黃帝內經 第十五講 　藏象概述

 

北京中醫藥大學

王洪圖教授

 

 

現在開始我們要學習藏象。藏象學說，藏象理論。其實都是一回事。過去我們叫藏象學說。後來有人提出來應該叫藏象理論。其實學說本身就是理論問題。藏象學說，是我們《內經》理論體系的核心。關於理論體系核心的說法，在六十年代初就有人提出來過，那時說的還不是《內經》理論體系核心，是中醫理論體系核心，叫藏象學說。這個是六十年代初，湖北中醫學院的西學中班，西學中班的學員，和老師們一塊寫的文章。在光明日報上發表的。當初他們提出來說它叫臟腑來着，叫臟腑學說。是中醫理論體系的核心。當然他們所說的臟腑，實際上就是說的藏象。因為藏象不單是個臟腑問題了。

 

“以象而不以質”，討論的是以象為主。說不以質就是沒有質？不是這意思。就是它強調的是象。所以藏象學說是《內經》理論體系的核心問題，或者中醫理論體系核心問題提的比較早。我在寫《黃帝內經研究大成》的時候，那是91年動筆寫的。藏象，我還沒說它是《內經》理論體系的核心，講說它《內經》理論體系的重要組成部分。這麼一個提法，重要組成部分也對，就相對比較籠統一點吧。免得在學術上出現一些分歧，其實看來這個問題，倒沒有什麼分歧可說的。也就是說，把它看作是《內經》理論體系的核心的問題，學術界上。沒有什麼太大的分歧意見。

 

關於藏象的概念，什麼叫藏象？歷來好像都有一些不同的說法，比較佔統治地位的，或者說在學術地位，代表學術界被大多數人所接受的，以前關於藏象的概念，那就是說“臟藏於內，形見於外”，就是這麼個觀點。因為內臟藏於體內，所以叫藏象。

 

還有一個說法，王冰的說法，就是“臟藏於內，形見於外”，又加個“可閱者也”。五臟藏於體內，它的功能表現、它的形象，可以表現在外。而且表現在外的這一部分，是可以看得到的。閱，不是見嗎？至於那個“現”字，我寫成“見”字，古時候就沒有“現”字。“見”字，有時候作為表現為“現”，有時候則看得見的“見”。就在不同的地方不同的意思。認為“可見者也”。就說是這個見可以，說形現於外，那就是“現”。就是這樣的話，“象”字也有一些不同的認識。有的說是形象，有的說是現象，有的說是假象、表現等等。有一些不同的分析，我們在考慮之後，就是說“臟藏於內，形見於外，可閱者也”的說法，好像不能夠完整地反應藏象的概念。只能可以說藏象，所謂藏象有這麼個特點。是吧？臟藏於內，形象表現這外，可以從外邊看得到。這個是個特點問題。好像不是藏象的概念問題。所以經過討論之後，給藏象確定的概念，就是咱們教材所說的，藏象是什麼呢？是研究臟腑經脈形體官竅的形態結構，臟腑、經脈、形體、官竅，有沒有形態結構？有。所以藏象就是研究臟腑、經脈、形體、官竅的形態結構，生理活動規律，及其相互關係的理論。它是《內經》理論體系的核心，也是中醫基礎理論的基本內容之一。這麼一個提法。

 

這裡所說的形態結構，是指的《內經》中的，因為研究的是《內經》，咱們不是講後世，也不是講今天的那個中醫學基礎。而是覺得《內經》時候的藏象，是指《內經》中的解剖知識，我們在講概論的時候，提到過，《內經》有粗略的解剖知識，所以這裡說是指《內經》中的解剖知識。生理活動規律是該理論的重點。也就是說，藏象理論重點是什麼？重點是研究生理活動規律。當然就是已經臟腑、經脈、形體、官竅等等的活動。以生理活動規律是其研究的重點。

 

它這些生理活動規律是什麼呢？它是以五臟為中心的，聯繫諸腑，五臟六腑，當然也有奇恆指腑，以五臟為中心的，聯繫諸腑、經脈、形體、官竅等。什麼呢？肝、心、脾、肺、腎，五個系統的生理活動。這生理活動是重點。重點是什麼？重點就是研究肝、心、脾、肺、腎五個系統的生理活動。而不是專指這五個臟的生理活動。只是以五臟為中心，而已經這五個系統。所說系統，那就包括六腑、經脈、形體、官竅，甚至於把自然界都聯繫起來。就我們在講《陰陽應相大論》乃至於講《金匱真言論》都提到過，《金匱真言論》、《臟氣法時論》都有這樣的問題。

 

我們看《臟氣法時論》教材46頁。這個表。和我們以前講《陰陽應象大論》，也就是37頁這個表。那都是反映這麼個問題。46頁和37頁分別有兩個表，這兩個表，其實都可以反映，這個五臟的五個系統活動問題。所以說它是五個系統的生理功能活動。作為重點的。這部分系統，又講了，它不僅都受到天地四時陰陽的影響，同時互相之間也緊密聯繫，從而體現人體局部與整體的生理活動規律。人體自己的局部與整體。人體與自然、環境，乃至於社會的，也是一個整體。所以體現這樣一個整體生理活動規律。這是關於它的概念。就是第一句話叫做概念。到“也是中醫基礎理論的基本內容之一”。這是關於藏象的功能。

 

下面是對於這個概念的進一步的解釋。因為說的是形態結構，所以解釋，我所說的形態結構，是指的《內經》時候的那些解剖知識。我所說的生理活動規律，是這些理論的重點。而所說的生理活動規律，是以五臟為中心的，這五個系統的生理活動。這等於是後邊，就自己解釋那個概念。這是允許的。確定概念的時候，自己可以確定，自己應該進行解釋。當然以往，就說這幾十年來，有一些個不同的說法，關於藏象的概念。當然並沒有經過深入的考慮，或者說也沒有經過嚴格的、認真的、仔細的討論。不同的專家在不同的著作當中，關於藏象的概念，曾經有過一些不同的說法。有的說藏象是研究人體的生理活動、病理變化規律的學說。換句話說，重點在於把藏象學說，又包含了病理，把病理也算在藏象學說的內容之一了。我們在討論的時候，我在確定這概念的時候，就排除了這一點。因為病理問題，我們中醫基礎理論也好，《內經》理論也好，它還有病機病理那一部分。病機病理就是作為一個學說來存在的，病理部分，它就不能夠既屬於藏象，又屬於病機。看來，放在病機裡頭是合理的。因此，藏象就不應該再包含著病理內容。

 

還有的時候，有的專家提出了，是包含著經絡的問題，其實在我們看，咱們在這部教材的概論的部分，講《內經》理論體系的基本組成的時候，經絡也包含在藏象裡了。經絡本身就屬於藏象的組成部分。它也是屬於生理方面的。主要的東西。主要的組成部分。

 

但是為什麼又沒說除了經絡呢？因為經絡已經屬於臟象了。只不過是經絡本身具有相對的獨立性，和它的一些特點。所以我們在寫很多著作的時候，臟腑之後，又列一章，又列一節，又列一個什麼組成部分，專講經絡。實際上，經絡應該是屬於臟象內容的。因為你們看到所有的關於經絡的記載，都沒有離開過臟，五臟六腑，特別是典型的權威性的著作。權威性的文章，《靈樞經》的《經脈篇》，它講十二經脈的時候，開頭都先說的是臟腑的名字。比如說，第一條經脈，肺，手太陰之脈。它是這麼叫的。先定的是肺，手太陰之脈，大腸，手陽明之脈，胃，足陽明之脈。它都先把臟腑的名字擺在前頭。下邊才說經脈的名字。當然《內經》裡頭還有一些其他方面的論述，都說明經絡和臟腑是分不開的。一體的東西。只是從層次角度說，臟腑在高一個層次，下邊才談到經脈這樣一個層次。

 

下面我再進一步解釋，藏象理論的內容，你看是這樣講的，藏象理論的內容，它包括五臟，以五臟為中心的，當然五臟位置最高，下面接著談的六腑、奇恆之腑，經脈。這不把經脈擺這了嗎？形體、官竅、精氣神，這些，就是說都屬於藏象。你看，所謂藏象學說的藏象理論，它就不是臟腑學說、臟腑理論。因為臟腑，它屬於藏象的重要組成部分而已。或者說是以五臟為中心而已。所以藏象不等於臟腑，臟腑是藏象的重要組成部分。所以這樣一個觀點，我們在寫“藏象”這兩個字的時候，雖然從字音、字義上，都是內臟之臟，但是在我們用藏象這個詞的時候，仍然是寫的這個藏，藏了。做成一個詞的時候，從我們這個基礎也好，從我主編的《黃帝內經研究大成》也好，都是這樣一種用法。其他就都是簡體字，凡遇到藏象的時候，都用的是“藏”這個字。因為在《內經》時代沒有簡體字，也沒有加肉月這個“臟”。就都是這個“藏”。有時候獨【cang】有時候讀【zang】。我們現在還使用這個“藏”。“藏”的意思就在於這個藏象的藏，不同有一般所說臟腑之“臟”。當然這裡頭，還留有其他方面的考慮，什麼考慮呢？就是現在還有少數的一些專家，認為這個“藏”字就應該讀作【藏】，藏象就應該讀作【藏】象。也有這樣，起碼我知道有一個專家是這種觀點。那樣的話，我就寫的“藏”，儘管我們現在讀成“臟”象。還留有餘地，可以討論。學術問題還是可以繼續討論的。出於這樣一些考慮。所以我們藏象兩個字，“藏”就沒寫成“臟”。當然意思都是讀“臟”。從古來就是寫的這個“藏”，讀成“臟”。

 

這也反映了臟腑本身的特點，它是主藏的。它不是露在體外的。而是藏於體內的，臟藏於內的。是“臟”和“藏”古來是一個字。反映藏象這詞，選這個字的時候，也有藏於內的意思。

 

藏象內容是這樣一些，臟腑、奇恆之腑、經脈、形體、官竅、精氣神。再有呢，關於論藏象的篇章，《內經》當中，討論藏象的篇章是很多的，我們教材說，《素問》有《靈蘭秘典論》《六節藏象論》《五臟生成論》（也有的說五臟生成篇）《五臟別論》《經脈別論》《太陰陽明論》《靈樞經》等等。這只是重點。這一篇文章，重點討論了有關藏象的問題。其實這些文章，往往也涉及到其他的醫學理論問題。但是這重點是討論藏象問題的文章。其實還有很多文章，雖然不以討論藏象為主，但是也都涉及了藏象的內容，只不過那不是以討論藏象為主的。我們都沒有列入進來。因為《內經》這文章有特點，大家所知道的，它很難說我這一篇就討論什麼問題，而不討論別的問題。它不是這樣。所以往往在一篇裡頭，涉及到陰陽五行、臟腑經絡、病因病機、診法、治則，甚至於治療方法。它往往在這一篇文章都涉及到了。當然它有重點，所以我們這裡說的，有這樣一些文章是討論藏象的。主要討論藏象的文章。並不是說別的篇章就沒有藏象問題了。因此我們大家在研究藏象理論的時候，除了讀本教材，還想讀《內經》的話，你可以以這些篇為主。但是再想深入研究，更全面研究，那一百二十六篇，你都先看一下看。那裡頭應該說很多地方，都涉及到藏象的問題。

 

這樣也和藏象的理論，是《內經》理論體系核心有關。因為其實理論體系核心，因為這個理論，它應該是指導，或者是涉及到所有的理論內容。凡是《內經》理論體系的部分，哪一部分都得有藏象的東西，沒有藏象的東西，那個理論就很難成立。這樣的理論才能叫做核心嘛！確實，想一想，是這樣。你比如診法問題，你診斷來診斷去，不管寒熱虛實，最後總要定個位，寒熱虛實，哪寒？哪虛？是臟腑虛、是經脈虛？還是氣血虛？總得定一位。甚至你說是陰陽虛，陰陽也涉及到人體的什麼陰什麼陽 。診斷這樣，治療更是，你診斷離不開，那你治療更離不開，你治療總要從診斷走，照著診斷去立法處方。所以治療也是這樣。同樣的，養生也是，藏象講的生理問題，那病理問題是哪來的？病理問題就是生理的失常，就是病理，病理出來的，那你生理、病理都有了，養生呢，那就是要保養好生理的部分，逐漸的，或者說不要讓它，產生病理的影響。這樣就是養生。所以同樣是離不開藏象理論。

 

因此說，藏象理論，涉及到《內經》的很多其他篇，這應該說也是自然現象，因為這是一種核心的理論。所以藏象的這一章的學習，應該是說我們全書的、全部《內經》課的重點內容。下面我們就一節一節的講。先看第一節，第一節是《靈蘭秘典論》。全篇全選下來了。只不過這篇有兩個自然段，我們就分兩段來講。

 

《靈蘭秘典》，靈蘭就是講的藏書的地方，黃帝藏書的地方。叫靈台蘭室。秘典驚世秘密的典籍，秘密的經典。就是家秘多少籍。不是隨便可以洩露的。無非是想說這一部分內容，是非常寶貴的、非常重要的。要很好的藏下來。所以篇名叫做《靈蘭秘典論》。第一段是講的十二官相使，或叫十二臟之相使。

 

十二臟相使

 

十二臟就是十二臟腑，有時候把這一段，把十二臟腑叫成“十二官”，官職。其實“官”本身就是功能的意思。只不過現在習慣了官，喊當官的，其實當官是要發揮他的職能的。不發揮職能，那就不叫官。是不是？我先講，這一段是要背誦下來的。也就是說這一段是藏象理論當中很重要的部分。或者說在藏象理論當中，它佔有很重要的地位。儘管其他的藏象的篇章，也是很重要的，甚至於在某些問題上，說法不完全相同的，但是這是一個很重要的。《靈蘭秘典論》這一段。是佔有很重要地位的。現在我把它讀一遍。

 

黃帝問曰：願聞十二藏之相使，貴賤何如？

歧伯對曰：悉乎哉問也，請遂言之：心者，君主之官，神明出焉。肺者，相傅之官，治節出焉。肝者，將軍之官，謀慮出焉。膽者，中正之官，決斷出焉。膻中者，臣使之官，喜樂出焉。脾胃者，倉稟之官，五味出焉。大腸者，傳道之官，變化出焉。小腸者，受盛之官，化物出焉。腎者，作強之官，伎巧出焉。三焦者，決瀆之官，水道出焉。膀胱者，州都之官，津液藏焉，氣化則能出矣。凡此十二官者，不得相失也。故主明則下安，以此養生則壽，歿世不殆，以為天下則大昌。主不明則十二官危，使道閉塞而不通，形乃大傷，以此養生則殃，以為天下者，其宗大危，戒之戒之。

 

膻中，我們讀成【tan 談】中，讀慣了讀了幾十年，現在有人說應叫【shan 善】中，我讀慣了，還是讀【tan】中。我記得我們工程院的老院士，程莘農先生，他說我們一直讀【tan】中，後來你給我們教了，應該讀【shan】中，反正大家知道。

 

這正是以一個封建王朝的官職，這樣的設置，來形容人體中的十二臟腑的相互之間的關係。這裡說強調的，雖然說有主有從，但是強調的是一個協調統一的關係。強調的是一個協調統一的問題。

 

黃帝問曰：願聞十二藏之相使，雖然是它說“十二藏”，指十二臟腑，腑也可以籠統稱為“藏”，細分的話，腑和臟是有不同的。籠統來說，內臟內臟，那就包括腑，包括臟。所以它把十二臟腑，都籠統的叫做十二臟，“之相使”就是相互使用。就是相互為用、相互聯繫。

 

貴賤何如？有什麼主？有什麼從？主為貴，從為賤，它其實就是講的臟腑之間的相互關係問題。當然講主從也可以，因為下邊講君臣關係。總之，貴賤就是講主從。

 

歧伯對曰：悉乎哉問也，請遂言之岐伯回答，對話，說悉乎哉問也，說您這問題問得太全面了，悉，不是完全嗎？問得太詳細了。請遂言之，請讓我把這個問題談一談吧。

 

心者，君主之官，神明出焉。，怎麼這些話其實各位在學中醫基礎的時候，大多都引證過了。對不對？在中醫基礎是叫藏象吧，在藏象裡頭講心臟的時候，肯定第一條“心為君主之官”，或叫“心主神明”，“心主血脈”等等。肯定以心主神明列過題，從哪裡出的？《內經》裡講了很多“心主神明”的問題。但是以《靈蘭密典論》最為突出。就是說把十二臟腑，和朝廷中的君臣相聯繫的話，心居君主之地位。居最高的領導者的地位，為什麼？就是因為心藏神。在《內經》理論裡面，人體雖然是形神統一，形體和神（精神）是統一的，但是神是又統領著形體，神要比形體重要得多。既說是統一的、不可分的，又說神統領著形體。因為心思藏神的，主神明的，所以就把它看作是在十二臟腑當中，是最重要的一個臟腑。因此把它叫做君主之官，而藏“神明”。這個“神明”呢，就是泛指一切精神意識思維活動，籠統的說，在我們《內經》裡面，甚至於在我們中醫裡面，都把它叫做“神”。都可以用神加於概括，當然，在神的概括的基礎上，還可以細分不同的層次。 籠統的來說，都可以叫做神。而這個神，可以說是由心來統領的。所以，你看教材的注釋，52頁最下一行，張介賓的注釋，最後，倒數第一行最後，“心為一身之君主，禀靈虛而含造化，具一理以應萬幾，臟腑百骸惟所是命。聰明智慧，莫不由之”。也就是說，心統領全身，臟腑百骸惟所是命，都受神的影響。人的“聰明智慧，莫不由之”，那都是出於心。都從心來的。就這個上來講，所以把心叫做“君主之官”，就好像朝廷中的皇帝一樣。封建王朝的皇帝一樣。我雖然這樣強調“心主神明”，而且引證張介賓的注，其實在《內經》理論裡面，還有其他關於精神的問題，只不過《靈蘭密典論》是強調這個，而且這個理論，在中醫理論體系當中，佔了很重要的地位，甚至於佔了主導的地位。關於神的問題。心主神明的觀點，是佔了中醫理論當中的主導地位。還有不是心主神明的，五臟都主精神的，那是另外一種理論。現在我們是講的《靈蘭秘典》，就是這樣一個觀點。

 

這個要是完全都從解剖上考慮，就不大容易。因為大家都學過解剖，中醫古時候，解剖不是太發達，一百多年來，西醫東漸，我們人人都學了解剖，而且那個“腦”主神，腦主持精神活動的問題，已經好像眾人皆知，因此你說心，如果是胸中之心來主這麼多神明，似乎講不通。確實也是很難講得通。所以我說學藏象的問題，你要單純的從解剖角度來考慮是很難學得通的。可是你說腦主神，這也有毛病。“腦主神明”，我們開中藥，開處方，就很難說清腦開竅，對不對？說“養腦安神”，好像從整個理論上，都不是這樣認為。而且從中國人的習慣上，也不是這麼說的。說這個人用心學習，當然現在也說動動腦子，也有這樣說的。說這人沒心沒肺，是腦子不開竅。也有人說腦子不開竅，說心不開竅，說的還是相對比較多。說是不用心，學習不用心，那就白費了。所以“心藏神”傳下來，幾千年來，我們從生活上到醫學上，一直是在這樣使用的。

 

再有說了，這個心是不是跟精神活動就沒關係呢？也還有關係。其實五臟，哪一臟都對，就我們現在的醫學的考慮，實驗為主的醫學考慮，全身各個臟腑，都和人的精神活動有影響。不是絕對沒影響，這個意思。報紙、雜誌上發表過一些材料，這當然是可以做參考的，不能說作為醫學論文來看，不是有過一個報紙登過一個，哪個國家一個婦女心臟病，後來移植心臟，移植給她一個好的心臟，她就活過來了，活過來以後，她的生活習慣改變不少，本來不喝啤酒，現在特別愛喝啤酒，本來根本就不喜歡激烈性的刺激，她回來之後，又騎摩托，又幹什麼，特別喜歡激烈性的運動。後來了解到，給她心臟的那個人，是二十幾歲的小伙子，死於車禍，騎摩托車，而且了解之後，接受心臟的那婦女，很多的脾氣的改變，就和獻心臟那小伙子的脾氣很相似。而且據知，獻心臟那個小伙子，特別愛喝啤酒，接受心臟那個婦女，原來就不喝脾酒，接受心臟之後，這麼個愛好也出來了。所以你說是心臟對神沒影響，恐怕這些問題還確實值得研究。當然，這個只能說是心氣通於腦，我們也並不是就此來說，腦就是不如這心主神，不能從解剖角度看來，中醫《內經》上所說的，“心主神明”，或者“君主之官，神明出焉”，就是經的精神活動。主持精神活動的這系統是什麼？是心系統。是這麼講下來的。不是完全，或者主要的不是從解剖上來考慮這個問題。

 

我記得一些古醫書上，對心的解釋有很多的，都是強調“心主神明”問題，敦煌醫學殘卷，其中殘卷論壇有一篇完整的，叫《明堂五臟論》，敦煌醫學殘卷馬繼興先生本人，早把它整理出來寫出書了。 其中有一篇文章還挺清楚的，並不殘。這篇文章不殘。看來是唐代的文章，或者唐以前的文章。不會晚於唐。它關於心的問題，它說“心者，纖維也”，纖細的纖，所謂纖細微，又說“無事不貫心”，不是完全的原話，我記得是差不多。意思不會錯了。敦煌醫學殘卷上頭關於《明堂五臟論》它說“心者，纖維也，所謂纖細微，無事不貫心”。就是心思很細微的，這才叫心，很多事情都要通過心。這才叫心。如果粗粗大大的，有什麼事情都不知道，這就沒心了。所以是要用心，要走心，這人“心很細”，心很粗那就沒有，就不算那心，不好，所以無事不貫心。什麼事都要通過心來想一想。記住了，思考了，這都叫通過心，貫就是通過。

 

當然，其他醫學書上，也有說“心者，新也，日有所新也。”新是新舊的新，日有所新，就是每天都得學點新東西，這才叫有心。活一輩子，稀里糊塗一輩子，什麼都沒學到，那沒有心，“日有所新”就是講的天天都要學新東西。不斷地學習，當然這學習，不單指天天看書學習，什麼都是學習，生活經驗的積累也是一種學習。這都是講的心。其實這些說法，都是從“心主神明”角度的命題，也就是說關於精神，或者叫中醫所說的神，和所說神志的命題，“心主神明”，是重要的一個命題。還有其他的主神明的命題。就是“心者，君主之官，神明出焉”。

 

肺者，相傅之官，治節出焉，相傅，傅就是輔助的意思，相也是幫助的意思，就是比喻成朝廷的宰相輔佐，“傅”是有輔佐的意思，宰相輔佐君主的，肺臟的功能，在心的旁邊輔佐著心臟，輔佐心臟，它具體的是“治節出焉”。治節是治理調節，治理調節什麼？治理調節臟腑氣血營衛。那都要靠肺的功能來進行調節。心固然是君主，但是肺是起到治理調節的作用。教材注釋講得挺清楚，治節就是治理調節。肺主氣而朝百脈，它有輔助心臟治理和調節物質氣血的功能。又引了張介賓的《類經》上的注釋：“肺主氣，氣調則營衛臟腑無所不治，故曰治節出焉”。對“出焉”，焉這個字，不單是虛詞，在這裡也有當“這裡”講的意思。就從這裡出，神明從心臟這裡出，治節從肺臟這裡出，我們在《內經》理論裡邊來看，“肺者，心之蓋也”，是心的華蓋，蓋子蓋在心臟上頭，可是《明堂五藏論》它說，“肺者，旁也”，旁邊的旁，那看來要是“肺者，旁也”，這個說法和相傅之官，輔佐著君主，可不是肺？君主的旁邊嘛。《明堂五藏論》說“肺者，旁也”。主治節，朝百脈，而治理全身。全身氣血營衛的正常運行，臟腑百骸【讀 hai 或 xie】的活動正常。都要靠肺氣來給以維持。都要靠肺主治節的功能進行調節。

 

肝者，將軍之官，謀慮出焉，肝，有保衛機體的作用，但是你看，謀慮又是神志了，謀慮是很肝有關係，或者肝的功能正常，人才能夠正常的謀慮、謀劃、思維，深入的考慮問題。如果肝功能失常了，就不能深入考慮問題，所以大家生活當中經常這麼說，說一生氣，一發怒，辦事簡直就不合乎情理了。為什麼？他不能考慮了。就超越了常規了。所以“肝者，將軍之官，謀慮出焉”。肝藏血，肝在志為怒，肝有病之後，血就逆行，逆亂，怒氣一發，精神活動就不再平靜。所以不能謀慮。而且《明堂五藏論》說“肝者，捍也”，捍就是捍衛的捍。說“肺者，旁也”，“心者，纖也”。“肝者，捍也”，也是捍衛的意思。捍衛機體的作用。肝藏血，它的功能正常，可以抵禦很多的外來的邪氣，對人體的健康，起到了捍衛的作用。所以叫“將軍之官”。

 

膽者，中正之官，決斷出焉，中正就是不偏不倚，叫做中正。膽的功能正常的話，人就可以下決斷，所以它“決斷出焉”。對事情，肝主謀，謀慮完了，還得決斷，決斷的功能又劃到膽上去了。所以這人要膽小，就思前想後，老是決定不下來。那就中國人的習慣，那叫膽小。一點小事，想來想去，睡不著覺，那叫膽虛。本來用不著失眠，這點事，他就是失眠了。怎麼想怎麼害怕，我們不是有一個溫膽湯嗎？來治療它。同樣的，決斷本身它也是屬於精神活動範疇裡邊的。雖然說“心為君主之官”，但是還是把這個活動，歸結到膽上頭來了。所以我說，即使強調了某一臟的重要的功能，更主要的，本篇它是講十二臟腑相互協調、整體協調問題。“膽者，中正之官，決斷出焉”。這在我們中醫理論裡邊，凡是膽小善驚的，那就要治膽了。這人特別容易害怕，聽點聲音就嚇一跳。治療的話就要考慮從膽來論治。

 

膻中者，臣使之官，喜樂出焉，膻中就是指的心包，心包絡，臣使之官，那就是在皇帝周圍的近臣，是近臣，所以“喜樂出焉”，心主神明之喜樂，實際上是通過膻中表達出來的。後世又把膻中（心包絡）叫做“心主之宮城”。宮殿的宮，可以保護著心。叫做“代心用事”，心的功能，喜樂，特別是它具體講的，是由於膻中發揮作用，膻中表現出來的。所以叫“代心用事”。因為代心用事，所以可以代心受邪。心臟，君主之官，不能受邪，真心不受邪，受邪則死，邪氣侵犯心，首先侵犯到心包（膻中），膻中也就講的是心包。代心受邪。後世溫病學派，不也是講“溫邪上受，首先犯肺，逆傳心包”嗎？一傳傳到心包

 

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 미국은 철수하거나 계속 한국에서 얼쩡거리거나 아니면 공격을 하는 세 가지 선택이 남아 있다. 공은 미국으로 넘어와 있다.

 

  출처: 가디언지

 

Trump sabre-rattling on North Korea has a flaw: Kim Jong-un has nothing to lose

 

 

Strategy of sending in the US navy and attacking Syria and Afghanistan likely only to boost Pyongyang’s nuclear resolve

 

 

In the lead-up to North Korea’s latest missile test, Donald Trump had battled to convince Kim Jong-un he was picking a fight with the wrong guy.

 

The US president pounded Syria with 59 Tomahawk missiles and then ordered a naval “armada” into the waters around the Korean peninsula. He dropped the “mother of all bombs” on eastern Afghanistan and used Twitter to hammer home his message.

 

“North Korea is looking for trouble,” the US president tweeted last week as Kim’s technicians made the final preparations for Sunday’s botched but nevertheless defiant test.

 

But experts say Pyongyang’s latest act has underlined the futility of the billionaire’s efforts to bully Kim Jong-un into abandoning his nuclear ambitions.

 

“There is a problem with playing the military threat [card] with North Korea because they are inclined to call the bluff,” said John Delury, a North Korea expert from Yonsei University in Seoul. “I’m not saying they tested because of the threats. But bringing a naval strike group doesn’t help if your goal is to put off a test. If anything you are increasing the odds.”

 

Trump supporters claim his apparent strategy of using spectacular shows of military might to cow the North Korean dictator and convince the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, to crack down on his ally is paying off.

 

“Displays of American power matter. A lot,” Daniel Blumenthal, a China specialist from the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative thinktank, argued on Twitter, describing the strikes on Syria and Afghanistan as “very much messages to Xi and Kim”.

 

 

Some observers point to a recent editorial in a Communist party-controlled newspaper, the Global Times, as proof that Trump has finally convinced Beijing to rein in Kim Jong-un by dramatically tightening sanctions.

 

 

Delury, however, said there was no evidence to suggest Xi was prepared to do anything more than “increase some sanctions here and there”. “The Global Times can write all the editorials it wants but China’s approach on this is consistent”. Beijing’s message to Trump was crystal clear, he said: “Cool down.”

 

In fact, Delury claimed Trump’s sabre-rattling rhetoric and erratic use of force would only strengthen Kim’s determination to develop an effective nuclear deterrent that might spare him the fate of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi.

 

“It’s really just playing Pyongyang’s game. It is a waste of time and the Trump administration should move onto a more promising avenue to solve the problem ... Since they have nothing to lose and we have everything to lose, they win every game of chicken.”

 

 

The message is that despite US posturing they are not going to abandon their missile programme

 

   

 

Leonid Petrov, a North Korea specialist at the Australian National University, said that with its latest missile launch “the message from North Korea is that despite US posturing they are not going to abandon their missile programme”.

 

Petrov said he was not surprised Kim Jong-un had chosen not to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of the founder of North Korea, his grandfather Kim Il-sung, with an anticipated sixth nuclear test.

 

“Given the physical damage that would cause to nearby areas, it would have been unusual for a loyal, filial grandson to order a nuclear test on such an auspicious day,” he said.

 

But when that test does come it would prove the day of reckoning for Trump’s more aggressive approach towards North Korea. “If the US responds with an attack, that would confirm Kim’s claims that he is surrounded by hostile forces that are determined to carry out a pre-emptive strike,” Petrov said.

 

“The moment of truth for the US will be whether it strikes [in response to a nuclear test] and provokes a resumption of the Korean war at the expense of South Korean security, or stands down and betrays its weakness.”

 

“What would the US do? Withdraw, hang around or strike?” Petrov asked. “The ball is in the Americans’ court.”

 

 

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한국 대선의 여론조사 사기극

 

권력 위의 권력, 여론조사 업체의 대선 여론조작사기극

 

이방주 칼럼니스트

 

 

 

한국에서 여론조사 업체는 정치인들조차 건드리기 꺼려하는 권력 위의 권력인데, 우리 국민들은 여론조사 업체를 무슨 국가기관이나 된 것처럼 착각 하는 경우가 많지만, 한국처럼 여론조사 조작 사기를 잘 치는 나라는 흔치 않으며, 그 업체들은 여론 조작을 밥 먹듯이 하는 장사꾼에 불과함을 많은 사람들이 모른다. 여론조사 업체는 그 특성상 거대 정치세력의 이해관계와 크게 맞물려 있어, 특정 정치세력과 밀접한 연관이 많을 수 밖에 없고, 여론 왜곡과 조작이 자주 발각되어 최우선 개혁이 필요한 집단이다. 최근의 여론조작 사기의 사례를 보자.

 

 

최근 19대 대선 여론조사에서 여론조사업체 리얼미터가 CBS의뢰로 2017년 3월15일 실시한 대선 여론조사에서, 공정하지 아니한 방법으로 조사를 실시하고, 피조사자의 응답 내용을 다르게 분석하는 등 피조사자의 의사를 왜곡한 사실로 인해 업체 이택수 대표가 과태료3000만원에 처해졌다.(참고로 법정 과태료 상한액은 3000만원이다.)

 

 

또 리얼미터는 2017년3월27일 MBN과 매일경제가 의뢰한 19대 대통령 여론조사에서도 ‘여론조사결과 왜곡 및 조작’ 혐의로 벌금에 처해졌고, 지난 2016년 3월에도 객관적이지 않은 자의적인 판단에 따라 결과가 왜곡 될 수 있는 방법을 사용 했다며 벌금 상한액인 3000만원의 과태료 처분을 받은 바 있으며, 2014년 4월에도 리얼미터가 여론조사 결과 조작 왜곡 혐의로 과태료 1500만원을 부과 받았는데, 그래도 이택수 대표가 여심위(중앙여론조사심의위원회)위원직을 계속 유지해서 문제가 되기도 했다. 리얼미터는 여론조사 업계의 골리앗으로 불리우기도 하는 국내 양대 여론조사 업체 중 하나로서, 특정 좌파 진영과의 유착 의혹을 지속적으로 받아온 업체다.

 

또 경향신문에 따르면 19대 대선과 관련 라디오 방송에서 여론조사 결과를 왜곡 발표한 혐의로 여론조사업체 대표 ㄱ씨에게 벌금 3000만원이 부과 되었는데, 업체명은 안나왔지만 잘 모르겠다는 응답을 특정 후보 지지로 왜곡하는 등 조사 결과를 왜곡한 혐의 때문으로 알려지고 있다. 또, 2016년 3월 24일 중앙선거관리위원회에 따르면 왜곡이 의심되는 여론조사 결과에 대한 특별조사를 실시한 결과 7개 여론조사 기관에서 53건의 선거여론조사기준 위반사실을 적발했고, 이 외에도 드러난 경고 건수 쯤은 수도 없이 많고, 드러나거지 않은 비리는 훨씬 더 많을 것이다.

 

 

 

 

국가의 운명에 대단히 중요한 문제인 여론조사에서 이러한 의도적 부정들은 후진국형 부패에 해당하며, 이러한 고의적인 조작은 국가의 운명을 뒤집어 흔들 수도 있는데, 이나라는 이런 중범죄도 겨우 벌금 상한액인 3000만원 정도에 처하고, 심지어 간첩에게도 겨우 징역 2~3년만 선고할 만큼 법이 물러터졌다. 이들을 쉽게 개혁하지 못하는 것은 아마도 정치권과 정치인의 운명을 좌우하는 여론조사 업체를 잘못 건드렸다가 선거에서 불이익을 당하는 게 싫어서 정치권에서 건드리지 않는 것으로 여겨지는데, 그런 부정한 업체들의 발표를 계속 믿어야 하는 것은 대단히 큰 문제다.

 

 

과거에도 조작 의혹이 있는 대선 여론조사 사건이 있다. 지난 IMF시대 97년 대선에서 이회창 후보의 지지율은 고작 10~14% 정도로 이어졌고 우파는 거의 포기 상태였다. 게다가 이후보의 낮은 지지율 때문에 이인제까지 경선불복 탈당했고, 많은 우파 유권자들이 투표를 포기 하기도 했으며, 조금이라도 가능성 높은 이인제를 밀기도 했다. 그런데 정작 뚜껑을 열어보니 김대중과 이회창은 겨우 40만표 차이의 박빙 승부였다. 여론조사의 조작이나 착오에 기인한 이인제의 탈당만 아니었다면 이회창 후보의 압승이었던 것이다.

 

 

현재까지의 여론조사 발표를 그대로 믿는다면, 최근까지 문재인 후보가 월등히 앞서다가 최근에 안철수가 근접하게 추격하는 양상으로 나타나고 있다. 거의 유일한 우파 후보인 홍준표는 여전히 한자리수여서 전혀 가망성이 없어 보인다. 그런데, 정말 그럴까? 여기에 숨겨진 비밀이 있음을 알려주는 또다른 사건이 터졌다.

 

 

2017년 4월 10일(월)부터 12일(수)까지 3일 동안의 리얼미터 여론조사에서 정당지지율이 민주당 44.8% 국민의당 26.5% 한국당 9.0%로 나타났다. 정당지지율이 한국당 9%인데, 이 정도라면 한국당은 완전히 궤멸이고, 당선자가 거의 없어야 정상이다. 그런데, 보선에서 한국당은 전체의 절반 정도를 가져갔다. 정당지지율 9%짜리 꼴찌당이 절반 정도를 승리했다는 것은 상식적으로 도저히 있을 수 없고, 소위 ‘샤이보수층’ 이나 '허용오차' 가지고도 설명이 안되며, 여론조사의 조직적인 조작을 빼고서는 설명하기 어렵다. 그런데, 업무의 특성상 어느 한 업체만 조작에 가담 해서는 전체 왜곡이 어려운 점에 비추어 이러한 조작 사기의 마수가 업계 곳곳에 퍼져 있을 가능성이 높다는 것이다.

 

 

이러한 여론조사 조작이 대체 어디까지인지, 우리는 제대로 알지 못하고 있다. 아마도, 그 뒤에는 특정 정치세력의 거대한 음모가 도사리고 있을 가능성이 높다. 예컨대, 조직적으로 왜곡된 여론을 만들어 내고, ‘진보우파’ 유권자가 자포자기 하게 만들고, 문재인을 싫어하는 '진보우파' 표심마저도 ‘문재인 싫으니 안철수라도 밀어서 문재인을 막아야 한다’는 인식을 유도하여, 결과적으로 ‘진보우파’의 표심마저 도둑질하여, 호남의 ‘수구좌파’인 안철수에게 향하게 유도하는 보이지 않는 손에 의한 조직적인 음모일 수도 있으며, 이렇게 모든 정치권력을 장악하여 ‘수구좌파’진영이 ‘진보우파’를 완전히 궤멸 시키기 위한 음모일 수도 있다는 것이다.

 

 

범죄는 찾아내는 게 더 어렵고, 발각 되어서 처벌 받은 건수는 비율적으로 미미하다는 상식에 비추어, 여론조사 업체를 전수 조사한다면, 태산같은 거짓과 음모들이 드러날 가능성이 높다. 우리 국민들은 특정 정치세력과 결탁한 여론조사 업체들의 장난에 통째로 놀아났을 가능성이 크고, 19대 대선에서도 현재진행형일 가능성이 높다.

 

 

탄핵사태 등의 일련의 과정도 모두가 거짓 언론과 허위 여론조사에서 비롯되었다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 지난 탄핵 사태에서 탄핵 찬성 여론은 압도적이어서, 80%의 국민이 분노하여 탄핵에 적극 찬성 한 것으로 나타났고, 견고하던 박대통령의 지지율은 한자리수로 급락 했다. 그러한 여론 때문에 여권에서는 여론의 눈치를 보느라 부랴부랴 탄핵에 찬성한 의원들이 생겨났고, 심지어 ‘진보우파’세력은 분당이라는 치명상까지 입었으며, 여론의 눈치를 본 헌재가 터무니 없는 구실을 걸어 탄핵을 가결 시켰고, 탄핵 찬성 80%라는 엄청난 민심 때문에 진보우파 후보가 당과 박대통령과의 이미지 단절을 위해 수차례 박대통령을 비난 하기도 했고, 그 여진이 지금도 남아서 우파를 분열 시켰다.

 

 

그런데, 여론조사 조작이 정말로 존재 했다면, 전 국민은 ‘수구좌파’의 보이지 않는 손에 완전히 놀아난 것이고, 이번 재보선 결과로 유추해 본다면, ‘진보우파’지지율은 절반 이상은 된다고 여겨지며, 홍준표 후보의 실제 지지율도 최소 35%를 넘어선다고 충분히 추정 해 볼 수 있다.

 

 

그런데, 설령 여론 조작이 없다고 치더라도 우파는 승리할 공산이 크다. 27만통 전화를 했는데 응답이 2000통도 안되는 전화여론조사로 지지율을 발표하고 이것이 사실인양 여론을 호도하는 것은 문제다. 응답률이 4.2%에 불과한 여론이 전체 국민의 의사일 수는 없다. 보통 우파 성향의 지지자들은 전화응답을 잘 안하고 종북좌파 성향의 지지자들은 적극적으로 응대하는 속성이 분명히 있다. 96%의 여론을 도외시 하는 지금의 전화 여론조사가 틀렸다는 것은 힐러리,트럼프 미국 대선에서도 이미 증명 된 바 있다. 미국 대선에서 정확성이 증명된 빅데이터 기법을 사용한 오늘 매격의 빅데이터 지수는 문재인 29.48%, 안철수 25.32%, 홍준표 21.21%로 이미 3강 구도로 형성 되어 있고, 인터넷, 모바일을 잘 쓰지 않는 숨은 표심이 누구에게 돌아가느냐에 따라 승부가 결정 되는게 19대 대선이다. 이번 대선은 명백한 3강 구도이며, 숨은 표심이 우파 표심이라면 홍준표는 우파 결집이 없더라도 이기는 것이고, 만약 우파가 더 집결한다면 낙승이 예상된다.

 

 

 

현재, 양강 구도이고 우파를 찍어봐야 문재인만 유리해지므로, 문재인을 막기 위해 조금이라도 차악인 안철수라도 밀자는 분위기가 존재한다. 이러한 분위기는 전적으로 여론조사 업계가 주도했다. 그러나 그 여론조사가 조작이건 아니건 간에, 발표된 여론조사가 사실과 크게 다르다는 것이 이번 보선에서 상당히 드러났다. 다음의 그림을 보라. 전국정당이 미니지역당에 표를 몰아준다는 게 말이 되는가?

 

 

무엇보다도, 국민의당은 표면에 내세운 얼굴만 안철수일 뿐, 그 뒤에 있는 사람들은 대부분 문재인과 다를 바 없는 반미친북친중의 좌파들이다. 또 '국민의당'은 지역구 25석 중 서울관악1곳 빼고는 모두가 전라도인 '미니지역당'이며, 전국정당인 우파정당이 의석수 몇분의 1에 불과한 전라좌파 지역당을 민다는 것은, 진보우파의 모욕임은 차치 하더라도, 결국 안철수 뒤에 숨어 있는 수많은 반미친북 수구좌파 인사들을 민다는 것으로서, 보수우파의 완전 몰락을 가져올 수도 있는 어리석고 치명적인 선택이다.

 

 

필자의 생각에 여론조작 내지 여론조작사기는 위에 드러난 것 뿐만 아니라 아주 거대하게 존재하며, 대선에서 보수우파가 각자 찍고 싶은 사람만 그대로 찍는다면 우파는 낙승을 거둘 것으로 여겨진다. 첫째, 여론 조작은 분명 존재하고, 우파의 분열만이 문제일 뿐이지, 대통령탄핵이라는 사태는 진보우파 진영 자체를 그토록 궤멸 시킬 만한 사건이 될 수 없다는 것이 첫째 이유다.

 

 

그런데도 불구하고 만약, 우파가 최악을 피한답시고 탄핵 주도세력인 안철수를 밀면 박대통령 탄핵의 진실도 묻히고, 보수우파는 궤멸 될 것이며, 그들은 30석 가지고 국정 운영이 안되므로 어차피 도로민주당으로 합당 할 수 밖에 없어 우파는 바보가 될 것이다. 이는 문재인 당선보다 더 치명적이 될 것이고, 이를 잊는다면 좌파들에게 대한민국이 무슨 변을 당할지 모르며, 그들에게 속지만 않는다면 예상치 못한 낙승이 눈 앞에 있다는 사실을 알아야 할 것이다.

 

[출처] 충격, 여론조사 사기극이 드러났다.

 

 

 

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Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia

 

Daniel Sneider

[2012.05.29.]

 

Some common assumptions about history textbooks used in Japan turn out to be ill-founded. Far from inculcating patriotism, as many overseas observers assume, Japanese high school textbooks tend to dryly present a chronology of historical facts, with little interpretive narrative added. This is the finding of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project by the author and his colleague Professor Gi-Wook Shin, involving an in-depth comparison of history textbooks used in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.

 

Japanese history textbooks and their treatment of the wartime era has become an almost constant subject of international dispute in the last three decades. For critics, both inside and outside Japan, the content of those textbooks is evidence of a failure to take responsibility for the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War or to acknowledge the suffering the Japanese military imposed on conquered Asian nations and the crimes committed in combat with the Allies. The decision of the Japanese education authorities to approve certain textbooks for use, or to reshape the content and language of the books, is presented as evidence of a nationalist tilt in Japan. Most importantly, Japanese textbooks were seen to fail to properly educate new generations of Japanese about their past.

 

Those views are not without some substance. Japanese history textbooks do not provide students with a detailed accounting of Japanese colonial rule, particularly in Korea. They have avoided or downplayed some of the more controversial aspects of the wartime period, such as the coercive recruitment of women for sexual services by the Japanese Imperial Army, the so-called comfort women. And at times, under pressure from conservative revisionists and their political supporters, the textbook screening process of the Ministry of Education has attempted to soften language describing Japan’s aggression.

 

The Divided Memories and Reconciliation project of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University, however, belies the essence of this widely held view of the particularly egregious nature of Japanese history textbooks. The project, directed by Professor Gi-Wook Shin and myself, was a multiyear study to better understand how historical memory about the wartime period is being shaped. It began with history textbooks and moved on to look at the role of popular culture—in particular film—and of elite opinion in shaping the view of the wartime past. Significantly, the Stanford project adopted a comparative approach, looking at Japan in comparison with other major Pacific war participants, principally China, South Korea, and, not least, the United States.

 

Methodological Approach for the Project

 

The study of history textbooks deliberately avoids the trap of focusing on the most controversial, and least used, textbooks. The project compared the treatment of the wartime and immediate postwar periods (1931–51) in Asia in the most widely circulated high school national history or world history textbooks recently or currently in use in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the United States, along with textbooks used for college-preparatory classes (with the aim of focusing on the formation of elite opinion). Translations of those textbooks were prepared and the research team presented comparative excerpts of the treatment of eight key historical issues, such as the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the atomic bombing of Japan. This allowed scholars, experts, the media and others, for the first time, to actually compare how historical memory is shaped in those school systems. It broadened the context for understanding the role of textbooks beyond those used only in Japan.(*1)

 

The textbooks were selected based on two criteria. First, the project sought to identify the most widely used national and world history textbooks in senior high schools. Where it existed, that selection relied on data provided by the national government agencies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) on textbook usage. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, until recently only one textbook publisher was authorized. In the case of the United States, where no national data exists, the project selected textbooks based on publishers’ data and on California usage, with the advice of the Stanford program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), which creates and distributes supplementary teaching materials to high schools across the country. In the case of Japan, the project selected the textbooks that are overwhelmingly used in Japanese high schools, published by Yamakawa Shuppansha. The decision was consciously made not to compare the textbooks published by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform that, while they receive lots of attention outside of Japan, are used in a tiny fraction—well less than 1%—of Japanese school districts.

 

Second, the project also selected, where available, textbooks that were provided for college-preparatory level courses, equivalent in the United States to textbooks for Advanced Placement–level courses. The intent in this second case was to capture the educational material more likely to have been used by elites in all the school systems. In the US case, two American history and two World history textbooks were selected—one set is used in general education classes while the second set (World Civilizations: The Global Experience and The American Pageant: A History of the Republic) are the most commonly adopted textbooks for AP courses. In the Japanese case, the history textbook published by Tokyo Shoseki is considered equivalent to AP-level usage in the United States, as is the South Korean history textbook published by Keumsung publishers.

 

In the course of the project, the researchers became aware of significant revisions of the textbooks of China and Taiwan, which were being introduced in both systems, though not yet in all classrooms. In those two cases, the newly revised textbooks offered very different accounts of this wartime period. The “old” and “new” textbooks in those two systems were both translated and excerpted in this study, offering an interesting internal comparison as well.

 

Heavy on Facts, Light on Patriotism

 

What the research uncovered was quite different from the common perception found in media, not only in Asia but also in the United States. Far from being nationalistic, Japanese textbooks seem the least likely to stir patriotic passions. They do not celebrate war, they do not stress the importance of the military, and they tell no tales of battlefield heroism. Instead they offer a rather dry chronology of events without much interpretive narrative.

 

 

Japanese textbooks are deliberately written in this somewhat subdued manner, partly to avoid overt interpretation and because they are aimed at preparing students for university entrance examinations. Nonetheless, Japanese textbooks do offer a clear, if somewhat implicit, message: the wars in Asia were a product of Japan’s imperial expansion and the decision to go to war with the United States was a disastrous mistake that inflicted a terrible cost on the nation and its civilian population. Indeed, that basic tale is what prompted revisionist critics to author their own textbooks to correct what was seen as a “masochistic” view of modern Japan.

 

Contrary to popular belief, Japanese textbooks by no means avoid some of the most controversial wartime moments. The widely used textbooks contain accounts, though not detailed ones, of the massacre of Chinese civilians in Nanjing in 1937 by Japanese forces.(*2) Some, but not all, of the textbooks also describe the forced mobilization of labor in the areas occupied by Japan, including mention of the recruitment of “comfort women” to serve in wartime brothels.(*3) One clear lacuna is the almost complete absence of accounts of Japanese colonial rule in Korea.

 

History as Our Story

 

 

Passage from a South Korean history textbook on the economy under Japanese colonial rule.

 

From their earliest days, history textbooks “have been fashioned to nurture a sense of national identity,” points out Stanford historian Peter Duus, one of the collaborators in our project.(*4) In this regard, Duus argues, the Japanese textbooks are perhaps the least overt in their mission to present a patriotic narrative about the story of the nation. In contrast, national curriculum guides in most other East Asian countries assert the promotion of national pride and national identity as the primary function of history education. The “war stories” told in their textbooks are clearly intended to do just that, Duus notes.

 

The desire to nurture a sense of national pride sometimes produces curious forms of myopia about the wartime period, most notably in the South Korean textbooks. The narrative of the wartime period offered to South Korean students is focused almost entirely on the oppressive experience of Koreans under Japanese colonial rule and on tales of Korean resistance to their overlords. The larger wartime context for Japan’s increasingly desperate and forced mobilization of Koreans for the war effort—namely the quagmire of the war in China and the mounting retaliatory assault of the Americans after 1942—is not provided. South Korean textbooks barely mention the outbreak of war in China in 1937 or the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in the case of the main textbook published by the government there is no mention at all of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

 

 

 

Chinese textbooks are most obviously imbued with a passionately patriotic and ideologically shaped narrative of the war. In the textbooks used up until the last decade, the war story is one of heroic military operations mounted by the Chinese, and for the most part by the Communists, against Japan. Little or no mention is made of the fighting in the Pacific or the role of the Allied powers. The role of the atomic attacks in ending the war is mentioned in only a single line. Mao Zedong’s call for an all-out attack on Japanese forces and the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945 are seen as the decisive factors. The victory in the anti-Japanese war represents, in this account, the end to a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialists who rode roughshod over China’s rights and interests, and the return of China to its historical position as a major world power.

 

The Chinese textbooks, published by the People’s Education Press, underwent a significant revision in 2002. The revised textbooks were slowly introduced around the country and offer a distinctly more nationalistic account of the wartime period. The previous edition focused on the civil war struggle between the Communist Party and the Nationalists, supporting Communist claims to have borne the brunt of the resistance to the Japanese invasion. The new version downplays the civil war in favor of a narrative of national unity against Japan. The Nanjing massacre had previously been downplayed—it was inconveniently a battle in which the Nationalists played the main role. Now Nanjing occupies extensive space in the textbooks, complete with graphic descriptions of Japanese atrocities.

 

 

 

The long used Chinese textbook hewed closely to classic Marxist historiography, presenting the war as an outgrowth of the crisis of capitalism and as a struggle against fascism, led by the Soviet Union and its Communist allies in China. The revised textbook largely drops that Cold War rendition in favor of tale of national resistance against a foreign invader. In its narrative about the events leading to the Japanese invasion of China, for example, the 2002 Chinese textbook offers an extensive quote from the so-called Tanaka Memorial to demonstrate the origins of Japanese ambitions in Asia from the 1920s. That there were aggressive Japanese ambitions in Asia during this period is undoubted, but modern historiography in the West and in Japan considers the “Tanaka Memorial” a spurious document.

 

 

Perhaps surprisingly to some, the American textbooks offer a similarly triumphant narrative of the war. The American Pageant, one of the most widely used textbooks in the United States, portrays the war as a critical turning point in the American maturation as an international power. Before the war the American people retreated from the outside world into a “head-in-the-sand” isolationism. The attack on Pearl Harbor brought the realization that isolation was no longer possible in a world of international anarchy. The unity of the American people forged by the attack, and equally important, the economic strength of the United States, brought victory in a global struggle against fascism, dictatorship, and militarism.

 

The language of the American account is unambiguous in portraying Japan as a rapacious aggressor and the United States as a largely innocent victim of unprovoked Japanese perfidy. The world history textbooks do offer more context for the start of the Pacific conflict, including the war in China and the rising tensions between Japan and the U.S. in the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. But the primary American history textbooks tend to ignore the war in Asia and present the conflict as having begun with Pearl Harbor and ending with the atomic bombing. American textbooks are much more willing, however, to present students with arguments for and against the decision to drop the atomic bombs, a debate that is absent from all the Asian textbooks.(*5)

 

 

In an odd echo of the approach of the Chinese textbooks, the American account emphasizes that the victory made the United States the most powerful country in the world. The wartime triumph sets the stage, in this “war story,” for the postwar struggle against the Soviet bloc. Having learned the dangers of isolationism and appeasement, Americans emerged prepared to use their new global power status in a new struggle against the Communist threat.

 

The language of American textbooks is less blatantly nationalistic than the Chinese but it supports the country’s Cold War policies in much the same way Chinese textbooks support the triumph of the Communist Party. The war story in The American Pageant narrative is consistent with both the liberal internationalism and the conservative interventionism that governed American foreign policy from Truman and Acheson to Nixon and Kissinger. And like much in American popular culture, it celebrates World War II as a “good war.”

 

Pacifism Over Patriotism

 

The patriotic passions of the Chinese, Korean, and American accounts of the war provide a striking contrast to what Duus, a preeminent historian of modern Japan, describes as the “muted, neutral, and almost bland” tone of Japanese textbooks. This may surprise those whose view of Japanese textbooks is derived from accounts that conflate the content of the rarely used revisionist textbook with the textbooks that are actually on the desks of almost all Japanese high school students.

 

As Duus points out in our book, the primary reason that it is difficult to fashion the same kind of triumphalist narrative in Japan is simple—“Japan lost the war.”(*6) Almost as important is the lack, as demonstrated by the varying contents of Japanese textbooks, of a postwar consensus on how to interpret the war in Japan. The battle to shape the memory of the war is an ongoing one in Japan—in contrast to China, Korea, and the United States, where the grounds of contention about the past are much narrower. In Japan, there are still vigorous attempts to refute the view, held by a majority of Japanese, that the nation waged a war of aggression in Asia and the Pacific. Still, the dominant narrative in Japan is not of a war of liberation fought against Western imperialism but of a disastrous militarist adventure that should never be repeated.

 

The low-key treatment of the war in Japanese textbooks reflects the enduring legacy of that post-war pacifism. “While the war may have ended China’s century of humiliation and America’s isolationism,” Duus writes, “it also ended the Japanese illusion that national pride can be based only on military power.”

 

Reconciling Different Historical Views

 

The divergent nature of the accounts of the wartime period reflected in high school history textbooks helps us understand why it is so difficult to reach a common understanding of wartime history among the main combatants. That has frustrated the efforts of bilateral commissions formed by China and Japan and by South Korea and Japan to emulate the success of Germany and France in creating common textbooks. But the commissions do have some value in narrowing issues of contention and creating awareness of the parallel historical perceptions of others.

 

A barrier to reconciliation lies, in the view of the scholars of Shorenstein APARC, in the existence of conflicting historical memories of the war. But the path to reconciliation also lies through recognizing the divided nature of historical memory. “Understanding how each nation has created its own memory and identity is an important first step,” Professor Shin argues.(*7) By putting Japan in a comparative context, the Divided Memories project hopes to further the mutual understanding that can form the basis for enduring reconciliation.(*8)

 

 

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NassimNicholasTaleb‏

 

"Intellectual elite"= people selected ability to get:

1 statics, not dynamics

2 actions, not interactions

3 low, not high dimensionality.

 

지적 엘리트들은 통계자료를 과신하고, 근시안적인 행동에 나서고, 저차원의 세계에 빠져 있는 멍청이들이다.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

예수는 도덕을 현시하는 바리세인들을 누구보다 증오했다.

 

NassimNicholasTaleb 님이 리트윗했습니다

 

Tyler Hogge 🎯‏ @thogge

 

@nntaleb 님에게 보내는 답글

 

Very good. as you elude to, nothing angered Jesus more than virtue-signaling empty-sepulcher Pharisees. saved his toughest rebukes for them

 

----------------------------------------

 

 미국과 중국은 투키디데스의 함정을 피할 수 있을까?

 

EDITOR'S CHOICE | 14.04.2017

 

How America and China Could Stumble to War

 

Can Beijing and Washington escape the Thucydides Trap?

 

Graham ALLISON

 

Would a Chinese leader barely in control of his own country after a long civil war dare attack a superpower that had crushed Japan to end World War II five years earlier by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? As American troops pushed North Korean forces toward the Chinese border in 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur could not imagine so. But Mao Zedong did. MacArthur was dumbstruck. Chinese forces rapidly beat American troops back to the line that had divided North and South Korea when the war began. That thirty-eighth parallel continues to mark the border between the two Koreas today. By the time the war ended, nearly three million had perished, including thirty-six thousand American troops.

 

Similarly, in 1969, Soviet leaders could not imagine that China would react to a minor border dispute by launching a preemptive strike against a power with overwhelming nuclear superiority. But that is precisely what Mao did when he started the Sino-Soviet border war. The gambit showed the world China’s doctrine of “active defense.” Mao sent an unmistakable message: China would never be intimidated, not even by adversaries that could wipe it off the map.

 

 

In the years ahead, could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in Taiwan or jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live spark a war between China and the United States that neither wants? It may seem hard to imagine—the consequences would be so obviously disproportionate to any gains either side could hope to achieve. Even a non-nuclear war conducted mostly at sea and in the air could kill thousands of combatants on both sides. Moreover, the economic impact of such a war would be massive. A 2016 RAND study found that, after just one year, American GDP could decline by up to 10 percent and Chinese GDP by as much as 35 percent—setbacks on par with the Great Depression. And if a war did go nuclear, both nations would be utterly destroyed. Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let that happen.

 

Unwise or undesirable, however, does not mean impossible. Wars occur even when leaders are determined to avoid them. Events or actions of others narrow their options, forcing them to make choices that risk war rather than acquiesce to unacceptable alternatives. Athens did not want war with Sparta. Kaiser Wilhelm did not seek war with Britain. Mao initially opposed Kim Il-sung’s attack on South Korea in 1950 for fear of blowback. But events often require leaders to choose between bad and worse risks. And once the military machines are in motion, misunderstandings, miscalculations and entanglements can escalate to a conflict far beyond anyone’s original intent.

 

To better understand these dangers, Washington and Beijing have developed scenarios, simulations and war games. These often begin with an unexpected incident or accident. Individuals assigned to play the hand of China or the United States take it from there. Participants in these exercises are repeatedly surprised to find how often and easily small sparks lead to large wars. Today, there are at least three plausible paths to war between the world’s two greatest powers.

 

In war scenarios, analysts use basic concepts made familiar by the U.S. Forest Service. Arsonists cause only a small fraction of fires. Discarded cigarettes, smoldering campfires, industrial accidents and bolts of lightning are much more common sources. Fortunately, in the forest as well as in relations among nations, most sparks do not ignite a blaze.

 

Background conditions often determine which sparks become fires. While Smokey the Bear’s warning that “only you can prevent forest fires” teaches campers and hikers about sparks, the Forest Service posts additional warnings after long dry spells or periods of extreme heat, occasionally closing high-risk areas. Moreover, it regulates the storage of flammable chemicals, propane tanks and gas depots, becoming increasingly stringent as conditions worsen.

 

In relations between China and the United States today, relevant background conditions include geography, culture and history. “History,” Henry Kissinger observed in his first book, “is the memory of states.” China’s memory is longer than most, with the century of humiliation forming a core part of the country’s identity. Recent military engagements are also part of each state’s living memory. The Korean War and Sino-Soviet border conflict taught Chinese strategists not to back down from more powerful adversaries. Moreover, both the American and Chinese militaries acknowledge that the United States has lost, or at least failed to win, four of the five major wars it has entered since World War II.

 

The most pertinent background conditions, however, are Thucydides’s Trap and the syndromes of rising and ruling powers that China and the United States display in full. Thucydides’s Trap is the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hundred years, a major rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power sixteen times. In twelve of those, the result was war.

 

The rising power syndrome highlights the upstart’s enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to recognition and respect. The ruling power syndrome is essentially the mirror image: the established power exhibiting an enlarged sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of “decline.” As in sibling rivalries, so too in diplomacy one finds a predictable progression reflected both at the dinner table and at the international conference table. A growing sense of self-importance (“my voice counts”) leads to an expectation of recognition and respect (“listen to what I have to say”) and a demand for increased impact (“I insist”). Understandably, the established power views the rising country’s assertiveness as disrespectful, ungrateful and even provocative or dangerous. Exaggerated self-importance becomes hubris; unreasonable fear, paranoia.

 

Like gasoline to a match, accelerants can turn an accidental collision or third-party provocation into war. One cluster of accelerants is captured by what Carl von Clausewitz called the “fog of war.” Extending Thucydides’s insight about war as “an affair of chances,” Clausewitz observed that “war is the realm of uncertainty. Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” This profound uncertainty can lead a commander or policymaker to act aggressively when a fuller set of facts would advise caution, and vice versa.

 

The advent of disruptive weapons that promise “shock and awe” makes the fog and uncertainty even worse. With attacks on command-and-control systems, enemies can paralyze a nation’s military command. In Desert Storm, U.S. forces demonstrated version 1.0 of this option. They destroyed Saddam Hussein’s intelligence and cut communication links to his commanders in the field. Isolated, his forces hunkered down; it was like “shooting fish in a barrel,” U.S. pilots remarked.

 

Antisatellite weapons are one accelerant that military planners expect to play a big role in any U.S.-China conflict. Long a subject of science fiction, such weapons are today a fact of life, running the gamut from kinetic ones that physically destroy their targets to quieter systems that use lasers to jam or “dazzle” satellites, rendering them inoperable. In 2007, China successfully destroyed a weather satellite, and it regularly tests its antisatellite capabilities in less dramatic fashion. Satellites provide a crucial link in almost every U.S. military endeavor, from early warning of ballistic-missile launches and providing imagery and weather forecasts to planning operations. Global positioning satellites put the “precision” in almost all the military’s precision-guided munitions and allow ships, planes and ground units to know where they are on the battlefield. The United States depends on this technology more than any of its competitors, making it a perfect target for Chinese military planners.

 

Cyberspace provides even more opportunities for disruptive technological transformations that could provide a decisive advantage, on the one hand, but might also risk uncontrolled escalation, on the other. The details of offensive cyberweapons remain heavily classified and are constantly evolving. But the public has seen glimpses of them in some cases, such as America’s cyberattack against Iran’s nuclear program or its “left-of-launch” attacks on North Korea’s missile tests. America’s primary cyberspace organizations, the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, as well as their Chinese counterparts, can now use cyberweapons to silently shut down military networks and critical civilian infrastructure like power grids. Moreover, by employing proxies and assembling an international web of compromised computers, they can disguise the origins of a cyber-operation, slowing the victim’s ability to identify the attacker.

 

Like antisatellite measures, cyberweapons could create a decisive advantage in battle by disrupting the command-and-control and targeting information on which modern militaries depend—and without bloodshed. This presents a dangerous paradox: the very action that attackers believe will tamp down conflict can appear reckless and provocative to the victims. Similarly, cyberattacks that disrupt communication would intensify the fog of war, creating confusion that multiplies the chances of miscalculation.

 

While both the United States and China now have nuclear arsenals that could survive the other’s first strike and still allow for retaliation, neither can be sure its cyber arsenals could withstand a serious cyber assault. For example, a large-scale Chinese cyberattack against the U.S. military’s networks could temporarily cripple Washington’s ability to respond in kind, or even to operate some of its critical command-and-control and surveillance systems. This creates a dangerous use-it-or-lose-it dynamic in which each side has an incentive to attack key links in the other’s computer networks before their capabilities are disabled.

 

Compared with the bluntest instruments of war, especially nuclear bombs, cyberweapons seem to offer the promise of subtlety and precision. But this promise is illusory. Increased connectivity among systems and devices creates a domino effect. Unable to determine how the hacking of one system may affect others, attackers would find it difficult to narrowly tailor the effects of their operation and avoid unintended escalation. In 2016, 180,000 Internet-connected industrial control systems were operating around the world. Along with the proliferation of the “Internet of Things,” which encompasses some ten billion devices worldwide, the number of enticing targets is growing rapidly.

 

Another accelerant might involve compromising the confidentiality of sensitive networks. Some are obvious, such as those that operate nuclear command and control. Each side, however, may perceive other actions quite differently. Take China’s “Great Firewall,” a collection of hardware and software that enables Beijing to monitor and block vast segments of online content. Washington could disable a system essential to the Great Firewall, intending it as a modest, private warning. But for Chinese leaders who regard the ability to control citizens’ access to information as vital, the operation could be misconstrued as the tip of a spear aimed at regime change.

 

Given these background conditions, potential sparks can be frighteningly mundane. Escalation can occur rapidly. The following three scenarios show just how easily the United States and China can stumble into a war that each side hopes to avoid.

 

Currently, American and allied warships and aircraft are operating in greater proximity to their Chinese counterparts than ever before. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers periodically conduct freedom-of-navigation operations near Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

 

Suppose that during routine operations an American destroyer passes near Mischief Reef, one of the newly constructed islands where China has built runways for aircraft and installed air and missile defenses. As the ship nears the contested site, Chinese coast guard vessels harass the destroyer, just as they did during the USS Cowpens incident in 2013. Unlike that encounter, however, the U.S. destroyer is unable to swerve in time. It collides with a Chinese ship and sinks it, killing all on board.

 

The Chinese government now has three options. The dovish course would be to avoid escalation by allowing the American destroyer to leave the area and to protest its actions through diplomatic channels. At the other end of the spectrum, it could adopt an eye-for-an-eye approach and sink the destroyer using aircraft or missiles stationed on Mischief Reef. By refusing to be the “chicken,” while also not wanting to escalate, Beijing could opt for what it believes is a middle course. As the U.S. destroyer attempts to leave the area, a PLA Navy cruiser blocks its way, insisting that the destroyer entered Chinese territorial waters and demanding that its crew surrender and face justice for the deaths of the coast-guard personnel.

 

China believes it is deescalating the situation by allowing for a diplomatic solution, akin to the deal that permitted an American crew to go free after a crash landing near Hainan Island sixteen years ago. The background conditions have changed since that incident. From a U.S. perspective, China’s reckless harassment of the destroyer caused the collision in the first place. China’s attempt to arrest American sailors in international waters would undermine the principles of the law of the sea. Surrendering would have far-reaching repercussions: if the U.S. military will not stand up to China to defend operations conducted by its own navy, what message does that send to America’s allies, including Japan and the Philippines?

 

Not willing to undermine its credibility by surrendering, the destroyer could simply sink the Chinese cruiser blocking its path. Alternatively, to avoid further bloodshed and to show a degree of sensitivity to the nationalistic pressures Chinese leaders face at home, the United States could use a show of force to get the cruiser to back down peacefully. U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, in consultation with leaders in Washington, could order nearby aircraft to fly to the area, send an aircraft carrier stationed in Japan toward the South China Sea, and forward-deploy B-2 bombers to Guam. American officials believe these actions will signal their seriousness without risking any further escalation.

 

Events look different to Beijing, especially amid the fog of war. As China sees it, the United States has already sunk a Chinese vessel. Now scores of American aircraft are aloft, threatening attacks on the Chinese cruiser, other naval vessels, or military installations on nearby islands. Mindful of public opinion, Chinese leaders are especially conscious that any further bloodshed inflicted by the United States would force them to retaliate aggressively.

 

But events are running beyond Beijing’s control. As U.S. fighter jets rush to the scene to assist the stranded destroyer, a Chinese antiaircraft battery panics and fires on the oncoming aircraft. The U.S. aircraft take desperate evasive action, and the destroyer begins firing on Chinese antiaircraft sites on the island. Under attack, the Chinese commander on the island bombards the destroyer with antiship missiles. The missiles hit their intended target, killing hundreds of American sailors and sinking the ship. Those who escape are now stranded in small lifeboats.

 

Chinese leaders are desperate to avoid a full-scale war with the United States, but also cannot admit that their chain of command broke down. They claim their actions were a proportionate and defensive response because the American destroyer was the aggressor. Officials in Washington are stunned that China has sunk a $3 billion vessel and killed hundreds of American sailors. Though wary of going to war with China, those in the Situation Room cannot back down: video of the ship’s wreckage and stranded U.S. sailors on cable news and social media has made that impossible. Many in Congress are calling on the administration to authorize war plans based on the doctrine formerly named Air-Sea Battle, which calls for massive air strikes against missile and radar systems on the Chinese mainland. Realizing that attacks on China’s mainland would trigger war, the president authorizes Pacific Command to instead destroy China’s military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea. The president reasons that this is a proportionate response, since these islands were directly responsible for the sinking of the destroyer. Furthermore, eliminating these military bases will allow U.S. ships to rescue the sailors stranded nearby. Most important, such an action would target only China’s artificial islands, leaving its mainland untouched.

 

President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials do not make this distinction. For years they have told the public that China has undisputed sovereignty over these islands. They are an integral part of China proper, and America has just attacked them. (Americans who scoff should recall that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor struck neither the mainland nor even a U.S. state, yet still rallied a nation to war.) Many in China are demanding that Xi order the PLA to destroy U.S. military bases in Guam, Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. Some want China to attack the United States itself. No one is calling for China to exercise restraint. As millions of its citizens’ social-media postings are reminding the government, after its century of humiliation at the hands of sovereign powers, the ruling Communist Party has promised: “never again.”

 

Still, President Xi clings to the hope that war can be avoided, an impossibility if China begins attacking U.S. military bases in Guam or Japan, killing soldiers and civilians and triggering retaliatory attacks on the Chinese mainland. Seeking a proportionate response to the U.S. attack on China’s island bases, Xi instead approves an alternative plan: using lasers, electronic and kinetic weapons to destroy or disable all U.S. military satellites in orbit above the crisis area, and using cyberattacks to cripple American command-and-control systems throughout the Asia-Pacific. The goal is to deescalate: Xi hopes that the United States will be shocked into backing down.

 

But from the American perspective, these “blinding” attacks are indistinguishable from the first stage of a coordinated attack on the U.S. aircraft carrier and its strike group sailing from Japan—an event for which the PLA has spent decades developing its “carrier-killer” antiship ballistic missiles. The ninety-thousand-ton carrier, a floating city of 5,500 sailors that the United States describes as sovereign American territory, is simply too big to lose. The president is not willing to take the risk. On the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president reluctantly approves the only plan ready on short notice that has a chance of saving the carrier: a war plan based on Air-Sea Battle.

 

Using those assets still operational after the Chinese attack, the United States military begins destroying China’s “kill chains,” the various satellite and surveillance systems that allow Beijing to accurately target American carriers with its antiship missiles. It also launches massive cruise missile and stealth bomber attacks on PLA missile sites and air bases on the Chinese mainland, which could at any moment be used to sink U.S. vessels anywhere within the first island chain.

 

The attacks provoke exactly what they intended to avoid. Its mainland now under attack, and the targeting systems needed to operate China’s antiship weapons about to be lost, China must use them or lose them. Xi authorizes attacks on all U.S. warships within range, including the carrier group. American aircraft and naval escorts intercept Chinese bombers and fighter jets flying to the carrier, but a swarm of DF-21D ballistic missiles—the so-called carrier killers—prove too much to handle. Enough reach their target to sink the carrier, killing most of the 5,500 sailors on board—far more than died during Pearl Harbor. The dynamics of playing chicken with cyber and space weapons over the South China Sea has transformed a tiny spark into a roaring fire.

 

If Taiwan were an independent nation, it would be among the most successful countries in the world. Its hardworking population of twenty-three million has developed a market economy twice the size of the Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam. Although many in Taiwan want independence, China views it as a province. Beijing is prepared to do whatever it takes to keep Taipei from asserting its sovereignty. No other country has been prepared to fight China over the matter.

 

Suppose, however, that the Chinese government were to substantially increase repression at home, including in Hong Kong, where China promised to maintain considerable autonomy and freedom when Britain returned control of the city in 1997. Enraged that the Chinese government is backtracking on its promises, residents of Hong Kong take to the streets to demand that Beijing uphold its commitment to “One Country, Two Systems.” As the protests drag on for weeks with no resolution in sight, Xi orders the military to do what it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989: crush the protests.

 

The ensuing violence shocks the Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. Pro-independence and anti-Beijing sentiment soars. In this atmosphere, the Taiwanese president is emboldened to ramp up rhetoric emphasizing her people’s hard-won rights and democracy. Her political allies go further, insisting that what has occurred in Hong Kong proves that Taiwan can never guarantee its citizens’ freedom without becoming a sovereign, independent country. To signal disapproval of Chinese regression in Hong Kong, the American president pointedly announces his respect for the Taiwanese president’s strong stance and declares that the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act fully commits the United States to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion.

 

This is a major break from the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the issue, and the Taiwanese president interprets it as tacit endorsement of a move toward independence. In an interview with the New York Times, she announces that Taiwan will apply for full membership to the UN (a move that China has long opposed) and rejects the so-called 1992 Consensus, under which both parties had agreed to the One-China concept while allowing for differing interpretations of what it actually meant. To punish Taiwan’s insubordination and scare it into backing down, China conducts an enhanced version of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis by barraging Taiwanese waters with “tests” of ballistic and cruise missiles, severely interrupting the commercial shipping that constitutes the island’s lifeline to the world. When Taipei still refuses to withdraw its membership application, China uses other weapons, including mine-laying drones, to further disrupt shipping into and out of Taiwan.

 

As a small island nation, Taiwan imports 70 percent of its food and most of its natural resources, including energy. A sustained blockade would grind its economy to a halt and cause large-scale food shortages. Despite opposition to Taiwan’s application to join the United Nations, the United States feels obliged to prevent its strangulation. Many pro-Taiwan members of Congress are demanding that the White House send aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s aid, just as Bill Clinton did during the 1995–96 crisis. But the administration knows that China’s antiship ballistic missiles would now pose a serious threat to any U.S. carriers moving into the area, and the American public has little stomach for another war.

 

Instead, U.S. Pacific Command offers to escort commercial shipping through the affected seas, a gesture of support but not of willingness to fight. The escort campaign puts U.S. warships at risk of being sunk by the Chinese missile barrage, either deliberately or accidentally—an event that could instantly kill more than one thousand Americans and spark calls for retaliation. In this scenario, a Chinese antiship missile—ostensibly fired as part of ongoing test barrages—sinks the USS John P. Murtha, an amphibious transport dock ship acting as an escort to civilian shipping. All of the nearly eight hundred sailors and marines aboard are killed—more than the United States lost in the first year of the Iraq War.

 

China insists that the sinking was accidental; the Murtha merely got in the way of a missile fired at a random patch of ocean. It reminds Washington that America accidently bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999. But in Washington, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs urge the president not to be deceived by this explanation. Instead they urge him to authorize the Air-Sea Battle plan to strike PLA antiship missile-launch sites on the mainland.

 

Confronted with the sinking of the Murtha, the president accedes to pressure from military and political advisers, and agrees to preemptively strike antiship and other ballistic-missile systems on the Chinese mainland. Because China’s conventional and nuclear missiles are kept in the same locations, and their command-and-control systems are intertwined, Beijing mistakenly believes the United States is trying to eliminate its nuclear arsenal in a surprise first strike. In a desperate attempt to “deescalate by escalating”—an Orwellian doctrine that is nevertheless a pillar of Russian military strategy—China fires one of its land-based, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles into an empty tract of ocean south of Okinawa. The nuclear threshold has been crossed. And while no lives have been lost in the strike, it is but a short step from here to all-out nuclear war.

 

The spark to a Sino-American clash need not initially involve American or Chinese military forces. Instead, it might result from a confrontation with or between third-party allies. Such a scenario nearly became reality in 2010, when North Korea sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors. China supported North Korea’s denial of involvement. Seoul, meanwhile, insisted that Pyongyang be held accountable. Ultimately, the two Koreas and their allies stepped back from the brink. But with a new set of background conditions and accelerants today, it is not clear that it would be so easy to avoid war, especially if the third parties involved were less inured to the sort of slow, grinding tensions that the Korean Peninsula has endured for decades.

 

Besides South Korea, the other major U.S. ally in China’s immediate vicinity is Japan, a country with a post–World War II history of pacifism, but whose politics have become increasingly militaristic in recent years. Conservative Japanese politicians have spoken ever more stridently about revising the pacifist constitution imposed on their country by the United States. They have also been chafing against Chinese claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In a crisis involving its historical rival Beijing, any steps Tokyo takes would certainly be shaped by these memories, and by the Japanese government’s shifting attitude toward military force.

 

A likely flashpoint is the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), located near valuable fishing grounds, trade routes and potential oil reserves in the East China Sea. The United States controlled the islands after World War II, before returning them to Japan in the early 1970s. That same decade, China began claiming sovereignty over the islands. Chinese ships regularly pass through these waters, raising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo and risking a collision that could set off a chain reaction.

 

Consider a scenario that provided the story line for a recent war game designed by the RAND Corporation. A group of Japanese ultranationalists set sail for the Senkakus in small civilian watercraft. On social media, they explain that they are headed for Kuba Jima, one of the smaller islands, which they intend to claim and occupy on behalf of Japan. They land and begin building unidentified structures. Taking a page out of the Chinese playbook, they live stream their activities for the world to see. China reacts swiftly, its coast guard arriving within hours with officers who arrest the Japanese dissidents and take them back to the Chinese mainland for trial. Does Japan allow them to face justice in a Chinese court? It could. Instead, rather than lose face, Japan dispatches some of its own coast-guard vessels to intercept the ship carrying the ultranationalists and prevent them from being taken to China.

 

A pileup ensues as both the PLA Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deploy warships and fighter planes to the area. Neither side backs down. To make matters worse, some of the Japanese vessels land amphibious troops to occupy Kuba Jima, doubling down on the nationalists’ actions. A skirmish has become a military confrontation. In an urgent call, the Japanese prime minister reminds the U.S. president that Tokyo expects Washington to uphold the seven-decade-old mutual defense treaty, noting that senior officials have repeatedly confirmed that America’s commitment applies to the Senkakus.

 

As the standoff enters its third day, the president and his National Security Council must decide: Does the United States wholeheartedly respond to Japan’s appeal, putting air power over the disputed island to protect the Japanese troops now on the ground there? Or is there a more restrained course that will satisfy the Japanese without antagonizing China and further escalating the tense naval standoff? The president opts for the latter, directing the Japan-based carrier strike group to patrol outside the range of the PLA’s land-based carrier-killer missiles, but keeping aircraft and submarines close enough to aid Japanese vessels and territory if things get ugly.

 

They do. The next morning, a Chinese destroyer collides with a Japanese fishing boat in the crowded waters off the Senkakus, and soon fighter jets from both sides are provocatively buzzing their opponent’s warships. The standoff erupts into a brief, bloody naval battle as a Japanese captain, fearing for his ship’s safety, downs one of the low-flying Chinese fighters, and the PLA Navy warships, in return, sink his vessel.

 

Both sides are at the edge of war at this point, and so is the United States, which is in a position to sink Chinese vessels with its hidden attack submarines or to send its carrier’s air wing into action. At this juncture, however, before the next decision has been made, something unexpected happens. All communications between Japanese forces on and around the Senkakus and their headquarters go dark.

 

A cyberattack has severely disrupted one of the Japanese military’s command-and-control systems. The United States and Japan immediately blame China. The attacker has even left the telltale signs of the PLA’s offensive hacking unit. There is little hesitation in Washington or at U.S. Pacific Command about what to do next. To prevent the Japanese naval force from being annihilated while it is incommunicado, U.S. submarines sink three PLA Navy warships off the Senkakus with torpedoes. China, Japan and the United States have now fired their opening shots in a three-nation war.

 

But what if it was not the PLA that launched the cyberattack after all? What if it was a carefully timed false-flag operation by Russia, seeking to draw the United States and China into a conflict in order to distract Washington from its wrestling match with Moscow over Ukraine? By the time intelligence agencies around the world learn the truth, it will be too late. The Kremlin has played its hand brilliantly.

 

From the Senkakus, the war zone spreads as China attacks more Japanese vessels elsewhere in the East China Sea. Tokyo is desperate for the United States to commit its carrier strike group to the fight. If Washington makes that call, the same point of no return may well be crossed as in the collision-at-sea scenario: the destruction of one of the crown jewels of the U.S. Navy and the loss of life of all aboard could be the tragedy that the U.S. administration is forced to avenge with widening attacks on Chinese forces in a full-scale Pacific war.

 

War between the United States and China is not inevitable, but it is certainly possible. Indeed, as these scenarios illustrate, the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict. That outcome is not preordained: out of the sixteen cases of Thucydides’s Trap over the last five hundred years, war was averted four times. But avoiding war will require statecraft as subtle as that of the British in dealing with a rising America a century ago, or the wise men that crafted a Cold War strategy to meet the Soviet Union’s surge without bombs or bullets. Whether Chinese and American leaders can rise to this challenge is an open question. What is certain is that the fate of the world rests upon the answer.