의 한국의 가계 부채는 국내 총생산(GDP)에 임박하는 1666조원이었다. 한국거시기?연구원 분석에 따르면 2016년 말 가계부채는 명목 GDP의 87.3%였으나 지난해 말 현재는 103.8%로 높아져 세계 주요국과 비교해도 엄청나게 빠르게 증가했다. 그 가계 부채의 60%를 차지하고 있는 것이 주택 담보대출 이란다. 日本のバブル崩壊よりも酷い惨状も…… 　一方で、日本と韓国の不動産バブルには大きな違いもある。日本では主に企業が不動産負債を抱えていたが、韓国ではその多くを個人が負っているのだ。 　今年4月時点の韓国の家計負債は国内総生産（GDP）に迫る1666兆ウォンだった。韓国経済研究院の分析によると、16年末の家計負債は名目GDPの87.3%だったが、昨年末の時点では103.8％に上昇しており、世界主要国と比べても速いペースで増加した。その家計負債の6割を占めているのが住宅担保融資だ。 참고로 OECD 31개 회원국의 GDP 대비 가계부채 평균은 68.1%이지만 한국은 이보다 훨씬 높은103.8%다. 한국의 부동산 개거품은 붕괴의 기로에 서 있다. 하지만 한국의 부동산 버블이 꺼지면 가계부채가 축적된 저소득층은 생존의 위기에 몰릴 것이다. 그리고 돈을 빌려준 은행도 연쇄적으로 파산해 경제 전체가 재앙 수준의 타격을 입게 될것이여. 가계부채가 폭증한 한국의 경우 그 영향이 광범위할 것이 분명해 우리 일본 쪽발국의 거품붕괴보다 더 심각한 상황에 빠질 것으로 보인다. 한국의 부동산과 금융당국에는 그야말로 고비를 맞게 될것이여. 그러나 경제에 거시기? 하다는 문 대통령이 위기감을 느끼는 기색은 없다. ちなみにOECD加盟31か国のGDPに対する家計負債の平均は68.1％で、韓国はそれを遥かに上回っている。 韓国の不動産バブルは「崩壊」の岐路に立っている。だが、本当にバブルが崩壊したら、家計負債が蓄積された低所得層は生存の危機に追い込まれるだろう。そこから融資した銀行も連鎖的に破綻し、経済全体が「災難レベル」の打撃を受けることになる。 家計負債が大きい韓国の場合は、その影響が広範囲に及ぶことは必定で、日本のバブル崩壊よりも深刻な状況に陥ると考えられる。 不動産と金融当局にとってはまさに正念場だ。しかし、経済に疎いと言われる文在寅大統領が危機感を感じている様子はない。 .........자세한 내용은 원문을 거시기하라........ https://bunshun.ismcdn.jp/mwimgs/7/0/560/img_7097eff8aa2a6e854bd17e2f126550b7265981.jpg 2x" alt="「マン -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 뱀파이어 경제: 이탈리아, 독일, 미국 여기서 뱀파이어 경제란 2차대전 이전의 이탈리아, 독일, 미국 등에서 행해진 국가 개입의 경제를 가리킨다. 이탈리아는 무솔리니, 독일은 히틀러, 미국은 루스벨트 하의 통치 하에서, 소위 말하는 경기의 부침을 막기 위해, 국가와 대기업들이 "소비자 주권"을 따돌리는데 합세했지만, 후에 대기업은 소비자 주권보다 국가가 더 무서운 존재라는 사실을 깨닫게 된다. 개인적인 생각이지만, 한국도 이런 방향으로 나아가고 있음. https://mises.org/library/new-vampire-economy-banks-and-socialization-investment에 가면, 필자인 제프리 허버너의 논문 발표 낭독을 들을 수 있음. 그의 낭독한 논문과 아래의 논문은 약간의 차이가 있다. The Vampire Economy: Italy, Germany, and the US Jeffrey M. Herbener What is the link between fascism and socialism? They are stages on a continuum of economic control, one that begins in intervention in the free market, moves toward regimentation and greater rigidity, marches toward socialism as failures increase, and ends in dictatorship. The fascist system, wrote Mises, "clung first to the same principles of economic policies which all not outright socialist governments have adopted in our day, interventionism. Then later it turned step by step toward the German system of socialism, i.e., all-round state control of economic activities."1 What distinguished the fascist variety of interventionism was its reliance on the idea of stability to justify extending state power. Big business and labor eagerly allied with the state to obtain stability against what Murray Rothbard called business fluctuations, the ups and downs of particular markets that result from shifting consumer demands. They naïvely thought that state power could supplant consumer sovereignty with their own producer sovereignty over their industries while maintaining the greater productivity of the division of labor. At first, the fascists used state spending, mainly for war, to eliminate business fluctuations. Only after they became dependent on the state did the leaders of big business and labor realize that they had merely traded consumer sovereignty for state sovereignty. Soon after they learned which one was the more exacting taskmaster. To extend their control, the fascists bolstered fiscal expenditures with debt and monetary inflation. Not only did they hope thereby to dominate more and more industries with their expenditures, but also to boost public support for their regimes by generating economic prosperity. Instead, their reckless spending and inflating set in motion the boom-bust cycle. They took the depression as an opportunity to extend their power further by socializing investment with regulations while claiming that such measures would stabilize the business cycle. The fascists found a readymade theoretical justification for stabilization policies in the work of John Maynard Keynes.2 Keynes claimed that the instability of capitalism emanated from the free play the system gave to the "animal spirits" of investors. Driven by bouts of over-optimism and over-pessimism, investors alternate between bullish spending and bearish hoarding sending the economy into fits of boom and bust. Keynes proposed to eliminate this instability with state control over both sides of the capital markets. A central bank with the power to inflate the money supply through credit expansion would determine the supply of capital funding and fiscal and regulatory policy would socialize the investment of capital. In an open letter to President Roosevelt published in the New York Times on December 31, 1933, Keynes counseled this plan: In a field of domestic policy, I put in the forefront, a large volume of loan expenditure under government auspices. I put in the second place the maintenance of cheap and abundant credit. . . . With these . . . I should expect a successful outcome with great confidence. How much that would mean, not only to the material prosperity of the United States and the whole world, but in comfort to men's minds through a restoration of their faith in the wisdom and the power of government.3 Keynes was even more enthusiastic for the spread of his faith in Germany. In the preface to the German edition of the General Theory, published in 1936, Keynes wrote: The theory of aggregate production, which is the point of the following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire.4 State control of money, credit, banking, and investment became the blueprint for fascist stabilization policy. Thus, the expansion of state control under fascism followed a predictable pattern. Debt and monetary inflation paid for state spending. The resulting expansion of credit led to the boom-bust cycle. The financial collapse of the bust resulted in stricter regulation of banking and socialization of investment, which permitted more monetary inflation, credit expansion, debt and spending. The consequent decline in the purchasing power of money justified price and wage controls, which became the focal point of all-around state control. In some cases more slowly and in other cases more rapidly, fascism followed this path toward central planning. Italian Fascism The Italian Fascists began spending and inflating to co-opt big business soon after the March on Rome in 1922. Industrial profits and production jumped during the consequent boom which lasted until 1926. Protectionist measures were also enacted during the boom to give an added benefit to steel, iron, automobiles, and shipbuilding. Under pressure on the lire to devalue in 1926, the Bank of Italy reversed course and the boom collapsed. By 1927, prices and wages were falling but not sufficiently to prevent widespread bankruptcy and depression. Businesses failed by the thousands in the 1930s. From 1928–1932 production was cut by one-fourth and national income by one-third, and by the end of 1934 one-third of capital capacity sat idle and over one million workers were unemployed. The state progressively intervened to stave off the ill effects of its monetary inflation and extend its control. It bailed out big businesses and banks, fostered mergers and acquisitions, cartelized the remaining, now larger enterprises, and renewed spending, mainly for war. Annual state expenditures in the early 1930s were double their levels of the early years of Fascism. As tax revenues failed to keep pace, deficits ballooned. Banks also combined and associated more closely with big industrial concerns under the supervision of the state. To rescue the big banks, which had accumulated significant holdings of industrial securities during the boom, the state nationalized their holdings in 1931 and issued new securities, backed by the state, to provide a source of new credit for the banks. The state also created new and invigorated old credit institutions outside the banking system to provide added channels for credit. It appointed a majority of the boards of these new credit institutions and provided them with their funds by direct subsidies and by guaranteeing their industrial investments with state bonds. Private parties would invest in the state-guaranteed bonds of these new institutions that would then invest the funds in favored businesses. Although the domestic purchasing power of the lire was rising in the early 1930s, the Italian state still overvalued it in foreign exchange. The resulting trade deficit and gold outflows led the state to limit imports and impose foreign exchange controls. When even the highest tariff rates in the world failed to close the trade deficit the Fascists adopted an import quota system enforced by licensing importers. The burgeoning state control of business swelled the state bureaucracy and led to widespread centralization and corruption. Small businesses were left to fail and have their assets swallowed up by big businesses and big banks. Nearly 100,000 businesses failed from 1926–1935 in Italy, almost fourfold the number that failed in the previous ten years. By 1935, Mussolini boasted that fully three-fourths of Italian businesses rested on the shoulders of the state.5 The Ethiopian war in 1935 demonstrated the extent of Fascist control.6 Annual war expenditures were fourteen times larger during the war years than previously. To meet these extraordinary expenditures, the Fascists resorted to monetary inflation and capital confiscation. Beginning in July, the gold reserve against the Bank of Italy's notes was progressively relaxed. Even as the gold reserve sagged, from 5.25 billion lire in June of 1935 to 3.93 billion lire in October, the money stock rose to 15.27 billion lire. In the next few years, monetary inflation accelerated as the Fascists monetized the national debt which stood at 1.8 trillion lire by 1938. To curb the decline in the purchasing power of the lire, the Fascists resorted to price and wage controls which paved the way for all-around planning. Confiscation of capital began in May of 1935, when banks, businesses, and individuals were required to turn all their foreign issued stocks and bonds over to the Bank of Italy. By September, the state had compelled renters in cities and towns over a certain size to buy state bonds in amounts proportionate to their rents, all Italians to exchange their foreign credits for state bonds, businesses to invest all profits in excess of 6% in state securities, and investors holding heavily depreciated state bonds to exchange them plus liquid capital for a new issue of bonds at par value. Carl Schmidt, in 1939, summarized Italian Fascism with these words: Fascism rose to power as a preventive reaction, defending the pecuniary and sentimental interests of the propertied and quasi-propertied groups of towns and country from the spectre [sic] of revolution. . . . It not only sought to safeguard existing property rights, but also fostered further industrialization and concentration of business enterprise. . . . Yet, Fascism could not solve the basic difficulties of Italian capitalism. The deepening economic crisis in later years forced business enterprise to rest more and more on the support of the State. As the economic role of the State grew, a subtle shift of spirit and purposes took place. Governmental support of the going economic order called for an increasing army of intruding officials, for a bureaucratic formalization of business affairs. And the bureaucracy developed ends of its own, associated with holding and enlarging its security and power. . . . Thus, despite all formal pronouncements . . . Fascism seemed to be evolving into a tyranny over all but a very few of the Italian people.7 The Original Vampire Economy Fascist Italy defined the fascist style of interventionism: state control of the economy by fiscal and monetary policy and regulation. Nazi Germany, in contrast, illustrates not so much the fascist style, but how the fascist episode culminates in all-around state control of the economy. Concerning the socialization of investment under Nazi Germany, Günter Reimann wrote in 1939: Backed by the General Staff of the army, Nazi bureaucrats have been able to embark upon schemes which compel the most powerful leaders of business and finance to undertake projects which they consider both risky and unprofitable. The building-up of the German war economy takes precedence over everything, including the opinions of private capitalists and their scientific research staffs. . . . The viewpoint of private investors and industrialists who think of the ultimate safety and soundness of investments has been disregarded. This is particularly true of the big industrialists who earned huge profits from the armament boom and who have large amounts of capital to invest. Their liquid funds do not escape the attention of State commissars, who are searching for means to finance new State-sponsored plants.8 Lured by enormous profits in war production, big businessmen in one industry after another came under state control. Neither political connections nor social status protected industrialists from state predation. The Nazis coerced them into investing war profits to build factories for unprofitable projects such as synthetic rubber, low grade iron ore, and other ersatz production. State and Army commissars insisted on rapid expansion of plant capacity, ancillary investments related to war production, and the use of obsolete, discarded machinery.9 Along with directing investment at the point of bayonet, the Nazis confiscated the profits of industrialists and directed them to new construction. In addition to malinvesting capital, these policies retarded maintenance of existing capital capacity. The state even forbade private investment to increase or replace existing profitable capital capacity. Prohibitions against new entry were enacted as well as closing down existing plants. And in the shrinking realm of private investment, the capriciousness of state bureaucrats could throw investment plans into disarray. The myopia of state planners led to the neglect of investment to maintain and improve what would become important wartime industries like the railroads.10 Reimann summarizes the situation with these words: The flow of capital is no longer regulated by a capital market which directs it into industries that are particularly profitable. The State has supplanted the capital market. It compels private capitalists to make investments in a future wartime economy and creates economic conditions which cause old investments to decline in value.11 Faced with the dearth of profitable opportunities in the shrinking market economy, investors turned to what they thought would be safe-havens from state power such as real estate and precious metals and gems. Thus, even the capital not consumed by the state was directed away from the capital structure.12 As part of the drive to bring capital markets under their control, the Nazis made bankers mere functionaries. Like their counterparts in industry, big bankers eagerly entangled themselves in the web of state power by accepting bailouts to avoid bankruptcy during the banking crisis in 1931. By the time the Nazis came to power, the state owned a majority of the shares of the big banks. State power was extended to the entire economy in the form of price and wage controls. Wage controls were imposed in 1933 with the purpose of holding down labor costs to boost profits during the depression and comprehensive price controls were added in 1936 to hide the effects of monetary inflation.In 1933 the state declared its "control of all credit institutions" and began to license banks, collect information on debtors, and scrutinize banking operations. The state dictated to them what investments they were permitted to recommend to investors, namely government bonds and bonds of the enterprises subsidized by the state. Bankers were forbidden to express less than optimistic assessments of the state's financial condition. For investors who refused such advice and withdrew their capital from banks to invest on their own initiative, bankers were obligated to report their activity to the state. A large bureaucracy was formed to oversee banking, centered in the Reichsbank. By 1935, state spending had ballooned to the point that private investment decisions had been supplanted and banking was under the full sway of the state.13 Hans Sennholz reports that by 1945, the Reichsbank's note issue was sixteen times larger than it was in 1933. And bank credit increased nearly sevenfold from July of 1936 to September 1944. By 1939 state debt had risen to 16 billion marks and the deficit had come to exceed the entire funds available in the capital markets. By 1935, war expenditures were more than half the total budget and by 1939 they exceeded 75% of the total. The price and wage controls enacted in response to the decline in the purchasing power of the mark formed an integral part of the Nazi system of total command over the economy.14 When debt and monetary inflation proved insufficient to feed its spending, the state freed itself from financial limitations by decree. It refused to make payment on its debt, confiscated funds from individuals and groups, cancelled private debts and reduced interest rates on private loans and transferred the resulting funds to the state. As financial pressures from war expenditures mounted during 1938 and investors fled from banks to invest with other financial intermediaries, the state compelled all credit intermediaries, banks, insurance companies, and savings banks as well as municipalities to buy its debt. The stock market, too, was controlled by the state through the dominant position that banks came to hold in it after its collapse during the depression. Reimann estimated that by 1938, 80–90% of new capital was absorbed by the state. Thus, the Nazis built their war economy by consuming the capital stock constructed by preceding generations of German savers and investors.15 The New Vampire Economy The fascist form of interventionism in America was built on the rump of state corporatism that emerged during the Progressive Era and the experience of state planning during the First World War.16 The former culminated in the establishment of the Federal Reserve System to fully centralize state control of banks and monetary inflation and the latter set precedents for New Deal programs. With the Fed in full swing, the Italian pattern during the Great Depression was seen in America, also.17 Monetary inflation and credit expansion during the 1920s led to the bust which was used to justify greater state control of investment, through fiscal expenditures and regulation. Like Mussolini, Hoover used protectionism to favor certain producers, increased funding for public works programs, and bailed out key businesses. Federal spending more than doubled from 1929 through 1934 and nearly tripled for the decade between 1929 and 1939. From a modest surplus in 1930, the federal budget was in deficit in every one of the next fifteen years. In 1932 the deficit was 142% of tax revenue and in 1933 it was 130%. In four of the five years between 1932 and 1936, the budget deficit was more than 100% of tax revenues.18 After the stock market crash in October 1929, the Fed tried unsuccessfully to re-inflate and to bolster the credit markets. When its effort failed, Hoover strong-armed big banks into establishing the National Credit Corporation to bailout banks. Capitalized with $500 million from the banks and the power to borrow up to $1 billion with Fed assistance, the NCC operated as a stopgap measure until the rebirth of the War Finance Corporation from the First World War as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Born in January of 1932, the RFC was chartered to issue $1.5 billion in debt and to lend to distressed businesses. The first $1 billion was dispensed by June and 80% of it went to banks and railroads. In July the RFC was authorized by the Emergency Relief and Construction Act to extend its credit to $3.8 billion and it dispensed $2.3 billion for the year, $300 million of which was lent to the states for their relief programs. Hoover also induced insurance companies to put off foreclosing mortgages by subsidizing them through the Federal Farm Loan Banks. Authorized by the first Glass-Steagall Act in February of 1932, the Fed stepped up its purchases of Treasury securities in what proved to be another vain attempt to re-inflate the economy. Despite a 35% rise in bank reserves during 1932, the money stock fell by $3.5 billion. In July of 1932, Hoover added the Federal Home Loan Bank with $125 million of capital for mortgage loans.19 At least Hoover did not embrace the Swope Plan, which called for the forced cartelization of the economy under the direction of the federal government; that would have to wait for his successor.20 While accelerating expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, Roosevelt conducted a regulatory blitz. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 further cartelized banks, brought them under stricter federal regulation, and provided bailouts. The state eliminated competition among banks and from non-bank institutions by reserving to banks a uniform set of practices. The Banking Act of 1935 insulated the banking cartel by closing entry to unapproved competitors. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation slowed the liquidation process of the depression and froze malinvestments in banking and the capital structure. To pave the way for more monetary inflation, Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard, abrogated gold contracts, and confiscated gold holdings. The Civilian Conservation Corps, the Emergency Relief Act, and the Works Progress Administration subsidized unemployment and misallocation of labor and distorted private charitable efforts. The Agricultural Adjustment Acts put crop planting decisions in the hands of the state and subsidized disinvestment and malinvestment in agricultural production. The Tennessee Valley Authority malinvested capital, destroyed natural resources, and distorted energy markets. The Federal Securities Act put stock markets, the pinnacle of capital allocation in the market, under the regulatory arm of the federal government. The National Industrial Recovery Act cartelized and bureaucratized the economy under federal control. The Home Owners Loan Act, the National Housing Act, and the Rural Electrification Administration malinvested capital in housing and electricity. The National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act distorted labor costs leading to malinvestments and fostered unemployment. The Social Security Act forced people to "invest" in federal trust-fund bonds. As the Fascists had done, Roosevelt built public support for state intervention as necessary for stability and made war preparation the main outlet for the state's stabilizing expenditures. The Office of Price Administration was charged with setting price and wage controls in the wake of the Fed's massive monetary inflation. Its General Maximum Price Regulation, issued in April of 1942, resulted in widespread shortages and rationing. Not content with the unsystematic application of controls, Roosevelt pushed through the Economic Stabilization Act in October of 1942. The Office of Economic Stabilization was charged to develop a "comprehensive national economic policy relating to control of civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all related matters." While New Deal agencies owed much to First World War predecessors both in form and in personnel it took the Second World War to bring all-around state planning.21 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 empowered Roosevelt to conscript labor and confiscate goods and factors for the war effort. In mid-1940, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to issue debt and use it to purchase and operate production facilities, invest in equipment and machinery, and buy land for war production. The First and Second War Powers Acts in 1941 vested broad powers in the President to seize production facilities, regulate industries, purchase goods and factors, stipulate terms of contracts, allocate resources and expanded Fed inflationary potential by authorizing it to purchase debt directly from the Treasury. From 1940 to 1945 federal expenditures increased nearly tenfold and tax revenue rose nearly sevenfold. By 1942, the budget deficit was more than double all federal expenditures in 1940. In 1943, the deficit was two and a half times the deficit in 1942 and double the amount of 1943 tax revenues. The federal debt rose fivefold during the war and the Fed nearly doubled the money stock.22 State power was rolled back after the war, federal expenditures were cut in half and many of the agencies were disbanded and some of their functions ceased while others were transferred to remaining agencies, but the state assumed the role of stabilizing the economy. The Employment Act of 1946 pledged the federal government to "use all practicable means . . . to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" in other words, to prevent downturns.23 To stabilize the economy, the state has been working to restore the power it exercised during the war. Let's recount how far down the fascist path we have traveled. The Fascists used state spending and regulation to direct investment into state-approved lines of production, war being chief among them. The federal government has 165 primary agencies, 141 of which have a significant affect on investment in the economy. Sixty-six impact investment by fiscal expenditures. The departments of agriculture, commerce, defense, education, energy, health and human services, homeland security, housing and urban development, transportation, and interior are among the major sources of such federal control. In 2005, the federal government spent approximately $1.3 trillion in these areas. And from 1945 to 2005, the federal government has spent $9.5 trillion on defense, $6.5 trillion on health care, $1.4 trillion on education, $1.2 trillion on transportation, $0.8 trillion on energy and natural resources, $0.6 trillion on agriculture, $0.5 trillion on science, space, and technology, $0.33 trillion on community and regional development, and $0.3 trillion on commerce and housing.24 These expenditures have malinvested entire sections of the capital structure. The other 75 federal agencies that affect investment do so by regulation. Examples here include the departments of labor, justice, and treasury, the environmental protection agency, the federal trade commission, the federal communication commission, the federal deposit insurance corporation, and the federal reserve system. The cost of compliance with federal regulation has been estimated at $1 trillion a year without the Patriot Act and Sarbanes-Oxley.25 The impact of the federal government's fiscal and regulatory policies is $2.3 trillion this year. This is nearly 20% of Gross Domestic Product and over 40% of Private Product Remaining. The Fascists used a central bank and cartelized the banking system under its regulation for the purpose of monetizing their debt and expanding the supply of credit. The Fed owns $736 billion of the federal debt and depository institutions own another $1.4 trillion. Together they hold 27% of the $7.9 trillion federal debt. Of the $4.6 trillion of the federal debt owned by the public, depository institutions hold 30%. The fiduciary component of checkable deposits issued by depository institutions is approximately $582 billion, which is 8% of the total credit of $7 trillion intermediated by depository institutions.26 As Joe Salerno has pointed out, monetary inflation and credit expansion cloak the capital consumption of state intervention and thus quell public outcry against it.27 The Fascists closed the windows of opportunity for investors to escape state control. As restrictions on banking mounted in the 1960s and 1970s, investors sought alternatives and entrepreneurs provided them. From 1950 to 1980, the share of total assets of all financial intermediaries held by banks fell from 52% to 36%. And the share of the short term credit market held by banks fell from 91% to 71%.28 In response to the financial services revolution, the federal government moved to consolidate its control over financial intermediaries. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 brought all financial institutions that offer checkable deposits under the regulatory authority of the Fed and imposed on them the uniform practices of all member banks. All depository institutions in America are regulated by three federal agencies, the Fed, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency. Combined they enforce more than 150 categories of regulations. The Fascists used banks to collect information on clients' financial activity. Since the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, the federal government has enacted eight additional anti-money laundering laws expanding its power to collect financial information on Americans. Banks must now form financial profiles of their customers and file suspicious activities reports to the state when they deviate from these patterns. The Fascists dictated acceptable lines of investment. The federal government compels banks to make certain types of loans, as with the Community Reinvestment Act, and businesses to make certain types of investments, as with the Americans with Disabilities Act, environmental laws, and Sarbanes-Oxley. In other cases, the federal government coercively changes incentives banks have to lend into certain lines of production, as with the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Fascists confiscated capital when fiscal pressures mounted. The confiscatory power of the federal government has been directed at drug war and RICO cases. The Patriot Act increased asset confiscation to abate money laundering and made anti-money laundering measures uniform across financial institutions. Faced with a fiscal crisis and price inflation from their fiscal and monetary policies, the Fascists stepped up dictatorial and confiscatory powers and resorted to price and wage controls. Extraordinary federal expenditures for the Vietnam War and Great Society programs coupled with monetary inflation led to our last imposition of price and wage controls in the early 1970s. Certainly, the federal government will resort to greater dictatorial and confiscatory powers and stricter price and wage controls in the wake of the next fiscal and monetary crisis. A political class that is willing to throw $250 billion into rebuilding a single city in the face of massive federal deficits is oblivious to the looming fiscal danger. As always, however, war spending is the biggest threat to the fiscal integrity of the state. If these fascist trends in America are not checked, they will lead to net capital consumption and the end of economic progress in America not to mention curtailing what remains of our liberties. 1.Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, Scholar's Edition (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1998), p. 814. 2.John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936); On Keynes's thought, see Joseph T. Salerno, "The Development of Keynes's Economics From Marshall to Millennialism," Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 3–64. 3.John Maynard Keynes, "An Open Letter to President Roosevelt," New York Times, December 31, 1933 in ed. Herman Krooss, Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States, Vol. 4 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 2788. 4.John Maynard Keynes, "Forward," 1936 German Edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, translated and reprinted in James J. Martin, Revisionist Viewpoints (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1971), pp. 203–05. 5.Carl Schmidt, The Corporate State in Action (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1939), pp. 153–76. 6.Gaetano Salvemini, Italian Fascism (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938), pp. 46–56. 7.Schmidt, Corporate State, pp. 152–53. 8.Günter Reimann, The Vampire Economy: Doing Business under Fascism (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1939), p. 125. Reimann, who real name was Hans Steinicke, passed away on March 8 of this year at the age of 100. After the war, he founded and operated the prestigious newsletter, International Reports on Finance and Currency. 9.Reimann, Vampire Economy, pp. 125–36. 10.Reimann, Vampire Economy, pp. 137–53. 11.Reimann, Vampire Economy, p. 148. 12.Reimann, Vampire Economy, p. 153. 13.Reimann, Vampire Economy, pp. 154–61 14.Reimann, Vampire Economy, pp. 170-173; Hans Sennholz, Age of Inflation (Belmont, Mass.: Western Islands, 1979), pp. 88–108. 15.Reimann, Vampire Economy, pp. 164–67. 16.On the Progressive Era, see Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (New York: Free Press, 1963). On the First World War, see Murray Rothbard, "War Collectivism in World War I," in Ronald Radosh and Murray Rothbard, eds., A New History of Leviathan (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1972), pp. 66–110. 17.On the Great Depression, see Murray Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1963). 18.Budget of the United States Government at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/hist.html 19.Rothbard, America's Great Depression, pp. 227–81. 20.On the New Deal, see Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 159-195. 21.On the war economy of the Second World War, see Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, pp. 196–236. 22.Budget of the United States Government at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/hist.html 23.Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, p. 227. 24.Budget of the United States Government at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/hist.html 25.Government Regulatory Cost Compliance Report at http://mwhodges.home.att.net/regulation.htm 26.St. Louis Fed: Economic Data at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 27.Joseph Salerno, "From Kennedy's 'New Economics' to Nixon's 'New Economic Policy': Monetary Inflation and the March of Economic Fascism," in John Denson, ed., Reassessing the Presidency (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2001), pp. 594–96. 28.James Elliot Mason, The Transformation of Commercial Banking in the United States (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), p. 8. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------