對日소송 이겼다고? 사실은 손해 막심이다




8일 언론들은 일제히, <법원 "전범기업 미쓰비시, 징용 피해 할머니에 1억2천
  배상" 판결> 등의 제목으로, 일부 한국인이 제기한 일본기업 상대 소송 결과
  를 보도했다. 한 마디로, 이번 판결은 1965년 한일 청구권협정에 反하는 판결
  이다. 이런 식의 일본기업 상대 소송은, 한국에서 현재 14件이 진행 중이다.
  만약 이번 판결이 최종 대법원에 가서까지 확정되면, 해당 일본기업이 순순히
  한국 법원 결정에 따르지 않는 경우, 이론상, 한국 내 해당 일본기업의 자산
  (재산)은 압류 절차로 돌입하게 된다.

  최근 수 년간 일본의 한국向 직접투자가 급격하게 축소되고 있는 원인 중 가장
  큰 것은 이런 식의 소송들 때문이다. 계속 이런 식이라면 최악의 경우 이미 옛
  날에 한국에 진출해 있는 일본기업조차 본국으로 철수할 가능성을 배제 못한
  다. 철수까지는 아니더라도, 해당 기업의 추가적 對한국 투자는 더이상 기대
  하기 어려워진다......


 어찌됐든, 우리 정부는 2010년에 <대일항쟁기 강제동원 피해조사 및 국외강제
  동원 희생자지원 특별법>이라는 것을 만들어, 1938년 4월1일부터 1945년 8월
  15일까지 7년 동안의 기간 중 근로한 한국인에 대해 금전적 지원을 완료했다. (펀드빌더, 발췌)


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‘노무현입니다’라는 영화
엄상익


댓글

stargate   2017-08-08 오후 12:01

가난한 사람들이 지원을 받아 나름 대로 생활을 살 수 있게된 것은 정부가 부자들에게 많은 세금을 거두어 가나한 사람들에게 지원한 결과입니다. 그러면 누구에게 고마워해야할까요? 먼저 많은 세금을 낸 부자들에게 고마와해야 되는 것이 아닌가요? 노무현 정부는 지원을 받은 가난한 사람들이 부자들에게 증오를 갖도록 부추키고 자기네들이 생색 낸것 아닙니까? 그래서 노무현씨를 싫어합니다. 가난한 사람들을 지원한 돈이 노무현씨 주머니에서 나왔다면 모르지만 그 것은 아니잖아요? 최소한 가난한 사람들을 지원한 돈이 부자들이 열심히 일해서 번 돈에서 나왔다는 것을 인식하게하고 그 들에게 고맙게 생각하도록 했다면 모르겠지만 노무현 정부는 집권 내내 99 대 1 이라는 구호로 사회를 분열 시킨는 일에 매진했던 기억 밖에 없습니다.

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오히려 '반도체 호황'을 빼고 나면 한국 경제의 근본 문제는 점점 더 심각해지고 있다는 불안한 경고음이 여기저기서 울린다. 당장 올 2분기 제조업 평균 가동률이 71.6%에 불과하다. 글로벌 금융 위기를 겪던 2009년 1분기(66.5%) 이후 가장 낮다. 공장 생산라인이 차츰 멈춰 서고 있다는 뜻이다.



삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 올린 '반도체 호황'의 착시를 걷어내고 한국 경제가 안고 있는 본질적 문제, 제조업의 구조적 위기를 직시해야 한다. 특히 생산 유발 효과가 큰 자동차, 조선 등이 다 사면초가에 싸여있다. 자동차의 경우, 중국의 사드 보복으로 대중(對中) 수출이 급감하고 국내 판매도 부진해 올 상반기 현대차 영업이익은 두 자릿수로 줄었다. 회사는 실적이 급감했는데 노조는 기본급을 7.2% 올려달라며 10일부터 부분 파업에 들어간다.


3년간 순손실이 2조원에 달하는 한국 GM의 철수설도 불거졌다. 실제 철수하면 협력업체까지 30만명의 일자리가 위협받는다. 기아차 역시 실적이 급격히 악화된 가운데 최대 3조원 규모에 달하는 통상임금 소송 1심 판결을 눈앞에 두고 있다. 철강, 유화 등 다른 주력 업종도 중국의 추격으로 힘겨운 경쟁을 하고 있다. 기획재정부도 어제 낸 '경제동향' 자료에서 "경기 회복세는 이어지지만 견고하지 않다는 것이 정부와 한국은행, KDI의 공통된 견해"라고 했다.


출처 : http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/08/2017080803131.html


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대한적십자사 신임 회장에 박경서… "北, 가난 거의 해결"

출처 : 조선일보


-----> 또 한 명의 쓸모 있는 멍청이가 나왔군!


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2015년 기준으로 근로자 1733만명 중 46.8%인 810만명이 소득세를 한 푼도 내지 않는 면세자였다.

근로소득세 면세자는 총급여에서 여러 항목을 공제한 다음 세율을 적용해 계산해보니 소득세가 '0원'이 된 사람을 말한다. 대개는 연소득 5000만원 이하 층이다

출처 : http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/08/2017080803206.html


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좌파들의 행동대원이 된 철 모르는 대학생들.


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박찬주대장 정도의 공관병으로 가러면 그 공관병 아비가 어떤 위치에 있는지 누가 한번 털어봐라...내가 보기에는 군바리 박찬주 대장보다는 던도 많고 아마도 지위도 더 높을지 모르지...\


내가 군대 생활 하면서 제일 부러웠던게 공관병과 부관병이다...대장 정도의 공관병 부관병은 대령 준장도 함부로 반말 못해...부관병이 제일 중요하게 하는일이 골프부킹하는거야...얘들은 정말 잘먹어...무슨 행사 끝나면 남은 음식 몽창 다 먹어...동기라고 불러서 좀 주면 감격하면서 얻어먹던 기억이 난다...


인권센터에 고발했다는 공관병 그 새끼는 딴 나라 군대에 있다가 온거냐...대장정도의 공관병이 인권타령이라니, 대한민국 청년군인들이 정말 기가 막히겠다...

[출처] 공관병에 갑질을 한다고..야 공관병자체가 무시무시한 갑이야. (발췌)

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일본 언론의 충격 폭로, "美 CIA, 문재인의 北 오염도 조사 !!"

https://youtu.be/-gsbyuY2tsI

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‘삼성 장충기 문자’에 비친 언론인의 민낯

광고·협찬요구, 자녀 취업청탁…시사IN 단독 보도

http://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=42289


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Trump: North Korea 'will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen' if more threats emerge

 

Published August 08, 2017

Fox News

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입법 없이 법률을 만드는 방법

How To Have Law Without Legislation

 

 

•Murray N. Rothbard

 

 

This article is also available as an Audio Mises Daily

 

[Adapted from Rothbard’s book review of Freedom and the Law by Bruno Leoni. This review first appeared in New Individualist Review, edited by Ralph Raico.]

 

[In his book Freedom and the Law,] Professor [Bruno] Leoni's major thesis is that even the staunchest free-market economists have unwisely admitted that laws must be created by governmental legislation; this concession, Leoni shows, provides an inevitable gateway for State tyranny over the individual. The other side of the coin to increasing intervention by government in the free market has been the burgeoning of legislation, with its inherent coercion by a majority—or, more often, by an oligarchy of pseudo-"representatives" of a majority—over the rest of the population. In this connection, Leoni presents a brilliant critique of F.A. Hayek's recent writings on the "rule of the law." In contrast to Hayek, who calls for general legislative rules as opposed to the vagaries of arbitrary bureaucracy or of "administrative law," Leoni points out that the real and underlying menace to individual freedom is not the administrator but the legislative statute that makes the administrative ruling possible. It is not enough, demonstrates Leoni, to have general rules applicable to everyone and written down in advance; for these rules themselves may—and generally do—invade freedom.

 

Leoni's great contribution is to point out to even our staunchest laissez-faire theorists an alternative to the tyranny of legislation. Rather than accept either administrative law or legislation, Leoni calls for a return to the ancient traditions and principles of "judge-made law" as a method of limiting the State and insuring liberty. In the Roman private law, in the Continental Civil Codes, in the Anglo-Saxon common law, "law" did not mean what we think today: endless enactments by a legislature or executive. "Law" was not enacted but found or discovered; it was a body of customary rules that had, like languages or fashions, grown up spontaneously and purely voluntarily among the people. These spontaneous rules constituted "the law"; and it was the works of experts in the law—old men of the tribe, judges, or lawyers—to determine what the law was and how the law would apply to the numerous cases in dispute that perpetually arise.

 

If legislation is replaced by such judge-made law, says Leoni, fixity and certainty (one of the basic requirements of the "rule of law") will replace the capriciously changing edicts of statutory legislation. The body of judge-made law changes very slowly; furthermore, since judicial decisions can only be made when parties bring cases before the courts, and since decisions properly apply only to the particular case, judge-made law—in contrast to legislation—permits a vast body of voluntary, freely-adopted rules, bargains, and arbitrations to proliferate as needed in society. Leoni brilliantly shows the analogy between these free rules and bargains, which truly express the "common will" of all participants, and the voluntary bargains and exchanges of the free market. The twin of the free-market economy, then, is not a democratic legislature ever grinding out new diktats for society, but a proliferation of voluntary rules interpreted and applied by experts in the law.

 

While Leoni is vague and wavering on the structure that his courts would take, he at least indicates the possibility of privately competing judges and courts. To the question, who would appoint the judges? Leoni answers with the question, who now "appoints" the leading doctors or scientists in society? They are not appointed, but gain general and voluntary acceptance on their merits. Similarly, while in some passages Leoni accepts the idea of a governmental supreme court, which he admits becomes itself a quasi-legislature,3 he does call for the restoration of the ancient practice of separation of government from the judicial function. If for no other reason, Professor Leoni's work is extremely valuable for raising, in our State-bemused age, the possibility of a workable separation of the judicial function from the State apparatus.

 

A great defect in Leoni's thesis is the absence of any criterion for the content of the judge-made law. It is a happy accident of history that a great deal of private law and common law is libertarian—that they elaborate the means of preserving one's person and property against "invasion"—but a good deal of the old law was antilibertarian, and certainly custom can not always be relied on to be consistent with liberty. Ancient custom, after all, can be a frail bulwark indeed; if customs are oppressive of liberty, must they still serve as the legal framework permanently, or at least for centuries? Suppose ancient custom decrees that virgins be sacrificed to the gods by the light of the full moon, or that redheads be slaughtered as demons? What then? May not custom be subject to a higher test—reason?

 

The common law contains such antilibertarian elements as the law of "conspiracy," and the law of "seditious libel" (which outlawed criticism of the government), largely injected into the law by kings and their minions. And perhaps the weakest aspect of the volume is Leoni's veneration for the Roman law; if the Roman law provided a paradise of liberty, how account for the crushing taxation, the periodic inflation and currency debasement, the repressive network of controls and "welfare" measures, the unlimited imperial authority, of the Roman Empire?

 

Leoni offers several different criteria for the content of the law, but none are very successful. One is unanimity. But while superficially plausible, even explicit unanimity is not necessarily libertarian; for, suppose that there are no Moslems in a country, and everyone unanimously decides—and it passes into custom—that all Moslems should be put to death. And what if, later, a few Moslems should appear in the land? Further, as Leoni recognizes, there is the problem of the criminal; certainly he does not join in favoring his own punishment. Here Leoni falls back on a tortured construction of implicit unanimity, i.e., that, in such a case as murder or theft, the criminal would agree to the punishment if anyone else were the criminal, so that he really agrees to the justice of the law. But suppose that this criminal, or others in the community, have the philosophical belief that certain groups of people (be they redheads, Moslems, landlords, capitalists, generals, or whatnot) deserve to be murdered. If the victim is a member of one of these abhorred groups, then neither the criminal nor others holding this belief would agree to the justice of either the general law against murder or to the punishment of this particular murderer. On this ground alone, the implicit-unanimity theory must fall.

 

A second proffered criterion for the content of the law is the negative Golden Rule: "Do not unto others what you would not wish them to do unto you." But this too is unsatisfactory. For one thing, some acts generally considered criminal would still pass the negative Golden Rule test: thus, a sadomasochist can torture another person, but since he would be delighted to be tortured, his act, under the negative Golden Rule, could not be considered criminal. On the other hand, the Golden Rule is much too wide a criterion; many acts would be condemned as criminal that certainly should not be. Thus, the Rule decrees that men shouldn't lie to each other (a man would not want to be lied to) and yet few would urge that all lies be outlawed. Also, the Golden Rule would decree that no man should turn his back on a beggar, because the former would not want the beggar to turn his back on him were they to change places—and yet it is hardly libertarian to outlaw the refusing of alms to a beggar.4

 

Leoni hints at a much more promising criterion: that freedom be defined as the absence of constraint or coercion—except against constrainers. In this case, the initiation of coercion is outlawed, and the "governmental" function becomes strictly limited to coercing the coercers. But, most unfortunately, Leoni falls into the very same trap that snared Hayek in his Constitution of Liberty: "coercion" or "constraint" is not defined in a proper or cogent manner.5 At first, Leoni gives promise of a correct understanding of coercion when he says that a man cannot be said to "constrain" another when he refuses to buy the latter's goods or services, or when he refuses to save a drowning man. But then, in his unfortunate chapter 8, Leoni concedes that constraint may occur when a religiously devout person feels "constrained" because another man does not observe the former's religious practices. And this feeling of constraint may appear to justify such invasions of liberty as Sunday blue laws. Here again, Leoni errs in placing his test of constraint or coercion not on the objective acts of the defendant but on the subjective feelings of the plaintiff. Surely this is an extremely wide highroad for tyranny!

 

Furthermore, Leoni apparently does not see that taxation is a prime example of coercion, and is hardly compatible with his own picture of the free society. For if coercion is to be confined to the coercers, then surely taxation is the unjust coercive extraction of property from a vast body of non coercing citizens. How, then, is it to be justified? Leoni, again in chapter 8, also concedes the existence of some legislation in his ideal society, including, mirabile dictu, some nationalized industries!6 One specific nationalization favored by Leoni is the lighthouse industry. His argument is that a lighthouse could not charge individual consumers for its service, and that therefore it should be supplied by government.

 

The basic answers to this argument are threefold:

 

1. the taxation for lighthouses imposes coercion and is therefore an invasion of freedom;

 

2. even if the lighthouse could not charge individuals, what prevents shipping lines from constructing or subsidizing their own lighthouses? The usual reply is that then various "free riders" would benefit from the service without paying. But this is universally true in any society. If I make myself a better person, or if I tend my garden better, I am adding to the benefits enjoyed by other people. Am I then entitled to levy tribute upon them because of this happy fact?

 

3. In fact, lighthouses could easily charge ships for their services, if they were permitted to own those surfaces of the sea which they transform by their illumination. A man who takes unowned land and transforms it for productive use is readily granted ownership of that land, which can henceforth be used economically; why should not the same rule apply to that other natural resource, the sea? If the lighthouse owner were granted ownership of the sea surface that he illuminates, he could then charge each ship as it passes through. The deficiency here is a failure not of the free market but of the government and the society in not granting a property right to the rightful owner of a resource.

 

On the necessity of taxing for government lighthouses and other services, Leoni adds the astonishing comment that "in these cases the principle of free choice in economic activities is not abandoned or even put in doubt." (p. 171) Why? Because "it is admitted" that people would be willing to pay for these services anyway, if available on the market. But who admits it, and to what extent? And which people would pay?

 

Our problem can be solved, however; a cogent criterion does exist for the content of libertarian law. That criterion defines coercion or constraint, simply, as the initiation of violence, or the threat thereof, against another person. It then becomes clear that the use of coercion (violence) must be confined to coercing the initiators of violence against their fellow men. One reason for confining our attention to violence is that the unique weapon employed by government (or by any other enforcing agency against crime) is precisely the threat of violence. To "outlaw" any action is precisely to threaten violence against anyone who commits it. Why not then use violence only to inhibit those who are initiating violence, and not against any other action or nonaction that somebody might choose to define as "coercion" or "constraint"?

 

And yet the tragic puzzle is that so many quasi-libertarian thinkers have, over the years, failed to adopt this definition of constraint or have failed to limit violence to counteracting violence, and have instead opened the door to statism by using such vague, jumbled concepts as "harm," "interference," "feelings of constraint," etc. Decree that no violence may be initiated against another man, and all the loopholes for tyranny which even such men as Leoni concede—blue laws, government lighthouses, taxation, etc., —would be swept away.

 

In short, there exists another alternative for law in society, an alternative not only to administrative decree or statutory legislation, but even to judge-made law. That alternative is the libertarian law, based on the criterion that violence may only be used against those who initiate violence, and based therefore on the inviolability of the person and property of every individual from "invasion" by violence. In practice, this means taking the largely libertarian common law, and correcting it by the use of man's reason, before enshrining it as a permanently fixed libertarian code or constitution. And it means the continual interpretation and application of this libertarian law code by experts and judges in privately competitive courts.

 

Professor Leoni concludes his highly stimulating and important book by saying that "law-making is much more a theoretical process than an act of will" (p. 189). But certainly a "theoretical process" implies the use of man's reason to establish a code of law that will be an unbreachable and unflawed fortress for human liberty.

 

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그런 법을 만들면 대기업이 강하게 반발하지 않을까.

“반발이 심하다고 안 하면 정부는 왜 있나. 반발하는 사람 막고 정책을 추진하려고 정부가 있고 법이 있다. 

삼성 특별법 제안했더니 삼성이 싫어할 것이라는 어떤 분의 의견이 보도됐다. 

삼성이 싫어하니까 법으로 만들자는 거 아니냐. 대기업이 로비로 입법을 좌절시킬 것이라는 판단은 물론 현실적이다. 하지만 그렇다고 해서 하면 안 된다는 것은 말이 안 된다.”

[출처] 삼성을 국유화한다라구라?

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재인이탄핵설계자 +3

           

개씹쌍욕하고 싶은데 시간이 없어서 못하고 간다.

출처: 일베

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출처: 뉴데일리
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정규재 전 주필은 장충기 문자 관련해서


" 시사IN에서 삼성 미래전략실 장충기 사장에 대한 
언론사 간부들의 청탁문제를 '폭로'했다. "

" 주요 언론사들 대부분이 이름을 올린 반면,
한겨레 경향 등은 쏙 빠졌다. "

" 폭로라고? 그보다는 특검이 '흘렸다'고 봐야한다." 라고
하면서 특검의 언론플레이 의혹을 제기하였다.

[출처] 정규재, 장충기 문자 관련 " 기레기와 특검과…"

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연말되면 국가 신용등급 5단계 하락이다.

내년에 하반기에 최저임금 쇼크 터지고 후년이면 제2의 imf 각이다.
다들 대비 하시라.
그러지 않아도 일본계 자금이 이를 대비해 수익 챙기려 본격 상륙했다고 하더니만.
ㅠㅠ

[출처] 박근혜 대통령이 곳간 채워 났다니 문재인이 신나게 털어버리네

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Niall Ferguson‏

 

As I said: Trump has no option but to threaten to use force and bank on the other side’s blinking

 

내가 말했듯이 트럼프는 무력 사용으로 위협하고, 상대가 겁 먹고 물러서기를 기다리는 수 밖에 없다.

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나심 탈레브

인간은 지역적이고 실제적이며, 스케일에 민감하다. 매크로보다 마이크로가 우리에게 더 유리하며, 구체적인 일에는 일반론을 피해야 한다. 우리는 직접적인 환경에 집중해야 하며, 단순하고 실용적인 규칙이 필요하다. 우리들 다수는 칸트의 보편론의 피해자들이다.

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NassimNicholasTaleb‏

 

The only way to prevent institutions from rotting is by automatic dissolution, to have the same life expectancy as free-market companies.

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What Nassim Taleb Can Teach Us

 

•Jeff Deist

 

 

Nassim Nicholas Taleb does not suffer fools gladly. Author of several books including The Black Swan and Antifragile, Taleb is known for his incendiary personality almost as much as his brilliant work in probability theory. Readers of his very active Medium page will experience a formidable mind with no patience for trendy groupthink, a mind that takes special pleasure in lambasting elites with no “skin in the game.”

 

“Skin in the game” is a central (and welcome) tenet of Taleb’s worldview: we increasingly are ruled by an intellectual, political, economic, and cultural elite that does not bear the consequences of the decisions it makes on our (unwitting) behalf. In this sense Taleb is thoroughly populist, and in fact he correctly identified trends behind the Crash of ’08, Brexit, and Trump’s election. He understands that globalism is not liberalism, that identity and culture matter, and most of all that elites don’t understand how randomness and uncertainty threaten the inevitability of a global order.

 

Thus Taleb argues the intelligentsia are not only haughty when they plan our future, they are also clueless: fragility abounds, and threatens to crash the Party of Davos. Hubris results from unearned wealth and prominence, coupled with a blindness to the Black Swans lying in wait.

 

Born in Lebanon to a prominent family, educated at the University of Paris and Wharton, Taleb was poised to become part of the cognitive aristocracy he mocks. But he was never one of them. His hard-nosed persona, enhanced by a dedication to rigorous deadlift workouts, is quickly evident in his notorious interviews and very public Twitter brawls. His willingness to delve into history and religion sets him apart from the neoliberals who hope to wish them both away. Taleb writes for the intelligent everyman, and this blue-collar approach also extends to his description of himself as a “private intellectual, not a public one.”

 

Austro-libertarians will find much to admire in his brilliant takedowns of the “pseudo-experts” he identifies in academia, journalism, politics, and science. But Taleb is no Austrian. While he holds a decidedly jaundiced view of most economists—calling for the Nobel in economics to be cancelled— he does not denounce economics as a field of study per se. Nor does he claim heterodox or reactionary inclinations:

 

 

“I am as orthodox neoclassical economist as they make them, not a fringe heterodox or something. I just do not like unreliable models that use some math like regression and miss a layer of stochasticity, and get wrong results, and I hate sloppy mechanistic reliance on bad statistical methods. I do not like models that fragilize. I do not like models that work on someone's computer but not in reality. This is standard economics.”

 

While he is not averse to using mathematics and statistics in economics, Austrians share his perspective that both are tools for economists. Statistical models are mostly bunk that provide no value to economic forecasters or investors, despite the highly paid Ivy League quants who produce them. In fact, models often have harmful effect of creating a false sense of relative certainty where none exists. It's refreshing to see Taleb make this claim so effectively from outside the Austrian paradigm of praxeology. But if his view of economics is mainline, his tone is Rothbard meets Hayek:

 

 

I'm in favour of religion as a tamer of arrogance. For a Greek Orthodox, the idea of God as creator outside the human is not God in God's terms. My God isn't the God of George Bush.

 

We know from chaos theory that even if you had a perfect model of the world, you'd need infinite precision in order to predict future events. With sociopolitical or economic phenomena, we don't have anything like that.

 

Taleb does see a role for government, and supports consumer protection laws against predatory lending as one example. But he also purportedly supported Ron Paul in the 2012 presidential election, and has indeed mentioned Hayek as an influence regarding the dispersal of knowledge in society. He’s also applied special venom to several worthy targets in professional economics, including Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and Paul Samuelson. Taleb labels as “Stiglitz Syndrome” the process whereby public intellectuals suffer no financial or career consequences for being spectacularly wrong in their predictions.

 

This is especially galling to a man who correctly called (and in fact became wealthy as a result of) economic crises in 1987 and 2008. In both instances, Taleb had “skin in the game” as a market trader. His own money and reputation were on the line, unlike the court economists in the New York Times.

 

For an excellent (albeit indirect) analysis of how Austrians and libertarians can advance their cause from a minority position, Taleb’s recent article The Most Intolerant Wins: The Dictatorship of the Small Minority is a must-read. He reminds us that a small minority with courage—the most important form of skin in the game— can prevail over the slumbering masses. And he also reminds us that courageous individual actors, not 51% mass movements, drive real changes in every society:

 

 

The entire growth of society, whether economic or moral, comes from a small number of people. So we close this chapter with a remark about the role of skin in the game in the condition of society. Society doesn’t evolve by consensus, voting, majority, committees, verbose meeting, academic conferences, and polling; only a few people suffice to disproportionately move the needle. All one needs is an asymmetric rule somewhere. And asymmetry is present in about everything.

 

Economics is lost, mired in a quicksand of predictive models that fail to predict and macro-analysis that fails to analyze. Democratic politics is lost, ruined by bad actors with perverse incentives to burn capital rather than accumulate it. And academia is lost, still stuck in a centuries-old model run by hopelessly sheltered PhDs. Taleb gets all of this, and does an admirable job of explaining it. Austro-libertarians would be wise to see him as a valuable ally and voice in the ongoing fight against states, central banks, and planners of all stripes.

 

Jeff Deist is president of the Mises Institute. He previously worked as a longtime advisor and chief of staff to Congressman Ron Paul. Contact: email; twitter.

 

전에도 유사한 글을 올렸던 것 같은데, 이 글은 다시 읽어볼 만 하다.

 

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