이언주
가슴이 먹먹하고 울컥합니다. 저도 IMF 때 부친의 사업 부도로 가족이 길에 나앉은 경험이 있습니다. 정권의 욕심과 정치권의 무책임, 정치노조의 선동과 놀음으로 망해가는 사람들, 빚더미에 앉을 사람들과 그 가족들 노동자들…그들의 한서린 좌절과 비명이 들리는 듯해서 괴롭습니다! 한 사업을 일으키고 일자리를 만들고 부가가치를 창출하는 게 얼마나 어려운 줄 압니까? 어떻게 그렇게 쉽게 말 한 마디 선동으로, 표에 눈이 어두워 회사를 망치고 일자리를 없애고 경제구조를 망가뜨리는 짓을 한 것입니까? 작년에 이미 숱한 조짐이 나타났고 수많은 사람들이 경고했건만 아직도 정신을 못차리고 있습니까?
이제 와서야 최저임금을 동결하니 3~4프로 인상하니 그러고 있는데요, 그걸로 회복될 것 같습니까? 최소한 문재인 집권 이전으로 돌려놓아야 합니다. 근로시간 단축도 중단하세요! 일자리가 줄어들고 소득이 줄어들고 소득양극화가 더 심해지기만 하는 판국에 누굴 위한 임금인상이고 근로시간 단축이란 말입니까? 버스기사들은 파업해서 국민 볼모로 지지체에서 혈세 지원이라도 받아 보전한다고 칩시다. 그게 안되는 대다수 근로자들은 어쩌란 말입니까?
국민들 삶이 당신들 장난감입니까? 어찌 이렇게 무책임할 수가! 노조 무서워 부화뇌동한 국회나 야당이나! 다들 용서가 안됩니다. 아니, 대통령도 내려놓고 우리 국회도 스스로 해산합시다! 권력이, 표가 대관절 뭐길래 이리도 국민들을 속이고 선동하고 그들 삶을 망쳐놓고 뻔뻔하게 아무 일도 없었다는 듯이…기가 막힙니다! 특히 지금의 집권세력과 민노총 등 노조세력들! 평생을 나라 경제를 지키고 산업현장에서 땀흘려온 기업인들과 평범한 노동자들의 삶을 파괴한 책임을 져야 할 것입니다.경제의 근본구조를 파괴해서 나라의 미래를 망치고 아이들의 희망을 앗아간 자들을 어찌 용서할 수 있겠습니까? (발췌)
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김문수
민노총의 성명서를 보십시오. 법치도 없고, 협상도 없습니다. 오직 폭력과 억지뿐입니다. 이래서야 누가 투자하겠습니까? 투자하지 않는데 일자리가 어떻게 생깁니까?
[민주노총 16개 지역본부 본부장 공동성명서]
현대중공업 법인분할 저지! 주주총회 중단! 현대중공업지부 투쟁 승리!
총파업! 총력투쟁!
오늘도 현장에서 구슬땀을 흘리며 투쟁하시는 조합원 동지 여러분!
민주노총 16개 지역본부장단, 힘찬 연대의 인사를 드립니다!
투쟁!
오는 30일(목) 오후 5시, “현대중공업 법인분할 저지! 대우조선 매각 저지! 노동자 생존권 사수! 영남권 노동자대회”에 전국적 연대를 호소드립니다!
지난 반세기 동안 작업 현장에서 죽어간 수많은 노동자의 피와 땀으로 일군 조선소가 바로 현대중공업입니다. 현대중공업 재벌은 혹독했던 4년간의 구조조정을 버텨온 노동자들과 지역 주민들에게 ‘법인분할’이라는 신종 구조조정의 신호탄을 다시 쏘아 올리려 합니다.
이제 2일 남았습니다!
오는 31일(금) 오전 10시, 울산 한마음회관에서 주총에서 의장이 망치를 두드리는 순간, 노동자들의 생존권은 또다시 바닥으로 곤두박질칠 것이며, 지역 경제는 물론 특혜 논란이 있는 대우조선 인수 작업에 속도가 붙을 것입니다. 일방적인 법인분할 주주총회는 중단되어야 합니다!
서울에 본사를 둔 한국조선해양(주) 중간지주회사를 만들면 자산 50%를 빼앗고, 부채 7조원을 고스란히 떠넘기게 됩니다. 현대중공업은 비상장기업으로 전락하게 됩니다. 빈껍데기 생산하청기지로 전락하게 됩니다. (발췌)
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신인균 티비에서 제기한 사안이라고 한다.
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중국의 속국이 되겠다는 서약인가?
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미중 무역 전쟁의 전망
What Are We Getting Wrong about the Trade War?
A ChinaFile Conversation
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중국의 70년 역사를 요약한 가디언의 기사
: stories from 70 years of the People's Republic of China
https://twitter.com/ningxianhua/status/1133033581603958791
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탄핵주범이 황교안이라는 가세연의 주장을 논리적으로 비판한다
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[긴급속보] 김정은 사망? 북한이 심상치 않다 - 2019.05.31 - [뉴스타운TV]
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총알이 비싸서 강도짓이 적자라는 말에 웃어야 할지 울어야 할지 모를 지경이다.
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내가 아는 모든 성공인은 메모를 했다
--->내가 아는 성공인은 누구도 메모를 하지 않았다.
실무적인 일을 하는 사람들은 잊어버리지 않기 위해 메모를 할 필요가 있다.
하지만 창조적인 작업을 하는 사람들은, 또는 천재들은 그냥 머리 속에 넣어두었다가, 결정적인 순간에 하나의 완성품으로 만들어내면 된다.
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음식을 먹고 배탈이 나면 당연히 음식을 제조한 업체가 책임을 진다. 하지만 음식을 먹고 서서히 죽어가면, 그들은 어떤 책임도 지지 않는다.
---> 현대 산업 국가의 음식들은 질병과 죽음에 이르는 음식이 너무 많다.
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가장 중요한 차이는 좌파, 우파에 있지 않다. 그것은 문명과 예의를 믿는 사람들과 잔인함과 무자비함을 힘이라고 여기는 사람들 사이의 차이이다.
--->잔인과 무자비를 힘이라고 여기는 인간들이 바로 좌파들이다.
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유독한 남성성이란 단어는 쓰레기이다. 여성도 얼마든지 유해할 수 있다.
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[만물상] 공소장과 소설
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화웨이가 중국 내에서 저지르는 짓들 | 신세기TV
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1990년대에 기후 변화로 말라리아로 인한 사망이 증가할 거라고 예상했지만, 21세기에 사망률은 반으로 줄었다. 그것은 부르키나파소에서 처음 발명된 살충제 처리 모기장 덕분인데, 이제 또 유전자조작 곰팡이로 모기를 퇴치한다고 한다.
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당신의 적들을 무시하지 않는다면, 당신은 결국 최악의 적을 닮게 된다.
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내가 아는 모든 성공인은 메모를 했다
--->내가 아는 성공인은 누구도 메모를 하지 않았다.
실무적인 일을 하는 사람들은 잊어버리지 않기 위해 메모를 할 필요가 있다.
하지만 창조적인 작업을 하는 사람들은, 또는 천재들은 그냥 머리 속에 넣어두었다가, 결정적인 순간에 하나의 완성품으로 만들어내면 된다.
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음식을 먹고 배탈이 나면 당연히 음식을 제조한 업체가 책임을 진다. 하지만 음식을 먹고 서서히 죽어가면, 그들은 어떤 책임도 지지 않는다.
---> 현대 산업 국가의 음식들은 질병과 죽음에 이르는 음식이 너무 많다.
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--->잔인과 무자비를 힘이라고 여기는 인간들이 바로 좌파들이다.
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관료제는 개혁할 수 있을까?
경찰과 검사 그리고 판사에 이르기까지 미국의 법률 수호자들은 공공의 이익보다는 자신들의 이익을 지키고 있다.
규제로부터 세상을 구하려면 대규모 경제 교육이 필요하다. 규제를 담당한 사람들에게 수요와 공급의 법칙을 가르쳐주기만 해도, 수 십억 달러가 절약될 것이다.
국가의 자원을 사용하는 검사들은 절대 면책권과 감시 기관들에 의한 검사의 책임 요구 거부로 인해, 그들의 개인적 손실로부터 보호되고 있다.
크리스 칼톤은 법원이 공유지와 같아서, 판검사들은 혈세에 의해 운영되는 자원들을 경제화 하려는 요인이 없다고 말했다.
정부의 봉록을 받는 경찰, 검사, 판사, 법률 제정가 등이 얻는 이익은 개인적인데 비해, 그들이 발생시키는 비용은 사회화 되어 고스란히 시민들이 세금으로 충당된다.
미제스는 관료 기관은 개선할 수 없고, 단지 그들의 영향을 제한할 수 있다고 밝힌 바 있다.
Bureaucracy, Legal Immunity, and Prosecutorial Abuse
William L. Anderson , Anthony G. Stair
[Adapted from "Protected Lying: How the Legal Doctrine of 'Absolute Immunity' Has Created a 'Lemons Problem' in American Criminal Courts" in the Spring 2018 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.]
In his famous speech to a gathering of federal prosecutors in 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson reminded his audience that their job was to do justice. He declared: “While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.” With apologies to George Stigler, one suspects that such a speech from a modern U.S. attorney general to prosecutors would be met with “uproarious laughter.”
Jackson continued:
Nothing better can come out of this meeting of law enforcement officers than a rededication to the spirit of fair play and decency that should animate the federal prosecutor. Your positions are of such independence and importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done.
The modern standards that the American Bar Association lays out for prosecutors show that at least some of Jackson’s idealism has not disappeared. Parts (a) and (b) of Standard 3-1.2 of the ABA’s Fourth Edition of the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecutorial Function declare:
(a) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court. The prosecutor’s office should exercise sound discretion and independent judgment in the performance of the prosecution function.
(b) The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict. The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor should seek to protect the innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.
This clearly is not the American criminal justice system described in sections I and III of this paper, but explaining why this is the current situation requires something much different than exhorting the players in the system to “serve the public.” If there is anything clear, the players in the system, from police to prosecutors to the judges do not serve the interests of the “public,” but rather their own interests.
Economists in the Austrian and Public Choice camps should not be surprised at this situation. Bruce Yandle wrote of his experience with the Federal Trade Commission and how oblivious its staff economists seemed to be to the problems of regulatory issues. He writes:
Not only does government rarely accomplish its stated goals at lowest cost, but often its regulators seem dedicated to choosing the highest-cost approach they can find. Because of all this, I and others in academia became convinced years ago that a massive program in economic education was needed to save the world from regulation. If we economists could just teach the regulators a little supply and demand, countless billions of dollars would be saved.
As he received his “education” in bureaucratic thinking, however, Yandle came to realize that the regulatory dynamic was not what he originally had imagined. He continues:
…instead of assuming that regulators really intended to minimize costs but somehow proceeded to make crazy mistakes, I began to assume that they were not trying to minimize costs at all—at least not the costs I had been concerned with. They were trying to minimize their costs, just as most sensible people do.
Those costs, he pointed out, included costs of making mistakes, costs of enforcement, and political costs. Those firms being regulated, he noted, also had goals that were well outside what the public perception of regulation was supposed to be. Writes Yandle:
They want protection from competition, from technological change, and from losses that threaten profits and jobs. A carefully constructed regulation can accomplish all kinds of anticompetitive goals of this sort, while giving the citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public interest.
Most of the regulation literature focuses upon the relationship between government and private firms that government agents regulate, but while courts are entirely government entities and the analogies between the various players in the courts and those in the regulated marketplace are not exactly the same, nonetheless there are similarities. First, and most important, as Robert McCormick and Robert Tollison write, all of those who take part in the systems—both markets and in government—are self-interested individuals:
They (government employees and politicians) are economic agents who respond to their institutional environment in predictable ways, and their actions can be analyzed in much the same way as economists analyze the actions of participants in the market processes.
If one can compare the actions of prosecutors to business owners, one can apply Murray Rothbard’s analysis that individuals will seek to gain psychic gains and also can suffer psychic losses. There is one important difference, however: Should the individuals in private business—entrepreneurs and the capitalists—engage in error or disseminate false information over time, they well may suffer real economic losses, losing their own resources.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, use state-owned resources, are protected from their own personal losses by both the legal doctrine of absolute immunity and the refusal of the so-called watchdog agencies such as state bar discipline committees to hold prosecutors accountable for lawbreaking and other wrongdoing. Furthermore, their actions force others to use their own resources, and when prosecutors target business owners, losses and occasional bankruptcies follow.
Chris Calton reinforces this point by likening the courts to a commons or, more specifically, a “public good” that is owned by the state, and the government players have no incentive to economize on resources financed by taxpayers. He writes:
Because the government holds a monopoly on the justice system in the United States, courtrooms are treated as public goods. For public goods, costs are socialized, so there is no individual cost to using this resource. From the perspective of the criminals, of course, this seems like a no-brainer—a defendant is hardly going to pay the cost of his own conviction. But the socialized costs of courtrooms remove the incentive to economize for two specific groups of people: legislators and police officers.
Calton explains that legislators can expand the criminal code to look “tough on crime” without having to use their own resources, while police gain from making more arrests, even though most of the people they collar are likely to be non-violent lawbreakers. To put it another way, the gains for the government players in the system, including police, prosecutors, judges, and lawmakers are private while the costs themselves are socialized.
While we use market analysis, nonetheless, we emphasize again that courts are not markets, and that plea bargain sessions are not exercises in mutual exchange. In economic exchanges, all parties involved anticipate being better off afterward, while in the courts, one party will be better off and the other will be worse off. Rothbard writes about government intervention:
On the market,…, there can be no such thing as exploitation. But the thesis of an inherent conflict of interest is true whenever the State or anyone else wielding force intervenes on the market. For then the intervener gains at the expense of the subjects who lose in utility. On the market all is harmony. But as soon as intervention appears on the scene, conflict is created, for each person or group may participate in a scramble to be a net gainer rather than a net loser—to be part of the intervening team, as it were, rather than one of the victims.
Prosecutors generally are winners in their interactions with people who are accused of crimes, and given the high conviction rates and the high rates of plea bargains (that serve as convictions), prosecutors benefit well from the existing system. This does not mean that society as a whole benefits from how the courts operate, however, and when innocent people are convicted and the courts and prosecutors refuse to rectify the errors, not only are the wrongfully-convicted individuals done irreparable harm, but also family and loved ones of the victim. Furthermore, every refusal to correct official wrongdoing that goes unpunished (and that is nearly every one of those cases) creates perverse incentives for prosecutors and judges to do more of the same.
As we have emphasized before, for all of the talk about how prosecutors “serve society,” the system is one in which many of the actors, such as prosecutors, gain individually from the system, but the benefits to others are not as clear. While it is true that most people would benefit with dangerous and violent criminals being punished and “taken off the street,” close to half of people in prison are there not for violent crimes like robbery, rape, and murder but rather for using or distributing drugs such as marijuana or cocaine. While one can argue whether or not such substances should be legal, nonetheless usage of these substances does not necessarily post a threat to the lives and property of others.
Ludwig von Mises provides a number of insights into bureaucratic mind. For the purposes of this paper, we look at the “justice” system as a bureaucracy, as opposed to dealing with whether or not elected prosecutors behave differently than appointed prosecutors, a subject for later research. Commenting on the differences between private enterprise and a bureaucratic office, Mises writes:
The objectives of public administration cannot be measured in money terms and cannot be checked by accountancy methods. Take a nation-wide police system like the F.B.I. There is no yardstick available that could establish whether the expenses incurred by one of its regional or local branches were not excessive. The expenditures of a police station are not reimbursed by its successful management and do not vary in proportion to the success attained. If the head of the whole bureau were to leave his subordinate station chiefs a free hand with regard to money expenditure, the result would be a large increase in costs as every one of them would be zealous to improve the service of his branch as much as possible. It would become impossible for the top executive to keep the expenditures within the appropriations allocated by the representatives of the people or within any limits whatever. It is not because of punctiliousness that the administrative regulations fix how much can be spent by each local office for cleaning the premises, for furniture repairs, and for lighting and heating. Within a business concern such things can be left without hesitation to the discretion of the responsible local manager. He will not spend more than necessary because it is, as it were, his money; if he wastes the concern’s money, he jeopardizes the branch’s profit and thereby indirectly hurts his own interests. But it is another matter with the local chief of a government agency. In spending more money he can, very often at least, improve the result of his conduct of affairs. Thrift must be imposed on him by regimentation.
While no one doubts that even prosecutors face scarcity constraints (even though critics may say prosecutors have “unlimited” resources), nonetheless there is an economic calculation issue facing a defendant that prosecutors do not share. Because individuals charged with crimes are expected to pay for their own representation—or face the tender mercies of an overworked public defender that is unlikely to offer an adequate defense—they are likely to face resource problems. Prosecutors, on the other hand, are using resources of others and face a much different calculus than do defendants. Mises explains, at least in part, the process:
In public administration there is no market price for achievements. This makes it indispensable to operate public offices according to principles entirely different from those applied under the profit motive.
Now we are in a position to provide a definition of bureaucratic management: Bureaucratic management is the method applied in the conduct of administrative affairs the result of which has no cash value on the market. Remember: we do not say that a successful handling of public affairs has no value, but that it has no price on the market, that its value cannot be realized in a market transaction and consequently cannot be expressed in terms of money.
As Mises points out, market prices and behavior will at best impose only partial constraints upon the bureaucrat’s actions, and given that the kind of economic calculation that constrains entrepreneurs and capitalists does not fully restrain prosecutors, the system then requires restraints of another kind imposed by a political process or the whims of an administrator. However, as Yandle notes, the regulator is interested in minimizing his own costs, not to mention reluctant to limit the power of his office. In other words, there are plenty of reasons for those who either supervise the prosecutor or are able to impose discipline for prosecutorial misconduct to shirk their assigned duties, as to do so in the long run would diminish the power of the prosecutor’s office, thus reducing all of their authority.
While this paper does not advocate reform for prosecutorial offices, nonetheless it is clear that the denial of using the tort system takes away the one remedy that one wronged by a prosecutor directly can take against his false accuser. Every other remedy—from other prosecutors charging the offending prosecutor with a crime to the state bar imposing discipline up to taking away the prosecutor’s law license—requires those who are government officials and also have a vested interest in preserving their own power and authority to do something that in the long run undermines their own power.
Such a state of affairs should surprise no one. Mises notes in Bureaucracy that one cannot really reform the bureaucratic institutions other than try to limit their influences. He pointed out that bureaucracies cannot run an economy with any success or replace a market. Likewise, one cannot impose “market-based” reforms upon bureaucracies; people charged with crimes cannot refuse to submit to prosecutors and the courts, and average citizens have no power over the system other than to serve on juries and, on occasion, impose their own form of “justice” through jury nullification.
By creating an atmosphere in which prosecutors nearly are invulnerable to legal accountability, the courts also have unleashed a situation in which F.A. Hayek described as one in which “the worst get on top.” Hayek—as well as Austrian economists such as Mises and Rothbard—warned that a collectivist system is more than likely to empower people who are more likely than not to abuse that power. He writes:
The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule; there is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must not be prepared to do if it serves “the good of the whole,” because the “good of the whole” is to him the only criterion of what ought to be done.
William L. Anderson is a professor of economics at Frostburg State University in Frostburg, Maryland.
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