중국 정전의 원인 이지듀MD http://www.ilbe.com/view/11370877609 정전의 원인이 잘못된 정책의 시너지 효과라고 하는데, 지난 60년대에 중국에서 4천만 명 이상이 굶어죽은 대기근 사태 역시, 식량의 근본적인 부족보다도, 여러가지 미친 정책들의 결과라는 주장이 있다. 그리고 이 모든 혼란의 근본 원인은, 중앙집권 통제에 있다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 오세훈 "이재명이 대장동 설계자···들여다보니 말문 막힌다" 중앙일보 winsock 일베 댓글 역시 오세훈이 변호사라서 핵심을 정확하게 잘 짚었네.. 기자 새끼들 일부러 퇴직금 50억 운운 개소리하는 데 핵심은 저거임. 1. 공영 개발의 가면을 쓰고 대장동 주민들의 토지를 헐값에 강제로 빼앗음 (강제수용) 2. 공영 개발의 가면을 쓰고 분양가 상한제를 피해가 비싼 가격에 분양해 폭리를 취함.(분양가 상한제 회피) 3. 그 이익을 극소수의 업자 새끼들이 다 해먹고 일부는 미국으로 튐. 전체 규모가 1조원에 육박하는 건국이래 최대의 토건 비리를 저질러놓고 그놈들이 보험용으로 돈 발라놓은 다른 놈들 붙잡고 욕하고 있는 형국. 이 문제는 국힘당이 저 대장동 토지 원주민들을 전부 만나서 규합하고 고액 분양 받은 주민들이 들고 일어나도록 해야한다. 이런 대가리가 전혀 안 돌아가고 자기당 의원보고 사퇴하라고 육갑 떨고 있는게 이준석... 이준석이 빨리 당대표에서 물러나야 한다. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 거대한 폭로가 공개될 예정 리얼그래놀라 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11370943752 Pandora Papers: Secret wealth and dealings of world leaders exposed By Pandora Papers reporting team BBC Panorama 세계 거물들의 비밀 재산이 폭로될 예정 The secret wealth and dealings of world leaders, politicians and billionaires has been exposed in one of the biggest leaks of financial documents. Some 35 current and former leaders and more than 300 public officials are featured in the files from offshore companies, dubbed the Pandora Papers. They reveal the King of Jordan secretly amassed £70m of UK and US property. They also show how ex-UK PM Tony Blair and his wife saved £312,000 in stamp duty when they bought a London office. The couple bought an offshore firm that owned the building. The leak also links Russian President Vladimir Putin to secret assets in Monaco, and shows the Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis - facing an election later this week - failed to declare an offshore investment company used to purchase two villas for £12m in the south of France. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 경기도 부지사 출신인 박수영 국민의힘 의원은 국정감사에서 ‘50억 약속 클럽’ 명단을 공개했다. 박 의원이 공개한 명단은 권순일 전 대법관, 박영수 전 특검, 곽상도 무소속 의원, 김수남 전 검찰총장, 최재경 전 민정수석, 홍 모씨 등이다. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 더팩트 수천억 손실에도 억대 연봉자 급증한 한국석유공사, 왜? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 한미 통화스왚 연장 안 되면 우리는 처음으로 경험해 보지 못한 세상을 겪게 될텐데 스나이퍼조련사 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11371033646 6개월 단위로 연장하다가 지난달 9월에 처음으로 3개월만 연장함 3개월 전에는 말해 주는데 지금까지 말이 없음 가계부채 1800조 부채폭탄때문에 연장을 안해주는걸까.. 하여튼 오늘 환율 1195원찍음 금리인상을 안할수가 없는 한은은 0.25%의 소폭으로 3번에 걸쳐서 기준금리 1.25로 간을 보려고 했던 것 같은데 이제 물건너 간거같음 대출을 조이고 금리를 인상하면 집값은 떨어질 수밖에 없는데 가파른 금리인상에 미국변수 , 중국 부동산 변수까지 장난이 아닐 것 같지않노 전세사는 게이들 조심해라 가계부채1800조 기업대출 2000조는 IMF가 예전처럼 우리 못 도와줌 돈이 없음 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 봉쇄 조치 없이도 스웨덴은 대부분의 유럽 국가들보다 excess death(초과 사망자)가 적었다. Without Lockdowns, Sweden Had Fewer Excess Deaths Than Most of Europe Ryan McMaken Although the experts assured us Sweden would experience a disaster and a bloodbath without covid lockdowns, the Nordic nation has fared better than Europe on excess deaths. https://mises.org/wire/without-lockdowns-sweden-had-fewer-excess-deaths-most-europe *Estimates of excess deaths can provide information about the burden of mortality potentially related to the COVID-19 pandemic, including deaths that are directly or indirectly attributed to COVID-19. Excess deaths are typically defined as the difference between the observed numbers of deaths in specific time periods and expected numbers of deaths in the same time periods. excess death란 특정 기간의 실재 사망자 수와 통상적인 사망자 예상 숫자 사이의 차이를 가리킨다. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 파스칼 살린의 책 <세금 독재> 서평 파스칼 살린은 유럽의 가장 중요한 경제학자의 한 사람으로 자유 사회의 원칙을 견지해왔다. 그는 20여권이 넘는 저술을 남겼는데, 오스트리아 경제학을 옹호한 <자유주의Libéralisme (2000)>는 그 대표작이다. <세금 독재>라는 책은 1985년에 프랑스에서 처음 출판되었고, 206 페이지의 소책자이다. 책의 주제는 세금에 대한 합리적인 근거가 없으므로, 세금은 절대 정당화 될 수 없다는 것이다. 소득이나 재산을 세금의 근거로 삼는 것은 합리성이나 정의의 어떤 기준에도 부합하지 못한다. 그것은 납세자의 나이나 피부색에 따라 세금을 매기는 것처럼 자의적이다. 상속은 자신이 번 돈이 아니기 때문에 정당하지 않다고 한다. 그렇다면 자신이 번 돈이 아닐 경우, 부모에게 받는 게 정당하지 않다면, (보조금 따위를) 국가에서 받는 건 어떻게 정당하다는 말인가? 그는 어빙 피셔와 허버트 피셔Irving and Herbert Fisher (1942)가 주장한 순수 소비세pure consumption tax를 표준으로 한 세제 개혁을 주장한다. 그는 민주제가 개인들의 동의를 대체할 수 있고, 사회 계약이 있다는 등의 생각에 반대한다. 그는 모든 세금은 자의적이고, 또 강압에 기반해 있다고 주장한다. Review: Tax Tyranny Jörg Guido Hülsmann Tax Tyranny by Pascal Salin Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2020, 224 pp. Jörg Guido Hülsmann (guido.hulsmann@univ-angers.fr) is Professor of Economics at the University of Angers. Pascal Salin is one of the most important Continental European economists. Throughout his career, he has developed and defended the principles of a free society against the encroachments of the state. He started off as a Friedmanite in the 1960s and then turned ever more Austrian through his personal encounters with Friedrich von Hayek in the 1970s, which led him to discover and appreciate the works of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner. He is the author of about two dozen books. His main research fields have been competition, international monetary economics, international trade, macroeconomics, and public economics. He has also become well known as a champion of Austro-libertarianism, especially through his treatise Libéralisme (2000). Even though Professor Salin is very prolific, most of his writings have been published in his native French. The book under review is therefore very welcome, being the first English edition of a text that has been published in several French editions starting in 1985. It was first published under the title L’arbitraire fiscale and then, in 2014, under the current title, La tyrannie fiscale. It has also been translated into Italian and other languages. The book has 206 pages, is organised into 12 chapters, and comes with a 7-page index. Tax Tyranny is an essay on the principles of taxation. It is written in a non-technical way and accessible to a broad readership. It serves very well as an introductory text for undergraduates, most notably in macroeconomics or public economics, but it also carries a lot of original food for thought that deserve the attention of scholars and tax practitioners. The central thesis is that there are no rational grounds for taxation and taxation can therefore never be justified. By its very nature, the tax state can never be a just state. When it taxes its citizens, it is willy-nilly arbitrary and tyrannical. Professor Salin starts off highlighting the destructive nature of taxes and then walks through the various arguments designed to present proportional taxation (“flat tax”) and even more so progressive taxation of incomes and savings as a matter of distributive justice. Because these justifications do not withstand scrutiny, chapter 2 carries the title “The myth of progressive taxation.” Salin argues that the principle of equality before the law is irreconcilable with proportional and progressive taxation. The core of his argument is that it is impossible to objectively assess the real income and real wealth of each citizen. Incomes and wealth have various personal dimensions which cannot be readily translated into monetary terms. As a consequence, when the state sets out to tax the citizens by relying only on their monetary income, respectively on the monetary expression of their wealth, it deals with the citizens not on equal terms, but creates privileges for some and disadvantages for others. This leads him to a radical conclusion: “The choice of income or wealth as a tax base does not correspond to any criterion of rationality or justice. It is as arbitrary as would be a modulation of the tax according to the age or the color of the skin of a taxpayer.” (p. 35) Proportional and progressive taxes are arbitrary by their very nature. They cannot be based on an equal treatment of the citizens. The taxing state is a tyrannical state. Its deeds are not based on reason and justice. “The reality is very different: Just as a robber has interest in attacking the one who has money rather than the one who has no money, the state takes the money where it is.” (ibid.) In chapters 3 through 5, Salin then zooms in on the over-taxation of savings, which are subject to multiple and overlapping layers of taxes: “[…] the one who saves may have to pay the income tax for his current savings, the wealth tax for the accumulation of the same savings, and the income tax for future yields of these savings. […] Thus, the extraordinarily arbitrary character of the income tax is dues to the fact that certain resources are taxed once, others twice, and some not at all.” (p. 52) Let us also quote the following passage from the brilliant chapter 4, where he deals with inheritance taxes: “We may also eliminate immediately the statist argument that inheritance is not ‘fair’ because it has not been ‘earned’. Such an accusation is indeed funny coming from people whose resources are obtained by coercion and whose main objective is usually to increase the share of the incomes of citizens that does not depend on the services that they have provided to others. Why would it be ‘fair’ to receive a non-earned income when it comes from the state and not when it comes from one’s parents?” (p. 67) The macroeconomic impact of the over-taxation of savings is discussed in chapter 6. Pascal Salin argues that an economy starved of savings suffers from low or negative growth rates. As a consequence, political leaders are tempted to replace savings by cheap credit out of the printing press, which in turn makes the economy prone to economic crises. In chapter 7, he presents a general conception for tax reform, very much in line with the idea of a pure consumption tax according to Irving and Herbert Fisher (1942). Chapter 8 deals with the problem of the incidence of taxation. Salin here makes the standard point that the persons who pay a tax are not necessarily the ones who bear it, that is, it is not necessarily their revenue that diminishes as a consequence of the tax. But he adds a few important considerations. He argues that firms do not bear the incidence of taxation for the simple reason that firms are legal and administrative abstractions (see pp. 83f, 120). Firms are nothing but contracts between human beings, and any taxes that have to be paid by a firm therefore ultimately fall on the individual human beings that are contractually related to that firm, be it as employees, suppliers, directors, or customers. Moreover, it is impossible to determine a priori which one of these parties will effectively bear how much of the tax. The incidence of taxes on profits and of corporate taxes depends on the subjective appreciation of all parties concerned and on other concrete circumstances prevailing in the institutional environment. The true significance of the amount of taxes paid by firms, therefore, is that the incidence of that exact same amount is blurred. Pascal Salin stresses the implication: “This figure [the amount of taxes paid by firms] is first and foremost and indication of the arbitrariness of taxes! The usual claims about the fair and efficient aspects of taxation appear particularly questionable when one understands that we do not know who actually pays [bears] such an important part of taxes.” (p. 124) A few pages later, he elaborates on the political significance of this fact: “Precisely because one does not know, no pressure group fights against this category of levies apart from the organisation of entrepreneurs.” (p. 126) But the representatives of such organizations are poorly interested in taking up the fight against the taxes paid by firms because the incidence on themselves is not clear and likely to be small. “Thus who is likely to promote and to make people accept the idea that all levies on firms should be suppressed? […] Levying taxes on firms, i.e. on taxpayers who do not have voting rights, is certainly ideal! It is therefore not surprising that taxation is arbitrary, irrational, and unfair.” (p. 126) In the last four chapters, Professor Salin criticises the most important justifications of taxes. In chapter 9, he argues that the state is a bad insurer and therefore unfit to set up and run state-sponsored insurance plans, most notably public health insurance and public pension schemes. Similarly, there is no reason to entrust the state with the mission to take care of the young, the elderly, and the handicapped. In his words: “It is […] undeniable that the exercise of solidarity is present in every society and that it is the result of a sense of benevolence characteristic of the human mind. […] but it is necessary to challenge the claims of statesmen […] to use the alibi of solidarity to justify actions that should be covered by insurance and, on the other hand, to monopolize the exercise of solidarity, all the more so since they give to this term an indefinitely expandable content. They make solidarity mandatory (therefore amoral), unconditional (therefore immoral), and funded by coercion (therefore unfair).” (p. 135) In chapter 10, Professor Salin deals with another fashionable idea, according to which taxation should be “harmonised” internationally in order to create a “level playing field” for market competition. This idea has played an important role in the political integration of the European Union and also in the context of NAFTA and other trade agreements. Salin delivers a short and elegant explanation why the whole idea is ill-founded: it ignores the economic principle of comparative advantage. “Even if the real costs of production are higher for all products in one country than in another, trade is possible and profitable, as there are differences in relative costs.” (p. 147) He concludes: “If ever the differences in the tax rates could explain differences in absolute prices of goods […] they would strictly have no influence on relative prices between goods. Therefore, in accordance with the general principle of specialization, they would not affect the trade between both countries. For this simple reason, the harmonization of tax rates is therefore unnecessary.” (ibid.) Pascal Salin therefore recommends we forget the idea of harmonizing tax rates. The proper focus should be on tax competition. In chapter 11, he then proceeds to dissect the most important economic justifications of the state, most notably, the theory of public goods. In the final chapter 12, he applies similar scrutiny to the idea that taxation could be based on consent rather than on coercion. He refutes the idea that democracy could be a substitute for individual consent, as well as the idea of a social contract. In fact, in his eyes, none of the typical justifications of the state holds water. And he stressed the inescapable conclusion: “Any tax is arbitrary, all taxation is based on the use of coercion.” (p. 183) When it comes to tax reform, the best that can be achieved short of abolishing the state, is apply a series of second-best remedies. “Limiting arbitrariness, getting closer to the wishes of the taxpayers, such is the minimum program which can be proposed.” (ibid.) The preceding selection of highlights from Tax Tyranny should not be misinterpreted as some sort of an executive summary. The book is much richer and warrants attentive study by all students and professionals. As a token of our own attentive reading, let us single out a few shortcomings of this otherwise excellent piece of work. The most annoying deficiencies concern two editorial matters: endnotes (rather than footnotes) and the quality of the translation. Pascal Salin is a very elegant and clear writer in his native French. Regrettably, the English rendition is often wooden and occasionally suffers from with oddities and inaccuracies. For example, while on p. 47, the text contains the correct phrase of the “correspondence between capital and income,” at other places it features the patently wrong phrase of an “equivalence between income and capital” (pp. 46, 54 et passim). On page 121, the sentence “However, the existence of these burdens does not affect employees […]” is incomprehensible and should in fact read “However, the existence of these burdens does not only affect employees […]” Tax Tyranny is an essay and not meant to be a thoroughgoing treatise with full documentation. Still it would have been appropriate at several places to quote Amilcare Puviani’s (1903) theory of fiscal illusions, and it would have been nice to find a reference to Friedrich von Wieser (1893 [1889], Bk. VI, ch. IV), who justified the progressive income tax with the help of marginal value theory, an approach that Salin criticizes very pertinently (see pp. 20–23). Moreover, Professor Salin occasionally quotes Murray Rothbard’s Power and Market which, while much larger in scope, covers the same ground as Tax Tyranny. It therefore would have been very helpful if Salin had taken the pains to discuss Rothbard’s (1977 [1970], 108ff) arguments against the very possibility of a pure consumption tax, as well as Rothbard’s related case against the very possibility and desirability of taxing consumption more than savings (ibid., pp. 99f. et passim). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 人在低谷的时候，一定要把这篇千古奇文。寒窑赋，至少读30遍。 인생사가 풀리지 않을 때 적어도 30번은 읽어야 하는 문장 <한요부寒窑赋> https://youtu.be/wSM4jOanPmE 4xAce 【破窑赋】恐是后人/现代人硬套于北宋宰相吕蒙正的伪作。。既不符合“赋”的文体用词用韵，也竟可笑地将北宋之后的文语超时代地构用。 북송 여몽의 이름을 빗댄 위장이다. 부의 문장체에 맞지 않는다. 寒窑赋的全文： 天有不测风云，人有旦夕祸福。蜈蚣百足，行不及蛇；雄鸡两翼，飞不过鸦。马有千里之程，无骑不能自往；人有冲天之志，非运不能自通。 盖闻：人生在世，富贵不能淫，贫贱不能移。文章盖世，孔子厄于陈邦；武略超群，太公钓于渭水。颜渊命短，殊非凶恶之徒；盗跖年长，岂是善良之辈。尧帝明圣，却生不肖之儿；瞽叟愚顽，反生大孝之子。张良原是布衣，萧何称谓县吏。晏子身无五尺，封作齐国宰相；孔明卧居草庐，能作蜀汉军师。楚霸虽雄，败于乌江自刎；汉王虽弱，竟有万里江山。李广有射虎之威，到老无封；冯唐有乘龙之才，一生不遇。韩信未遇之时，无一日三餐，及至遇行，腰悬三尺玉印，一旦时衰，死于阴人之手。 有先贫而后富，有老壮而少衰。满腹文章，白发竟然不中；才疏学浅，少年及第登科。深院宫娥，运退反为妓妾；风流妓女，时来配作夫人。青春美女，却招愚蠢之夫；俊秀郎君，反配粗丑之妇。蛟龙未遇，潜水于鱼鳖之间；君子失时，拱手于小人之下。衣服虽破，常存仪礼之容；面带忧愁，每抱怀安之量。时遭不遇，只宜安贫守份；心若不欺，必然扬眉吐气。初贫君子，天然骨骼生成；乍富小人，不脱贫寒肌体。 天不得时，日月无光；地不得时，草木不生；水不得时，风浪不平；人不得时，利运不通。注福注禄，命里已安排定，富贵谁不欲？人若不依根基八字，岂能为卿为相？ 吾昔寓居洛阳，朝求僧餐，暮宿破窖，思衣不可遮其体，思食不可济其饥，上人憎，下人厌，人道我贱，非我不弃也。今居朝堂，官至极品，位置三公，身虽鞠躬于一人之下，而列职于千万人之上，有挞百僚之杖，有斩鄙吝之剑，思衣而有罗锦千箱，思食而有珍馐百味，出则壮士执鞭，入则佳人捧觞，上人宠，下人拥。人道我贵，非我之能也，此乃时也、运也、命也。 嗟呼！人生在世，富贵不可尽用，贫贱不可自欺，听由天地循环，周而复始焉。 寒窑赋的译文： 天气的变化是很难预测的，人早晚的命运是很难说的。蜈蚣虽然有百十条腿，但爬行却不如蛇（快）。家鸡的羽翅很大，但却不能像鸟儿一样飞翔。好马可以驰骋千里，但是没有人驾驭是不能来回的。每个人都有远大的志向，但是要有机会才可以飞黄腾达。就算是文章再好，孔子尚且被困于陈蔡。打仗的方法再多，姜太公也是先在渭水河畔钓鱼。偷盗的人活长了，不是善良的人。颜回的命短，却不是凶恶之徒。尧舜虽然是至圣的明君，却生下了不肖的儿子。瞽叟虽然顽皮呆板，但却生下世称大圣的儿子，张良原本是老百姓，萧何称他是治县的能手。晏子身高不足五尺，却被封为齐国丞相。孔明居住在草庐中，却能做西蜀的军师。韩信双手没有捉鸡的力气，却被封为汉朝的大将。冯唐虽然有治国安邦的志向，到死也没有个一官半职。李广虽然有箭射猛虎的威名，却一直没有封侯。楚王项羽虽然兵强，难免吴江自刎。汉王刘邦虽兵弱，却又江山万里。满腹的学问，一生没有中榜。只有一点的知识，在少年却已经当官。有的人是先富而后贫，有的人是有先贫而后富。蛟龙没有被发现的时候，和鱼虾在一起。君子失宠时，委曲于小人的手下。天气不好的时候，太阳，月亮都没有光辉。大地不的时宜的时候，寸草不长。 补充： 河水不流畅时，水浪滔滔。人不的时宜时，即不能发财也不能做官。过去的时候，我在洛阳，白天在寺庙里读书，夜晚在破窑里住宿。身上穿的破布衣服尚且不能掩盖我的全身，淡如水的米粥不能摊薄我的肚子。逼我好的人憎恨我，比我低的人讨厌我，都说我是贫贱的人！我说：不是我贫贱，是时运和命运啊！等到我中了状元，官位到了最高，位列三公（三公，国代最高的官员）有鞭打百官的禅杖，有斩杀吝啬之徒的宝剑，出去的时候有士兵为我拿着鞭子，进家的时候有人为我提着衣服，想穿衣服有的是绫罗绸缎，先吃东西的时候有的是山珍海味。上面的人宠信我，下面的人奉承我，人人都仰慕我，都说我是贵人！ 《寒窑赋》相传是北宋大臣吕蒙正的作品。相传此赋是作者为了劝诫太子而创作的。作者以自己从贫苦到富贵的经历，并列举了历史上诸多名人的起伏命运，来说明一种自然循环的人生思想。 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------