21일 중국 요녕성 심양시의 한 조선족 소식통은 “며칠 전 한국행을 위해 중국 길림성 연길시를 거쳐 제3국으로 향하던 탈북자 일가족이 공안에 체포되는 사건이 있었다”며 “이들은 공안에 의해 북한으로 압송되던 도중 모두 자살했다”고 밝혔습니다.
--->탈북자 가족 5명이 편안한 하늘나라로 가기를 기도한다.
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<<< 경제 성장없는 대한민국 미래가 헬 조선이다 >>>
손정우(조선 토론마당)
*** 문재인 정부 100대 국정과제에 필요한 돈이 178조 원이라는데...
문재인 정부 100대 국정과제에 필요한 국민 혈세, 178조원 추가 투입 필요, 천문학적 금액에 대한민국 국민은 한번 놀라고, 문재인 정부의 그 비용 계산방식의 주먹구구식에 두번 놀라고, 과연 178조원 만으로 가능한 것인지, 즉 그 178조 원 만으로는 부족할 것이라 예상하고 의문을 제기하는 언론 보도를 보면서 세번 놀란다.
*** 문재인 정부의 좌경화 포플리즘 정책을 정리하면...
1. 추가경정 예산안 편성( 11.2조 원): 금년도 예산은 최초로 400조 원을 돌파한, 401조 원, 수퍼예산으로 편성되어 사실상 추경이 필요없다.
2. 81만 개 공공일자리 정책 중 공무원일자리( 소방관, 사회복지전담공무원, 교사, 경찰, 부사관, 근로감독관 등 ) 17만 4천 개 증원; 7급 7호봉 기준 5년간 인건비 16.7조 원이라는 정부 발표지만, 국회 예산정책처는 각종수당, 법정부담금 포함 5년간 28.5조 원이 든다고 했다. 이직율 낮은 공무원 30년 근속 기준 1인당 17억 원씩 327조 원 국민 세금 부담, 퇴직 후 연금을 포함하면 350조 원 국민 부담이 발생한다.
3. 최저임금 인상 16.4%( 6470원 - 7530원); 내년에 국민세금 3조 원이상 부담, 2020년에는 국민세금 16조 원이 필요하다.
4. 원전중단, 탈원전; 신고리 5. 6호기 3개월 중단비용 1000억원, 영구중단 할 때 2.6조원 손실도 국민 세금으로 부담해야 한다.
5. 병사월급인상; 매년 3000억 원 이상 국민 세금부담, 향후 월 최저임금 30%수준으로 인상하면 국민세금부담은 더 늘어 난다.
6. 기초연금 및 장애인연금 인상; 23.1조원, 2030년이면 80조 원이 필요하다.
7. 아동수당 등 기타; 매년 수조 원 이상 필요한 정책들이 있다.
대한민국과 같은 경제적 환경에서 경제성장율이 1% 상승 할 때마다 일자리 약 7만 ~ 10만개 창출, 세금은 약 10조 원 더 걷힌다는 것이 정설에 가깝다. 어느 국가든 경제성장 없는 미래는 없다. 경제성장이 없는 일자리정책과 과도한 복지정책은 지속 가능성이 없다. 문재인 정부, 경제성장 없는 복지정책의 그 한계와 허구성( 虛構性)을 사실로 확인하는 것은 오랜 시간이 걸리지 않을 것이다. (발췌)
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문죄인 정부가 "부자 증세"를 하겠다고 한다. 이게 황금 알을
낳는 거위의 배를 가르는 짓이라는 건 누가 봐도 안다. 문제는 그 다음에 오는 경제 침체와 파국을 어떡할 거냐는 거다.
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<Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics>
이 책에는 하이에크의 복잡계에 대한 주요 논문들이 들어 있어서, 내가 즐겨찾기에 걸어놓고 보고 있었다. 한동안 한국의 탄핵 사태 때문에 보지 못하다가, 얼마전 책을 보려고 하니까, 그 책이 증발해버렸다. 인터넷을 검색해보니 아마존에서 하이에크의 책을 판매하면서, 그 사이트를 폐쇄해버린 듯했다.
그래서 인터넷을 뒤지다가 겨우 중국의 한 사이트에서 하이에크의 아래 논문을 발견했다. 그래서 캡처해서 여기에 다시 올려 놓은 것이다.
아마 복잡계에 대해 가장 최초로 체계적인 연구를 한 사람은 하이에크일 것이다. 아래 논문 말고도 위의 책에는 복잡계와 관련해 주요 논문들이 다수 들어 있다.
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과거에는 경제 호황과 불황의 반복 주기가 없었다. 이런 현상은 중앙은행이 설립된 이후에 나타나는 현상이다. 중앙은행이 돈을 풀면 진정한 부를 창출하던 행위 대신에 부를 창출하지 못하는 경제 행위들이 우후죽순처럼 일어난다. 따라서 실질적인 부는 오히려 감소한다. 하지만 지표상의 GDP 따위는 증가하기 때문에 경제학자들은 이를 호황이라 부른다.
이와 반대로 은행이 돈줄을 조이면 거짓 부를 창출하던 업자들에게 가던 돈이 막히므로, 경기가 침체에 빠지고 업자들은 도산하기도 한다. 결국 정부가 말하는 불황이나 호황은 중앙은행의 돈줄에 의존하는 현상이다.
관변 학자들이 말하는 경제적 호황이란 실질적이고 지속적인 경제적 팽창과는 아무 관련이 없다. 그와 반대로 그런 호황은 실질적인 경제의 파괴자이다.
Here's the True Definition of a Recession — It's Not About GDP
07/19/2017•Frank Shostak
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the institution that dates the peaks and troughs of the business cycles,
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough.1
In the view of the NBER dating committee, because a recession influences the economy broadly and is not confined to one sector, it makes sense to pay attention to a single best measure of aggregate economic activity, which is real GDP. The NBER dating committee views real GDP as the single best measure of aggregate economic activity.
We suspect that on the back of the NBER's much more general definition, the financial press as a shortcut introduced the popular definition of a recession as two consecutive quarters of a decline in real GDP. Also, by following the two-quarters-decline-in-real-GDP rule, economists don't need to wait for the final verdict of the NBER, which often can take many months after the recession has occurred.
Regardless of whether one adopts the broader definition of the NBER or the abbreviated version, these definitions are actually failing to do the job.
After all, the purpose of a definition is to establish the essence of the object of the investigation. Both the NBER and the popular definition do not provide an explanation of what a recession is all about. Instead they describe the various manifestations of a recession.
The Problem with Measuring GDP
Another grave problem with both the abbreviated and the NBER definitions is that recession is defined in terms of real gross domestic product (GDP), which supposedly mirrors the total of final real goods and services produced.
To calculate a total, several things must be added together. To add things together, they must have some unit in common. However, it is not possible to add refrigerators to cars and shirts to obtain the total of final goods. Since total real output cannot be defined in a meaningful way, obviously it cannot be quantified. To overcome this problem economists employ total monetary expenditure on goods, which they divide by an average price of those goods. But is the calculation of an average price possible?
Suppose two transactions are conducted. In the first transaction, one TV set is exchanged for $1,000. In the second transaction, one shirt is exchanged for $40. The price or the rate of exchange in the first transaction is $1000/1TV set. The price in the second transaction is $40/1shirt. In order to calculate the average price, we must add these two ratios and divide them by 2. However, $1000/1TV set cannot be added to $40/1shirt, implying that it is not possible to establish an average price.
On this Rothbard wrote,
Thus, any concept of average price level involves adding or multiplying quantities of completely different units of goods, such as butter, hats, sugar, etc., and is therefore meaningless and illegitimate.2
Since GDP is expressed in dollar terms, which are deflated by a dubious price deflator, it is obvious that its fluctuations will be driven by the fluctuations in the amount of dollars pumped into the economy. Hence various statements by government statisticians regarding the rate of growth of the real economy are nothing more than a reflection of the fluctuations in the rate of growth of the money supply.
Now, once a recession is assessed in terms of real GDP it is not surprising that the central bank appears to be able to counter the recessionary effects that emerge. For instance, by pushing more money into the economy the central bank's actions would appear to be effective since real GDP will show a positive response to this pumping after a short time lag. (Remember that changes in real GDP reflect changes in money supply). Observe that once the economy is expressed through GDP the central bank would appear to be able to navigate the economy (i.e., GDP) by means of a suitable policy mix.
Even if one were to accept that real GDP is not a fiction and depicts the so-called real economy there is still a problem as to why recessions are of a recurrent nature. Is it possible that various shocks cause this repetitive occurrence of recessions? Surely there must be a mechanism here that gives rise to this repetitive occurrence?
The Cause of Boom-Bust Cycles
In a free, unhampered market, we could envisage that the economy would be subject to various shocks but it is difficult to envisage a phenomenon of recurrent boom-bust cycles.
According to Rothbard,
Before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the late 18th century, there were no regularly recurring booms and depressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever some king made war or confiscated the property of his subjects; but there was no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general and fairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions and contractions.3
In short, the boom-bust cycle phenomenon is somehow linked to the modern world. But what is the link? Careful examination would reveal that the link is in fact the modern banking system, which is coordinated by the central bank.
The source of recessions turns out to be the alleged "protector" of the economy — the central bank itself.
Further investigation would show that the phenomenon of recessions is not about the weakness of the economy as such, but about the liquidation of various activities that sprang up on the back of the loose monetary policies of the central bank. Here is why.
A loose central bank monetary policy sets in motion an exchange of nothing for something, which amounts to a diversion of real wealth from wealth-generating activities to non-wealth-generating activities. In the process, this diversion weakens wealth generators, and this in turn weakens their ability to grow the overall pool of real wealth.
The expansion in the activities that came about based on loose monetary policy is what an economic "boom" (or false economic prosperity) is all about. Note that once the central bank's pace of monetary expansion has strengthened, irrespective of how strong and big a particular economy is, the pace of the diversion of real wealth is going to strengthen.
However, once the central bank tightens its monetary stance, this slows down the diversion of real wealth from wealth producers to non-wealth producers. Activities that sprang up on the back of the previous loose monetary policy are now getting less support from the money supply; they fall into trouble — an economic bust, or recession emerges.
Irrespective of how big and strong an economy is, a tighter monetary stance is going to undermine various uneconomic activities that sprang up on the back of the previous loose monetary policy. This means that recessions or economic busts have nothing to do with the so-called strength of an economy, improved productivity, or better inventory management by companies.
For instance, as a result of a loose monetary stance on the part of the Fed various activities emerge to accommodate the demand for goods and services of the first receivers of newly injected money. Now, even if these activities are well managed and maintain very efficient inventory control, this fact cannot be of much help once the central bank reverses its loose monetary stance. Again, these activities are the product of the loose monetary stance of the central bank. Once the stance is reversed, regardless of efficient inventory management, these activities will come under pressure and run the risk of being liquidated.
From what was said we can conclude that recessions are the liquidation of economic activities that came into being solely because of the loose monetary policy of the central bank. This whole recessionary process is set in motion when the central banks reverses its earlier loose stance.
We have established that recessions are about the liquidations of unproductive activities, but why they are recurrent? The reason for this is the central bank's ongoing policies that are aimed at fixing the unintended consequences that arise from its earlier attempts at stabilizing the so-called economy, i.e., real GDP.
On account of the time lags from changes in money to changes in prices and changes in real GDP, the central bank is forced to respond to the effects of its own previous monetary policies. These responses to the effects of past policies give rise to the fluctuations in the rate of growth of the money supply and in turn to recurrent boom-bust cycles.
Conclusions
Contrary to the accepted way of thinking, recessions — properly understood — are not negative growth in GDP for at least two consecutive quarters.
Recessions, which are set in motion by a tight monetary stance of the central bank, are about the liquidations of activities that sprang up on the back of the previous loose monetary policies. Rather than paying attention to the so-called strength of real GDP to ascertain where the economy is heading, it will be more helpful to pay attention to the rate of growth of the money supply.
By following the rate of growth of the money supply, one can ascertain the pace of damage to the real economy that central bank policies inflict. Thus the increase in the growth momentum of money should mean that the pace of wealth destruction is intensifying. Conversely, a fall in the growth momentum of money should mean that the pace of wealth destruction is weakening.
Additionally, once it is realized that so-called real economic growth, as depicted by real GDP, mirrors fluctuations in the money supply rate of growth, it becomes clear that an economic boom has nothing to do with real and sustainable economic expansion. On the contrary such a boom is about real economic destruction, since it undermines the pool of real wealth — the heart of real economic growth.
Hence despite "good GDP" data, many more individuals may find it much harder to make ends meet.
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Africa’s Future Lies in Trade Not in Aid!
생각해보면 지구 위에 사는 모든 생물의 원래 상황은 가난이다. 태초에 인간은 자유로웠지만 배를 굶주렸다. 진짜 문제는 가난의 원인을 찾는 데 있지 않다. 그것은 무엇이 인간을 부유하게 만드느냐는 것이다. 그 해답은 300년 전에 영국에서 일어난 기적에 있다.
If you think about it, poverty is the original state of every creature on this planet, including us. For most of human history, we were hunter-gatherers, living hand to mouth. We may have been free, but we were hungry.
The real question isn’t what causes poverty. It is what causes wealth. We find the answer in our history.
Until around 300 years ago, almost everyone was on this planet was poor. Setting aside a handful of kings and aristocrats, the rest of us bent our backs in the fields for a mouthful of food. That was true whether we lived in Nigeria or Russia or Mexico or Burma.
But 300 years ago, a miracle started. A miracle that was expressed through secure property rights, free trade and specialisation. People learned that, if they concentrated on what they were good at, and bought what they needed, everyone became better off. And as global trade spread, and more people got involved in more complex chains of production, the miracle intensified. (발췌)
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재생 에너지는 완벽하지 않다.
Renewables Aren’t Perfect
Africa’s Future Lies in Trade Not in Aid!
생각해보면 지구 위에 사는 모든 생물의 원래 상황은 가난이다. 태초에 인간은 자유로웠지만 배를 굶주렸다. 진짜 문제는 가난의 원인을 찾는 데 있지 않다. 그것은 무엇이 인간을 부유하게 만드느냐는 것이다. 그 해답은 300년 전에 영국에서 일어난 기적에 있다.
The real question isn’t what causes poverty. It is what causes wealth. We find the answer in our history.
Until around 300 years ago, almost everyone was on this planet was poor. Setting aside a handful of kings and aristocrats, the rest of us bent our backs in the fields for a mouthful of food. That was true whether we lived in Nigeria or Russia or Mexico or Burma.
But 300 years ago, a miracle started. A miracle that was expressed through secure property rights, free trade and specialisation. People learned that, if they concentrated on what they were good at, and bought what they needed, everyone became better off. And as global trade spread, and more people got involved in more complex chains of production, the miracle intensified. (발췌)
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수학적 모델이 지배하는 경제학의 현상은 미제스나 하이에크의 말을 빌리면 바로 과학주의이다. 자연과학의 모델을 가져와서 복잡계인 사회과학에 적용하는 멍청한 짓이다.
The new astrology
By fetishising mathematical models, economists turned economics into a highly paid pseudoscience
Ultimately, the problem isn’t with worshipping models of the stars, but rather with uncritical worship of the language used to model them, and nowhere is this more prevalent than in economics. The economist Paul Romer at New York University has recently begun calling attention to an issue he dubs ‘mathiness’ – first in the paper ‘Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth’ (2015) and then in a series of blog posts. Romer believes that macroeconomics, plagued by mathiness, is failing to progress as a true science should, and compares debates among economists to those between 16th-century advocates of heliocentrism and geocentrism. Mathematics, he acknowledges, can help economists to clarify their thinking and reasoning. But the ubiquity of mathematical theory in economics also has serious downsides: it creates a high barrier to entry for those who want to participate in the professional dialogue, and makes checking someone’s work excessively laborious. Worst of all, it imbues economic theory with unearned empirical authority. (발췌)
Alan Jay Levinovitz
is an assistant professor of philosophy and religion at James Madison University in Virginia. His most recent book is The Gluten Lie: And Other Myths About What You Eat (2015).
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재생 에너지는 완벽하지 않다.
Renewables Aren’t Perfect
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