2021년 10월 26일 화요일

조선일보 與野, 교원·공무원 노조에 ‘유급 전임자’ 허용 추진해 논란 세금으로 지급할 전임자 봉급 전교조 등 교원노조, 年 24억 추산 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 윤석열 박정희 대통령 본받아 대한민국 재도약을 해야 한다. --->박 대통령의 통치는 사실 중앙집권적이고 사회주의적으로 발전한 시기였다. 그것이 통했던 이유는, 그 앞에 독일이나 일본과 같은 나라가 그와 똑같은 방법으로 단시간에 경제를 일으켰기 때문이다. 하지만 이제는 그런 방식은 통하지 않고, 또 박 대통령의 사회주의적 사고 방식이 지금까지도 우리 사회에 큰 해를 끼치고 있다. 의료보험이나 국민연금 자체가 사회주의적인 발상이다. 박 대통령은 당시간에 한국의 경제를 도약시켰지만, 이제는 박 대통령의 사회주의적 정책들을 폐기하고 자유주의적 정책을 실시할 때이다. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 속보: 법원이 경선금지 가처분신청을 기각했습니다 이상로의 카메라 출동 https://youtu.be/KGiIMnkq7hY 이재명 앞에서 일찌감치 업드린 조선일보 ! https://youtu.be/vmVF7z3LanI --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 그들이 국민을 어려워하지 않으면 / 도대체 어떻게 되는건가 / 이탈리아의 경험에서 배우는 미래 [공병호TV] https://youtu.be/XL2VNDV6da4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 판다의 발톱 [한민호 공자학원 실체 알리기 운동 본부 대표] 이봉규 티비 https://youtu.be/rjS9JxRu1Qw ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 적자 지출이 바로 인플레를 뜻한다 오래 전 정부가 모든 사람을 번영하게 만드는 새로운 방법을 발표했는데, 그것은 적자 금융(또는 지출)"deficit financing, deficit spending이라는 것이다. 그런데 이런 기술적 용어들은 사람들이 잘 이해하지 못한다는 특징을 지니고 있다. 그런데 기술적 용어를 쉽게 풀어보면, 적자 지출이란 결국 “윤전기로 찍어낸 돈”이란 뜻이다. 그리고 적자란 말은 정부가 세수보다 더 많은 돈을 쓴다는 말이므로, 인플레를 뜻한다. 하지만 가끔 정부는 가격이 상승한다며 위원회를 만들어 인플레에 대항한다는 촌극을 벌이기도 한다. 하지만 인플레를 만드는 주범은 바로 돈을 찍어내는 정부이다. 하지만 정부는 인플레가 욕심 많은 기업가들에 의해 만들어지는 것처럼 말한다. 최악의 돈의 실패, 돈에 일어날 수 있는 최악의 사태는 정부에 의해 저질러지고 있다. "Deficit Financing" and Inflation Bettina Bien Greaves I assume that you know how the banking system developed and how the banks could improve the services rendered by gold, by transferring assets from one individual to another individual in the books of the banks. When you study the development of the history of money you will discover that there were countries in which there were systems in which all the payments were made by transactions in the books of a bank, or of several banks. The individuals acquired an account by paying gold into this bank. There is a limited quantity of gold, so the payments which are made are limited. And it was possible to transfer gold from the account of one man to the account of another. But then the governments began something which I can only describe in general words. The governments began to issue paper, which they wanted to serve the role, perform the service, of money. When people bought something they expected to receive from their bank a certain quantity of gold to pay for it. But the government asked, What's the difference whether the people really get gold or whether they get a title from the bank that gives them the right to ask for gold? It will be all the same to them. So the government issued paper notes, or gave the bank the privilege to issue paper notes, which gave the receiver the right to ask for gold. This led to an increase in the number of paper banknotes that gave to the bearer the right to ask for gold. Not too long ago, our government proclaimed a new method for making everybody prosperous: a method called "deficit financing." Now that is a wonderful word. You know, technical terms have the bad habit of not being understood by people. The government and the journalists who were writing for the government told us about this "deficit spending." It was wonderful! It was considered something that would improve conditions in the whole country. But if you translate this into more common language, the language of the uneducated, then you would say "printed money." The government says this is only due to your lack of education; if you had an education you wouldn't say "printed money;" you would call it "deficit financing" or "deficit spending." Now what does this mean? Deficits! This means that the government spends more than it collects in taxes and in borrowing from the people; it means government spending for all those purposes for which the government wants to spend. This means inflation, pushing more money into the market; it doesn't matter for what purpose. And that means reducing the purchasing power of each monetary unit. Instead of collecting the money that the government wanted to spend, the government fabricated the money. Printing money is the easiest thing. Every government is clever enough to do it. If the government wants to pay out more money than before, if it wants to buy more commodities for some purpose or to raise the salaries of government employees, no other way is open to it under normal conditions than to collect more taxes and use this increased income to pay, for instance, for the higher wages of its employees. The fact that people have to pay higher taxes so that the government may pay higher wages to its employees means that individual taxpayers are forced to restrict their expenditures. This restriction of purchases on the part of the taxpayers counteracts the expansion of purchases by those receiving the money collected by the government. Thus, this simple contraction of spending on the part of some, the taxpayers from whom money is taken to give to others, does not bring about a general change in prices. The thing is that the individual cannot do anything that makes the inflationary machine and mechanism work. This is done by the government. The government makes the inflation. And if the government complains about the fact that prices are going up and appoints committees of learned men to fight against the inflation, we have only to say, "Nobody other than you, the government, brings about inflation, you know." On the other hand, if the government does not raise taxes, does not increase its normal revenues, but prints an additional quantity of money and distributes it to government employees, additional buyers appear on the market. The number of buyers is increased as a result, while the quantity of goods offered for sale remains the same. Prices necessarily go up, because there are more people with more money asking for commodities which had not increased in supply. The government does not speak of the increase in the quantity of money as "inflation;" it calls the fact that commodity prices are going up "inflation." The government then asks who is responsible for this "inflation," that is, for the higher prices? The answer — "bad" people; they may not know why prices are going up but nevertheless they are sinning by asking for higher prices. The best proof that inflation, the increase in the quantity of money, is very bad is the fact that those who are making the inflation are denying again and again, with the greatest fervor, that they are responsible. "Inflation?" they ask. "Oh! This is what you are doing because you are asking higher prices. We don't know why prices are going up. There are bad people who are making the prices go up. But not the government!" And the government says: "Higher prices? Look, these people, this corporation, this bad man, the president of this corporation…" Even if the government blames the unions — I don't want to talk about the unions — but even then we have to realize what the unions cannot do is to increase the quantity of money. And, therefore, all the activities of the unions are within the framework that is built by the government in influencing the quantity of money. The situation, the political situation, the discussion of the problem of inflation, would be very different if the people who are making the inflation, the government, were openly saying, "Yes, we do it. We are making the inflation. Unfortunately we have to spend more than people are prepared to pay in taxes." But they don't say this. They do not even say openly to everybody, "We have increased the quantity of money. We are increasing the quantity of money because we are spending more, more than you are paying us." And this leads us to a problem which is purely political: Those into whose pockets the additional money goes first profit from the situation, whereas others are compelled to restrict their expenditures. The government does not acknowledge this; it does not say, "We have increased the quantity of money and, therefore, prices are going up." The government starts by saying, "Prices are going up. Why? Because people are bad. It is the duty of the government to prevent bad people from bringing about this upward movement of prices, this inflation. Who can do this? The government!" Then the government says, "We will prevent profiteering, and all these things. These people, the profiteers, are the ones who are making inflation; they are asking higher prices." And the government elaborates "guidelines" for those who do not wish to be in the wrong with the government. Then, it adds that this is due to "inflationary pressures." They have invented many other terms also which I cannot remember, such silly terms, to describe this situation — "cost-push inflation," "inflationary pressures," and the like. Nobody knows what an "inflationary pressure" is; it has never been defined.1 What is clear is what inflation is. Inflation is a considerable addition to the quantity of money in circulation.… And this system can work for some time, but only if there is some power that restricts the government's wish to expand the quantity of money and is powerful enough to succeed to some extent in this regard. The evils which the government, its helpers, its committees, and so on, acknowledge are connected with this inflation, but not in the way in which they are discussed. This shows that the intention of the governments … is to conceal the real cause of what is happening. If we want to have a money that is acceptable on the market as the medium of exchange, it must be something that cannot be increased with a profit by anybody, whether government or a citizen. The worst failures of money, the worst things done to money, were not done by criminals but by governments, which very often ought to be considered, by and large, as ignoramuses but not as criminals. Excerpted from Ludwig von Mises on Money and Inflation: A Synthesis of Several Lectures, compiled by Bettina Bien Greaves. This lecture was given at the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE). 1.Talk of "inflationary pressures" and "guidelines" dates from the 1960s. At that time, business firms were raising prices and wage rates because the government had expanded the nation's quantity of money so much, and government officials were trying to persuade private business firms to keep price and wage increases below 3.2%. This was the maximum considered permissible "under the President's voluntary guidelines [or "guideposts"] for non-inflationary wage and price hikes." And President Johnson threatened a tax increase if "inflationary pressures" did not cease. See World Almanac, 1967, pp. 60, 61. — BBG --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 개입주의 경제학자들은 왜 외부효과를 즐겨 말할까? 기술관료들이 전통적으로 하는 일은 이렇다: 그들이 혐오하는 문제를 찾아내서 그것이 인간의 탐욕, 시장, 또는 기업가 때문이라고 분석한 다음에, 문명의 쇠퇴를 막기 위해 자신들이 제안하는 정책을 실행해야 한다고 주장한다. 노벨상을 받은 윌리엄 노드하우스에 따르면 교통 정체, 주유소, ATMs, 거리 쓰레기, 교통 소음 등이 모두 외부 효과이다. 비만까지도 운전에서의 부정적인 외부 효과로 취급된다. 심지어 흡연가와의 결혼도 부정적인 개인적 외부효과라 나온다. 정부의 역할이 시장에서의 외부 효과를 교정하는 것인데, 거의 모든 것이 외부효과라면, 모두가 정부가 개입할 명분이 생기는 것이다. Why Interventionist Economists Love to Talk about Externalities Joakim Book “Happy families are all alike,” goes the Leo Tolstoy quote from the Russian classic Anna Karenina, “but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” The same can be said about government-focused technocrats and their central planning tendencies: all happy technocrats are alike, but every unhappy citizen-subject living under their rule is unhappy in his or her own way. Whatever the topic, technocrats follow the same time-honored formula: they find an issue they dislike and blame it on greed, the market, or some iconic industrialist before resolutely delivering their “urgent” policy solutions, without which civilization is ostensibly doomed. William Nordhaus, the environmental economist and 2018 Nobel Laureate, fills this role perfectly. In the book he recently published, The Spirit of Green, he covers the philosophy and ethics of a green world and how it applies to economics—to markets, taxes, regulations, and most perniciously externalities. Whatever the precise issue Nordhaus considers, a government solution is never far away—even if it occasionally works through manipulating market mechanisms. Ultimately, technocrats like our professor here want to nudge, outlaw, regulate, and tax things they don’t like while subsidizing, funding, and encouraging those they do. Despite being the author of a long-standing economics textbook, Nordhaus manages to butcher several economic concepts, most egregiously costs and values, principal-agent problems, public goods, and externalities. We’ll deal with externalities in this article, public goods in the next, and Nordhaus’s struggle with costs, values, and prices in the final one. The first mistake happens before he’s barely begun (on p. 2), where we get the usual praise for “mixed economies”: [S]ocieties need to combine the ingenuity of private markets with the fiscal and regulatory powers of governments. Private markets are necessary to provide ample supplies of goods such as food and shelter, while only governments can provide collective goods such as pollution control, public health, and personal safety. As a description of the ideology held by interventionists like Professor Nordhaus, this is accurate. As a statement about the world, economics, or markets, it’s entirely false: there exist very few collective goods; pollution control can and is alleviated privately or through private courts and only individuals, not collectives, have health or safety. Most other errors in Nordhaus’s eloquent text follow from these initial mistakes. The Many Shapes of External Damage At the first chance he gets, Nordhaus treats public goods and externalities as seemingly meaning the same thing, “activities whose costs or benefits spill outside the market and are not captured in market prices.” This is close to how many economists think about the concept (whether or not they think it a useful theoretical lens). From Greg Mankiw’s textbook we get that “externality is the impact of one person’s actions on the well being of a bystander”; from Wikipedia, that “an externality is a cost or benefit for a third party who did not agree to it.” Further into the book, externalities have gotten an expanded meaning. They’re a “by-product of an economic activity that causes damages to innocent bystanders,” like the Mankiw formulation. Two chapters earlier, externalities occurred when costs of activities spill over to others “without those other people being compensated for the damages.” What’s it going to be? Is it all activities affecting others? Just market activities? Just market activities to which the third-party individual objects? That these others aren’t being compensated? Much too imprecise for the only laureate in environmental economics, but we’re still roughly on board with the general meaning of market activities imposing damage on an innocent third party. Then Nordhaus runs with his newfound conceptual justification for government action. Congested traffic is an externality. An entire segment in The Spirit of Green displays network externalities, of which Facebook might be the example that first comes to mind (the value to the user increases with the number of other users joining the network). Then we have “pecuniary externalities,” which are any (negative) economic impact on you from other people’s actions—from competitors opening a store to a consumer importing better products from abroad. Gas stations, Nordhaus says, are externalities. As are ATMs, street litter, traffic noise—oh, and most certainly the pandemic, which gets a full twenty-page chapter in a book about climate economics. Go figure. My favorite one is obesity, which is now treated as a negative externality from driving. We may accept that a sedentary lifestyle has undesired consequences and “harmful side effects”—but does that really make these effects externalities which governments then have carte blanche to rectify? But it gets worse. Nordhaus shows absolutely no familiarity with how markets routinely internalize external damages—whether it is individuals opting out, litigation or enforced property rights, negotiations between people, or how market prices on land or homeowners’ associations adjust in response to consumers’ valuation of that supposed external damage. Or, more importantly, from knowingly opting into an activity, despite there being negative externalities involved. I had to bang my head against the wall when he brought up “marrying a smoker” as a negative personal spillover—as if I weren’t aware that my partner is smoking! My increased exposure to dangerous compounds in cigarette smoke is thus a side effect: these are constrained optimizations, professor, across several distinct domains—not externalities. I take the bad with the good, and make the calculus that it’s still worth it. To his (very minor) credit, marrying a smoker is related to a set of externalities that he thinks only operate at a personal level and so need not concern others. At a different passage he also explores which externalities one ought to care about: “Nations cannot and should not regulate every minor externality, such as a messy yard or burping in public.” I’m glad to hear that too, but the bad news is that Professor Nordhaus is not in a position to distinguish which negative externalities are major and which are minor. It might seem obvious that burping is fine and polluting rivers isn’t, but that’s the all-knowing technocrat speaking—not the acting man making subjective valuations under conditions of uncertainty. A central planner cannot know. The minute we then take pecuniary externalities into account, anything inside or outside the marketplace is no longer ours to decide. In discussing pecuniary externalities, Nordhaus has already given us a criterium for which externalities are permissible in his well-managed society and which we ought to overlook: “[B]enefits to society from actions that cause pecuniary externalities are generally higher than are the costs to persons who suffer pecuniary externalities.” Finally, a cost-benefit test. So, if fossil fuels benefit enough people in sufficient proportions—which they overwhelmingly do—any residual externalities are okay. Great—cancel the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference, please. If everything is an externality, the concept becomes rather meaningless. More importantly, it lets technocrats and governments arbitrarily invoke it when issuing commands they like while refusing to invoke it for their opponents’ commands. If the role of governments is to correct externalities in markets and everything is an externality, there are few hurdles left for governments to dismantle; anything is up for grabs. Everything is political; nothing is above or outside the scope of the all-seeing political master. Like a good technocrat, Nordhaus wishes to sit not on the throne but right next to it, eagerly advising the ruler on what is “obviously” the best solution to a certain problem. His lack of faith in individuals, firms, and markets to achieve beneficial ends is stunning: [P]eople may cough and die, firms may prosper or fail, species may disappear, and lakes may catch on fire. But until governments, through the appropriate mechanisms, take steps to control the polluting causes, the dangerous conditions will continue. Externalities are everywhere. And for a technocratic planner, that’s the point. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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