조선일보 기사중) 이재명·측근들, 조폭 출신과 어깨 짚고 팔짱... 과거 사진 보니 화천거유 http://www.ilbe.com/view/11373514375 이재명·측근들, 조폭 출신과 어깨 짚고 팔짱... 과거 사진 보니 조폭 출신 A씨가 이재명 당시 성남시장과 함께 시장 집무실에서 찍은 사진. 시점 불명. /페이스북 조폭 출신 A씨가 이재명 당시 성남시장과 함께 시장 집무실에서 찍은 사진. 시점 불명. /페이스북 국회 경기도청 국정감사에서 이재명 경기도지사의 조직폭력배(조폭) 연루 논란이 불거진 가운데, 성남 지역 한 조폭 출신 인사가 이 지사 또는 그 측근들과 함께 찍었던 여러 장의 사진들이 뒤늦게 재조명되고 있다. 이 조폭 출신 인사는 성남 국제마피아파에서 활동했던 A씨로, 지난 18일 자신의 얼굴을 공개하며 이 지사에게 돈을 건넸다고 주장했던 같은 조직 출신 박철민씨는 A씨를 ‘큰형님’이자 ‘자신과 이 지사를 소개시켜준 인물’로 지목했었다. 박철민씨는 18일 공개한 사실확인서에서 “이재명 시장 선거 당시 A 국제마피아파 큰형님이 합류하게 되면서 인연은 더욱 깊어 갔고, A 형님이 ‘이재명 시장을 밀어라’라고 밑에 하부 조직원들에게 지시를 하셨고, 또한 (코마트레이드) 준석 형님을 결정적으로 이재명 지사와 연결을 시켜 준 것도 A 형님입니다”라고 적었다. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1987년 10월 black monday, 약과! ... 훨씬 더 깊고 늘어지는 주식붕괴 ... 상위 0.1%에 진입하려면 [박훈탁TV https://youtu.be/8t4UhQCO_X0 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 국민일보 [단독]"초과이익 환수 조항, 삭제된 게 맞다" 檢 진술 확보 사업협약서에서 지워진 경위 조사 중 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 정부는 인플레를 좋아한다. 따라서 인플레를 멈추기 위해 아무 것도 하지 않을 것이다. Governments Love Inflation, and They Won't Do Anything to Stop It Daniel Lacalle In spite of what they say, governments will do nothing about inflation. Even though "money printing" is the real cause of this, governments will just keep blaming red herrings like supply chain problems. 통화 증발이 인플레의 진정한 원인이지만, 정부는 공급 체인 장애 때문이라며 엉뚱한 변명을 하고 있다. https://mises.org/wire/governments-love-inflation-and-they-wont-do-anything-stop-it ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 존 케이와 머빈 킹의 책 <근본적인 불확실성: 숫자를 넘어서 의사 결정 Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making Beyond the Numbers> 서평 오스트리아 경제학은, 시장의 역동성은 수익을 쫓는 기업가들에 의존한다고 주장한다. 그런데 기업가의 판단은 필연적으로 주관적이고 나아가 돈으로 계산할 수가 없다. 위험은 행위의 주체가 가능한 결과를 알고 있고, 얼마나 위험한지 확률을 적용할 수가 있다. 하지만 불확실성의 경우, 그는 확률을 적용할 수도, 모든 가능한 경우의 수를 예측할 수도 없다. 그는 특정 사안에 대해 자신의 판단력에 의존할 뿐이다. 밀턴 프리드먼의 논문 <방법론에 대해>는 포퍼의 반증가능성falsification 논리가 유행할 때 나왔다. 즉 어느 가정이 과학적이라는 지위를 얻으려면, 그것이 부정될 가능성이 있어야 한다는 것이다. 하지만 포퍼의 논리는 뒤앙-콰인 가정에 의해 논박되었다. 즉 어떤 부정도 결정적이지 못한데, 이 이유는 모든 실험은 다양한 부수적 가정을 포함하는데, 이들 가정들이 완벽하다고 할 수가 없기 때문이다. 경제학자들이 말을 연구하고 싶으면, 그들은 말을 보러가지 않는다. 대신 그들은 서재에 앉아 생각한다. “내가 말이라면 어떻게 할까?” Review: Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making Beyond the Numbers David Gordon Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making Beyond the Numbers John Kay and Mervyn King New York: Norton, 2020, xvi + 528 pp. David Gordon (dgordon@mises.org) is a senior fellow at the Mises Institute and editor of the Journal of Libertarian Studies. Kay and King are not Austrians, but in this important book, they lend aid and comfort to several key points of Austrian economics. Kay teaches economics at Oxford, and King, who was formerly Governor of the Bank of England, teaches at NYU. (King in an earlier book, The End of Alchemy, which I had occasion to review, warns against the dangers of fractional reserve banking, in a way that will delight admirers of Murray Rothbard.) Austrians hold that the dynamics of the market depend on profit-seeking entrepreneurs, whose judgments of appraisement are of necessity subjective, irreducible to monetary calculation. As Joseph Salerno (1990) explains, Mises presents a penetrating critique of the Walrasian view that, in the plans of producers, prices substitute for knowledge of the economic data or, rather, for entrepreneurial understanding and appraisement of future variations of these data. Mises’s critique is grounded on the incontrovertible fact that ‘The prices of the market are historical facts expressive of a state of affairs that prevailed at a definite instant of irreversible historical time.’ As such, realized prices can never serve as an unambiguous guide to production; which is always aimed at supplying a market of the more or less remote future involving a different configuration of the economic data. Mises’s argument depends on the distinction, made famous by Frank Knight, between risk and uncertainty. In a situation of risk, the actor knows the possible outcomes and can apply the probability calculus to them. In a situation of uncertainty, he cannot so, either because he cannot use the probability calculus or because he does not know all the possible outcomes. He must rely on his judgment about the particular case. Mises calls this the distinction between class and case probability. He says in Human Action about case probability: Case probability means: We know, with regard to a particular event, some of the factors which determine its outcome; but there are other determining factors about which we know nothing. Case probability has nothing in common with class probability but the incompleteness of our knowledge. In every other regard the two are entirely different. (Mises [1949] 1998, 110) Mainstream neoclassicals do not accept this distinction. Milton Friedman says, [I]n his seminal work, Frank Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or knowable probability distribution, and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not possible to specify numerical probabilities. I’ve not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it is valid…. We may treat people as if they assigned numerical probabilities to every conceivable event. (p. 74, quoting Friedman.) If Friedman is correct, a key tenet of Austrian economics is wrong; entrepreneurial appraisement must exit the scene. Mises acknowledges that you can say things like, “I think there is a 50 percent chance the Republicans will win the coming election.” But this is just an expression of how confident you feel about this, and it is meaningless to use probability calculus here. He says, On the eve of the 1944 presidential election people could have said:... (c) I estimate Roosevelt’s chances as 9 to 1.... This is a proposition about the expected outcome couched in arithmetical terms. It certainly does not mean that out of ten cases of the same type nine are favorable for Roosevelt and one unfavorable. It cannot have any reference to class probability. But what else can it mean? It is a metaphorical expression.... For the comparison is based on a conception which is in itself faulty in the very frame of the calculus of probability, namely the gambler’s fallacy. In asserting that Roosevelt’s chances are 9:1, the idea is that Roosevelt is in regard to the impending election in the position of a man who owns 90 per cent of all tickets of a lottery in regard to the first prize. It is implied that this ratio 9:1 tells us something substantial about the outcome of the unique case in which we are interested. There is no need to repeat that this is a mistaken idea. (Mises [1949] 1998, 113–15) Knight has an amusing comment on this issue. He says, The saying often quoted from Lord Kelvin... that where you cannot measure, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory; as applied in mental and social science is misleading and pernicious.... the Kelvin dictum very largely means in practice, if you cannot measure, measure anyhow!” (p. 86) Friedman has an answer to this objection. It does not matter, he says, whether people actually do assign probabilities to every conceivable event. This is just an assumption economists make, and what counts for a good theory is not the realism of its assumptions. Rather, a good theory is one that generates good predictions. Kay and King reject this view, and here they again render Austrian economics a service, though, to reiterate, they themselves aren’t Austrians. The method of Austrian praxeology is deductive, and unless your premises are true, you have no guarantee that the conclusions you deduce from them are also true. Thus, Austrians must reject Friedman’s position. Kay and King reject Friedman’s methodology because there is almost never clear evidence that the predictions of a theory are false. You can always adjust something in the theory to make it come out true, and that is what all-too-many economists do: Friedman’s article [on methodology] appeared in a brief period of intellectual history in which a version of Popperian falsificationism—the idea that a hypothesis acquires scientific status only if there is a possibility that it might be refuted was in fashion.... The decisive rejection of this falsificationist view is encapsulated in what philosophers know today as the Duhem-Quine hypothesis: such refutation is rarely definitive, because any test requires a range of auxiliary assumptions, and it is always possible to argue that these assumptions have not been fulfilled. (pp. 259–60) There is an additional point that strengthens the argument against Friedman. It isn’t clear that his claim about probability estimates generates any predictions at all. If you make a series of bets that don’t conform to the principles he sets forward, he can show through what is called a “Dutch-book” argument that you will lose money. But that is hardly a prediction that anyone will in fact make a series of bets of this kind. Kay and King suggest that, in fact, most people won’t make bets in the circumstances that Friedman assumes. In a world of radical uncertainty, most people do not choose among lotteries, far less enter them, and for good reasons.... They shun randomness. They are reluctant to make commitments in situations they do not understand, especially when other people may have a better understanding of them.... Of course, there are people who will take a bet on anything, but that is a mark of weirdness, not rationality. (p. 84) Friedman’s rejection of the risk-uncertainty distinction is part of a general effort of the Chicago School to judge the free market by external standards of “efficiency,” here again a point of divergence from the Austrian School. (By “Chicago School,” I refer to the period that began with Friedman’s dominance Knight and Henry Simons did not share Friedman’s views) The authors give another example of this Chicago tendency. Herbert Simon criticizes the neoclassical view that people try to maximize their expected utility on the ground that often, what is “good enough” suffices. If, for example, you are selling your house and you get an offer that seems satisfactory, you may take it. You won’t keep investigating to see if you can get a better offer. Simon called this “bounded rationality” or “satisficing.” Simon’s point does not faze the Chicago economists. They argue that if you accept the offer, you are still maximizing, if account is taken of the search and transactions costs of looking for something better. Thus, they transform what Simon argues into its exact opposite. “Simon is reported to have joked that he should take legal action against his successors who misused his terminology and neglected his insights.” (p. 151) Austrian School economists also reject the use of the conditions for general equilibrium as a standard to judge the free market, and here once more Kay and King agree. They tell us that Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, who first proved that competitive prices can under certain conditions result in a general equilibrium, realize that their model is unrealistic: Arrow and Debreu recognized that they were describing an imaginary world akin to that of Through the Looking-Glass. And they interpreted that world as a rhetorical device, like those literary fictions, illustrative of propositions which might—or might not—be true in any real world. (p. 344) Kay and King have written an impressive and erudite book that ranges over many disciplines. It is often repetitious; though the book is about radical uncertainty, readers will rarely be uncertain what the authors are going to say. The book is filled with anecdotes, and I’ll close with one that illustrates the authors’ criticism of the neoclassicals: The new macroeconomic theorists followed a different approach.... Ronald Coase attributed a satirical description of it to the English economist Ely Devons: “If economists wished to study the horse, they wouldn’t go and look at horses. They’d sit in their studies and say to themselves, ‘What would I do if I were a horse?’” ------------------------------------------------------------------------