전임범이라는 조금은 과장된 제스처를 하는 특전사 장군이 아내가 부정을 저질렀다면, 자기가 권총으로 쏘아죽이겠다고 공언했는데, 마침 어제 그의 아내 심화진 성신여대 총장이 교비 횡령으로 1년 형을 받고, 법정 구속되었다. 그럼으로써 전임범은 아내를 쏘아야 하는 운명을 맞았고, 경솔한 언행으로 세상의 웃음거리가 되었다. 참고로 그는 문죄인의 무슨 참모인가로 활동하고 있다.
정미홍의 트윗이 문죄인과 전임범 그리고 표창원을 간결하게 정리했다.
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태극기를 들지 않으면 대한민국 국민은 앞으로 노예로의 길을 걷게 된다. 그 많은 시민이 자발적으로 시청 앞으로 모인 이유는, 그들 자신도 이런 사실을 직감하고 있기 때문이다.
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좌파들의 위선이 또 발각되었다. 오늘의 주인공은 손석희
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북한 나선 지구에서 만들어진 옷이 한국으로 수출되고 있다고 하는데, 좌파들이 언론을 쥐고 있는 탓인지 우리 뉴스에서는 보도가 되지 않는 듯하다.
Chad O'Carroll @chadocl · 2월 6일
Exclusive: Clothes being made for South Korea w/ boxes featuring co.kr website address manufactured in Rason, DPRK
A popular South Korean clothing brand used a factory in North Korea’s Rason special economic zone (SEZ) to produce inventory in 2015, despite sanctions prohibiting inter-Korean exchange, an NK Pro investigation has revealed. Photos obtained from August 2015 show scores of boxes featuring the name of a South Korean company and the printed URL of ......
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나심 탈레브의 글
THE FOURTH QUADRANT: A MAP OF THE LIMITS OF STATISTICS 발췌
But, as he points out, there is also good news.
We can identify where the danger zone is located, which I call "the fourth quadrant", and show it on a map with more or less clear boundaries. A map is a useful thing because you know where you are safe and where your knowledge is questionable. So I drew for the Edge readers a tableau showing the boundaries where statistics works well and where it is questionable or unreliable. Now once you identify where the danger zone is, where your knowledge is no longer valid, you can easily make some policy rules: how to conduct yourself in that fourth quadrant; what to avoid........
And we are beyond suckers: not only, for socio-economic and other nonlinear, complicated variables, we are riding in a bus driven a blindfolded driver, but we refuse to acknowledge it in spite of the evidence, which to me is a pathological problem with academia. After 1998, when a "Nobel-crowned" collection of people (and the crème de la crème of the financial economics establishment) blew up Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, because the "scientific" methods they used misestimated the role of the rare event, such methodologies and such claims on understanding risks of rare events should have been discredited. Yet the Fed helped their bailout andexposure to rare events (and model error) patently increased exponentially (as we can see from banks' swelling portfolios of derivatives that we do not understand).......
They insistently made a distinction between the "statisticians" (those who deal with the subject itself and design the tools and methods) and those in other fields who pick up statistical tools from textbooks without really understanding them. For them it is a problem with statistical education and half-baked expertise. Alas, this category of blind users includes regulators and risk managers, whom I accuse of creating more risk than they reduce.
So the principal value of the map is that it allows for policy making. Indeed, I am moving on: my new project is about methods on how to domesticate the unknown, exploit randomness, figure out how to live in a world we don't understand very well. While most human thought (particularly since the enlightenment) has focused us on how to turn knowledge into decisions, my new mission is to build methods to turn lack of information, lack of understanding, and lack of "knowledge" into decisions—how, as we will see, not to be a "turkey".
For us the world is vastly simpler in some sense than the academy, vastly more complicated in another. So the central lesson from decision-making (as opposed to working with data on a computer or bickering about logical constructions) is the following: it is the exposure (or payoff) that creates the complexity —and the opportunities and dangers— not so much the knowledge ( i.e., statistical distribution, model representation, etc.). In some situations, you can be extremely wrong and be fine, in others you can be slightly wrong and explode. If you are leveraged, errors blow you up; if you are not, you can enjoy life.
So knowledge (i.e., if some statement is "true" or "false") matters little, very little in many situations. In the real world, there are very few situations where what you do and your belief if some statement is true or false naively map into each other. Some decisions require vastly more caution than others—or highly more drastic confidence intervals. For instance you do not "need evidence" that the water is poisonous to not drink from it. You do not need "evidence" that a gun is loaded to avoid playing Russian roulette, or evidence that a thief a on the lookout to lock your door. You need evidence of safety—not evidence of lack of safety— a central asymmetry that affects us with rare events. This asymmetry in skepticism makes it easy to draw a map of danger spots.
Figure 1 My classical metaphor: A Turkey is fed for a 1000 days—every days confirms to its statistical department that the human race cares about its welfare "with increased statistical significance". On the 1001st day, the turkey has a surprise.
Figure 2 The graph above shows the fate of close to 1000 financial institutions (includes busts such as FNMA, Bear Stearns, Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers, etc.). The banking system (betting AGAINST rare events) just lost >1 Trillion dollars (so far) on a single error, more than was ever earned in the history of banking. Yet bankers kept their previous bonuses and it looks like citizens have to foot the bills. And one Professor Ben Bernanke pronounced right before the blowup that we live in an era of stability and "great moderation" (he is now piloting a plane and we all are passengers on it).
Figure 3 The graph shows the daily variations a derivatives portfolio exposed to U.K. interest rates between 1988 and 2008. Close to 99% of the variations, over the span of 20 years, will be represented in 1 single day—the day the European Monetary System collapsed. As I show in the appendix, this is typical with ANY socio-economic variable (commodity prices, currencies, inflation numbers, GDP, company performance, etc. ). No known econometric statistical method can capture the probability of the event with any remotely acceptable accuracy (except, of course, in hindsight, and "on paper"). Also note that this applies to surges on electricity grids and all manner of modern-day phenomena.
And the unusual dominance of the rare event shown in Figure 3 is not unique: it affects all macroeconomic data—if you look long enough almost all the contribution in some classes of variables will come from rare events (I looked in the appendix at 98% of trade-weighted data).
By the "narrative fallacy" the turkey economics department will always manage to state, before thanksgivings that "we are in a new era of safety", and back-it up with thorough and "rigorous" analysis
Decisions: The first type of decisions is simple, "binary", i.e. you just care if something is true or false. Very true or very false does not matter.
The second type of decisions is more complex. You do not just care of the frequency—but of the impact as well, or, even more complex, some function of the impact. So there is another layer of uncertainty of impact. (I call these M1+, as they depend on higher moments of the distribution). When you invest you do not care how many times you make or lose, you care about the expectation: how many times you make or lose times the amount made or lost.
Probability structures: There are two classes of probability domains—very distinct qualitatively and quantitatively. The first, thin-tailed: Mediocristan", the second, thick tailed Extremistan. Before I get into the details, take the literary distinction as follows:
In Mediocristan, exceptions occur but don't carry large consequences. Add the heaviest person on the planet to a sample of 1000. The total weight would barely change. In Extremistan, exceptions can be everything (they will eventually, in time, represent everything). Add Bill Gates to your sample: the wealth will jump by a factor of >100,000. So, in Mediocristan, large deviations occur but they are not consequential—unlike Extremistan.
Mediocristan corresponds to "random walk" style randomness that you tend to find in regular textbooks (and in popular books on randomness). Extremistan corresponds to a "random jump" one. The first kind I can call "Gaussian-Poisson", the second "fractal" or Mandelbrotian (after the works of the great Benoit Mandelbrot linking it to the geometry of nature). But note here an epistemological question: there is a category of "I don't know" that I also bundle in Extremistan for the sake of decision making—simply because I don't know much about the probabilistic structure or the role of large events.
First Quadrant: Simple binary decisions, in Mediocristan: Statistics does wonders. These situations are, unfortunately, more common in academia, laboratories, and games than real life—what I call the "ludic fallacy". In other words, these are the situations in casinos, games, dice, and we tend to study them because we are successful in modeling them.
Second Quadrant: Simple decisions, in Extremistan: some well known problem studied in the literature. Except of course that there are not many simple decisions in Extremistan.
Third Quadrant: Complex decisions in Mediocristan: Statistical methods work surprisingly well.
Fourth Quadrant: Complex decisions in Extremistan: Welcome to the Black Swan domain. Here is where your limits are. Do not base your decisions on statistically based claims. Or, alternatively, try to move your exposure type to make it third-quadrant style ("clipping tails").
Pre-asymptotics. Theories are, of course, bad, but they can be worse in some situations when they were derived in idealized situations, the asymptote, but are used outside the asymptote (its limit, say infinity or the infinitesimal). Some asymptotic properties do work well preasymptotically (Mediocristan), which is why casinos do well, but others do not, particularly when it comes to Extremistan.
Most statistical education is based on these asymptotic, Platonic properties—yet we live in the real world that rarely resembles the asymptote. Furthermore, this compounds the ludic fallacy: most of what students of statistics do is assume a structure, typically with a known probability. Yet the problem we have is not so much making computations once you know the probabilities, but finding the true distribution.
Alas, the rarer the event, the more theory you need (since we don't observe it). So the rarer the event, the worse its inverse problem. And theories are fragile (just think of Doctor Bernanke).
The tragedy is as follows. Suppose that you are deriving probabilities of future occurrences from the data, assuming (generously) that the past is representative of the future. Now, say that you estimate that an event happens every 1,000 days. You will need a lot more data than 1,000 days to ascertain its frequency, say 3,000 days. Now, what if the event happens once every 5,000 days? The estimation of this probability requires some larger number, 15,000 or more. The smaller the probability, the more observations you need, and the greater the estimation error for a set number of observations. Therefore, to estimate a rare event you need a sample that is larger and larger in inverse proportion to the occurrence of the event.
If small probability events carry large impacts, and (at the same time) these small probability events are more difficult to compute from past data itself, then: our empirical knowledge about the potential contribution—or role—of rare events (probability × consequence) is inversely proportional to their impact. This is why we should worry in the fourth quadrant!
This tells us that there is "no typical" failure and "no typical" success. You may be able to predict the occurrence of a war, but you will not be able to gauge its effect! Conditional on a war killing more than 5 million people, it should kill around 10 (or more). Conditional on it killing more than 500 million, it would kill a billion (or more, we don't know). You may correctly predict a skilled person getting "rich", but he can make a million, ten million, a billion, ten billion—there is no typical number
This absence of "typical" event in Extremistan is what makes prediction markets ludicrous, as they make events look binary. "A war" is meaningless: you need to estimate its damage—and no damage is typical. Many predicted that the First War would occur—but nobody predicted its magnitude. Of the reasons economics does not work is that the literature is almost completely blind to the point.
A Simple Proof Of Unpredictability In The Fourth Quadrant
I show elsewhere that if you don't know what a "typical" event is, fractal power laws are the most effective way to discuss the extremes mathematically. It does not mean that the real world generator is actually a power law—it means you don't understand the structure of the external events it delivers and need a tool of analysis so you do not become a turkey.
Now the problem: Parametrizing a power law lends itself to monstrous estimation errors (I said that heavy tails have horrible inverse problems). Small changes in the "alpha" main parameter used by power laws leads to monstrously large effects in the tails. Monstrous.
Now this mean error has massive consequences. Figure 6 shows the effect: the expected value of your losses in excess of a certain amount(called "shortfall") is multiplied by >10 from a small change in the "alpha" that is less than its mean error! These are the losses banks were talking about with confident precision!
Many researchers, such as Philip Tetlock, have looked into the incapacity of social scientists in forecasting (economists, political scientists). It is thus evident that while the forecasters might be just "empty suits", the forecast errors are dominated by rare events, and we are limited in our ability to track them. The "wisdom of crowds" might work in the first three quadrant; but it certainly fails (and has failed) in the fourth.
So all I am saying is "what is it that we don't know", and my advice is what to avoid, no more.
Students cannot understand the value of "this is what we don't know"—they think it is not information, that they are learning nothing. Practitioners on the other hand value it immensely. Likewise with statisticians: I never had a disagreement with statisticians (who build the field)—only with users of statistical methods.
Phronetic Rules: What Is Wise To Do (Or Not Do) In The Fourth Quadrant
1) Avoid Optimization, Learn to Love Redundancy. Psychologists tell us that getting rich does not bring happiness—if you spend it. But if you hide it under the mattress, you are less vulnerable to a black swan. Only fools (such as Banks) optimize, not realizing that a simple model error can blow through their capital (as it just did).
Indeed some systems tend to optimize—therefore become more fragile. Electricity grids for example optimize to the point of not coping with unexpected surges
Biological systems—those that survived millions of years—include huge redundancies. Just consider why we like sexual encounters (so redundant to do it so often!). Historically populations tended to produced around 4-12 children to get to the historical average of ~2 survivors to adulthood.
Option-theoretic analysis: redundancy is like long an option. You certainly pay for it, but it may be necessary for survival.
2) Avoid prediction of remote payoffs—though not necessarily ordinary ones. Payoffs from remote parts of the distribution are more difficult to predict than closer parts.
3) Beware the "atypicality" of remote events. There is a sucker's method called "scenario analysis" and "stress testing"—usually based on the past (or some "make sense" theory).
4) Time. It takes much, much longer for a times series in the Fourth Quadrant to reveal its property. At the worst, we don't know how long
5) Beware Moral Hazard. Is optimal to make series of bonuses betting on hidden risks in the Fourth Quadrant, then blow up and write a thank you letter. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Chairmen will in all likelihood keep their previous bonuses (as in all previous cases) and even get close to 15 million of severance pay each.
6) Metrics. Conventional metrics based on type 1 randomness don't work. Words like "standard deviation" are not stable and does not measure anything in the Fourth Quadrant.
The technical appendix shows why these metrics fail: they are based on "variance"/"standard deviation" and terms invented years ago when we had no computers. One way I can prove that anything linked to standard deviation is a facade of knowledge: There is a measure called Kurtosis that indicates departure from "Normality". It is very, very unstable and marred with huge sampling error: 70-90% of the Kurtosis in Oil, SP500, Silver, UK interest rates, Nikkei, US deposit rates, sugar, and the dollar/yet currency rate come from 1 day in the past 40 years, reminiscent of figure 3. This means that no sample will ever deliver the true variance. It also tells us anyone using "variance" or "standard deviation" (or worse making models that make us take decisions based on it) in the fourth quadrant is incompetent.
9) Beware presentations of risk numbers. Not only we have mathematical problems, but risk perception is subjected to framing issues that are acute in the Fourth Quadrant.
댓글
Jaron Lanier
Computer Scientist; Musician; Author, Who Owns The Future?
An astute reader of edge.org will notice a connection with "Digital Maoism,"the Edge original essay I wrote a couple of years ago. In that essay I proposed that the "Wisdom of the Crowds" could only work when an answer the crowd was asked to give was no more complicated than a single number or value, when the crowd was not able to formulate its own questions, and so on.
In Digital Maoism, I reported that some of the organizations I consulted to were in the grips of "Crowd Wisdom" and as result had come to expect less work and accountability from me and the other consultants. Taleb similarly points out that he had observed warning signs in recent years from financial Goliaths that have since collapsed. Without betraying any confidences, I will say that the lists of companies we are each talking about share a huge overlap.
Taleb addresses finance, but similar madness has appeared in connection with:
• Science, where it has been proposed that statistics in the computing cloud can and should replace the process of understanding within a scientist's brain
• Arts, where it has been proposed that "big n" business models should replace taste, artistic voice, or the idea of "artist" as profession
• Education, where it has been proposed that wikis can do better than textbooks and teachers
• Journalism, where many believe blogs, Twitter streams, wikis, and so on can do better than reporters in the mold of Woodward and Bernstein
• Technology, where it has been proposed that an uncannily smooth historical determinism is in charge, propelling us to the Singularity.
There are many other examples. What is discouraging is that the complete failures of all these claims have only bolstered the faith of the seduced believers.
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From
시간은 이점을 삭제한다. 모든 성공은 스스로의 쇠락의 씨앗을 포함하고 있다. 진보와 성공 역시 언제나 상대적이다. 역사와 진화에서 진보는 개선을 통해 동일한 상대적인 위치에 머물러있기 위한 시지프스적인 투쟁이다. 모든 진보가 상대적이라는 개념은 <이상한 나라의 앨리스>에 나오는 장기 "레드 퀸"으로 알려져 있다.
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사이비 전문가에 대한 전지구적 저항이 있다. 브렉시트와 트럼프, 나이젤 파라지 등이 그 증거이다. (사이비 전문가인) 관료는 직업이 되어서는 안 된다.
미래 사회는 스위스 같은 국가가 다수 존재하고, 의사 결정이 빠르고, 실행이 즉시 이루어지는 곳이다. 우리는 지도자를 필요로 하지 않는다. 우리는 시스템에 개입하지 않는 통치자를 원한다.
"There's A Global Riot Against Psuedo-Experts" Nassim Taleb Exclaims "This Is Not About Fascism"
by Suhasini Haidar via TheHindu.com,
Feb 7, 2017 5:11 PM
Economist-mathematician Nassim Nicholas Taleb contends that there is a global riot against pseudo-experts
After predicting the 2008 economic crisis, the Brexit vote, the U.S. presidential election and other events correctly, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the Incerto series on global uncertainties, which includes The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, is seen as something of a maverick and an oracle. Equally, the economist-mathematician has been criticised for advocating a “dumbing down” of the economic system, and his reasoning for U.S. President Donald Trump and global populist movements. In an interview in Jaipur, Taleb explains why he thinks the world is seeing a “global riot against pseudo-experts”.
I’d like to start by asking about your next book, Skin in the Game, the fifth of the Incerto series. You do something unusual with your books: before you launch, you put chapters out on your website. Why is that?
Putting my work online motivates me to go deeper into a subject. I put it online and it gives some structure to my thought. The only way to judge a book is by something called the Lindy effect, and that is its survival. My books have survived. I noticed that The Black Swan did well because it was picked up early online, long before the launch. I also prefer social media to interviews in the mainstream media as many journalists don’t do their research, and ‘zeitgeist’ updates [Top Ten lists] pass for journalism.
The media is not one organisation or a monolithic entity.
Well, I’m talking about the United States where I get more credible news from the social media than the mainstream media. But I am very impressed with the Indian media that seems to present both sides of the story. In the U.S., you only get either the official, bureaucratic or the academic side of the story.
In Skin in the Game, you seem to build on theories from The Black Swan that give a sense of foreboding about the world economy. Do you see another crisis coming?
Oh, absolutely! The last crisis [2008] hasn’t ended yet because they just delayed it. [Barack] Obama is an actor. He looks good, he raises good children, he is respectable. But he didn’t fix the economic system, he put novocaine [local anaesthetic] in the system. He delayed the problem by working with the bankers whom he should have prosecuted. And now we have double the deficit, adjusted for GDP, to create six million jobs, with a massive debt and the system isn’t cured. We retained zero interest rates, and that hasn’t helped. Basically we shifted the problem from the private corporates to the government in the U.S. So, the system remains very fragile.
You say Obama put novocaine in the system. How will the Trump administration be able to address this?
Of course. The whole mandate he got was because he understood the economic problems. People don’t realise that Obama created inequalities when he distorted the system. You can only get rich if you have assets. What Trump is doing is put some kind of business sense in the system. You don’t have to be a genius to see what’s wrong. Instead of Trump being elected, if you went to the local souk [bazaar] in Aleppo and brought one of the retail shop owners, he would do the same thing Trump is doing. Like making a call to Boeing and asking why are we paying so much.
You’re seen as something of an oracle, given that you saw the 2008 economic crash coming, you predicted the Brexit vote, the outcome of the Syrian crisis. You said the Islamic State would benefit if Bashar al-Assad was pushed out and you predicted Trump’s win. How do you explain it?
Not the Islamic State, but al-Qaeda at the time, and I said the U.S. administration was helping fund them. See, you have to have courage to say things others don’t. I was lucky financially in life, that I didn’t need to work for a living and can spend all my time thinking. When Trump was running for election, I said what he says makes sense to a grocery store owner. Because the grocery guy can say Trump is wrong because he can see where he is wrong. But with Obama, he can’t understand what he’s saying, so the grocery man doesn’t know where he is wrong.
Is it a choice between dumbing down versus over-intellectualisation, then?
Exactly. Trump never ran for archbishop, so you never saw anything in his behaviour that was saintly, and that was fine. Whereas Obama behaved like the Archbishop of Canterbury, and was going to do good but people didn’t feel their lives were better. As I said, if it was a shopkeeper from Aleppo, or a grocery store owner in Mumbai, people would have liked them as much as Trump. What he says makes common sense, asking why are we paying so much for this rubbish or why do we need these complex taxes, or why do we want lobbyists. You can call Trump’s plain-speaking what you like. But the way intellectuals treat people who don’t agree with them isn’t good either. I remember I had an academic friend who supported Brexit, and he said he knew what it meant to be a leper in the U.K. It was the same with supporting Trump in the U.S.
But there were valid reasons for people to be worried about Trump too.
Well, if you’re a businessman, for example, what Trump said didn’t bother you. The intellectual class of no more than 2,00,000 people in the U.S. don’t represent everyone upset with Trump. The real problem is the ‘faux-expert problem’, one who doesn’t know what he doesn’t know, and assumes he knows what people think. An electrician doesn’t have that problem.
Is the election of Trump part of a global phenomena? You have commented on the similarity to the election of Narendra Modi in India.
Well, with Trump, Modi, Brexit, and now France, there are some similar problems in those countries. What you are hearing is people getting fed up with the ruling class. This is not fascism. It has nothing to do with fascism. It has to do with the faux-experts problem and a world with too many experts. If we had a different elite, we may not see the same problem.
There are other similarities, to quote from studies of populist movements worldwide: these leaders are majoritarian, they build on resentment, they use social media for direct access to their voters, and they can take radical decisions.
I often say that a mathematician thinks in numbers, a lawyer in laws, and an idiot thinks in words. These words don’t amount to anything. I think you have to draw the conclusion that there is a global riot against pseudo-experts. I saw it with Brexit, and Nigel Farage [leader of the U.K. Independence Party], who was a trader for 15 years, said the problem with the government was that none of them had ever had a proper job. Being a bureaucrat is not a proper job.
As a businessperson, you have a point about experts and pseudo-experts who you say are ‘left-wing’. How do you explain the other parts to the phenomenon that aren’t economic: the xenophobia, Islamophobia, misogyny, etc.?
I don’t understand how a left-wing person can defend Salafism, or religious extremism. In a democracy, you can allow people to have any view, but they can’t come with a message to destroy democracy. Why should people who come to the West come with a message to finish the West? This is where the discourse goes haywire. So in Yemen, the [Saudi] intervention is good, but the intervention [by Russia] in Aleppo shouldn’t be allowed. I don’t think Trump was racist when he said Mexican criminals shouldn’t be allowed into the U.S.; he was targeting criminals. If you are Naziphobic, you are not against Germans. If I oppose Salafism, I am not an Islamophobe. Obama also deported Mexicans and refused to accept immigrants.
Is anti-globalisation a part of this sentiment?
I am not anti-globalisation, but I am against big global corporations. One of the reasons is what they cost. Today, every project sees cost overruns because these projects have to factor in global risks as well. In nature there is an ‘island effect’. The number of species on an island drops significantly when you go to the mainland. Similarly, when you open up your small economies, you lose some of your ethnicity or diversity. Artisans are being killed by globalisation. Think of the effect on so many artists who have been put out of work while people are buying wrinkle-free shirts and cheap mobile phones. I’m a localist. The problem is globalisation comes through large global corporates that are predatory, and so we want to counter its ill-effects.
Where do you see the world moving now? Further right, or will it revert to the centre?
I don’t think it will go left or right, and I don’t know about the short term. But I think in the long term, the world can only survive if it lives like nature does. Many smaller units of governance, and a collection of super islands with some separation, quick decision-making, and visible implementation. Lots of Switzerlands, that’s what we need. What we need is not leaders, we don’t need them. We just need someone at the top who doesn’t mess the system up.
스웨덴 경찰의 폭로: 다문화주의에 따라 이민 온 아프리카와 중동의 이민자들이 스웨덴에서 강도와 강간을 일삼고, 스웨덴이 몰락해가는 현실을 폭로한 경찰관
Swedish Cop Posts Epic Facebook Rant On Immigrant Crime; Ignites Nationwide Firestorm
A Swedish police officer recently offered up a little more truth than people are used to when he posted an epic rant on Facebook about immigrant crimes plaguing his police department and his country. In the beginning of the post, the police officer said that he was "so fucking tired" and warned that "what I will write here below, is not politically correct." With that warning, below is brief taste of what followed courtesy of RT:
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좌파들은 우리를 증오하고 있다. 우리는 싸울 준비를 해야 한다.
The Left Hates You. Act Accordingly.
by Kurt Schlichter , Townhall.com,
They hate you.
Leftists don’t merely disagree with you. They don’t merely feel you are misguided. They don’t think you are merely wrong. They hate you. They want you enslaved and obedient, if not dead. Once you get that, everything that is happening now will make sense. And you will understand what you need to be ready to do.
You are normal, and therefore a heretic. You refuse to bow to their idols, to subscribe to their twisted catechisms, to praise their false gods. This is unforgivable. You must burn.
Crazy talk? Just ask them. Go ahead. Go on social media. Find a leftist – it’s easy. Just say something positive about America or Jesus and they’ll come swarming like locusts. Engage them and very quickly they will drop their masks and tell you what they really think. I know. I keep a rapidly expanding file of Twitter leftist death wish screenshots.
They will tell you that Christians are idiots and vets are scum.
That normals are subhumans whose role is to labor as serfs to subsidize the progressive elite and its clients.
That you should die to make way for the New Progressive Man/Woman/Other.
Understand that when they call Donald Trump “illegitimate,” what they are really saying is that our desire to govern ourselves is illegitimate. Their beef isn’t with him – it’s with us, the normal people who dared rise up and demand their right to participate in the rule of this country and this culture.
They hate you, because by defying them you have prevented them from living up to the dictates of their false religion. Our rebelliousness has denied them the state of grace they seek, exercising their divine right to dictate every aspect of our puny lives. Their sick faith gives meaning to these secular weirdos, giving them something that fills their empty lives with a messianic fervor to go out and conquer and convert the heathens.
And the heathens are us.
Oh, there are different leftist sects. There are the social justice warriors who have manufactured a bizarre mythology and scripture of oppression, privilege, and intersectionality. Instead of robes, they dress up as genitals and kill babies as a blasphemous sacrament. Then there are the pagan weather religion oddballs convinced that the end is near and that we must repent by turning in our SUVs. Of course, the “we” is really “us” – high priests of the global warming cult like Leonardo DiCaprio will still jet around the world with supermodels while we do the ritual sacrificing of our modern comforts. Then there are the ones who simply worship themselves, the elitists who believe that all wisdom and morality has been invested in them merely because they went to the right college, think the right thoughts, and sneer at anyone living between I-5 and I-95.
But all the leftist sects agree – they have found the revealed truth, and imposing it upon the benighted normals like us is so transcendently important that they are relieved of any moral limitations. They are ISIS, except with hashtags instead of AKs, committed to the establishment of a leftist caliphate.
You wonder why the left is now justifying violence? Because they think that helps them right now. Today it’s suddenly OK to punch a “Nazi.” But the punchline is that anyone who opposes them is a “Nazi.”
You wonder why they ignore the rule of law, why they could switch on a dime from screaming at Trump for refusing to preemptively legitimize a Hillary win and then scream that he is illegitimate the moment she lost? Because their only principle is what helps the left win today. That’s why the media gleefully, happily lies every single day about every single thing it reports. Objectivity? When that stopped being a useful thing, it stopped being a thing at all.
They are fanatics, and by not surrendering, by not kneeling, and by not obeying, you have committed an unpardonable sin. You have defied the Left, and you must be broken. They will take your job, slander your name, even beat or kill you – whatever it takes to break you and terrify others by making you an example. Your defiance cannot stand; they cannot allow this whole Trump/GOP majority thing to get out of control. They must crush this rebellion of the normal, and absolutely nothing is off the table.
We’ve seen them burn UC Berkeley and how the police controlled by the leftist state government of California stood by and watched as Americans were beaten by the mob. Why? Because the government of the State of California approves of the violence. Do you think it’s a coincidence that California is doing everything it can to disarm its normals?
The Left won’t say it out loud – at least not yet – but make no mistake. If violence is what it takes for the Left to prevail, then violence we will have. You saw it, and you were meant to. Berkeley was a message about the price of dissent where leftist hold sway. And they seek to hold sway everywhere
How to we respond?
The first step is to end the denial. Open your eyes. See what is happening. Don’t allow yourself to be deluded by false nostalgia for a past period of cultural peace that existed only because, at that time, the Left was winning. They hate you. Look at Twitter. Look at Facebook. Try and tell yourself that leftists are just nice people who disagree with you on a few policy details. Stop fooling yourself.
Understand that this must get much worse before it can get better. We may wish to stop the cultural/political struggle, but they can’t stop. Their religion tells them we are greedy, racist, sexist, homophobe morons who hate science and love Hitler. How could they tolerate us? How could they ever allow us power?
They can’t. Their sick ideology and false theology requires that we be enslaved or exterminated – we can’t be tolerated, and we certainly can’t be allowed to hold the reins of power. I hoped that my novel People’s Republic, about what lies at the bottom of this blood-soaked slippery slope, would be rendered moot by the GOP’s victory in November. I was wrong. The Left has redoubled its efforts.
So the only outcome is that one side wins and the other loses. There’s no truce to be had, no possibility of a tie. And the frightening thing is that the Left is so foolish, so stuck in its bubble that it has no understanding that it can only push so far before the people with all the guns and all the training push back. That’s the problem with kids who were raised on participation trophies and who never got into a fistfight – they don’t consider the possibility that they will lose, and lose hard.
We must ensure they do. Understand your enemy. Understand that the Left will exploit your principles and morals to make you disarm yourself – figuratively and literally. Don’t play their game; don’t fall for their manufactured outrages. Never concede their lies, never take their side against the people defending your liberty. Most of all, accept the truth that if we let them win we will spend the rest of our lives on our backs with a giant Birkenstock pressed into our collective face.
They hate us. And however they come at us, we need to be prepared to fight
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